Re: Laura
[2025] FedCFamC1F 408
•20 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Re: Laura [2025] FedCFamC1F 408
File number(s): By Court order file number is suppressed Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J Date of judgment: 20 June 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Gender Dysphoria –Where consent orders are made – Where the Court distinguishes this case from the facts of that in Re Kelvin – – Where all parties seek a declaration of Gillick competence for the subject child – Where the subject child wishes to undergo “stage two” gender affirming treatment – Where the Court declares that the child is Gillick competent – Where an auxiliary name change order is sought to affirm the new gender identity of the child – Where the Court considers that the proposed name change will benefit the welfare of the child – Where the Court discusses the benefit of including subject children of advanced age in gender affirming proceedings. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CB, 60CC, 67ZC
Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Reform Bill 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Chapman & Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510; [1978] FamCA 86
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 219 CLR 365; [2004] HCA 20
Re Ash (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 777
Re Devin [2025] FedCFamC1F 211
Re Imogen (No. 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344; [2020] FamCA 761
Re Kelvin (2017) FLC 93-809; [2017] FamCAFC 258
Re: Elliott [2017] FamCA 1008
Re: Jamie (2013) FLC 93-547; [2013] FamCAFC 110
Re: Lincoln (No 2) [2016] FamCA 1071
SMB and JWB; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (Re Marion) (1992) 175 CLR 218; [1992] HCA 15.
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 44 Date of hearing: 8 May 2025 Representation: By Court order the names of legal practitioners are suppressed ORDERS
SUPPRESSED FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: THE MOTHER
Applicant
AND: THE FATHER
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 MAY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT:
1.Pursuant to Part 10.2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), orders are made by consent in accordance with the document marked “A” dated this day and attached hereto.
2.Pursuant to s 62B and s 65DA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.
“A”
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
File No. [SUPPRESSED]
BETWEEN
THE MOTHER
(Applicant)And
THE FATHER
(Respondent)And
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
CONSENT ORDERS
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The child James born 2008, known as Laura (“Laura”), has capacity and is competent to make decisions in relation to "stage two" treatment for Gender Dysphoria, being the administration of oestrogen in such dose, in such manner and with such frequency as determined by and under the guidance of Laura’s treating medical practitioners from time to time.
THE COURT ORDERS, BY CONSENT, THAT:
2.Pursuant to section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 ("the Act"), the proposed stage 2 hormone treatment of Laura, being the administration of oestrogen to be administered in such dose and manner and with such frequency as determined by her medical treating team is authorised by this Court, with Laura otherwise authorised to make her own decision in relation to that treatment.
3.In the event parental consent is also required, both parents are to do all things and sign all documents necessary to provide the required consents for the Child to access oestrogen treatments as prescribed, within seven (7) days of a request being made to sign or give such consent.
4.Each parent is at liberty to provide a copy of the non-anonymised orders to all persons involved in Laura’s treatment.
5.For the purposes of the relevant state Births, Deaths and Marriages Act, a change of name for the child born 2008 from "James” to “Laura" is approved by the Court.
6.For the purposes of the relevant state Births, Deaths and Marriages Act, the Registrar of the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages is to register the change of name from “James” to “Laura" and issue a change of name certificate.
7.Laura and each of the parents be permitted to provide a copy of the non-anonymised orders to the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for the purpose of effecting the change of name contemplated by these Orders.
8.Laura’s full name, her family members, her medical practitioners, the Court file number, the State in which the proceedings were initiated and any other fact or matter that might identify Laura shall not be published in any way.
9.Only anonymised reasons for judgment and orders (with cover sheets excluding the registry, file name and number, and lawyers' names and details, as well as Laura’s real name, (both past and present) shall be released by the Court to non-parties without an Order of a Judge.
10.No persons shall be permitted to search the court file without leave of this court.
11.All extant applications are otherwise dismissed.
