Re LB
[2020] VSC 232
•30 April 2020
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL LAW DIVISION
S CR 2008 1744
IN THE MATTER OF a Major Review under Section 35 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and
Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997
BETWEEN:
LB
and
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA
and
SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
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JUDGE: | COGHLAN JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 30 April 2020 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 30 April 2020 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re LB |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSC 232 |
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CRIMES MENTAL IMPAIRMENT – Major review of custodial supervision order – Safety of patient and members of public would be seriously endangered if order varied to non-custodial supervision order – Parties unanimous that custodial supervision order should be confirmed –- Custodial supervision order confirmed – No grant of extended leave sought – Whether completion of 12 months’ extended leave a pre-condition to vary order on major review – Further major review ordered in 12 months’ time – Publication of proceedings suppressed under s 75 - Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 ss 32(3), 35, 39, 40, 41, 75.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Reviewee | Sheeana Dhanji | Victoria Legal Aid |
| For the Attorney-General | Matthew Hocking | Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
| For the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services | Suganya Pathan | Department of Health and Human Services |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Julie Carpenter | Ms Abby Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
HIS HONOUR:
On 6 October 2008 I found LB not guilty of attempted murder because of mental impairment.[1] I ordered that she be subject to a custodial supervision order for a nominal term of twelve and a half years, commencing on 6 February 2008, and that she be detained at the Thomas Embling Hospital (‘TEH’). She has been so detained since that date. In that time, she has been granted brief periods of unescorted leave, but has not applied for any grant of extended leave.
[1] Citation omitted to preserve the anonymity of the Reviewee.
This proceeding comes before the Court pursuant to s 35(1)(a) of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (‘the Act’), which requires the Court to undertake a major review of a CSO at least three months prior to the expiry of the nominal term of the order. That nominal term will expire on 6 August 2020.
The purpose of the major review is to determine whether LB can be released from the CSO.[2] On a major review, the Court must vary the order to a non-custodial supervision order (‘NCSO’), unless satisfied on the evidence available that the safety of the person subject to the order, or members of the public, will be seriously endangered as a result of the release of the person on an NCSO. If so satisfied, the Court must confirm the CSO or vary the place of custody. If the CSO is confirmed, the Court may grant LB extended leave, subject to the provisions of the Act.[3]
[2]Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (‘the Act’) s 35(2).
[3]Ibid s 35(4).
As a result of the current global health emergency and the restrictions to movement and personal contact enacted to stop the spread of COVID-19, the Court has adopted a protocol to allow for the determination of some proceedings under the under the Act to proceed by way of written material only. To date, two such proceedings have adopted that protocol, namely Re LTB[4] and Re XY (Ruling No 3).[5] In both matters, Taylor J determined that it was consistent with the interests of justice to determine the application on the papers, noting the unanimous positions of the parties.[6] With respect, I adopt Her Honour’s reasoning. The course adopted is now specifically permitted by s 120 of the Act.
[4][2020] VSC 173.
[5][2020] VSC 195.
[6]Re LTB [2020] VSC 173, [6]; Re XY (Ruling No 3) [2020] VSC 195, [17].
In the present matter, all of the interested parties consented to the major review proceeding on the papers without appearances by the parties. The DPP again took no view, noting that her role is limited to discharging notice obligations under the Act.[7]
[7]The Act, ss 38C and 40(2)(c).
LB, the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services (‘the Secretary’) and the Attorney-General of Victoria (‘the Attorney’) submit that the appropriate outcome of this major review is confirmation of the CSO. As is customary in these matters, the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘the DPP’) expresses no view. Further, LB does not seek a grant of extended leave.
Background
LB’s background and psychiatric history, as well as the circumstances giving rise to the imposition of the CSO, are set out in my previous decisions in the related prosecution,[8] and a Summary of Proceedings and Facts of the Case filed on 30 March 2020. It is not necessary to rehearse those matters in great detail here.
[8]Citations omitted to preserve the anonymity of the Reviewee.
