Re MSS Security Pty Ltd
[2010] FWA 3687
•10 MAY 2010
[2010] FWA 3687 |
|
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.185 - Application for approval of a single-enterprise agreement
MSS Security Pty Ltd
(AG2009/23849)
COMMISSIONER ASBURY | BRISBANE, 10 MAY 2010 |
MSS Security Enterprise Agreement (Qld) 2009 - 2012.
Background
[1] On 30 December 2009, MSS Security Pty Ltd (MSS) made an application under s.185 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act), for approval of the MSS Security Enterprise Agreement (Queensland) 2009-2012 (the Agreement). The application for approval of the Agreement (Form F16) states that the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (LHMU) was a bargaining representative for the Agreement. The employer declaration in support of approval of the Agreement (Form F17), executed by Ms Margaret Stinson, Human Resources Manager for MSS, states that all of the requirements under the Act necessary for approval of the Agreement have been met.
[2] On 7 January 2010, the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (LHMU) wrote to Fair Work Australia (FWA) alleging inter alia, that MSS had not complied with pre-approval procedures for an enterprise agreement as prescribed in s.180 of the Act. The LHMU subsequently advised that it wished to place evidence before FWA and make submissions in relation to these allegations. A hearing was conducted on 26 March 2010.
Evidence
[3] Evidence was given for MSS by Ms Stinson, the Human Resources Manager for MSS. Evidence was given for the LHMU by:
Mr Bradley McLeod, Security Officer employed by MSS;
Mr Jason Parker, Security Officer employed by MSS;
Mr Raymond Marshman, Security Officer employed by MSS;
Ms Melissa Warren, LHMU Organiser; and
Mr James Miller, LHMU Official.
[4] The evidence and material before FWA in these proceedings can be summarised as follows. There were proceedings in FWA in relation to the negotiation of the Agreement. On 26 November 2009, the LHMU made an application under s.240 of the Act seeking the assistance of FWA in relation to a bargaining dispute. The matter was dealt with by Senior Deputy President Richards, who on 1 December 2009 released a Statement, setting out an agreed position between MSS and the LHMU to re-commence the bargaining process (which had reached an impasse) and to manage that process in the short term. The agreed position included deferral of a request by MSS to employees to approve an agreement, which was to have been made on Friday 4 December 2009, until no sooner than Tuesday 15 December 2009 and that a new access period would start on Tuesday 8 December 2009. It was further agreed that during the period from 1 December 2009 to 7 December 2009, MSS would ensure all employees had access to any relevant documentation incorporated in the agreement, by reference.
[5] There were a number of meetings between MSS and the LHMU and on 9 December 2009 a final negotiation meeting was held. According to Ms Stinson, the LHMU was to communicate its final position by close of business on 10 December 2009, and did not do so. On 11 December 2009, Ms Stinson sent an email to Ms Warren requesting that the LHMU advise its final position. On the same date, MSS decided to send the Agreement out to be voted on by employees, on the basis that the access period would commence on 15 December 2009. Accordingly on 11 December 2009, employees of MSS were sent a package of material which included a number of documents. Ms Stinson swore an affidavit in these proceedings (Exhibit 1), and appended documents said to have been sent to employees on 11 December 2009 to that affidavit. The documents appended to Ms Stinson’s affidavit were a covering letter; a summary document purporting to outline changes that would occur by employees voting “yes” or “no”; a document entitled “Questions and Answers”; an excerpt from the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) in relation to long service leave; a copy of the proposed Agreement; a ballot paper; an envelope in which to enclose the ballot paper; and a further envelope with pre-paid postage to facilitate the return of the ballot paper to a locked bag.
[6] The covering letter (“MS4” to Exhibit 1), informed employees that the enclosed documents related to the proposed Agreement and ballot. The letter also stated that the proposed Agreement would contain references to other documentation which employees needed to consider when they were voting for the proposed Agreement. The letter went on to set out internet sites where employees could obtain a copy of the Act, the National Employment Standards (NES) and the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld). Employees were also informed that copies of these documents could be viewed at the MSS Offices or could be emailed by Ms Stinson if the employee requested this. The letter stated that if employees required assistance in interpreting the material provided and referred to that they could contact Ms Stinson and translation services could be organised. Further, the letter stated that:
“You have a 7 day access period in which to view the proposed Agreement and documents. Once this 7 day access period has passed, you are entitled to vote by posting your completed ballot form in the Reply Paid envelope provided.”