12.There be no Orders as to costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Re: Laura has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns a child, formally assigned male at birth, legally named James (“the child”). The child was born in 2008 to the mother and the father (collectively “the parents”) and is now 17 years old. The matter has been brought to the Court seeking orders that fall within the child welfare jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1). An Independent Children’s Lawyer was appointed, on short notice, at the request of the Court on 9 April 2025.
All parties, by consent, ask the Court to declare that the child has capacity and competency to made decisions in relation to “stage two” treatment for Gender Dysphoria, and to permit the child to change their legal name to ‘Laura’.
ROLE OF THE COURT
Much has recently been made in the media about gender affirming treatment and this Court. In light of this, it is crucial to re-iterate the apoliticality and independence of the Court. As stated by Tree J in Re Ash (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 777 at [51] (“Re Ash (No 4)”), “my task as a judge is not to resolve political disputes, and certainly not ones which seem to have presently polarised large parts of the world”. Similarly, Strum J in Re Devin [2025] FedCFamC1F 211 affirmed at [24] (“Re Devin”), “Ideology has no place in the application by courts of the law, and certainly not in the determination by courts exercising jurisdiction under [the Act]…”.
All decisions of this Court are based on evidence and made in accordance with the inherent rules of law and the statutory guidance of relevant acts of parliament.
TERMINOLOGY
At the outset of this matter, it is important to clarify certain points of terminology.
The Court acknowledges that there is potential psychological harm in referring to a transgender, or non-binary person, by the name listed on their birth certificate after they have chosen a new name. As explained in the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s Case Outline Document filed 6 May 2025 at paragraph 50 (“the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s Case Outline”), this practice is colloquially referred to as calling someone by their “dead name”. The Independent Children’s Lawyer asserts that the masculinity of the name ‘James’ causes the child disquiet. To avoid offense or harm to the child at the centre of these proceedings, they will be referred to with feminine pronouns under their preferred name of Laura (“Laura”) throughout the balance of these reasons for judgment.
Any subsequent reference to “stage two” gender affirming treatment should be understood through the relevant state framework for gender-affirming care (Exhibit C3) and the explanation provided by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, “the administration of hormonal medication to initiate the (sic) secondary sexual characteristics and appearance of the female sex” (Independent Children’s Lawyer’s Case Outline, paragraph 39).
JURISDICTION
There is no reason to doubt that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) is empowered to make orders relating to the welfare of children. Section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) confers the ability to make orders “analogous to orders traditionally made by courts exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 219 CLR 365 at [51] – [53]; Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Reform Bill 1994 (Cth)).
Section 67ZC enables orders pertaining to the Gillick competence of any child (see Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 (“Gillick”) and SMB and JWB; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (Re Marion) (1992) 175 CLR 218). In the context of gender affirming treatment, ‘orders’ should not be interpreted as excluding any inherent declaratory power of the Court (Re Kelvin (2017) FLC 93-809 at [68] (“Re Kelvin”)). Such powers must be exercised with a paramount regard to the best interests of the child (see s 60CB & s 60CC of the Act).
This matter comes before the Court in unusual circumstances. Proceedings of this nature would generally not require Court authorisation, as outlined by the Full Court in Re Kelvin at [226]:
…
Question 2: Where:
2.1 Stage 2 treatment of a child for Gender Dysphoria is proposed;
2.2. The child consents to the treatment;
2.3. The treating medical practitioners agree that the child is Gillick competent to give that consent; and
2.4. The parents of the child do not object to the treatment
is it mandatory to apply to the Family Court for a determination whether the child is Gillick competent (Bryant CJ at [136-137, 140(e)]; Finn J at [186] and Strickland J at [196] Re Jamie)?
Answer: No.
Notwithstanding this, the Court clearly has jurisdiction to make the orders sought. Indeed, in the current proceedings, the parents, the Independent Children’s Lawyer, Laura, and her medical treaters are all in agreement that it would be in the best interests of Laura to formally change her name, and for her to undergo “stage two” gender affirming treatment. None of the parties raise questions as to the Gillick competence of Laura.
