Re McNeil, D.J & anor Ex Parte Vince, P.R
[1992] FCA 581
•14 Aug 1992
s2._
IN FEDERAL OF A I J S ~ I A 1 JUDGMENT NO. .ii8~....,1 )
VICTORIA, DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No VX 23 of 1990 1
J3ANKRUPTCY DIVISION 1
BETWEEN: DARYL JOHN McNEILL and DOROTHP PRANCES MCNEILL EX PARTE: PETER ROBERT VINCE. as
Trustee of the promrty
of Darvl John McNeill
and ~orothv Prances McNeill. Debtors
Coram: Ryan J Place: Melbourne
- Date : 14 August 1992
REASONS FOR
Rvan J: By Deed of Assignment made 2 March 1990, the applicants assigned to the respondent, Peter Vince ("the Trustee") as Trustee pursuant to Part X of the Bankruptcv Act
1966 ("the Act") all their divisible property. In a joint statement of affairs as at 9 February 1990, the applicantrs disclosed assets which included "household furniture and effects situated at 8 Auldana Court, Vermont South - $15,000. M
Goughs Bay ("the Goughs Bay property"). The Goughs Bay As well as the property at 8 Auldana Court, Vermont South, which had been occupied by them as a matrimonial home, the applicants were the owners of a holiday cabin overlooking Lake Eildon being the property known as Lot 1, 1 Bayside Boulevard,
property was encumbered by a mortgage in favour of the State Bank of Victoria ("the Bank") and at the date of the Deed of Assignment, the principal and interest owing under that mortgage was approximately $70,000.
A report by the Trustee pursuant to s.189A of the Act and dated 9 February 1992 contained the following relevant paragraphs:
"The amount,.by whrch secured debts due to the creditors are less than the palue--?df t h e m securities accordrng to Part I11 of their Statement of.Affairs is $41,528. The AN2 Bank is a secured creditor ,for an amountbf- $189,010.23, with the State Bank of Vrctoria being a secured credatot for an amount of $69,461.29. The AN2 debts are
a reaistered first mortgage over property situated at 8 Auldana- Court,l Vermont South. The State Bank debts are supported by a xeg+stered first mortgage over property srtuated at Lot 2, Bayside
supported- by, , Boulevard! Goughs Bay. The estimated value of the Vermont South
m property ,is--$220,000 with the estamated value of the Goughs Bay
property berng $80,000.
The estimated-surplus available to ored~tors arising from a sale of the Vermont South property rs $30,989.76 with the estimated surplus available to credrtors arisrng from a sale of the Goughs Bay property is [sic] $10,538.71.
Joint property of the debtor comprises stock in trade, machrnery, and trade fixtures, fittrngs, utensrls, etc. situated at Safedrive m Bayswater and Daveric in Ferntree Gully which has an estimated realisable value of $65,000. Furthermore, the estimated value of household furniture and effects srtuated at 8 Auldana Court, Vermont South is $15,000. However, pursuant to Section 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the household furniture and effects are deemed to be property not drvrsible amongst cred~tors."
After the execution of the Deed of Assignment, the applicant!s had communications from time to time with MS Della who was employed by the Trustee as an insolvency assistant. From about April 1990, the Trustee, and, under his direction, MS Della, gave consideration as to whether the Goughs Bay property could be realised advantageously to the applicants' unsecured creditors. On 23 April 1990 MS Della noted that advice had been received from a Mr John Snowdon that "he estimated the value of the property to be "not less than $100,000" in spite of its non-completion." MS Dellafs file note continued:
"I advised Peter that the bank is owed about $70,000 or so and I needed confirmation that the property wrll bring $100,000 before we proceed to sell. Peter will liaise with John Snowdon and get back to me - Peter advrsed that the R-E market is very touchy at the present time".
In the same file note, MS Della adverted to the need to speak to the first applicant, and to the possible necessity of obtaining a proper sworn valuation. Her note of her conversation with Mr McNeill, so far as is relevant, continues :
"Spoke to Daryl McNerl this morning. Advised him that proper sworn valuation on Goughs Bay property will probably have to be done - said that I would arrange for valuation to colnci.de with the McNerl's presence at the property so the valuer can go through - No problems. Daryl asked rf he would lose property - sa~d that there was a good chance that he would (too much equity), however this would have to be confirmed by a sworn valuation.....
