Re Leczynski, Bogdan Ex Parte Hont, Helen Elene
[1997] FCA 523
•13 JUNE 1997
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY - sequestration order - application to review decision of Registrar - judgment debt - whether proper reasons exist to go behind judgment - no reason shown to do so - debt based on judgment and taxed costs and interest calculated pursuant to statutory provision - whether debt is liquidated - whether debt claimed is correct debt - application for review dismissed.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 44(1)
Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212
Re Longo; Ex parte Longo (1995) 57 FCR 523
No SP 302 of 1995
Re: BOGDAN LECZYNSKI; Ex Parte: HELEN ELENE HONT
Mansfield J
Adelaide
13 June 1997
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY )
)
GENERAL DIVISION ) No SP 302 of 1995
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE )
)
STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA )
Re: BOGDAN LECZYNSKI
Debtor
Ex Parte: HELEN ELENE HONT
Substituted
Petitioning Creditor
MINUTES OF ORDER
CORAM: Mansfield J
PLACE: Adelaide
DATE: 13 June 1997
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application for review be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY )
)
GENERAL DIVISION ) No SP 302 of 1995
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE )
)
STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA )
Re: BOGDAN LECZYNSKI
Debtor
Ex Parte: HELEN ELENE HONT
Substituted
Petitioning Creditor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CORAM: Mansfield J
PLACE: Adelaide
DATE: 13 June 1997
Application to review decision of Registrar made on 17 April 1997 that a sequestration order be made against the estate of Bogdan Leczynski ("Mr Leczynski"), with costs of the substituted creditor Helen Elene Hont ("Ms Hont") and of the petitioning creditor Bank of South Australia ("BSA") to be taxed and paid out of Mr Leczynski's estate. The order was stayed for fourteen days to enable Mr Leczynski to meet the claim and costs of Ms Hont and the costs of BSA. He did not do so.
History of Petition
The proceedings were initiated by creditor's petition of BSA on 28 November 1995, based upon the failure of Mr Leczynski to comply with a bankruptcy notice served upon him on 6 November 1995. That notice was based upon a judgment debt in favour of BSA of $18067.31 entered on 11 October 1995. When that petition came on for hearing on 12 February 1996, it was adjourned as Mr Leczynski had apparently then paid the claim of BSA by cheque, and the cheque had not been cleared. It was apparently subsequently cleared.
Ms Hont, who had appeared on the first hearing day, then sought leave to be substituted as petitioning creditor. Through her solicitor, she asserted that Mr Leczynski was indebted to her as at 20 November 1995, being the date of the act of bankruptcy relied upon by BSA, for $22206.49. Leave was given accordingly on 17 April 1996. The petition itself was adjourned on the application of Mr Leczynski so he could present material in opposition.
On 30 April 1996 Mr Leczynski filed a notice of intention to appear at the hearing, and to oppose the petition on two grounds, namely:
"1.The judgement which substantially comprises the amount of the monies owing to the judgement creditor is subject to an appeal to a single Judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia and the debtor thereby denies that he is liable to the petitioning creditor in any amount other than $1,156.70 which is an amount of taxed costs thrown away ordered to be paid by the judgement debtor.
2.The debtor is solvent in that his assets far exceed the amount claimed by the petitionary creditor."
In support of that opposition, Mr Leczynski filed an affidavit sworn on 30 April 1996. I shall refer to the contents of that affidavit hereunder. It dealt both with the circumstances of the judgment in favour of Ms Hont, and with his asserted solvency. One issue raised in that affidavit, and relied upon in the grounds of opposition, was that the judgment in favour of Ms Hont was subject to an unresolved appeal.
The petition was adjourned from time to time whilst that appeal was unresolved. In the meantime, as the twelve month period for the life of the petition was soon to expire, Ms Hont applied for, and was granted on 26 November 1996, an order that the petition lapse twenty four months from the date of its presentation.