[7] The letter set out dates and times for three information sessions with the last session to be held on 18 December 2009. The version of the covering letter appended to Ms Stinson’s statement as “MS4”, is not the version that was sent to employees, and this matter was corrected at the hearing on 26 March 2010. The letter that was sent to employees on 11 December 2009 stated that votes would be counted on Wednesday 30 January 2009. A copy of the ballot paper said to have been forwarded with the package of material on 11 December 2009 was also appended to Ms Stinson’s affidavit (“MS7” Exhibit 1). The ballot paper appended to Ms Stinson’s affidavit is marked with a release date of 11 December 2009. It contains instructions which include the following:
“Return the envelope by mail to MSS Security from [insert date] onwards.”
This document is clearly not the ballot paper that was sent to employees on 11 December 2009.
[8] The versions of the covering letter and ballot paper which were actually sent to employees on 11 December 2009 were appended to statutory declarations executed by Mr Marshman and Mr McLeod in these proceedings. The letter received by Mr Marshman, appended to his statutory declaration (“RM1” Exhibit 4) is undated, and states that the counting of the vote will take place on 30 January 2009. The ballot paper received by Mr McLeod and appended to his statutory declaration (“BM1” Exhibit 2) is also marked with a release date, but the instruction on the ballot paper states:
“Return the envelope by mail to MSS security from 22nd December onwards.”
[9] Ms Stinson said that upon becoming aware of the incorrect date in the covering letter sent to employees, she distributed a revised version by email to Operations staff, Managers and Duty Inspectors, to be distributed to employees and sites. The revised letter (“MS12 Exhibit 1) states that the vote will be counted on Wednesday 30 December, 2009 and not as stated in previous communication where there was an error with the month communicated. The covering email (“MS13 Exhibit 1) is headed “Agreement vote update 16 December 2009” and states: “Hi all, Could you please distribute the attached document in relation to the vote to all sites and employees”. Ms Stinson also states that the Duty Inspectors were given copies of the revised letter containing the correct date for the vote to be counted, and were asked to distribute the letter to sites.
[10] Mr McLeod said that when he received the package of material, he presumed that MSS had made an error and that the ballot papers would be counted on 30 January 2010. On that basis, Mr McLeod assumed that he had from 22 December 2009 to 30 January 2010 to return his ballot paper. Mr McLeod did not submit his ballot paper prior to the votes being counted. Mr McLeod said that he was not aware that the ballot was to close on 30 December 2009. Mr McLeod also said that the copy of the proposed Agreement that he received was missing page 23. Mr McLeod did not receive a replacement page or another copy of the Agreement which included the page.
[11] Mr Marshman said that he received the package of material on or around 14 December and took the package of material on holiday with him to read. On reading the material Mr Marshman became aware that page 23 of the proposed Agreement provided to him was missing. Mr Marshman forwarded his ballot paper to MSS in the envelope provided for that purpose, on 17 December 2009. Mr Marshman said that he was never provided with a replacement page 23 or a complete copy of the Agreement. Mr Parker said that the copy of the Agreement he received was missing page 23 and he did not receive a full copy of the Agreement or a replacement page.
[12] Ms Stinson said in her affidavit that on 18 December 2009, she became aware that the copy of the proposed Agreement sent to employees on 11 December 2009 was missing a page – page 23. Ms Stinson “redistributed” the entire Agreement by email, and caused it to be delivered to sites by Duty Inspectors. The email forwarded by Ms Stinson stated that:
“It has been brought to our attention that page 23 is missing on some of the Enterprise Agreements that were sent out to our officers. Please find attached a full copy of this for your viewing.”
[13] Ms Stinson said that the result of the ballot was that there were 175 votes received, with a total of 87 “yes” votes and 82 “no” votes. Six votes were deemed to be invalid, comprising 2 invalid “no” votes and 4 invalid “yes” votes. These votes were considered to be invalid on the basis that 3 ballot papers were old papers from a previous ballot which had been stopped; 1 ballot paper was photocopied and not the original document sent out to employees and two papers had markings on them. According to the Employer Declaration in support of approval of the Agreement, there are a total of 394 employees to be covered by the Agreement.
