JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: RE MINISTER FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS; EX PARTE WOODLEY [No 2] [2009] WASC 296
CORAM: MARTIN CJ
HEARD: 18 SEPTEMBER 2009
DELIVERED : 18 SEPTEMBER 2009
PUBLISHED : 6 OCTOBER 2009
FILE NO/S: CIV 2359 of 2009
MATTER :Application for a writ of certiorari against the Minister for Indigenous Affairs
EX PARTE
MICHAEL WOODLEY
First applicantYINDJIBARNDI ABORIGINAL CORPORATION as trustee for YINDJIBARNDI PEOPLE
Second applicantAND
MINISTER FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
First respondentROBE RIVER MINING CO PTY LTD
Second respondent
Catchwords:
Prerogative writs - Application for a writ of certiorari - Decision of the Minister - Section 18 of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA) - Minutes presented to the Minister did not accurately reflect recommendation of the Aboriginal Cultural Materials Committee - Pre-conditions for valid grant of consent under s 18 were not met - Discretion - Whether material or significant - Futility - Hardship to third parties
Legislation:
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA), s 18
Criminal Code (WA), s 24
Result:
Order nisi discharged
Declaratory relief refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First applicant : Mr G M Irving
Second applicant : Mr G M Irving
First respondent : Mr A J Sefton
Second respondent : Mr G R Donaldson SC
Solicitors:
First applicant : Slater & Gordon
Second applicant : Slater & Gordon
First respondent : State Solicitor for Western Australia
Second respondent : Blake Dawson
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26
Gavranich v Shire of Wanneroo (Unreported, WASC, Library No 980473, 25 August 1998)
Re Smith and West Australian Development Corporation; Ex parte Rundle (1991) 5 WAR 295
Sasterawan v Morris [2008] NSWCA 70
Savage v Tech Explorations Ltd (Unreported, WASC, Library No 7285, 16 September 1988)
Varney v The Parole Board (2000) 23 WAR 187; [2000] WASCA 393
MARTIN CJ: (This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 18 September 2009 and has been edited from the transcript.)
This is the return of an order nisi granted to Mr Michael Woodley and to the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation relating to the grant of a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Minister for Indigenous Affairs (the Minister), purportedly made pursuant to s 18 of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA) (the Act) consenting to the performance of work at a site of Aboriginal heritage value which might otherwise contravene the Act.
The facts
The facts which I find are drawn from affidavit evidence which was largely undisputed. The only area of potential factual controversy concerned the evidence given by the Minister, Dr Hames, to which I will refer in due course.
The site - Gurrwaying Yinda
The case concerns a site known as Gurrwaying Yinda which is an area of the Booyeemala Creek, known to the Yindjibarndi People as Thurdimarlu Wurndu. It is approximately 12 kilometres south of the Fortescue River crossing and approximately 126 kilometres south of Cape Lambert. The area includes an…
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- Case
- [2009] WASC 296
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the Minister's decision was invalid due to non-compliance with the statutory requirements, and if so, whether the discretionary factors of futility, hardship to third parties, and the significance of the departure from the requirements justified denying relief. The court considered whether the Minister's decision was significantly flawed and whether there was any hardship to third parties, such as the company Robe, which had carried out work following the Minister's consent. The court concluded that the decision was invalid due to non-compliance with the statutory requirements, but refused to grant relief on the basis of futility, hardship to third parties, and the minor nature of the statutory departure.
The reasoning of the court was that if the Minister's decision was quashed, it would render invalid the consent given from 20 July 2009 onwards, potentially exposing Robe to prosecution for work done after that date. This constituted a significant hardship to Robe, which had no way of knowing about the statutory non-compliance until well after it had commenced work. The court found that these factors, combined with the futility of granting relief, justified the exercise of discretion to deny relief despite the statutory non-compliance. The court discharged the order nisi and refused declaratory relief.
The final order of the court was to discharge the order nisi and to refuse declaratory relief, effectively denying the applicant's request for the Minister's decision to be quashed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Order nisi discharged
Declaratory relief refused
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I return then to the third ground upon which it is said that a discretion should be exercised to deny relief, namely, hardship to a third party. There are authorities that establish that prejudice to third parties can provide an appropriate basis for the discretionary denial of prerogative relief. Those cases include Re Smith and West Australian Development Corporation; Ex parte Rundle (1991) 5 WAR 295; Gavranich v Shire of Wanneroo (Unreported, WASC, Library No 980473, 25 August 1998) and Savage v Tech Explorations Ltd(Unreported, WASC, Library No 7285, 16 September 1988). In the circumstances of this case, the hardship that would be suffered by Robe, in respect of the work that it carried out following the purported grant of the Minister's consent on 20 July 2009, if the Minister's decision is quashed provides an alternative basis for denying relief. It is, I think, clear that if I were to quash that decision because the requirements of the Act had not been adhered to, it would follow that the decision had always been invalid from 20 July 2009 onwards. That would mean that Robe would be denied the opportunity to rely upon the valid consent of the Minister as a defence to any prosecution for contravention of the Act in respect of work done after 20 July 2009. The question of whether or not Robe would be able to rely upon the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact provided by s 24 of the Criminal Code is a complicated question and not one upon which I should express a concluded view. It is however sufficient for present purposes to conclude that the answer to that question is not so obvious as to deny acceptance of the proposition that the prospect of prosecution in respect of work done after 20 July 2009 exposes Robe to potential prejudice and hardship. As I have found, Robe had no way of knowing the matters that are said to have given rise to invalidity until some time well after it commenced work in late July. That provides another reason, in addition to the futility of relief, why the discretion should be exercised to refuse relief. Futility and hardship are the sorts of factors which could combine with a conclusion that the departure from the strict requirements of the Act was not of great significance, because the decision of the Minister would have been the same in any event, to add additional weight to the conclusion that the discretion to deny relief should be exercised. For those various reasons it seems to me that all of these factors in combination, and some of them individually, compel the conclusion that I should refuse relief notwithstanding that the requirements of s 18 of the Act were not followed and notwithstanding the conclusion which would ordinarily follow from that to the effect that the Minister's decision was invalid. I discharge the order nisi for these reasons.