The petition was relisted for hearing on 10 March 1997, after the appeal of Mr Leczynski to the Supreme Court against the judgment in favour of Ms Hont was rejected. Apart from Ms Hont, Electro Research International Pty Ltd (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) ("ERI") appeared in support of the petition, claiming Mr Leczynski was indebted to it for $26289.07. Mr Leczynski sought an adjournment whilst his application to the Full Court of the Supreme Court for leave to appeal from the dismissal of his appeal was resolved; that application ultimately was dismissed on 8 April 1997. The matter was then listed for hearing before the Registrar on 17 April 1997 on the question of his solvency, the then remaining ground of Mr Leczynski's opposition. At the hearing Mr Leczynski applied unsuccessfully for a further adjournment to enable him to pay the debt.
Mr Leczynski's affidavit of 30 April 1996 asserted solvency, based on his shareholding in ERI "which are currently valued at $225,000.00" and a shareholding in another company AMD International Pty Ltd ("AMD") "which I believe have a value in excess of $200,000.00" plus "telecommunication stock in my business valued at $45,000.00" and a motor car in Poland valued at $15000. He had not taken the opportunity given to him at an earlier hearing to supplement that laconic affidavit, or to bring it up to date. He was cross-examined. Mr Leczynski acknowledged that his ERI shares had been somehow "seized" and sold by the administrator of ERI, and that his asserted value of them was his estimate by reference to their price to other shareholders three or four years ago. There was no other evidence of their value. He also acknowledged that AMD had no assets, and that another shareholder had transferred his shares in AMD for $1. Not surprisingly, quite apart from the Registrar's dissatisfaction with the reliability of Mr Leczynski as a witness, he did not consider that there was any proven value in those two shareholdings. There was also no independent verification either of the existence of the stock, nor its value; there was inconsistent evidence given by Mr Leczynski on those matters. Similar comments apply to the motor vehicle said to be in Poland. Consequently, the Registrar was simply not satisfied as to the availability of those assets to Mr Leczynski or their realisability: Re Poulson; Ex parte Hempenstall Bros Ltd (No 2) [1929] 1 ABC 54. He was given no evidence of Mr Leczynski's income, or recurrent outgoings. He was not satisfied that Mr Leczynski was able to pay the debt of Ms Hont, or his debts, as and when they fell due. He accordingly made the sequestration order, but suspended its operation for fourteen days to give Mr Leczynski 'one last chance' to pay his debts. He did not do so within that period, and has still not done so.
On this application for review, Mr Leczynski relied upon his further affidavits of 23 May 1997, 27 May 1997 and 30 May 1997, a print out apparently of Knox & Hargrave containing 'Time Recording Details' of a client Tadeusz Stec, an affidavit of Ms Hont sworn on 18 November 1993 in Magistrates Court (Civil Division) (SA) action number 13656 of 1993 ("the Magistrates' Court action") and an affidavit of Peter Brodie Womersley ("Mr Womersley") sworn on 3 May 1996 in Supreme Court of South Australia action number 1885 of 1994 ("the Supreme Court appeal"). Those documents were received without objection. I also received in evidence without objection the affidavits of Ms Hont and of Mr Womersley both sworn on 2 June 1997 in this proceeding. By consent, I also had before me the exhibits tendered before the Registrar, including the certified copy dated 15 April 1997 of the record of the Magistrates' Court action. As part of the grounds
for review relate to the course of that action and the Supreme Court appeal, I turn to consider those matters.
Magistrates' Court action; Supreme Court appeal
The initial claim was made on 16 July 1993 for $13895 plus costs. Judgment in default was entered on 16 September 1993 for $14627.02 including $236.02 interest. On 11 October 1993, Mr Leczynski applied to set aside that judgment. After some adjournments, that application was dismissed with $100 costs on 23 November 1993 when Mr Leczynski failed to appear either in person or by solicitors. On 21 December 1993, Mr Leczynski applied again to set aside that judgment, and on 21 January 1994 the default judgment was set aside and he was given leave to file a defence. He was ordered to pay the costs thrown away to that point. On 28 February 1994, those costs were taxed and allowed at $1156.70; subsequently certain execution costs and disbursements were incurred in the amount of $67.