In brief, LB is a 41-year-old woman with an established diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder pre-dating the index offence. As a child, she witnessed frequent physical abuse perpetrated by her father against her mother. She commenced using cannabis at the age of 18 and experienced her first episode of psychosis requiring hospital admission at the age of 21.
Around this time, LB commenced a relationship with a man 23 years her senior, PH, and became pregnant with her first child, CH. She ceased taking antipsychotic medication during the pregnancy and experienced a relapse of psychotic symptoms, including ideas of reference from the television and religious and grandiose delusional beliefs. LB continued to express delusional beliefs following the birth of her second child, AH. Around this time, she reported growing fearful of PH, who she states had become increasingly controlling. She moved to Wodonga with her daughters, prompting PH to initiate Family Court proceedings to regain custody of their children.
LB was admitted to St Vincent’s Hospital as an involuntary patient in 2006, during which time she lost custody of her children. She was made subject to a six-month Community Treatment Order following her discharge; however, she soon became non-compliant with medication and her cannabis use escalated, leading to further deterioration in her mental state.
On 1 November 2007, in the context of a relapse of psychotic symptoms exacerbated by non-compliance with psychotropic medication, cannabis use and the loss of custody of her children, LB stabbed her partner, GT, multiple times and caused him serious injuries. At the time of the index offending, LB was experiencing delusional beliefs that GT intended to share information that would be used against her in pending Family Court proceedings. She reported that she had made a deal with Satan to get her children back.
As I have already set out, following a consent mental impairment hearing on 6 October 2008, I directed that a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental impairment be recorded in relation to a charge of attempted murder and LB was placed on a CSO for a nominal term of twelve and a half years.
LB was thereafter admitted to the Barossa acute unit at TEH, where she continued to report psychotic symptoms despite treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilising medications.
LB’s progress through the treatment pathway of TEH fluctuated in the decade that followed, with multiple transfers between the Barossa acute unit and the Daintree rehabilitation unit due to concerns regarding LB’s low mood, lack of engagement with her rehabilitation program, repeated substance use, inappropriate sexual behaviour and two instances in which she absconded on unescorted leave in 2013 and 2015. Notably, LB progressed to unescorted leave granted by the Forensic Leave Panel in 2016 and again in 2018, however, on both occasions her leave was formally suspended by the Chief Psychiatrist as a result of substance use concerns, including an attempt to bring synthetic cannabis into TEH.
Positively, throughout 2019, LB’s clinical presentation and engagement with treatment has improved significantly and there have been no reported instances of substance use since December 2018. She has again been granted unescorted leave, which she has utilised on nine separate occasions since December 2019 without incident.
Relevant Legal Principles
The present hearing is governed by s 35 of the Act, which relevantly provides as follows:
35 Major reviews
(1) The court that made a supervision order must undertake a major review of the order—
(a)at least 3 months before the end of the nominal term of the order; and
(b) thereafter at intervals not exceeding 5 years for the duration of the order.
(2) The purpose of a major review is to determine whether the person subject to the order is able to be released from it.
(3) On a major review, the court –
(a)if the supervision order is a custodial supervision order –
(i)must vary the order to a non-custodial supervision order, unless satisfied on the evidence available that the safety of the person subject to the order or members of the public will be seriously endangered as a result of the release of the person on a non-custodial supervision order; or
(ii)if so satisfied, must confirm the order or vary the place of custody;
…
(4) If the court confirms a custodial supervision order on a major review, the court may grant extended leave to the person subject to the order, without the need for a separate application for leave, if the court could have granted extended leave to the person on an application under section 57.
As explained by the Court of Appeal in NOM v Director of Public Prosecutions,[9] an assessment of ‘endangerment’ in the context of the Act is focused on the ‘chance, risk or peril of some harm materialising’,[10] while the concept of ‘serious endangerment’ encompasses a consideration of the ‘gravity of the possible harm’ that may eventuate should that risk be realised.[11] As stated in NOM, a highly probable risk of minor harm may not equate to serious endangerment, while conversely, a mathematically improbable risk of grave harm may satisfy the Court of such a criterion.[12]
[9](2012) 38 VR 618 (‘NOM’).
