Decision
Reasons for decision
According to a personal safety survey published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, one in six Australian women experienced violence in their domestic relationship in 2021-22.[30] Women dominated the statistics of intimate partner homicide victims.[31] These figures are a 20-30% increase on previous years.[32] [30] [32] >Between July 2022 and June 2023, 34 women were killed by their intimate partner.[33] It is trite to observe that homicide is the most extreme example of DFV in a range of other violent or abusive behaviours.[33] type="1">The statistics on homicide do not reflect the increasingly apparent presence of physical and emotional abuse and coercive control that exist in domestic relationships in the broader community. Much of the data on those matters still remains cloaked by a lack of reporting by victims who have not reached a point of engaging with police, the courts or other support services. The real rate of the broader types of DFV at any given time may never be able to be accurately ascertained. Between July 2023 and May 2024 there were in excess of 25,000 applications made in the Magistrates Courts in Queensland for Domestic Violence Orders (DVO). Of those applications, approximately 77% were made by women.[34] This equates to approximately 19250 women, in Queensland, in one year. [34] >While it is difficult to identify how many women are at risk at any given time due to DFV, these statistics give some insight into how many women (in Queensland alone) had reached a point in the last 12 months where they felt it necessary to seek the intervention of a court to protect themselves or their children from the threat of violence. The data is not clear, but the common experience with DVOs is that they are made at a point of culmination i.e., in a context of weeks, months or years of escalating DFV. It would therefore not be unreasonable to estimate that for every woman who initiated a DVO in the last 12 months, there would be at least one other who has not yet reached a point where they will seek the intervention of police or a court. The prevalence of DFV within our society is a topic that is subject to increasing awareness. Governments at all levels are now proactively developing policy and legislation to address DFV in a range of ways. The rate of DFV related fatalities would suggest there is still much work to be done. In all of these circumstances there is an obvious community interest in any measures that aid and assist the prevention of DFV. By extension, services that provide relief and shelter to those who are victims of DFV are plainly done so in the community interest, and anything that enhances those services could be regarded as being in the community interest. Notwithstanding this general conclusion, when one has regard to the statutory exemptions already available to the Applicant, the exemption proposed is a duplication rather than an enhancement of the measures available to assist the Applicant’s service delivery. Refusing to grant the proposed exemption will not detract from the services provided by the Applicant nor prevent them from providing services in the way they propose to i.e, with the employees best suited to the inherent requirements of the role. In circumstances where there are effective statutory exemptions in place, and where there is a risk (albeit slight) that the proposed exemption may result in an unjust outcome, the community interest will still be served just as effectively by the statutory exemptions. Whether any other persons or bodies other than the applicant support the applicationBoth the QCU and the QHRC opposed the exemption. Their positions in this regard are explained earlier in these reasons. No other entity notified of the application made a submission. Whether it is reasonable and appropriate to grant the exemptionFor all of the reasons already stated I do not consider it appropriate to grant the exemption.The effect of not granting the exemptionThe practical effect of not granting the exemption will be that the Applicant remains bound by the terms of the AD Act. However, while the AD Act sets out certain proscribed conduct, any question of a contravention of the AD Act is a matter for determination by inter alia this Commission, and only upon the making of a complaint and a hearing of evidence. That evidence should inevitably include matters relevant to the application of statutory exemptions in defence.While the statutory exemptions provide protection that lacks the comfort the Applicant might feel from an exemption that allows them a pre-emptive right to actively discriminate, the suite of exemptions already available should assure the Applicant that, in all likelihood, they can (if required) rely on an existing statutory exemption to allow them to selectively recruit or refuse to hire an unsuitable individual.To the extent that I have not already been clear about this, I consider that on the description of the workplace already before the Commission, an inherent requirement of any person employed by the Applicant at their shelter would be that are biologically female and further, that they are absent of objectively appreciable male traits and characteristics. While this would obviously exclude cis men, it also allows the Applicant to exercise a greater degree of discretion with respect to other applicants without having to commit them to a ‘label’ as to who they can and cannot discriminate against. Alternatively, as I have already concluded above, the nature of the business conducted by the Applicant plainly falls within the contemplation of s 104 of the AD Act. Section 104 of the AD Act even provides the example of crisis accommodation for women who are victims of DFV. The operation of s 104 is not limited to the examples it contains. In my view, restricting employment to women only at a DFV refuge for women is entirely within the contemplation of the exemption contained at s 104 of the AD Act.The Applicant’s proposed discriminatory employment practices would also be allowed pursuant to s 108 of the AD Act in my view. In the circumstances, the effect of not granting the exemption is that the Applicant will not have the benefit of a pre-emptive right to discriminate. They will instead be required to plead and prove the application of one (or all) of the statutory exemptions upon which they rely.