I also asked Daryl what needed to be done on the home to complete at. As far as I could ascertain, the painting of the interior needs to be done along wlth a no. of smaller things. The plumbing/benches etc. are all complete."
Subsequently a sworn valuation of the Goughs Bay property was commissioned, and Mr Parker, a valuer, inspected the property i on 14 May 1992 for the purpose of preparing that valuation. His valuation of the same date was received at the office of the Trustee on 18 May 1992. It valued the Goughs Bay property
In the meantime, on 16 May, 1992 Mrs McNeill telephoned MS
Della whose file note of that conversation is in these terms:
"Peter,
Dot McNeil phoned today.
Dot was rather distraught. she advised that Daryl has been unsuccessful in obtaining employment because of his age and the fact that he has been involved in a business that has gone broke. He is also unqualified in his trade.
Dot advised that the valuer who assessed the value of thear property last week estmated it to be worth $125,000. This would probably mean that some of the equity available in their property would need to be made avarlable to the creditors of Mr and Mrs McNeil.
I believe that the monies due to the State Bank amount to about
$70,000 but I will confirm this. Dot advised that at present their total income is $200 per week which is barely enough to put food on the table and pay for the SEC and Telecom services.
I spoke to Dot regarding the $1,000 in the account that was due to
come to the estate of Daryl and herself.
Dot advised that they simply do not have the funds available to pay as this money has been used to keep the family going.
I advised Dot not to worry about this for the time being but to
concentrate on getting employment for Daryl.
Dot advised that they borrowed a few thousand dollars from Daryl's mother an order to finish the property at Gough's Bay. She estimated that about $7,000 or $8,000 would have been spent in finishing the property.
I advised Dot that I would look at the srtuation and get back to
her. "
The applicants' account of their conversation with MS Della at about the date of M r Parker's evaluation is contained in these paragraphs of an affidavit sworn by Mrs McNeill on 28 November
calculations, there were [src] almost no equity value in the had obtained a valuation of the property, and that accordrng to her "6. Shortly prior to 17 May 1990, she [MS Della] told me that she property, and that upon a sale, after taking into account a discharge over mortgage held by the State Bank over the property, real estate agents commission and legal costs, there was effectavely no value in the property. 7. She said that in the circumstances, provided we maintained payments under the mortgage to the State Bank, the property would be ours, in effect, to do with as we washed, as it was of no value to our assigned estate. At this tune the State Bank was owed about $73,000 under the mortgage, and there was no equity in the property, as the market value was equal to the moneys covered by the mortgage."
At about the same time, the State Bank served on the applicants notices of demand dated 17 May 1990 requiring payment of moneys then outstanding under the mortgage on the Goughs Bay property which amounted to approximately $73,000. After some negotiations with the bank, M r and Mrs McNeill concluded an arrangement detailed in the following lette; dated 7 September 1990 from the bank to them:
"The Bank acknowledges your acceptance of t h e condi t ions of t h e
proposal set out i n t h e letter of t h e 17th August 1990.
Please f l n d enclosed an opening statement f o r each f a c i l r t y and a
pay-in book which can be used t o make instalments a t any S t a t e Bank
Lump sum rnstalments of $2,000.00 due on 17th of September 1990.
F r rS t payment of $650.00 is due on 1st October 1990, and eachof Victoria .