[10]Ibid 637 [58] (Redlich and Harper JJA and Curtain AJA).
[11]Ibid 639 [64].
[12]Ibid 639 [63], quoting Re Percy, Farrell and RJO (1998) 102 A Crim R 554, 566 (Eames J).
Section 35(3)(a)(i) of the Act therefore requires me to consider both the chance of a harmful incident occurring if LB’s CSO is varied to an NCSO, and the gravity of the harm that might result if that risk were to materialise.
Section 39(1) of the Act sets out the guiding principle to be applied in determining whether to vary a supervision order under the Act:
In deciding whether to make, vary or revoke a supervision order, to remand a person in custody, to grant a person extended leave or to revoke a grant of extended leave under this Act, the court must apply the principle that restrictions on a person’s freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to the minimum consistent with the safety of the community.
Section 40(1) of the Act outlines the matters to which the Court must have regard when deciding whether to vary a CSO or to grant extended leave:
(a) the nature of the person’s mental impairment or other condition or disability; and
(b) the relationship between the impairment, condition or disability and the offending conduct; and
(c) whether the person is, or would if released be, likely to endanger themselves, another person, or other people generally because of his or her mental impairment; and
(d) the need to protect people from such danger; and
(e) whether there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of the person in the community; and
(f) any other matters the court thinks relevant.
The Court of Appeal considered the interaction between ss 39 and 40(1) of the Act in NOM. Their Honours held that:
Section 39 requires a value judgment informed by the competing considerations stated in the provision. Section 40(1) requires an evaluation of the appellant’s mental condition and progress and an assessment of risk against discrete but interrelated criteria. These assessments call for value judgments in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion. No particular opinion being uniquely right, the making of the order involves the exercise of a judicial discretion. The discretionary character of the decision is not displaced by the mandatory requirements that the judge ‘must apply’ the principle in s 39 or ‘have regard to’ the factors in s 40.[13]
[13]Ibid 633 [47] (citations omitted).
Finally, s 40(2) of the Act provides that the Court cannot significantly reduce the degree of supervision to which LB is subject, for instance by varying her CSO to an NCSO, unless it has first obtained and considered the psychological reports and other materials stipulated in that subsection.
Notification of Family Members and Victims
Section 38C(2)(a) of the Act requires the DPP to provide notice of the major review hearing to LB’s family members and each victim of the index offence. The affidavit of Julie Carpenter of the Office of Public Prosecutions dated 23 April 2020 details compliance with that section. I am satisfied that reasonable notice of the hearing of the major review has been given.
The Court has received four reports made pursuant to s 42 of the Act. They are the reports of LB’s mother, PB, LB’s two daughters, CH and AH and her former partner, PH. I have had regard those reports pursuant to s 40(2)(d) of the Act. Whether PH was strictly entitled to make such a report is moot but given the fact that he has the custody of CH and AH his views are relevant.
PB expresses support for LB’s eventual transition back into the community and states that LB is aware that she requires support to manage her mental stability.
In his report, PH expresses concern that, should LB’s level of supervision be lessened in any way, she would present a risk both to his safety and that of their daughters. The basis for this concern is LB’s history of absconding from care, which received significant media attention at the time, and the possibility that she would view him as a barrier to seeing her children. He notes that both of LB’s daughters have expressed a desire to cease any contact with their mother, however, he is wary of LB’s ability to respect those wishes.
Both CH and AH detail feelings of anxiety and fear in relation to the possibility of LB’s supervision order being varied and confirm that they do not wish to continue any contact with their mother.
Contemporary psychiatric evidence
For the purposes of this review, the Court has received the report of Dr Oladipo Sorungbe dated 30 March 2020 in compliance with ss 40(2) and 41(3) of the Act.
Dr Sorungbe is a consultant forensic psychiatrist employed by the Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health (‘Forensicare’). He has been LB’s treating psychiatrist since October 2017 and bases his report on his psychiatric reviews of LB, together with previous reports and clinical information held by Forensicare.