The matter was then listed for hearing on 12 October 1994. Mr Leczynski appeared by a solicitor, and sought an adjournment. It was refused. It appears Mr Leczynski's instructions did not include that solicitor representing him at the trial. Without a full hearing, judgment was entered in Ms Hont's favour for $13895 plus interest fixed by the Court at $1500 plus costs to be taxed. Those costs were, on 9 November 1994, taxed and allowed at $3541. The Supreme Court appeal was then instituted. On 9 December 1996 that appeal was dismissed, with costs. Those costs were taxed
on 11 February 1997 and allowed at $3,144.50. An application for leave to appeal was dismissed on 8 April 1997.
The grounds of review
It would not be unfair to conclude that the grounds of review as identified from the application for review, the affidavits, and the written and oral submissions reflect a thorough trawling of all materials. They are thus somewhat indiscriminate, and some clearly incorrect or irrelevant; others are more pertinent to relevant issues.
As best I can from my perusal of that material, and from the oral submissions of Mr Leczynski, those grounds (in no order of significance) are set out below. In respect of a number of them, I also give my reasons for rejecting them at that point. There are some grounds of review which I deal with separately.
The summons in the Magistrates' Court action was not served personally. The relevant rules do not require personal service. Apparently service under the rules was proved by affidavit. No procedural irregularity is alleged. In any event, Mr Leczynski was aware of the proceedings, and participated in them, including ultimately having the default judgment set aside and filing a defence before the trial. The complaint does not give rise to a ground of review.
The refusal of a magistrate to adjourn the application to set aside the default judgment, which was heard and dismissed on 23 November 1993. The grant or refusal of the adjournment was discretionary. Mr Leczynski was aware of the hearing date, and says he communicated to the Court his reasons for not attending. No ultimately adverse consequence is alleged, as the default judgment was in fact later set aside, and the matter listed for trial. No ground of review is made out.
The refusal of a magistrate to adjourn the trial of the action. Again, that was a discretionary matter. Mr Leczynski was aware of the hearing date. He applied, by his solicitor for the adjournment and his reasons, presumably, were put forward. The trial proceeded in his absence. If that process was flawed, the proper avenue for review was that pursued by Mr Leczynski, namely by appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed. Any appeal from that decision could only be brought by leave of the Full Court. The Full Court has refused leave. There is therefore a regular judgment, confirmed on appeal. There is nothing arising from that process which itself gives rise to a ground of review.
There is no debt owing to Ms Hont, or alternatively no debt of the amount asserted. This ground of review is discussed below.
The debt to BSA, or the regularity of the judgment establishing it, is not made out. There is no evidence to support this ground of review, and no argument made in support of it. This ground of review is not made out.
A bankruptcy notice issued at the request of Ms Hont on 27 November 1995, and a creditor's petition issued by her on 21 December 1995, were in respect of the wrong amount owing. Even if that is correct, and I make no decision on that question, neither that bankruptcy notice nor that creditor's petition provided the vehicle for the sequestration order. This ground of review does not therefore succeed.
The debt claimed by Ms Hont, upon which she was substituted as the petitioning creditor, of $22206.49 is not in its entirety a liquidated sum, as it includes not just the judgment sum of $13895 but also costs which have not been taxed. I accept the evidence of Mr Womersley that the bill of costs for taxation was served upon Mr Leczynski's solicitors, and both his evidence and the certified record of the Magistrate's Court action confirms that the costs were taxed on 9 November 1994 and allowed at $3541. This ground of review is not made out.
The election by Ms Hont to seek to be substituted as petitioning creditor in this matter disentitled her from proceeding once twelve months had elapsed from the
creditors' petition in her own name apparently made on 21 December 1995. No authority was cited to support that proposition. The Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"), s49 entitled her to proceed in this matter as she did. On her application under s52(5) of the Act the time before which the petition in this matter would lapse was extended for twenty four months from its presentation and the sequestration order was made within that period. I do not see any merit in the point, and this ground of review fails.