Submissions
[14] It was submitted for MSS that all of the requirements of s.180 of the Act had been met. On 11 December MSS sent a copy of the proposed Agreement, and materials incorporated into it by reference, to each relevant employee by post. Upon discovering that the Agreement was missing page 23, a complete copy of the Agreement was sent electronically to each MSS worksite and to each employee for whom MSS had an email address. It was submitted that this was done on 14 December 2009, and each relevant employee then had a complete copy of the proposed Agreement allowing for a full 7 day access period. This satisfied s.180(2) of the Act. With respect to the requirements of s.180(3) of the Act, a document was posted to each relevant employee on 11 December, which incorrectly nominated the date the ballot was to be counted as 30 January 2009 instead of 30 December 2009. Upon becoming aware of this error, MSS promptly took steps to ensure that each relevant employee was notified of the correct date, by distributing information clarifying the date on which the ballot was to be counted to each of its work sites and to the email addresses of those employees for whom it held an email address. This was done on 16 December 2009, ensuring that employees had at least 7 days notice of the date the ballot was to be counted. It was also submitted that the Agreement satisfied all of the requirements set out in s.186 of the Act.
[15] In relation to the contents of the missing page 23, it was submitted that it contained part of the model flexibility clause which is a mandatory requirement under s.202 of the Act. If the Agreement had not contained such a clause, a model clause would have been inserted into the Agreement by virtue of s.202(4) of the Act.
[16] The LHMU contended that the mandatory requirements of s.180 of the Act had not been complied with. Further, the LHMU pointed to the close result of the ballot and submitted that FWA should carefully scrutinise the processes that lead to the ballot. The access period is a critical part of the pre-approval process because a number of anterior requirements rely upon defining the access period with some precision. Ms Stinson said in her affidavit that it commenced on 15 December 2009 (Exhibit 1 Paragraph 3). This date is also consistent with the statement on the ballot papers that they should be returned from 22 December 2009. Further, the Employer’s Declaration in Support of the Application (Form F17) stated that the voting opened on 22 December 2009.
[17] The LHMU also pointed to the fact that the ballot paper did not state a specific date upon which the ballot would close. Further, the missing page 23 in the proposed Agreement mailed to employees dealt with individual flexibility agreements, a significant issue. In relation to the attempts to redistribute the complete Agreement, it was submitted that Ms Stinson’s affidavit did not indicate that she had any personal knowledge that her requests to Duty Inspectors to do this were carried out, and there was no evidence that this was done or to what extent the material was distributed. The emails attached to Ms Stinson’s affidavit in this regard, were said to establish that an email was sent to some 20 employees out of a total of 394. Neither Mr McLeod nor Mr Parker received a replacement Agreement. There was insufficient evidence in Ms Stinson’s affidavit to establish that the problems were repaired.
[18] There can only be one access period and in the present case it ran from 15 to 22 December 2009. Employees did not receive a complete copy of the Agreement in the original mail out, and a number did not receive the replacement document. It cannot be said that by emailing a full copy of the Agreement to some of its Managers, MSS provided access to a copy of the Agreement to employees. An employee told that copies of documents were available in the office, was entitled to infer that this referred to copies of the same documents he or she had already received. Even if it was accepted that access to a full copy of the Agreement was provided by emailing a replacement copy and making it available in an office for viewing by employees, this did not occur until 18 December 2009. As a result, employees did not have access to the Agreement throughout the whole of the access period and the Agreement was not genuinely agreed to.
[19] The LHMU also submitted that the requirements of s.180(2), (3) and (5) are mandatory, and failure to comply with those requirements cannot be cured by an undertaking. In this regard, reference was made to a decision of Commissioner Cargill: Class Electrical Services Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia 1(Class Electrical). In that caseit was held that an undertaking could not retrospectively correct a company’s obligations under s.180(5).2
Legislative requirements for approval of an enterprise agreement
[20] The requirements for approval of an enterprise agreement are set out in sections 186 and 187 of the Act. The provisions of s.186 relevant to the issues in dispute in this matter are as follows:
Basic rule
s.186(1) If an application for approval of an enterprise agreement is made under s.185, FWA must approve the agreement under this section if the requirements set out in this section and s.187 are met.