Dr Sorungbe’s report rehearses LB’s psychiatric history and provides an overview of her uneven progress at TEH between 2008 and 2018, compromised as it has been by instances of illicit substance use, inappropriate sexual behaviour and absconding incidents.
He opines that there was, however, a ‘significant improvement’ in LB’s overall presentation and engagement in rehabilitation throughout 2019, coinciding with the move of a co-patient out of the Daintree rehabilitation unit, where she currently resides. Dr Sorungbe indicates that this co-patient potentially presented as a negative peer association, being present for most incidents of rule breaking involving LB.[14]
[14]Report of Dr Sorungbe dated 30 March 2020, 9 [60].
Dr Sorungbe confirms that LB is currently is treated with 350mg of clozapine and 30mg of aripiprazole antipsychotic medications per day, together with 20mg of citalopram antidepressant medication daily. He advises that LB is compliant with all prescribed medications and continues to present with a stable mental state.
The report notes that LB has completed a significant number of therapeutic programs since her admission to TEH and has engaged in individual psychology sessions dealing with issues such as substance use, offending behaviours, relationship difficulties, and the index offence itself. She has also undertaken a range of technical and further education courses, ranging from general education, hospitality, to digital media and technology.
Dr Sorungbe confirms that LB’s records show 25 documented incidents of illicit substance use since her admission to TEH, largely comprising of synthetic cannabis use while on unescorted leave. LB’s most recent recorded incident relates to her self-reported use of methamphetamine in December 2018. On this basis, Dr Sorungbe opines that substance use remains ‘a significant problem’ for LB, despite her protracted stay at TEH.[15]
[15]Ibid 5, [30].
As noted, notwithstanding earlier setbacks, LB resumed unescorted leave on 19 December 2019 and has accessed this leave without incident on nine occasions.
With respect to community linkages, LB attends the St Kilda Drop-in Centre and a Collingwood gym on a weekly basis, receives support from a National Disability Insurance Scheme funded support worker and is appointed as the TEH’s female Consumer Action Group representative, which involves her attendance at meetings both inside and outside the hospital grounds.
LB maintains regular contact with her parents and has visited both in regional Victoria with the support of Forensicare staff. She has had intermittent contact with her daughters while at TEH, as her ex-partner continues to have sole custody. The report notes that LB desires further interaction with her daughters and has considered seeking legal assistance to obtain greater access, but is reluctant to do so, noting that it may be too late to establish a close relationship with them.
Dr Sorungbe notes that LB has been involved in a number of romantic relationships with co-patients while at TEH, several of which have concluded abruptly. This, opines Dr Sorungbe, demonstrates LB’s tendency towards a relationship style characterised by dependency, coupled with avoidance.
With respect to risk assessment, Dr Sorungbe identifies LB’s historical risk factors for future violence, including her past history of violence and substance use, her enduring and severe mental illness, relationship difficulties and underlying personality style, traumatic experiences in childhood, limited employment history and past examples of non-compliance with treatment and absconding incidents.
Dr Sorungbe confirms that LB’s psychotic symptoms are currently in remission. He opines that at present, LB exhibits several protective factors, including her improved insight and engagement with treatment, sustained compliance with her prescribed medication, abstinence from illicit substance use since December 2018 and lack of reported violent ideation or intent.
Despite her recent therapeutic gains, Dr Sorungbe assesses LB’s current risk of future violence as moderate, owing in large part to her high loading of historical risk factors. He opines that her risk of violence is likely to become elevated should any of her protective factors abate and is most likely to materialise in the context of a deterioration of her mental state triggered by medication non-compliance, interpersonal difficulties or illicit substance use.
Dr Sorungbe notes that potential stressors for LB may include periods of transition between TEH and the community, reduced supervision, relationship difficulties, alcohol and substance use and reduced structure and support. He details her early warning signs of imminent violence as including a pre-occupation with grandiose or religious beliefs, with potential victims likely to include family members or intimate partners. Despite the index offence representing LB’s only reported incident of past violence, Dr Sorungbe states that its severity indicates that any future violence would likely also be severe.