On the hearing of the petition, the requirements of s52(1)(a) of the Act were not satisfied. Section 52(1)(a) requires proof, at the hearing of a creditor's petition, of the matters stated in the petition; the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as such proof. The petition of BSA dated 28 November 1995 was verified by the affidavits of Steven John Gareth Thomas and John Graeme Moore both sworn that day, including as to the act of bankruptcy by Mr Leczynski. In so far as it is necessary for Ms Hont to prove indebtedness to her at the date of the act of bankruptcy on 20 November 1995 (see McNamara v Langford (1931) 45 CLR 267) and/or at the date of the hearing of the petition (see Hyams v Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 637), that matter has been proved through Mr Womersley's affidavit of 20 March 1996 to establish indebtedness at that date of $22206.49 and through the Magistrates' Court record tendered before the Registrar. Mr Leczynski's own evidence also confirmed the fact of the judgment debt, and that it and the costs and interest on it had not been paid. No submission to the contrary was put to the Registrar. In addition, this matter being a rehearing, the affidavit of Ms Hont sworn on 2 June 1997 confirms those matters. Accordingly, this ground of review is not made out. I intend by that to indicate only that the technical complaint of non-compliance with s52(1)(a) is not made out; the issue as to the existence and the amount of indebtedness in fact will be separately dealt with.
10.Ms Hont was a secured creditor, so her debt for the purposes of s44(1)(a) is only to the extent that it exceeds her security: s44(2) and (3). Apart from observing that this ground of review is quite inconsistent with that asserting the absence of any indebtedness at all, it is in any event not made out. Ms Hont was not, on the evidence, a secured creditor.
11.Ms Hont has mislead the Court that her costs in the Magistrates' Court action have been taxed, and has pursued her petition "with malice" for the ulterior purpose of preventing Mr Leczynski from pursuing proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia against ERI and others, so that (presumably in the Court's discretion) the petition should have been, or
should be, dismissed. On the evidence there is no merit in these allegations. The evidence satisfies me that the costs were taxed. That Ms Hont sought to appoint a receiver of Mr Leczynski's shares in ERI to procure payment of her judgment against him does not remotely support an inference to the effect alleged. The making of such allegations, given the paucity of the material adduced in support of them, is in my view quite irresponsible. This ground of review fails.
12.Any debt owing by Mr Leczynski to Ms Hont is not a liquidated debt, and so could not provide the basis for the making of a sequestration order: s44(1)(b)(i) of the Act. This ground of review is discussed below.
13.Ms Hont did not, "in my opinion", exist. This contention hardly bears remark. It is inconsistent with Mr Leczynski's own affidavits and submissions about his dealings with Ms Hont which he asserts led to her owing him money, rather than the reverse. It is not a matter raised in his opposition to the petition, nor so far as the material disclosed either in the Magistrates' Court action or in the Supreme Court appeal. This ground of review is rejected.
It is noteworthy that, on this review, neither of the grounds of opposition to the petition as originally expressed were pursued.
There was no further material adduced on the topic of Mr Leczynski's solvency. Such affidavit material as was filed at an earlier stage, for reasons much similar to those which attracted observations of the Registrar, and Mr Leczynski's evidence before him, lead me to the view that solvency has not been established. In that conclusion, I have acted only upon the objective facts referred to by the Registrar and my conclusion does not reflect any assessment as to the general credibility of Mr Leczynski as a witness. The fact is that there is no coherent and persuasive evidence that any of the four categories of assets identified have the value ascribed to them by Mr Leczynski, or are readily realisable, and that the evidence as to his shareholdings in ERI and AMD suggests now that neither asset has any real value and certainly not any readily realisable value.
The other ground of opposition was that there is no indebtedness to Ms Hont because the judgment giving rise to the indebtedness was the subject of appeal. The appeal has been resolved adversely to him. It is only after that event that he has, apparently, sought in this matter to widen the scope of his ground to encompass a dispute as to the indebtedness at all.
The indebtedness and its amount
There were several matters which, in the course of submissions, I discerned were sought to be put under this general heading:
that the Court can, and should, go behind the judgment in favour of Ms Hont finally entered on 12 October 1994;
that, if it did so, the evidence would show that no amount was owing by Mr Leczynski to her, because either
(i)there was simply no debt, or
(ii)there is a counterclaim or set-off available to Mr Leczynski in a much larger amount than the debt;
that, in any event, the debt is an unliquidated one, so that it does not qualify under s44(1) of the Act to support Ms Hont as a substituted petitioning creditor; and
that the debt is not of the amount claimed and sought to be proved as owing at the time of the act of bankruptcy on 20 November 1995, of $22206.49.
