Re Simpson and National Disability Insurance Agency

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Simpson and National Disability Insurance Agency [2018] AATA 1326 (22 May 2018)

Division:NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME DIVISION

File Number(s):      2018/0455

Re:Lyn Simpson

APPLICANT

AndNational Disability Insurance Agency

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President Gary Humphries

Date:22 May 2018

Place:Canberra

The Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the application lodged on 31 January 2018.

........................................................................

Deputy President Gary Humphries

Catchwords

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – whether there has been an internal review decision – application to review by telephone – whether the National Disability Insurance Agency met its requirement to review the access decision as soon as reasonably practicable – whether telephone call constitutes a decision or evidence of a decision – operation of s 25(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 – Tribunal has jurisdiction.

Legislation

National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 ss 18, 20, 21, 24, 24, 99, 100, 103
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 25

Cases

FJKH and NDIA [2018] AATA 1294
ZKTN and National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] AATA 744

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President Gary Humphries

22 May 2018

BACKGROUND

  1. Mrs Lyn Simpson, the Applicant in these proceedings, made an application to become a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). Her application was rejected in January 2017, and a request was then made on her behalf to review this decision. In a phone call in January 2018 the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) advised Mrs Simpson’s representative that it could not consider her application for review any further as it had been made out of time. Mrs Simpson then lodged an application for merits review with the Tribunal.

  2. The issue before the Tribunal in this interlocutory proceeding is whether it has jurisdiction to consider Mrs Simpson’s application for merits review. The answer to that question turns on whether the NDIA has made a decision pursuant to s 100(6) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (the Act). The Tribunal may only review a decision which has been made pursuant to that subsection. For the reasons given below, I consider that the NDIA has made such a decision under s 100(6), and the Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction to consider Mrs Simpson’s application.

    RELEVANT LEGISLATION

  3. Section 18 of the Act permits a person to request to become a participant in the NDIS. Section 20 requires the CEO of the NDIA to decide within 21 days of receiving this request to make a decision on it, or seek more information. Section 21 sets out the access criteria an applicant must meet to become a participant. These include the requirement to meet either the disability requirements[1] in s 24 or the early intervention requirements in s 25.

    [1] In this decision, italicised text is generally used to indicate direct quotations.

  4. Section 99 states:

    Reviewable decisions

    Each of the following decisions of the CEO is a reviewable decision:

    (a)a decision under paragraph 20(a), subsection 21(3) or paragraph 26(2)(c) that a person does not meet the…

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Details
Case
[2018] AATA 1326
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for review of a decision made by the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA). The applicant, Mrs Simpson, sought to challenge an earlier decision of the NDIA that refused her access to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). The central dispute revolved around whether the AAT had jurisdiction to hear the application, which depended on whether an internal review decision had been made by the NDIA as required by the relevant legislation.

The primary legal issue before Deputy President Gary Humphries was whether an internal review decision under section 100(6) of the relevant Act had been made by the NDIA. This was crucial because the AAT's jurisdiction to review certain NDIA decisions, as stipulated by section 103 of the Act, is contingent upon a prior internal review decision. The Tribunal was required to determine if a telephone call made by the NDIA to Mrs Simpson's representative constituted such a decision, or at least evidence of one, and whether the NDIA had fulfilled its obligation to conduct the review as soon as reasonably practicable.

The Tribunal reasoned that an internal review decision could be established on at least two alternative bases. Firstly, the initial access decision of 11 January 2017, which refused Mrs Simpson NDIS participant status, was a reviewable decision under section 99. Mrs Simpson's request for review, lodged by her representative on 11 April 2017, was within the three-month time limit prescribed by section 100(2). The NDIA was then obliged under section 100(6) to review this decision as soon as reasonably practicable. The Tribunal found that a telephone call on 4 January 2018 to Mrs Simpson's representative, which communicated that her request for review was unsuccessful, was the most appropriate construction of an internal review decision. The Tribunal emphasised that the substance, rather than the form, of the communication determined its character, and the call clearly indicated the finality of her review request, even if based on a mistaken assumption about the timeliness of the request. The Tribunal also noted that there was no statutory requirement for such a decision to be in writing.

The Tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the NDIA's decision. The telephone call on 4 January 2018 was considered to be an internal review decision, or at least evidence of one, satisfying the jurisdictional prerequisite under section 103 of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

According to the terms of s 103 of the Act, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review certain decisions of the NDIA only if there has first been an internal review decision pursuant to s 100(6) of the Act. In this case, the Tribunal considers that there are two, alternate bases on which it can be said that an internal review decision under s 100(6) has been made.Phone call of 4 January 2018 is an internal review decision The access decision of 11 January 2017 refusing Mrs Simpson the status of a participant in the NDIS was a decision falling within the definition of a reviewable decision in s 99 – specifically under paragraph (a): a decision under paragraph 20(a), subsection 21(3) or paragraph 26(2)(c) that a person does not meet the access criteria… Mrs Simpson was aggrieved by this rejection and lodged an application to have it reviewed. It is not material that this was not done by her personally but by her representative at Alzheimer’s Australia ACT, nor that it was done by telephone rather than in writing: see s 100(3). The access decision was made on 11 January 2017 and Mrs Simpson’s request to have it reviewed was made on 11 April 2017; the latter therefore meets the requirement of s 100(2) that the request for review be made within three months after receiving the access decision. By the terms of s 100 the NDIA was then required to cause the access decision to be reviewed and to make a decision to either confirm, vary or set it aside. The section requires that it do so as soon as reasonably practicable: subsection (6). It cannot be said to be abundantly clear that the NDIA met its requirement to review the access decision, much less that it did so as soon as reasonably practicable. Nonetheless, I consider that the most appropriate construction that can be placed on the telephone call to Alzheimer’s Australia ACT on 4 January 2018 was that the NDIA affirmed its decision to refuse Mrs Simpson access. One may reasonably view the telephone call itself as the decision; it was, at the very least, evidence that the decision had been made. The content of the call dealt with finality with her request for review, even though – as summarised very briefly in the agency’s internal note – it appeared to be saying that it could not consider that request for review because it was out of time. Of course, the request for review was not out of time, but whatever the assumptions underpinning the decision communicated to Mrs Simpson’s representative, the import of that decision was clear: her request for review of the access decision was unsuccessful. It is the substance, and not the form, of the decision which characterises it: see ZKTN and National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] AATA 744 at [23]-[25]. There is no requirement in the Act for a decision confirming a reviewable decision under s 100(6) to be in writing. There is, however, the requirement in s 100(5) for the person confirming the reviewable decision (the reviewer) to be a person to whom the CEO’s powers and functions under that section have been delegated and who was not involved in making the reviewable decision. There was no explicit evidence before the Tribunal on this question, though I infer from the agency’s submission that it considered that the reviewer in this case did meet the requirements of subsection (5).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 31 January 2018, Mrs Simpson lodged an application for review of decision with the Tribunal, referring to a decision dated 4 December 2017. NDIA’s records do not indicate that it made any decisions in respect of Mrs Simpson on 4 December 2017. CONSIDERATION According to the terms of s 103 of the Act, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review certain decisions of the NDIA only if there has first been an internal review decision pursuant to s 100(6) of the Act. In this case, the Tribunal considers that there are two, alternate bases on which it can be said that an internal review decision under s 100(6) has been made.Phone call of 4 January 2018 is an internal review decision The access decision of 11 January 2017 refusing Mrs Simpson the status of a participant in the NDIS was a decision falling within the definition of a reviewable decision in s 99 – specifically under paragraph (a): a decision under paragraph 20(a), subsection 21(3) or paragraph 26(2)(c) that a person does not meet the access criteria… Mrs Simpson was aggrieved by this rejection and lodged an application to have it reviewed. It is not material that this was not done by her personally but by her representative at Alzheimer’s Australia ACT, nor that it was done by telephone rather than in writing: see s 100(3). The access decision was made on 11 January 2017 and Mrs Simpson’s request to have it reviewed was made on 11 April 2017; the latter therefore meets the requirement of s 100(2) that the request for review be made within three months after receiving the access decision. By the terms of s 100 the NDIA was then required to cause the access decision to be reviewed and to make a decision to either confirm, vary or set it aside. The section requires that it do so as soon as reasonably practicable: subsection (6). It cannot be said to be abundantly clear that the NDIA met its requirement to review the access decision, much less that it did so as soon as reasonably practicable. Nonetheless, I consider that the most appropriate construction that can be placed on the telephone call to Alzheimer’s Australia ACT on 4 January 2018 was that the NDIA affirmed its decision to refuse Mrs Simpson access. One may reasonably view the telephone call itself as the decision; it was, at the very least, evidence that the decision had been made. The content of the call dealt with finality with her request for review, even though – as summarised very briefly in the agency’s internal note – it appeared to be saying that it could not consider that request for review because it was out of time. Of course, the request for review was not out of time, but whatever the assumptions underpinning the decision communicated to Mrs Simpson’s representative, the import of that decision was clear: her request for review of the access decision was unsuccessful. It is the substance, and not the form, of the decision which characterises it: see ZKTN and National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] AATA 744 at [23]-[25].