f o r t n i g h t t h e r e a f t e r . "
Pursuant to their arrangement with the Bank, Mr and Mrs
McNeill made payments totalling approximately $6,500.Between the date of the deed of assignment, 2 March 1990, and the time when the Goughs Bay property was sold, the applicants moved furniture and fittings from their former matrimonial home at 8 Auldana Court, Vermont South, to the Goughs Bay property. As well, both before and after 2 March, they
expended time and labour (particularly that of Mr McNeill) ahd some money on finishing the dwelling which had been erected at Goughs Bay, and generally on improving the property there. A schedule relating to those improvements, the factual contents of which have not significantly been disputed by Mr Bigmore, who appeared for the trustee, is as follows:
"1. Early 1990 Floor coverings $3,000.00 2. Before 2 March Slab under house 1990 and lengthen stumps $3,734.00 Total of Items 1 & 2
February 1990
(Paid 14/3/90) Garage Doors $1,464.00 March/~pra.l 1990 Install wood heater
and base $1,995.00
March/Aprrl 1990 Rear and side
agrrcultural drains $ 865.00
March/~pril 1990 Storage room under
house $1,400.00
March/~pril 1990 Rollclad colorbond $ 266.00
Total of items 3 to 7 $5,190.00
2 March-16 May Curtains $ 559.00 $ 559.00
June/July 1990 Chattels from Aula-
dona [sic] street property
moved to Goughs Bay m
June/July, 1990 and
subsequently sold in
January, 1991:
Lounge $1,494.00 Krtchen $1,615.00 Laundry $1,090.00 Main Bedroom $1,030.00 Second Bedroom $ 984.00 Third Bedroom $ 899.00 External
$ 688.00
Total
~une/July 1990 Labour, 2 months at
8 hrs per day @ $ $20
per hour, parnting,
gardenrng, laying
drrves and paths,
moving soil, erecting
fences &c.May/June 1990 (School Paint and pine holidays) sealer Before June Front fences &
gatesPine fences & poles Wire netting. Single strand
fencing wireTop soil
Plumbing suppliesSand & screenings
Fruit trees &
conifers $ 150.00
21. Var~ous small plants $ 50.00
22. November 1990 Light fittings $ 120.00 23. Pre-Christmas
1990 Vertical drapes $ 600.00
Total of items 11 to 23 $2,865.00
24. Rates $ 347.00 25. Ingurance $ 291.00 26. 26 September to
December 1990 State Bank payments $6,500.00 Total 2 March to December, 1990
Total 16 May to December, 1990
Money was borrowed in small amounts from Mts McNeill's mother as required to a total of about $11,500. Part of that money was expended on the floor coverings and under-house works listed as items 1 and 2 of the Schedule reproduced above.
However, on about 7 July 1990 the applicants decided to live apart and in consequence on that decision, in about January 1991, placed the Goughs Bay property on the market for sale. A buyer was quickly found who signed a contract to purchase
date fixed for settlement of the sale, he replied as follows for $129,500.00. When the Trustee was notified before tie by letter dated 13 March 1991: "As you are aware, you are sub~ect to the terms of a Deed of Assignment executed by yourself and your spouse on the 2nd March, 1990.
I am advised by the State Bank of Victoria that you have executed the
Contract of Sale in respect of the above property. Section 229 of the Bankrruptcy Act 1966 states that the due execution by a debtor of a Deed of Assignment that is entered into in accordance with t h ~ s
part, and complies with this part, operates to vest in the trustee forthwith, upon the trusts and for the purposes of the deed, all the
div~sable [sic] property of the debtor and property of the debtor. Accordingly, you are unable to deal with the above property.
I believe you have made improvements to the above property and
request you provide me with full detaals, including invoices
detailang all costs rncurred as a matter or urgency.
I have advised the State Bank of Victorla and Victorian Country
conveyancing of the anvalidity of the sale documentatron.
should you wlsh to dascuss this matter further, please contact Mr
Simon Nelson of this office."
The sale of the Goughs Bay property proceeded with the Trustee's consent and the sum of $47,564.65, being the balance of the proceeds after discharging the mortgage to the Bank and paying estate agents' commission and conveyancing fees, was paid into a solicitor's trust account to be held pending resolution of the competing claims of the applicants and the Trustee.
In an affidavit sworn 6 May 1992, M r Parker, who had valued the Goughs Bay property at $90,000 on 14 May 1992, has deposed:
"4. At the trme of the valuatron referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, the house was not completely furnished. Now produced and shown to me and marked exhibit "MP-2" is a bundle of documents forwarded to me by the Applicants' solicitors namely the Contract of Sale dated the 25th January, 1991, an Inventory List and a lrst of values of chattels whach chattels were included in the inventory last. i 5. The valuataon referred to in paragraph 3 hereof was made wrthout taking account of the chattels referred to in paragraph
4, namely the chattels in the lounge, kitchen, laundry,
bedrooms, external chattels and miscellaneous chattels namely the floor coverings, lrght fattings, curtarns, vertical drapes and combustaon heater and stove.