Note: FWA may approve an enterprise agreement under this section with undertakings (see section 190)
Requirements relating to the safety net etc.
s.186(2)(a) FWA must be satisfied that:
(a) if the agreement is not a greenfields agreement – the agreement has been genuinely agreed to by the employees covered by the agreement; and
…
(d) the agreement passes the better off overall test.
Requirement for a term about settling disputes
s.186(6) FWA must be satisfied that the agreement includes a term:
(a) that provides a procedure that requires or allows FWA, or another person who is independent of the employers, employees or employee organisations covered by the agreement to settle disputes;
(i) about any matters arising under the agreement;
(ii) in relation to the National Employment Standards; and
(b) that allows for the representation of employees covered by the agreement for the purposes of that procedure.
[21] Section 188 of the Act prescribes the conditions which must be met for FWA to be satisfied that employees have genuinely agreed to an agreement, as follows:
s.188 An enterprise agreement has been genuinely agreed to by the employees covered by the agreement if FWA is satisfied that:
(a) the employer, or each of the employers covered by the agreement complied with the following provisions in relation to the agreement:
(i) subsections 180(2), (3) and (5) (which deal with pre-approval steps);
(ii) subsection 181(2) (which requires that employees not be requested to approve an enterprise agreement until 21 days after the last notice of employee representational rights is given); and
(b) the agreement was made in accordance with whichever of subsections 182(1) or (2) applies (those subsections deal with the making of different kinds of enterprise agreements by employee vote); and
(c) there are no other reasonable grounds for believing that the agreement has not been genuinely agreed to by the employees.
[22] Section 180 provides that:
180 Employees must be given a copy of a proposed enterprise agreement etc.
Pre-approval requirements
(1) Before an employer requests under subsection 181(1) that employees approve a proposed enterprise agreement by voting for the agreement, the employer must comply with the requirements set out in this section.
Employees must be given copy of the agreement etc.
(2) The employer must take all reasonable steps to ensure that:
(a) during the access period for the agreement, the employees (the relevant employees) employed at the time who will be covered by the agreement are given a copy of the following materials:
(i) the written text of the agreement;
(ii) any other material incorporated by reference in the agreement; or
(b) the relevant employees have access, throughout the access period for the agreement, to a copy of those materials.
(3) The employer must take all reasonable steps to notify the relevant employees of the following by the start of the access period for the agreement:
(a) the time and place at which the vote will occur;
(b) the voting method that will be used.
(4) The access period for a proposed enterprise agreement is the 7-day period ending immediately before the start of the voting process referred to in subsection 181(1).
Terms of the agreement must be explained to employees etc.
(5) The employer must take all reasonable steps to ensure that:
(a) the terms of the agreement, and the effect of those terms, are explained to the relevant employees; and
(b) the explanation is provided in an appropriate manner taking into account the particular circumstances and needs of the relevant employees.
(6) Without limiting paragraph (5)(b), the following are examples of the kinds of employees whose circumstances and needs are to be taken into account for the purposes of complying with that paragraph:
(a) employees from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds;
(b) young employees;
(c) employees who did not have a bargaining representative for the agreement.
Conclusions
[23] I am unable to accept, as required by s. 186(2)(a) of the Act, that the Agreement has been genuinely agreed to by employees covered by it. Pursuant to s.188(a)(i) I am not satisfied that MSS as the employer covered by the Agreement, complied with subsections 180(2), (3) and (5).
[24] Section 180(2) does not require the employer in absolute terms to give a copy of an agreement or access to a copy of the agreement to each employee. Rather, the section requires that the employer take all reasonable steps to ensure that this occurs. There is also some tension in the language used in s.180(2)(a) and (b). The provision gives an employer the option of either providing a copy of the written text of the agreement and other material incorporated by reference in the agreement, to employees during the access period, or providing access to those materials by some other means, throughout the access period. Those other means may include posting an agreement and any other material incorporated by reference in the agreement, on a notice board or making a copy available in some central location in the workplace where employees could reasonably access it.