I shall deal with each of those matters in turn.
There is no doubt that the Court has jurisdiction to go behind a judgment obtained by default and to inquire whether the judgment is founded upon a real debt: Corney v Brien (1951)
84 CLR 343. To determine whether I should do so, it is necessary to review the material before me in a little detail. In doing so, I accept that the ultimate judgment remained a default one without adjudication on the merits; the magistrate making the order on 12 October 1994 did so expressly under Rule 101 of the Magistrates' Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) ("the Magistrates' Court Rules") which provide for such a judgment for non-attendance of a party at a hearing. I assume that Mr Leczynski's solicitor, having unsuccessfully sought an adjournment of the hearing, was not instructed to appear at the hearing itself. He clearly did not do so.
The evidence before me indicates that on about 8 November 1991 Ms Hont, a management consultant, contracted with Mr Leczynski, a Mr Brenton DeLurant and a Mr Wojciech Czuchra to perform certain management and financial advisory work for them for a fixed fee plus 10% of the value of certain stock recovered by them through her work. She performed that work. After some pressure, Mr Leczynski paid his component of the fixed fee. On 1 July 1992 he acknowledged that he owed $13895 for the percentage of the goods recovered, and he promised to pay that sum. That acknowledgment and promise is confirmed by the affidavit of Wojciech Czuchra sworn on 10 February 1994 filed in the Magistrates' Court action, and exhibited to Ms Hont's affidavit tendered before me. Mr Leczynski has failed to pay that amount. That affidavit of Ms Hont to the same effect, sworn on 18 November 1993 in that action, was tendered by Mr Leczynski as part of his evidence in this case.
It was upon that debt that the Magistrates' Court action was brought. It is implicit that goods were recovered by the work of Ms Hont for Mr Leczynski to the value of $138,950. Mr Leczynski's affidavits before me assert that
"No evidences (sic) that abovementioned goods she supplied to me exist.
I deny that any of recovered goods were supplied to me by her, her agent servant or whosoever.
...
Pursuant to evidences (sic) Mrs Hont is in a possession of my goods vaulted (sic) by her on amount of $138,950 ..."
and elsewhere that
"Miss Hont by her affidavit sworn on 18th November 1993 ... stated that she acting on my behalf (power of attorney) recovered by goods in amount of $138,950, but never supped (sic) any of the above goods to me. Due to the fact that she holds my property she is not a creditor but the debtor."
Those references, which so far as I can see are the most direct material in affidavits which might give rise to a defence to the claim, mis-state Ms Hont's affidavit. She does not say that she did not supply the goods recovered. The parts of her affidavit referred to, and apparently relied upon, by Mr Leczynski confirm the arrangement and its performance, and his acknowledgment of the debt outstanding and his promise to pay it. He does not deny those things. Furthermore, Ms Hont's affidavit of 2 June 1997 asserts that:
"I have never personally obtained possession of any of the stock, goods, plant and equipment or other items recovered by Mr Leczynski or his company ... I was told by Mr Leczynski that he was the one that regained possession of the stock ... after an inventory of such was taken by Mr Leczynski together with a private investigator, Mr Geoff Illingworth."
That history of events was not, except by the denial of Mr Leczynski in the most general of terms, contradicted. Mr Leczynski did not seek to call Mr Illingworth, or for that matter anyone else to contradict Ms Hont.
In those circumstances, in my view, the discretion I have to go behind the judgment should be exercised against doing so. I do not think that sufficient doubt is cast upon the judgment to warrant my doing so. Indeed, even were I to do so, I would on the material before me reach the conclusion on the merits that Mr Leczynski was indebted to Ms Hont at the time of the ultimate default judgment, and from 1 July 1992, in the sum of $13895. Far from being of the view that there is reason shown for questioning whether behind the judgment there is "in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioning creditor" (see per Barwick CJ with whom Windeyer and Owen JJ agreed in Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 224), I am of the view that there was such a debt.
