Re Kordatos, Steve Ex Parte Batounas, Michael Theodosiou

[1996] FCA 613

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA     )
GENERAL DIVISION  )
   No. QP 275 of 1996
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE             )
STATE OF QUEENSLAND  )

RE:STEVE KORDATOS

EX PARTE:MICHAEL THEODOSIOU BATOUNAS

MINUTES OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:     Spender J

DATE OF ORDER:          15 July 1996

WHERE MADE:              Brisbane

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. A sequestration order is made against the estate of Steve Kordatos;

1. The costs of and incidental to the creditor's petition, including any reserved costs, be taxed and paid in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

NOTE:     Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA     )
GENERAL DIVISION  )
   No.  QP 275 of 1996
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE             )
STATE OF QUEENSLAND  )

RE:STEVE KORDATOS

EX PARTE:MICHAEL THEODOSIOU BATOUNAS

CORAM:    Spender J
DATE:     15 July 1996
PLACE:    Brisbane

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is a creditor's petition which arises out of most unfortunate circumstances.  The fact of the matter is that these proceedings are simply the culmination of a long history of dispute between the petitioning creditor, Michael Theodosiou Batounas, and the debtor, Steve Kordatos.  The material before me, not all of which is in proper form, but which I have had regard to out of a concern that nothing be overlooked that may be relevant to the making of a sequestration order, indicates that what essentially is a very small matter has resulted in litigation of an extensive kind and which has led to the making of costs orders for significant amounts.  Apparently the debtor had done work for the petitioning creditor in relation to the translation of a Greek text.

Subsequently, a defamation action took place, as the result of which the debtor was successful.  An appeal to the Court of Appeal, however, was successful and the order of the
Court of Appeal was that the appeal be allowed and that the judgment below be set aside, the action below be dismissed with costs to be taxed and the respondent, that is, Mr Kordatos, pay the costs of the appeal to be taxed.  On 16 November 1995 the Deputy Taxing Officer and Deputy Registrar of the District Court taxed the costs in the District Court pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeal and those taxed costs were allowed in the sum of $12,515.67. 

It is that claim which founds the bankruptcy notice and on which the petition is brought, although there are other costs now that attend this series of litigation.  Mr Kordatos sought special leave to appeal from the High Court of Australia, but special leave was refused.  There is before me an affidavit by Anthony David Gray, which is, I would have to say, disturbing in a number of respects, no less because, in a number of important points, Mr Gray directly and indirectly asserts that the process of the various courts was the subject of abuse and that the Courts themselves failed in the discharge of their functions.

Courts exist to resolve disputes on the material before them, and if people are dissatisfied with the results of the court decision, then avenues are available to have those decisions rectified.  Mr Gray in particular said that Mr Kordatos is "rightly" dissatisfied with the decisions which have been made in the Court of Appeal, "and it is unfortunate, to say the least, that he was not able to have a judicial
review of the matter before the High Court of Australia".  The fact is that the High Court considered his application for special leave and that that was unsuccessful.  In those circumstances, the decision of the Court of Appeal concerning the proper disposition of the proceedings in the District Court is the concluded determination with respect to those matters.

It is, however, and I acknowledge this quite frankly, a matter of great regret that this dispute, which at one stage turns around the question of possession of tools and the making of claims in respect of tools which had a value of about $70, should lead to this terrible situation developing.    

The material before me shows that Mr Kordatos is very highly regarded, particularly in his work as a translator and interpreter; that the consequences for him are significant, particularly in the community of which he is an important part. The fact of the matter is, however, that the making of a sequestration order will not, of itself, prevent Mr Kordatos from continuing with his valuable work, and the fears that he has are, in my view, not able to be substantiated. I was concerned that there might, in the material, have been a suggestion that those matters which are referred to in s 52 could be prayed in aid for the purpose of declining to make a sequestration order.

Section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") provides that:

"At the hearing of a creditor's petition, the Court shall require proof of:

(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);

(b)service of the petition; and

(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;

and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. "

Subsection 2 provides:

"If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:

(a)that he is able to pay his debts; or

(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;

it may dismiss the petition. "

I have looked carefully at the material, and in particular the suggestion in Mr Gray's affidavit of solvency, and that there were unavailed avenues on which the petitioning creditor might satisfy the judgment debt, the subject of the petition.  However, having regard to the totality of the material, and in particular the steps that have been taken concerning satisfaction of the judgment debt which are referred to in Mr Conroy's affidavit of 5 July 1996, it seems to me that I have no option but to make the sequestration
order that has been sought.  The material filed by Mr Kordatos and on his behalf is testimony to the regard and value of his services to the community.

However, I am constrained by the laws that relate to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 to proceed according to law. It is a matter, as I say, of sadness that this deep dispute between the petitioning creditor and the debtor should have had the expensive consequences that it has had. I am, however, constrained by the law, and, on the material before me, I am satisfied of the matters of which the Act requires proof. I note that Paul Sweeney, a registered trustee, has consented to act as trustee of the estate of the debtor in the event of a sequestration order being made against him.

I make a sequestration order against the estate of Steve Kordatos and order that the costs of and incidental to the petition, including any reserved costs be taxed and paid in accordance with the Act.

Those are the orders that I have made. 

I certify that this and the  preceding four (4) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Spender.

Associate

Date: 15 July 1996

The debtor appeared in person.

Counsel for the petitioning
         creditor             :         Mr L Boccabella
instructed by                  :         Conroy and Associates

Date of Hearing                :         15 July 1996