[25] The use of the term “during” in s.180(2)(a) suggests that where an employer gives employees a copy of the written text of the agreement, this may occur while the access period is underway. This is in contrast with s.180(2)(b) where the term used is “throughout”. In my view, the use of the term “throughout” means that employees must have access to the material for the whole of the access period, and not at some point during the access period. It is logical that an employee with his or her own copy of the written text of an agreement may not require a full 7 days to read that document, while an employee who has to take steps to access an agreement on a notice board or at some other location, may require a 7 day period to do so.
[26] In the present case, it is not necessary to determine the point, because I am not satisfied that MSS took all reasonable steps to give employees a copy of the agreement or to provide them with access to it. In the first instance, MSS opted to fulfil the requirements of s.180(2) by the method provided for in subclause (a) – giving a copy of the written text of the Agreement and material incorporated by reference in the Agreement, to employees. In doing so, MSS did not fulfil the requirements of s.180(2)(a) of the Act. The document that was mailed to employees was incomplete. It is not to the point that the missing portion was a mandatory term that would have been taken to be a term of the Agreement even it had been omitted. The point of the access period and the steps that must be taken during that period is to ensure that before employees vote for an agreement, they have an opportunity to consider the agreement and the effect of its terms. I am not prepared to accept that for this purpose, anything less than a complete agreement can be provided to employees.
[27] I do not accept that the electronic redistribution of the Agreement by Ms Stinson rectified this deficiency. The deficiency was a significant one. At very least, the email should have mandated that Site Managers ensured that each employee was given a copy of the missing page, or a new copy of the completed agreement and that this was documented so that it could be established that it had been done. This was of particular importance given that the application for approval of the Agreement required a responsible person to execute a statutory declaration, stating that the requirements of s.180(2) had been met. The email simply informs recipients that page 23 of the Agreement sent out to officers was missing, and that a full copy is attached for their viewing. There is evidence, which I accept, that at least three employees did not get the missing page 23, and that one employee cast his vote without seeing that page.
[28] Further, I do not accept that MSS can rely on the electronic redistribution as an alternative to the failure to take all reasonable steps to meet the requirements of s.180(2)(a). For the reasons set out above I am unable to be satisfied as to what, if any, steps were taken as a result of the electronic redistribution, to inform employees of the need to access a different version of the Agreement than the one that had previously been sent to them. Ms Stinson was not aware that the version of the Agreement sent to employees (or some employees) was missing page 23, until 18 December 2009. Contrary to the submission for MSS, on Ms Stinson’s evidence, the electronic redistribution was not undertaken until 18 December 2009. As a result, even if employees did have access to the complete Agreement, including page 23, that access was not throughout the entire access period, which ran from 15 to 22 December 2009.
[29] I am unable to accept that MSS has met the requirements of s.180(3) of the Act. The ballot information sent to employees was deficient in a number of respects. Obviously the date upon which the votes were to be counted was incorrectly advised as 30 January 2009. In my view, it was reasonable for employees, reading a letter in December 2009 which indicated that votes were to be counted in January 2009, to conclude that the Company’s error was in respect of the year rather than the month in which this would occur. This type of error is common in December and January of any year. There is evidence that two employees believed that they had until January 2010 to cast their vote. Both employees maintain that they were not subsequently informed that the votes would be counted on 30 December 2009 and not 30 January 2010. I am unable to accept that MSS took reasonable steps to correct this mistake.
[30] It should have been apparent when the mistake was discovered on 16 December 2009, that employees needed to be properly informed of the correct date. Because employees were not properly informed of the deadline for voting - the day the votes would be counted - it cannot be said that they were informed of the date and time at which the vote was to occur. To simply email a letter correcting the error to various sites without having a proper process to record its distribution to each employee, meant that Ms Stinson could not actually be satisfied that the correct date for votes to be counted had been advised to employees, when she completed the Employer Declaration in Support of the Approval of the Agreement stating that employees had been informed of the date and time at which the vote was to occur.
[31] It is also the case that employees should not have actually cast their vote during the access period. The point of the access period is that employees have 7 days to consider the proposed Agreement before casting their vote. The instruction to employees on the ballot paper was that they should return their vote from 22 December onwards. The instruction should have been that there was a 7 day access period in which employees should consider the proposed Agreement and that they should not vote until that period concluded on 22 December 2009. The covering letter did nothing to clarify this, as it simply told employees there was an access period and that they were entitled to cast their votes when it concluded, without informing employees of the date the access period commenced and concluded. The fact that employees were not properly informed about the requirement to observe the 7 day access period, is evidenced by Mr Marshman having completed his ballot paper on 17 December 2009, before the access period had run its course. When these matters are considered, it is clear that MSS did not inform employees of the time and place at which the vote would occur, as required by s.180(3).