BACKGROUND
According to Laura, she has had gender dysphoric thoughts since she was in lower primary school; approximately seven or eight years old. It is unclear when Laura first began to desire a name change. However, since 2020, Laura has been known, informally, as such by close friends.
The mother first became aware of Laura’s gender dysphoria struggles in late 2021 after receiving a call from a school social worker who was concerned about Laura expressing self-harming and suicidal thoughts. After receiving this call, the mother went through Laura’s iPad and social media messages where she discovered conversations in which Laura stated words to the effect of “I’m a girl trapped in a boy’s body” (Affidavit of the mother filed 17 February 2025, paragraph 39 (“the mother’s affidavit”)). Shortly after this incident, Laura confided in her mother about her Gender Dysphoria and its impact on her mental health.
Laura commenced seeing a counsellor in 2022. This counsellor was ultimately pivotal in later connecting her with specialist treaters at B Service; a specialist, multidisciplinary service that assists gender diverse children and young adults based at C Hospital.
Laura undertook her first medical consultation at B Service in early 2023. Since that point, Laura has had interactions with psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers and paediatric endocrinologists, through B Service, with varying forms of treatment occurring on:
·Mid-April 2023;
·Late April 2023;
·Early June 2023;
·Late June 2023;
·Early July 2023;
·Early July 2023;
·Late July 2023;
·September 2023;
·November 2023;
·June 2024;
·September 2024;
·Mid-October 2024;
·Late October 2024; and
·November 2024.
Laura was first formally diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria in mid-2023. The Court understands that she wished to commence puberty blockers; gender affirming treatment “stage one”, shortly following her diagnosis. For various reasons, this did not take place.
Dr D, a psychiatrist at B Service, affirmed in her Affidavit of filed 27 February 2025 that Laura continues to meet the diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria (DSM-V-TR) and the criteria for the World Health Organisation definition of gender incongruence (ICD-11).
Laura’s diagnosis aligned with the period, in or around mid-2023, where she first socially transitioned and began living and identifying as a female publicly. Her transition coincided with significant social backlash from her peers at school and from members of the maternal and paternal families. Laura experienced significant mental health concerns in and around early 2024.
The Court understands that Laura continues to engage with mental health support services such as “Headspace, the Child and Adolescent Mental Health service and [E Program]” (Independent Children’s Lawer’s Case Outline, paragraph 15). Notwithstanding this, her depression allegedly continues to worsen as she progresses into male puberty.
MATERIAL BEFORE THE COURT
In support of the case, the applicant relies upon the following material:
·Application for Final Orders filed 18 February 2025;
·Affidavit of the mother filed 18 February 2025;
·Affidavit of the mother filed 18 February 2025 (Non-Filling of Family Dispute Resolution Certificate);
·Annexure J to the Affidavit of the mother filed 18 February 2025 (Exhibit C1); and
·Affidavit of Dr D filed 27 February 2025.
In support of the case, the Independent Children’s Lawyer relies upon the following material:
·Case Outline Document filed 6 May 2025;
·Letter from Dr F to Mr G dated 10 December 2024 (Exhibit C2);
·Views and Wishes Statement of Laura dated 16 April 2025 (Exhibit ICL1); and
·State framework for gender-affirming care (Exhibit C3).
In circumstances where the practitioners took the Court to, and tendered, varying documents during the hearing, but few formal Exhibit numbers were allocated, the Court has taken the liberty of marking certain material in Chambers; indicated by ‘C’ Exhibit labelling.
THE LAW
Gender dysphoria
The Court agrees with the law as stated by Watts J in Re Imogen (No. 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344 and respectfully extracts this below:
[28]In Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 (“Marion’s case”), the High Court of Australia held that at common law and under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) a parent generally has power to consent to medical treatment of their child, but adopted the approach explained by the House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, that the parental power to consent on behalf of a child diminishes as the child’s capacities and maturities grow: a child is capable of giving informed consent, and a parent is no longer capable of consenting on the child’s behalf, when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed (at 237 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). This capability has become known as “Gillick competence”.