6. On the basis of the documents referred to in paragraph 4
hereof, I verily believe that- had the property been presented to me for assessment in the state of furnishing and improvements shown therein, I estimate that at the tune of the vaiuation the value of the property would have been in the region of $120,000.00.
7 . I have considered a number of comparable sales of properties at or near the time of sale of the Goughs Bay property. There was an upturn in the property market between the time of the valuation and the time of sale of the property. The Goughe Bay property was sold in the prime season during which time the
value of p r o p e r t i e s was higher than t h e value of p r o p e r t i e s a t
t h e tune of t h e va luat ion i n Hay. 8.
Afte r cons idera t ion of t h e s a l e s r e f e r r e d t o i n paragraph 7
hereof. I v e r i l y be l ieve t h a t t h e s a l e of t h e Goughs Bay
property f o r t h e sum of $129,500.00 was f a i r l y comparable with
t h e s a i d salea."
In the light of these facts, the Court is invited to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by s.178 of the Act which provides:
"If t h e bankrupt, a c r e d i t o r o r any o the r person i s a f fec ted by any
a c t , o m i s s ~ o n o r dec i s ion of t h e t r u s t e e , he may apply t o t h e Court,
and t h e Court may make such order i n t h e matter as it t h i n k s j u s t and equitable."
The applicants rely first on the proposition that they have acquired an equity in the Goughs Bay property after the execution of the Deed of Assignment because they have expended money and labour on improvements thereto in circumstances where it can be said that the Trustee stood by and allowed that expenditure. That proposition was said to derive support from Ramsden v Dvson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129 where it was observed by Lord Kingsdown, at p.170:
" I f a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord f o r a c e r t a i n
i n t e r e s t i n land, or , what amounts t o t h e same t h ~ n g , under an
expectat ion, c rea ted o r encouraged by t h e landlord , t h a t he s h a l l have a c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t , takes possession of such land, with t h e
consent of t h e landlord, and upon t h e f a i t h of such promise o r
expectat ion, with t h e knowledge of t h e landlord, and without
objec t ion by him, l a y s out money upon t h e land, a Court of equ i ty
w i l l compel t h e landlord t o glve e f f e c t t o such promise o r expectat ion. This was t h e p r i n c ~ p l e of t h e dec i s ion i n Greaorv v
Mrahell 18 V e s . 328, and, as I conceive, i s open t o no doubt.
I f , a t t h e hearing of t h e cause, t h e r e appears t o be such uncer ta in ty
a s t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r tenns of t h e con t rac t a s might prevent a Court
of equ i ty from giving r e l i e f i f t h e con t rac t had been i n wr i t ing , but
t h e r e had been no expenditure, a Court of e q u i t y w i l l nevertheless,
i n t h e case whlch is above s t a t ed , m t e r f e r e i n o rde r t o prevent
fraud, though t h e r e has been a d i f fe rence of opinion amongst g r e a t
Judges a s t o t h e na tu re of t h e r e l i e f t o be granted. Lord Thurlow seems t o have thought t h a t t h e Court would a s c e r t a i n t h e terms by
reference t o t h e Master, and i f they could not b e ascer ta ined, would i t s e l f f i x reasonable tenns. Lord Alvanley and Lord Redesdale, and
perhaps Lord Eldon, thought t h ~ s w a s going t o o f a r ; b u t I do no t
understand any doubt t o have been en te r t a ined by any of them t h a t , erther in the form of a specific interest in the land, or in the shape of compensation for the expenditure, a Court of equity would glve relief, and protect in the meantime the possession of the tenant.
If, on the other hand, a tenant berng in possession of land, and knowing the nature and extent of his interest, lays out money upon it in the hope or expectation of an extended term or an allowance for expenditure, then, if such hope or expectation has not been created or encouraged by the landlord, the tenant has no claim which any Court of law or equity can enforce. Thrs was the principle of the decision in Prllina v. Armitaae 12 Ves.78, and, like the decision in Greqorv v. Miahell, seems founded on plain rules of reason and justice."
That passage was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Plimmer v Mavor, Councillors and Citizens of Wellinaton (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699 saying, at 713:
"The Lordships consider that this case falls within the principle stated by Lord Kingsdown as to expectations created or encouraged by the landlord, wrth the addition that in this case the landlord did more than encourage the expendrture, for he took the inrtiatrve in requesting it."