[32] I am unable to accept that MSS took reasonable steps to explain the terms of the Agreement and the effect of those terms to employees. According to the Employer Declaration in Support of Approval of the Agreement, there were three information sessions conducted for the purpose of explaining the Agreement to employees. The covering letter sent to employees on 11 December 2009 appended to Ms Stinson’s affidavit (“MS4 Exhibit 1) indicates that those information sessions were conducted on 16, 17 and 18 December 2009. At least two of those sessions were conducted in circumstances where employees had a version of the Agreement that was missing a page and the Human Resources Manager of MSS was not aware of this until 18 December 2009. This is not suggestive of a proper information session. Further, the Employer Declaration in Support of Approval of the Agreement indicates that there are employees in categories who may have particular circumstances and needs. There is no indication of any particular steps being taken to explain the Agreement and its terms to those employees, despite the Form F17 indicating in question 2.5 that the answer must include information on how particular circumstances of employees were taken into account.
[33] In relation to s.188(c) I am of the view that there are other reasonable grounds for believing that the Agreement has not been genuinely approved by employees. The outcome of the ballot was extremely close with 87 employees voting in favour of the Agreement and 82 voting against it. Although the 6 informal votes were not determinative, when they are added to the “yes” and “no” votes, the result is that only 175 employees of a total of 394 (according to the Employer Declaration in Support of Approval of the Agreement) cast a vote. While this is not in itself a barrier to approval of an agreement, it is in my view significant in the context of the circumstances in this case, where employees were not properly informed of the date on which votes were to be counted. It is more probable than not that employees, other than Mr McLeod and Mr Parker, did not have an opportunity to vote for or against the Agreement because they mistakenly believed that the ballot was not closing until 30 January 2010, when it closed on 30 December 2009.
[34] For these reasons, I am of the view that the requirements of the Act for certification of the Agreement have not been met. I am also of the view that these issues cannot be rectified by way of an undertaking pursuant to s.190 of the Act. I accept that s.186(1) of the Act is followed by a note, which indicates that FWA may approve an agreement under the section with undertakings. It is also the case that s.190 applies where FWA has a concern that an agreement does not meet the requirements set out in s.186 and s.187. However, it is clear from sections 190 and 191 that an undertaking relates to the terms of an agreement. An undertaking accepted by FWA to address a concern about an agreement, becomes a term of the agreement in relation to which it is accepted. The provisions of s.186 and s.187 to which an undertaking may relate are:
- s.186(2)(c) so that s.55 dealing with the interaction between the National Employment Standards and enterprise agreements;
- s.186(2)(d) so that the agreement passes the better off overall test (or the no-disadvantage test);
- s.186(4) to excise an unlawful term;
- s.186(4A) to excise a designated outworker term;
- s.186(5) to ensure that the nominal expiry date of an agreement is specified and is no more than 4 years after the date on which FWA approves the agreement;
- s.186(6) to ensure an agreement has a term about settling disputes that meets the requirements set out in this section;
- s.187 to ensure that FWA is satisfied as to matters set out in Subdivision E.
[35] I share the view expressed by Commissioner Cargill in Class Electrical that an undertaking cannot rectify or cure a failure to establish that an agreement has been genuinely agreed to by employees, or a failure by an employer under s.180 to take a step required in the pre-approval stage for an agreement to be made. If one of the mandatory steps in s.180 has not been taken, or employees did not genuinely agree to an enterprise agreement, FWA cannot approve the agreement.
[36] In the present case, I am unable to be satisfied that the requirements for approval of the Agreement have been met and I cannot approve the Agreement. The application for approval of the Agreement is dismissed. I Order accordingly.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Mr G. Muir on behalf of MSS Security Pty Ltd.
Mr R. Reed of Counsel and Ms A. Kent on behalf of the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union.
Hearing details:
2010.
Brisbane:
March 26.
1 [2009] FWA 1541.
2 [2009] FWA 1541 at [116]
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