In concluding his report, Dr Sorungbe states that:
[LB] has encountered significant setbacks in her rehabilitation and transition back into the community since her admission to TEH in October 2008. She had two major setbacks in 2013 and 2015 following her absconding incidents which significantly impacted on her progress and also led to her returning to the acute unit on one occasion. Other obstacles to her progress have been due to other factors such as her repeated substance misuse, subversion of security, limited engagement with her rehabilitation, interpersonal difficulties (relationship, friendships and negative peer influence) and her ambivalence about discharge.
[LB] has made significant progress in terms of her mental health recovery. Her psychotic symptoms are currently in remission with treatment with a combination of Clozapine, Aripiprazole and Citalopram. She has engaged in a significant amount of psychotherapeutic programs and treatments with very modest gains noted over the past 12 years. Substance misuse remains a significant risk factor for which she requires ongoing support and interventions.[16]
[16]Ibid 15-6 [92]-[93].
Dr Sorungbe notes that LB’s progress to date has occurred in the context of the secure setting of TEH, with high levels of supervision and support from her treating team. In light of her improvement over the past 12 months and successful resumption of unescorted leave, planning has begun for an application for extended leave. This is, however, in its early stages involving referrals to relevant support services. At the date of Dr Sorungbe’s report, LB had not yet been assessed by those services.
Overall, Dr Sorungbe notes that LB is ‘yet to be fully tested out in the community unsupervised over a sustained period due to her multiple setbacks in the past’.[17] He states that due to her moderate risk of future violence, she will require ‘robust discharge planning, involving a graded exposure back into the community with regular risk assessments and close supervision’.[18] As such, Dr Sorungbe opines that LB continues to require management within TEH subject to the conditions of her CSO. He does not recommend that her order be varied to an NCSO at this stage of her rehabilitation.
[17]Ibid 14 [84].
[18]Ibid 16 [94].
Analysis
As stated above, the purpose of this major review is to determine whether LB can be released from the CSO. In making such a determination, I am required to have regard to the matters set out in s 40(1) of the Act and apply the guiding principle prescribed by s 39(1) of the Act.
Turning to each of the s 40(1) matters, it is well established that there is a direct relationship between LB’s mental impairment and her commission of the index offence. She committed the offence while floridly psychotic and experiencing delusional beliefs that the victim would prevent her from recovering her children.
While LB has made slow progress through treatment at TEH and experienced a number of setbacks, she has demonstrated significant improvement over the last 12 months. Her psychotic symptoms are currently in remission and she continues to maintain compliance and engagement with her rehabilitation plan. It is important to note, however, that substance abuse remains an enduring risk to her mental stability and LB still requires ongoing support and treatment in relation to those issues.
Despite her recent progress, it is the evidence of Dr Sorungbe that LB continues to pose a moderate risk of future violence and that the harm that would eventuate should LB’s risk materialise would be severe.
Finally, any preparations for LB’s transition to full-time community living are clearly in their infancy, such that LB does not yet have access to appropriate resources within the community that could support her management and treatment either on an NCSO or extended leave.[19]
[19]See s 40(1)(e) of the Act.
Taking into account the above and applying the principle of parsimony inherent in s 39, I am satisfied that the safety of LB and members of the public would be seriously endangered if she were to be released on an NCSO at this time. And I am satisfied that LB’s CSO should be confirmed.
As I have noted, major reviews are governed by s 35 of the Act. That section makes no mention of s 32(3) of the Act, which relevantly provides:
(3) in the case of a forensic patient ….
(a)the court must not vary a custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order (whether during or after the nominal term) unless the forensic patient ....has completed a period of at least 12 months extended leave granted by the court under s 57; and
(b) in deciding an application to vary a custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order, the court must take into account whether or not the forensic patient….has complied any conditions of extended leave.
I was not asked to grant extended leave to LB even though I had the power to do so pursuant to s 35(4) of the Act. No arrangements which would be necessary for the grant of extended leave are yet in place.
A question to be resolved, notwithstanding that it does not strictly arise in this case, is whether or not s 32(3) should be read as only applying to applications for variation of orders pursuant to s 31 and the types of reviews referred to in s 32(1), although the plain words of s 32(3) would leave open the interpretation that the subsection applies to any determination relating to variation of a CSO to an NCSO.