In those circumstances, strictly speaking I do not need to determine whether I would in any event, have exercised a discretion against going behind the judgment in the light only of the history of this matter. Having regard to that history
of the Magistrates' Court action and the Supreme Court appeal, and having regard to the expressed grounds of opposition to the petition as filed by Mr Leczynski which, relevantly, disputed the debt only because the appeal against the judgment was extant, especially as it was the foundation for the delay in disposing of the petition earlier, and accepting as satisfactorily explained the recurrent default judgments, I would not in the circumstances have looked behind the judgment. That is simply because I regard Mr Leczynski's affidavit material, in the light of his submissions, as not sufficiently cogent to warrant doing so. His dispute as to Ms Hont's existence lies not at all with the basis of his denial of the debt; his denial is only in the most general of terms, and does not deign to explain his version of any arrangement, or the stock in issue or its whereabouts; his denial of a debt at all does not lie with the basis of his asserted counterclaim or set-off; his claim is not sought to be supported by any other persons who it might reasonably be expected in the circumstances he would bring forward. In expressing that view in any event, I have had regard only to Mr Leczynski's affidavits without considering any material emanating from Ms Hont, whoever may have tendered that material. I am not satisfied that there exists a bona fide allegation that no real debt lies behind the judgment: see Re Longo; Ex parte Longo (1995) 57 FCR 523 at 527 and cases referred to by Cooper J thereat.
I deal briefly with the ground of review based upon s44(1) of the Act. The claim, based upon a judgment, is a liquidated one so long as the interest component of it is also determined by a statutorily prescribed formula or by prior court order, and so long as the costs component of it are costs taxed prior to the act of bankruptcy. The fact that the quantification involves some process of calculation does not mean that the claim is not a liquidated one. As the recital of events relating to the Magistrates' Court claim set out above illustrates, that Court did from time to time make specific orders for costs. Costs were taxed on 9 November 1994 in respect of the judgment upon which Ms Hont was substituted as petitioning creditor, and in respect of subsequent execution steps those costs were prescribed by the Magistrates' Court Rules. Similarly, the interest on the judgment was fixed by the Court on 12 October 1994, and thereafter was payable and calculated pursuant to s35(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) and r124 of the Magistrates Court Rules. In my view, the quantum of the debt asserted at the date of the act of bankruptcy calculated in that way constitutes a liquidated claim: Spain v The Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 138.
Finally, I consider whether the debt claimed at that date of $22206.49 is the correct debt. Section 35(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 provides that a judgment debt bears interest at a rate prescribed by the rules, and r124 of the Magistrates Court Rules prescribed that rate of 10% per annum
on the judgment debt exclusive of interest. Section 35(2) of that Act relevantly prescribes interest to run from the date of the judgment, and where costs are taxed from the date the costs are taxed. The quantification of the claimed indebtedness as at 20 November 1995 is therefore made up of the following:
12 October 1994` $13895 Judgment
12 October 1994` 1500 Interest
28 February 1994 1156.70 Costs thrown away
28 March 1994 42 Execution costs and
disbursements
13 October 1994` 25 Taxing disbursement
9 November 1994` 3541 Taxed costs, per order
12 October 1994
plus interest at 10% from 12 October 1994 on the judgment sum and costs orders then in force, but not on the interest awarded on 12 October 1994, and from 9 November 1994 on the costs taxed on that day. The minor items of costs and disbursements referred to are those prescribed by the Third Schedule to the Magistrates Court Rules and under the Magistrates Court (Fees) Regulations 1992 (SA).
It follows from the above that I am satisfied that the amount of Ms Hont's debt upon which she was substituted as petitioning creditor was in existence as a liquidated claim at the time of the act of bankruptcy, and was established by acceptable evidence before me on this review and before the Registrar. This ground of review must also, therefore, fail.
Conclusion
Having considered the grounds of review argued in this matter, I am satisfied nevertheless that the matters required to be proved by Ms Hont to support the making of a sequestration order have been established. Accordingly, I have reached the view that the sequestration order was properly made. I affirm that order and its terms and otherwise dismiss the application for review.
I certify that this and the preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Mansfield.
Associate:
Dated:
Debtor appearing in person
Counsel for the
Substituted Petitioning Creditor : Mr P Womersley
Solicitors for the
Substituted Petitioning Creditor : Womersley & Co
Trustee in person by his officer
Hearing Date : 4 June 1997
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