[29]In Marion’s case, the High Court at 250-252 drew a distinction between “therapeutic” and “non-therapeutic” procedures finding that non-therapeutic medical procedures and particularly those which in combination:
a) Require invasive, irreversible and major surgery;
b)Involve a significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future capacity to consent or about the best interests of a child who cannot consent; and
c) Where the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave,
required court approval notwithstanding the consent of a Gillick competent child, of the child’s parents and the treating medication practitioners.
…
[31]The Court has jurisdiction and power to determine a dispute, disagreement or controversy about consent by making an order or declaration as to Gillick competence under the welfare jurisdiction (s 67ZC of the Act); a parenting order (s 65D(1) and s 64B(2)(i) of the Act) or an order using the general powers conferred by s 34(1) of the Act (see Re Kelvin at [66]) including an order dismissing an application made under any of those sections. The Court has jurisdiction and power to determine a dispute, disagreement or controversy about treatment by making an order or declaration under the welfare jurisdiction or a parenting order.
…
[33]In Re Kelvin, the Full Court determined that:
a)Given the current state of medical knowledge, stage 2 treatment was therapeutic and was treatment for which consent no longer lies outside the bounds of parental authority or requires the imprimatur of the court (reversing the position in Re Jamie), and
b)In respect of stage 2, if the child, the parents and the medical practitioners agree a child is Gillick competent, there was no need for the Court to determine Gillick competence (reversing the position in Re Jamie), and
c)If all agree, a Gillick competent child can consent to stage 2 treatment, and
d)If a child is not Gillick competent and the treating medical practitioners agree, the child’s parents can consent to stage 2 treatment without court approval.
[34]For the sake of completeness, if all agree, the law is the same for stage 3 treatment and there is no necessity for this Court to determine whether the subject child is Gillick competent before stage 3 treatment for Gender Dysphoria can proceed (see Rees J in Re Matthew [2018] FamCA 161 at [46]).
Name change
The Full Court considered the change of a child’s name in Chapman & Palmer [1978] FLC 90-510 (“Champman & Palmer”). At 77-674 the Full Court said:
The general principle appears to be that the Court will not intervene to prevent a parent from changing the surname of a child in the custody or care and control of that parent (or to direct that a name be restored where a change has occurred), unless the Court is satisfied that the change was made without the consent of the other parent and that it does not promote the welfare of the child. The same principle applies when the Court is asked to direct that a surname be restored where a change has already occurred. In deciding the issue in each case there is no onus of proof. It is for the Court to balance in its discretion the factors for and against change. The guiding principle is that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It must stand above the wishes or proprietary interests of the parents.
The Full Court provided further assistance at 77-676 and 77-677:
…the factors to which the Court should have regard in determining whether there should be any change in the surname of a child include the following:
(a) The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration;
(b) The short and long-term effects of any change in the child’s surname;
(c)Any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child if its name is different from that of the parent with custody or care and control;
(d)Any confusion of identity which may arise for the child if his or her name is changed or is not changed;
(e)The effect which any change in surname may have on the relationship between the child and the parent whose name the child bore during the marriage or relationship; and
(f) The effect of frequent or random changes of name.
DISCUSSION
Gillick competence
Gillick competence is a question of fact that requires the Court to determine, on the evidence, whether “a child seeking advice has sufficient understanding of what is involved to give a consent valid in law” (Gillick at 118-119 per Lord Scarman). Chief Justice Bryant in Re: Jamie (2013) FLC 93-547 at [134], stated that the question of Gillick competence will be answered in the affirmative for “stage two” gender affirming treatment where the evidence proves that the child has achieved “sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed”.