[35] But this requirement only arises if there is a complaint of discrimination. Given the views I have expressed above, any such complaint would likely be swiftly dismissed. [35] AD Act (n 1) s 206. Further, the granting of an exemption is not a panacea to avoiding litigation. Individuals are free to make complaints regardless of the existence of a s 113 exemption, and the Applicant would still be required to respond in much the same manner as they would if they were granted the exemption by pleading the existence and effect of a previously granted exemption. The Applicant is no better or worse off for the refusal to grant the exemption. The Human Rights Act Before concluding, it is necessary to have regard to s 58 of the HR Act. There is an instinctive temptation to dismiss the need to consider the HR Act given that I have refused the application for exemption. I have therefore not disturbed the status quo. In those circumstances I have made a decision that has not affected nor is it incompatible with the human rights of any individual. But the language of s 58 of the HR Act does not discriminate as to the type of decision that provokes the obligation to consider human rights. Regard must be had to s 58 of the HR Act in every decision by a public entity. Section 58(1)(a) of the HR Act provides that it is unlawful to inter alia make a decision ‘in a way’ that is ‘not compatible with human rights’. The proscribed conduct contemplated by s 58(1)(a) of the HR Act is the way in which the decision was made (rather than the decision itself). Relevantly, s 48 of the HR Act prescribes statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights. Section 8(a) of the HR Act provides that a decision is compatible with human rights if inter alia it does not limit a human right.The Applicant does not have human rights.[36] Further, my decision to refuse the application has not deprived the Applicant’s office holders and employees of any right that they held before their application was refused. The mere act of declining an application whose purpose was to extend exemptions to discriminate has not limited any human rights of those individuals. I am satisfied that my decision is compatible with human rights. And the human rights of those sought to be excluded by the exemption remain undisturbed. [36] Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 11. But the obligations imposed on me by s 58 of the HR Act do not end there. Section 58(1)(b) of the HR Act also requires me to give ‘proper consideration’ to a human right ‘relevant to the decision’. The first step is to identify the human rights relevant to the decision, and the holders of those rights. The Applicant is not an individual and as such does not have human rights. Beyond the Applicant, there is arguably some impact on the employees and clients of the Applicant. I am not privy to the individual circumstances of each employee or client of the Applicant affected by this decision. However, s 58(5) of the HR Act only requires me to identify the human rights that ‘may’ be affected. The language invites, where necessary, a speculative or hypothetical consideration. In the absence of precise details of individuals potentially affected, I do not consider the obligations of s 58(1)(b) of the HR Act require me to embark on an investigative process to identify individuals affected in order to discharge the obligation. Both the individuals and their circumstances are likely to be diverse, especially the clients. In those circumstances I can only speculate about their human rights. Out of an abundance of caution to ensure compliance with the HR Act, I will speculate broadly. Part 2 of the HR Act delivers an extraordinarily generous suite of rights. Having regard to what I imagine would be a diverse group of individuals that likely makes up the employees and clients of the Applicant, and the multitude of reasons and circumstances that drive women and their children to flee DFV, there is hardly a right conferred in Part 2 of the HR Act that would not conceivably be impacted by the decision. As such, I have considered them all. Given the nature of my decision and its neutral impact on the status quo, I do not intend to descend into the analysis of my considerations in these reasons. Suffice to say, while the range of rights is broad, I consider the impact of my decision on those rights is less than negligible. This is best illustrated by considering the nature of the Applicant’s application. The Applicant was at liberty to apply for an exemption pursuant to s 113 of the AD Act. The nature of such an application is that, if accepted, it confers a right on the Applicant (or its officers and employees) that they otherwise did not have. Conversely, refusing the application has not deprived the Applicant (or its officers and employees) of any right, human or otherwise. Further, my decision outlines how the proposed exemption can be achieved in multiple alternative ways by reliance on the existing statutory exemptions. It leaves the Applicant and its employees and clients in entirely the same position they were always in. It follows that whatever impact my decision has on the Applicant’s employees or clients, it is not incompatible with their human rights, nor does it limit them.For completeness, to the extent my conclusions about the application of the statutory exemptions might impact on the human rights of individuals who will be excluded from employment with the Applicant, they are equally unaffected. They remain at liberty to apply for work with the Applicant and my observations about the application of the statutory exemptions are in no way a barrier. Any refusal of work to such an individual is not authorised by my decision but is, instead, a separate decision of the Applicant. Alternatively, if my decision has imposed any limitation of their rights they hold pursuant to s 15 of the HR Act, I consider such limitation is reasonable and demonstrably justified when one has regard to the statistical data regarding DFV set out earlier in these reasons.[37][37] Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 13(1).Any human rights limitation arising from my decision is important because it inter alia serves to protect vulnerable women and children from continued risk of violence and death. When balanced against the rights of affected individuals who may be deprived employment opportunities with the Applicant, there can be no contest as to which must take priority.[38] [38] Ibid s 13(2).ConclusionThe Applicant performs an important role in providing protection and refuge to vulnerable women and children. They are entirely justified in their pursuit of employment practices that exclude men or other individuals with male traits and characteristics likely to trigger trauma in clients.My concerns about the impracticality of a blanket exemption for gender identity are not a pedantic consideration of appearances. The diversity and complexity accompanying matters of gender and gender identity mean that all scenarios must be considered in order to fully appreciate the effect of a proposed exemption. And where such consideration reveals the possibility of authorising discrimination that is not justifiable, an exemption ought to be refused. In my view the interests of the Applicant, their clients, and the wider community are better served by the Applicant evaluating suitability for employment on a case by case basis. That is not to say that I have not understood the Applicant’s concerns. I am entirely in agreement with their ambitions to ensure a workplace where their clients will not be at risk of experiencing further trauma. Moreover, I consider that the Applicant can still achieve this, albeit it will require a more carefully structured recruitment process and policies. And in the event those measures still lead to a complaint of discrimination, the Applicant will have the benefit of the statutory exemptions that already afford them the protection they desire. OrderThe application for exemption is declined.