The expectation of the tenant in that case was that he would have an indefinite licence to use the land on which he had
I
| I | erected a wharf. For a similar expectation founding the recognition in equity of a licence in the person effecting improvements to use the land for life, see Inwards v Baker | |
| ||
| to a son who built, with his father's knowledge and approbation, a dwelling house on the father's land, that he would acquire an estate in fee simple in the land. In those circumstances equity was held to complete a gift, imperfect at law, of the fee simple estate. | ||
| Here, in my view, no higher expectation was created in the applicants than that they could continue to have the use and occupation of the Goughs Bay property unless and until the Bank or the Trustee considered that it should be sold. | ||
| In Crabb v Arun District Council [l9761 1 Ch. 179 Lord Denning M.R. said, at 188: |
"shor t of an a c t u a l promrse, i f he, by h i s words o r conduct, s o
behaves a s t o l ead another t o be l reve t h a t he w i l l not i n s r s t on h i s strict l e g a l r i g h t s - knowing o r in tending t h a t t h e o the r w i l l a c t on t h a t be l re f - and he does s o a c t , t h a t again w i l l r a i s e an equ i ty i n favour of t h e o ther ; and it is f o r a cour t of equr ty t o say i n what
way t h e equi ty may be s a t i s f i e d . The cases show t h a t t h i s equ i ty
does not depend on agreement but on words o r conduct. I n Ramsden v. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129, 170 Lord Klngsdown spoke of a verbal agreement "or what amounts t o t h e same th ing , an expectatron, c rea ted o r encouraged." I n Brrminoham and D i s t r i c t Land Co. v. London and North Western Rarlwav CO. (1888) 40 Ch.D. 268, 277, Cotton L.J. s a i d t h a t "... what passed drd not make a new agreement, but ... what took p lace ... r a i s e d an equi ty aga ins t him." And it was t h e Privy
Councrl rn Plunmer v. Wellinoton C o r ~ o r a t i o n (1884) 9 App.Cas. 699,
713-714 who s a l d t h a t ". . . t h e cour t must look a t t h e circumstances ~ - - -
i n each case t o decide i n what way t h e equ i ty can be s a t i s f i e d "
g iv ing instances."
In this case, from the end of April, the Trustee was aware through MS Della that the Goughs Bay property required the expenditure of work and money to complete it. The Trustee was similarly aware from at least 16 May 1992 that the applicants had finished or intended to finish the necessary work on the i property. However, the Trustee took no steps to prevent them from doing so, or to warn them that they were at risk of losing the value of that work if the Trustee subsequently sold the property. In this way, the Trustee, in my view, encouraged in the applicants a belief or expectation that they could have the use and occupation of the Goughs Bay property unless the Bank exercised its power of sale, because there was likely to be insufficient surplus above the amount required to discharge the Bank's mortgage to warrant a sale by the Trustee. Neither the applicants nor the Trustee adverted to the possibility that the property would so increase in value as to make it worthwhile for the Trustee to sell it. Had they adverted to that possibility, I consider the applicants would have believed that they would be entitled out of the net proceeds, if any, to recover the value of their improvements. If such a belief were not imputed to the applicants, it would follow that they intended to make available to proving creditors the value of the improvements which were not divisible property. An intention of that kind, in my view, is not to be inferred from anything which occurred after 2 March
Accordingly, I consider that this case can be assimilated to Morris v Morris [l9821 1 NSWLR 61, where McLelland J held that no express or implied trust arose in respect of a property on which the plaintiff had spent money on improvements. His Honour continued:
"However, in my view wider equitable princaples operate in the present case. The plarnt~ff spent money on the defendants' property in the expectation, induced or encouraged by the defendants that he would be able to live there indef~nitely as a member of their family. Thas expectation has been defeated by the occurrence of events which were not in contemplation when the money was spent and as a result of which any subsisting riaht of residence bv the ~laintiff in the -... property -is now of no practical consequence- In m+ opinion, o n the facts of t h ~ s case, it would be unconscionable and ineauitable that the defendants should now retain the benefit of the e&enditure~~bi the plalntlff of his money on thelr property free of any obligation of recoupment to him. Consequently an equity arises in favour of the plaintiff and the court must determine how in all the circumstances justice requires that that equity be satisfied. What a plaintiff m such a case as this should in lustice receive will not necessarily correspond with what, when the relevant expenditure was made, he expected to receive."