Justice Tree in Re: Elliott [2017] FamCA 1008 at [22] affirmed a list of factors, first produced by Johnston J in Re: Lincoln (No 2) [2016] FamCA 1071, that may inform Gillick competence. This Court accepts these guidelines and reproduces them below:
•An ability to comprehend and retain both existing and new information regarding the proposed treatment;
•An ability to provide a full explanation, in terms appropriate to the child’s level of maturity and education, of the nature of the treatment;
•An ability to describe the advantages of the treatment;
•An ability to describe the disadvantages of the treatment;
•An ability to waive the advantages and disadvantages in the balance, and arrive at an informed decision about whether or when the treatment should proceed;
•An acknowledgment that the treatment may not necessarily address all of the psychological and social difficulties experienced before its commencement;
•Being free, to the greatest extent possible, from temporary factors such as pressure of pain that could impair judgment in providing consent to the treatment.
On the facts of this case, it is clear that the Court must be satisfied that Laura fully understands the physical and mental impact, nature, scope, consequences, benefits and reversibility of “stage two” gender affirming treatment. Further, in the view of this Court; as additional to the factors outlined above, it is vital that Laura be proven to be, at least, on notice to the fact that there may be some unknown, un-forecast or as-yet-unrevealed repercussions to the treatment. This requirement stands as safeguard for the self-evident proposition that medical sciences are constantly advancing, and that what was once considered safe, may at some point in the future, with the benefit of hindsight, be later considered unacceptable.
In confirming Laura’s competence, the Court has special regard to Exhibit ICL1 and to the voluminous medical evidence in this matter.
The Court accepts as correct the medical chronology of Laura as outlined at paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s Case Outline:
31. [Laura] participated in three clinical assessments and interviews with [Dr D], a child and adolescent psychiatrist at [B Service]. Following that assessment, [Dr D] prepared a report for these proceedings dated 16 December 2024 (“[Dr D’s] report”).
32. In that report, [Dr D] deems [Laura] capable of making an informed decision in relation to the proposed treatment. [Dr D] further reports that [Laura]:
a) indicated she understood the information provided to her in relation to effects (reversible and irreversible), side effects, impact on mental health, medical workup and monitoring and sexual function and fertility;
b) has been clear about her treatment goals and has indicated what the treatment can and cannot do;
c) is realistic in her expectation of engaging in the proposed treatment, with those expectations being in line with what the treatment can do10; and
d) can speak to the pros and cons of both accessing treatment and not accessing treatment.
33. On 20 November 2024, following consultation with paediatric endocrinologist [Dr F], [Laura] signed a [B Service] Consent Form which outlined permanent effects, reversible changes, potential and specific risks and negative side effects. In that form, she confirmed that she understands the potential benefits and side effects of oestrogen treatment.
34. On 16 December 2024, paediatric endocrinologist [Dr F] confirmed that she was satisfied [Laura] “understands the nature of the proposed treatment and the consequences of both the treatment in terms of intended and possible side-effects and, also, the possible consequences of failure to treat”.
To the extent that it is probative, the mother affirms that Laura “understands what is involved, including the risks, and she is committed to living as a female” (the mother’s affidavit, page 15), and Laura self-reports that she has “heavily researched the effect of the proposed treatment and understands the effects, including the intended effects, the side-effects and the effects which cannot be reversed” (Exhibit ICL1).
The Court is also comforted by the content contained within Annexure J to the mother’s affidavit (Exhibit C1). Annexure J features a B Service “Informed Consent for Treatment With Oestrogen” form signed by Laura on 20 November 2024. Upon reading the content of Annexure J, it is clear that the unknowability of certain outcomes, including consequences not explicitly written on the form, were contemplated. Two of the clauses within the consent form read, “I understand that there may be long term risks associated with oestrogen therapy that are not yet known”, and, “I understand that the changes outlined above will start shortly after treatment is initiated, but that the full physical impact of taking hormones may not be evident until several years of continuous treatment have been undertaken”.
The Court is satisfied that Laura would, upon reading, understanding and signing Exhibit C1, at least have been placed on notice of the fact that there may be some unknown, un-forecast or as-yet-unrevealed repercussions to the treatment.