I invited submissions from the parties on the applicability of that subsection to major reviews. It was submitted on behalf of the Secretary and LB that the subsection did not apply, and on behalf of the Attorney that it did apply. The Secretary and LB submitted that s 32(3) of the Act should be confined to the proceedings referred to in s 32(1) of the Act, which does not include major reviews. Similarly, each of the Secretary and LB observed that s 35 contains no reference to s 32(3) of the Act. Conversely, the Attorney submitted that Part 5 of the Act, which encompasses both ss 32 and 35, should be read as a whole.
In expanding on the grounds for her position, counsel for LB advanced an argument on the basis of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (‘the Charter’). More particularly, it was submitted that the Court is required by the Charter to adopt a construction of s 32(3) of the Act that is consistent with human rights, specifically, the right to not be arbitrarily detained.[20] Accordingly, LB sought to give notice of the issue to the Attorney and the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission under s 35 of the Charter. Following an indication upon which I will expand below, LB did not seek to pursue the Charter argument and sought leave to withdraw her notice. I granted leave as requested and make no comment as to the Charter argument.
[20]Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, s 21(2).
As indicated to the parties, I am satisfied that the better view is that s 32(3) does not apply to major reviews under s 35 of the Act. That does not mean that the question of leave is irrelevant on a major review. The very existence of s 35(4) demonstrates the importance of extended leave and emphasises that it should be viewed as a step on the path to variation to an NCSO. As noted by Parliament at the time of introducing that section:
Leave… is part of the gradual reintegration into the community of people on custodial supervision orders. Extended leave, which is granted by the courts and allows a person to be absent from custody for up to 12 months, is also part of this process.
When a person seeks extended leave it will usually be the first time that they have lived independently in the community for some years.[21]
[21]Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 November 2001, 2189 (Mr John Thwaites, Minister for Health). See also RDM v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] VSCA 84 [24] (Winneke P) and Application under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 by “MB” [2005] VSC 118R [17].
Although extended leave could be for a period of less than 12 months I know of no case where an order of less than 12 months has been made. It would make good common sense that the decision to be made under s 35(3), in part, be dependent on whether or not there had been a period of successfully completed extended leave.
It is somewhat anomalous that, if LB had herself made an application for the variation of her CSO to an NCSO under s 31 of the Act, she would be required to have completed 12 months’ extended leave. It seems to me that even if that provision is not mandatory under s 35 of the Act, it is an important consideration. It has been shown in this case that it is not the risk represented by a person in a custodial setting which matters but rather the risk which arises if variation to an NCSO is made.[22] It is noted that, should LB progress to the stage that she is supported by her treating team to apply for extended leave, such an application may be made to the court under s 57 irrespective of any court-ordered major review period.
[22]The Act, ss 31 and 32.
It was submitted on behalf of the Secretary that I should fix the next major review on a date that is between 12 and 24 months’ time and on behalf of the Attorney and LB that it should be within 12 months.
I am satisfied that the next major review should be listed within 12 months from today. It will be necessary for an annual report to be prepared and filed with the Court pursuant to s 41(3) of the Act within that time and there is no reason why a major review could not be undertaken using that report as was basically done in this case.[23] If in the meantime the reviewee has been released on extended leave, the nature of the further major review hearing will be a matter to be discussed among the parties. If extended leave has not been granted it might be an occasion to consider a grant of extended leave.
[23]Ibid sub-ss 40(2)(a)–(b).
Finally, there has been no suppression order made in this case to date. LB now makes application for such an order. In accordance with my usual practise that I do not issue such orders during the criminal trial part of the proceedings. We have moved onto the part of the proceedings which are rehabilitative, for want of a better expression. I do not regard publication of the proceedings as beneficial to the recovery of LB, which in turn is contrary to the general aims of the Act and the public interest. Accordingly, I will order pursuant to s 75 of the Act that the content of any report or other document put before the Court in the proceeding and any information that might enable LB to be identified must not be published.
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