After citing Chalmers v Pardoe [l9631 1 W.L.R. 677 at 681, 682 his Honour went on:
"The principle ~llustrated by this extract is a flexible one and has been applied in a great variety of situations. In the present case the assurance or promise to the plaintiff of an indefinite right of residence in the defendants' property is the operative equivalent of the assurance or promise to make over part of the land referred to in the extract from Chalmers v Pardoe. The remedies to which the principle gives rise are imposed, as is a constructive trust, in order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience. Indeed in some crrcumstances the appropriate remedy may well be the imposition of a constructive trust. However, in the particular circumstances of the present case the plaintiff's equity would in my opinron be satrsfied by his having an equitable charge over the Krngsgrove property in the sum of $28,000 together with anterest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent per annum as from the date of commencement of these proceedings, namely, 19th May, 1980."
That an equitable charge or lien may arise for the value of improvements was also recognized in Raffaele v Raffaele [l9621 W.A.R. 29 which is cited in support of the proposition in
Snell's Princi~les of Eauitv 28th Edn. p.562. Chalmers v Pardoe and Morris v Morris were both referred to by Morling J in Re Brunner: Ex ~arte Official Trustee (1984) 2 F.C.R. 6 where his Honour declined to recognize, in favour of a trustee in bankruptcy, an equitable charge said to arise from the performance of work by a bankrupt husband in
improving a property owned by his wife. However, in that ca$e his Honour found that the only expectation which the husband had when he did the work was that he would be permitted to continue living in the home, which expectation was not disappointed. There was no relevant expenditure of money because the wife conceded that she was liable to pay to the trustee in bankruptcy an amount of $10,000 lent to her by her husband for the purpose of the improvements. I regard
Brunner as clearly distinguishable on its facts from the present case and from the authorities on which I have relied in deciding to give effect to an equitable charge in favour of the applicants.
In the course of a comprehensive review of the authorities and literature in this area, the High Court in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 considered, without disapproval, the English cases discussed above. Although the expectation in that case, on the basis of which the respondent's improvements to land proceeded, was that an informal agreement would be formalized by an exchange of contracts, the High Court's reliance on unconscionable conduct constituted by standing by and failing to warn, supports by analogy, I consider, the grant of equitable relief in the present case.
I accept that the Trustee did nothing amounting to a disclaimer of the Goughs Bay property within the meaning of s.133 of the Act. I therefore do not consider that any
promissory estoppel arose to preclude the Trustee from himse?f selling the property or adopting a sale by the applicants. In terms of the available relief as formulated by McLelland J in Morris v Morris (suDra), I regard the equity which the circumstances raise in favour of the applicants as one to be satisfied by granting them an equitable charge over the proceeds of sale to the extent of the moneys and labour expended by them after 2 March 1990 which I find to be $25,054.00. I have included, in quantifying that charge, the full value ascribed by the applicants to the furniture and fittings moved from the former matrimonial home at South Vermont, because the Trustee accepted from the date of his report: to creditors of 9 February 1990 that all of those assets having a total estimated value of $15,000.00 were, pursuant to s.116 of the Act, "deemed to be property not divisible amongst creditors" and accordingly outside the assignment. On the other hand, I have excluded the amounts expended on rates, insurance and bank interest which I regard as items of recurrent expenditure referable to the use and occupation actually enjoyed by the applicants, or at least M r McNeill, and not as reflected in any accretion to the capital value of the Goughs Bay property.
Accordingly, I shall declare that the applicants are entitled to a charge over the proceeds from the sale of the Goughs Bay property to the extent of $25,054.00. The applicants' and the Trustee's costs of the application (including any reserved costs) should be taxed and paid and retained respectively out of the assigned estate.
i
I certify that this and the preceding fourteen (14) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour M r Justice Ryan
Associate:
Counsel for the Debtors/Applicants: Mr G T Bigmore Solicitors for the Debtors/Applicants: Mulcahy Mendelson
and Round
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr H Fraser Solicitor for the Respondent: J M Smith & Emmerton
0