On balance, given Laura’s age, the comprehensive medical records placed before the Court and the lay accounts from the mother and Laura herself, the Court is comfortably satisfied that Laura possesses Gillick competence to the requisite extent required to provide informed consent to “stage two” gender affirming treatment.
Best interests
It serves repeating, given the media controversy following recent decisions of this Court, that this is not a case akin to either Re Ash (No 4) nor Re Devin. As outlined at the opening to these reasons for judgment, the Court is not strictly required to determine whether “stage two” gender affirming treatment is in Laura’s best interests, where all parties consent, and the subject child is Gillick competent (Re Kelvin).
The Court has read the affidavit of Dr D and extracts two sections. The first at page 11:
[Laura’s] expectation of her future is specifically that of a female. Her aspirations are closely linked to being perceived as and treated as, a female. She has been persistent, insistent and consistent in this desire since being referred to [B Service] in 2023.
The second at page 14:
… [Laura's] mental health has declined to the point of suicide attempts in 2024.
She has socially transitioned. She has not been able to take any medication to feminise her appearance and this has caused her to be bullied by peers. She has to shave often, and sometimes is unable to leave her room due to distress from her masculinised body and facial hair.
Her gender identity has not changed since Y7, despite transphobic bullying by peers and being unaffirmed and misgendered by her father and being denied access to medical gender affirming care.
Her mental health has declined and she is now actively in mental health treatment -safety planning to protect her from self-harm and suicide ideation, as well as prescription antidepressant medication.
She has done everything she can to affirm her gender - informal name change, clothes (social transition). She is linked in with mental health treatment to keep her safe from further suicide attempts and to try to build a life for herself. She continues to experience dysphoria and distress around her gender.
For her, access to feminising treatment is gender affirming and will help alleviate her gender-related distress.
The Court agrees with the proposition that affirming Laura’s desire to identify as female through enabling her to begin “stage two” gender affirming treatment would positively influence her mental health. In the circumstances, if it had been required, I would have deemed commencing “stage two” gender affirming treatment to be in Laura’s best interests.
Name change
Little needs to be said with respect to Laura’s proposed name change in light of the reasons that have fallen above. The Court has significant evidence of the impact of Laura’s desire to identify as female on her mental health. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that allowing Laura to formally change her name will re-affirm her long desired female personal identity. An inference can be drawn from this, that resolving cognitive dissonance will go some way to alleviating the mental strain Laura is under. The Court, certainly, does not view that any harm would arise from any name change order made.
As identified in Chapman & Palmer, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration when considering any putative name change. It is plain that changing the child’s name to ‘Laura’ would achieve this.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE CHILD
The Court notes that these reasons for judgment follow an oral pronouncement of the orders made on 8 May 2025. Prior to the pronouncement, I sought clarification from the practitioners as to whether Laura would benefit from, and desire to, have her voice heard in Court. I was informed, by way of joint correspondence to my Chambers, that Laura sought to be virtually present whenever the Court intended to make orders, however, did not want to be seen or heard during the hearing.
The oral pronouncement of the orders accompanying these reasons for judgment occurred in a closed Court format to enable Laura to be virtually present. The practitioners, alongside the Court, viewed that a psychological benefit may accrue to Laura from her witnessing ‘justice being done’, from viewing the Court endorsing orders that affirm her gender identity, as well as from affording a near 17-year-old a sense of agency in a legal proceeding that affected them. Despite her initial reservations against being heard, Laura spoke to the Court directly after the orders were pronounced. She expressed her gratitude and thanked the Court.
The Court echoes the gratitude of Laura and highlights the collaborative and diligent work of all practitioners in these proceedings. In particular, the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s manner, conduct, preparation and submissions were of the highest order.
ORDERS MADE
The declaration, name change, and consequential procedural orders sought by the parties should be made. Nothing in the evidence has given the Court pause as to this conclusion. If anything, the material considered indicates that a substantial benefit will flow to Laura from the making of these orders.
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli. Associate:
Dated: 20 June 2025
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