Re: RONALD GRAFTON SARINA
And: THE COUNCIL OF THE SHIRE OF WOLLONDILLY
No. G53 of 1980
Bankruptcy
32 ALR 596
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Bowen C.J.
C.A. Sweeney J.
Lockhart J.
CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - creditor's petition - whether phrase in s. 52 (2) (a) "is able to pay his debts" means "is able and willing to pay his debts" - whether phrase "it may dismiss the petition" in s. 52 (2) is mandatory or discretionary
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.) s. 52
HEARING
SYDNEY
#DATE 17:11:1980
ORDER
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
4. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the cross-appeal.
5. The sum of $2,790.00 paid into Court by the appellant be paid out of Court to the appellant
JUDGE1
This appeal raises the important question in bankruptcy whether a sequestration order may be made against the estate of a person who proves to the Court on the hearing of the petition that he is able to pay his debts. We are not aware of any previous Australian decision upon the question.
The learned primary Judge (Deane J.) heard a petition presented by the Council of the Shire of Wollondilly ("the respondent") for a sequestration order against the estate of Ronald Grafton Sarina ("the appellant").
It is common ground that the appellant is and was at all material times, capable of paying his debts. His failure to pay the judgment debt owing to the respondent is not because he lacks the necessary means. He simply refuses to pay the debt.
The learned primary Judge held that the appellant was "able to pay his debts" for the purposes of s. 52 (2) (a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") as the word "able" should be given its ordinary meaning and not the meaning "willing and able".
It was not suggested by the respondent that, in the event of such a finding, his Honour should do otherwise than dismiss the petition, and it was dismissed. His Honour ordered that the appellant pay to the respondent its costs of the proceedings up to and including 28 April 1980. It was on that day that the appellant first claimed in the proceedings that he was able to pay the debt owing to the respondent.
The other order made by the learned primary Judge relevant to this appeal was for payment out of Court to the appellant of the sum of $2,790.00 previously paid into Court by him as an earnest or pledge of the genuineness of his case in opposition to the petition. At an earlier stage of the proceedings another Judge of this Court had granted an application by the appellant for an adjournment of the petition on the condition, which he had himself suggested, that the sum of $2,790.00 was paid into Court.
The appellant appeals to this Court against the order for costs made…
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- Case
- [1980] FCA 175
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the bankruptcy petition could be dismissed on the basis that the petitioner was able to pay her debts, despite her refusal to do so. Additionally, the court had to clarify the interpretation of the phrase "it may dismiss the petition" and whether the court had a mandatory obligation to dismiss the petition if the debtor was able to pay their debts. The court also considered the implications of the statutory language on the discretion of the court in handling creditor's petitions.
The court found that the phrase "is able to pay his debts" in s. 52 (2) (a) does not require the debtor to be willing to pay, only able. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to protect debtors who are financially capable of settling their debts but choose not to. Regarding the phrase "it may dismiss the petition," the court held that this was discretionary rather than mandatory. Therefore, the court was not obligated to dismiss the petition simply because the debtor was able to pay. The court also concluded that the dismissal of the petition and appeal did not result in an abuse of process. Consequently, the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, and the costs were apportioned between the parties as outlined in the orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
4. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the cross-appeal.
5. The sum of $2,790.00 paid into Court by the appellant be paid out of Court to the appellant
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi