Re JN Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Liq)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

Re: JN TAYLOR HOLDINGS LIMITED (IN LIQ)

[2007] SASC 193

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Debelle

25 May 2007

PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - PROCEEDINGS IN OPEN COURT OR IN CAMERA

Application by liquidator for leave to compromise debt – application that the hearing be in closed court - whether court has power to close court – in what circumstances court will close court – whether court has power to seal up confidential documents and other material adduced in evidence.

CORPORATIONS - WINDING UP - LIQUIDATORS

Companies – winding up – liquidator’s application for leave to compromise debt – whether application should be heard in closed court – relevant principles – leave granted.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 477(2A), s 477(2B), s 596A, s 596B; Evidence Act 1929 s 69, s 69A; Supreme Court Act 1935 s 46A, s 131; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 6(2), s 71; Corporations Rules 2003 R 1.8, R 11.3; Supreme Court Rules 1987 R 62.07; Supreme Court Rules 2006 R 9, referred to.
Andrew v Raeburn (1874) LR 9 Ch App 522; Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440; Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228; re Chase Corporation (Australia) Equities Pty Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 1118; re GA Listing and Maintenance Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 308; re HIH Insurance Ltd [2004] NSWSC 5; re HIH Insurances Ltd [2005] NSWSC 731; re HIH Insurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 498; re Mineral Securities Australia Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 207; re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 9 ACSR 83; re Walker Hare Pty Ltd (in liq) [1968] VR 447; Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495; Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417; State Bank of NSW v Turner Corporation Trust (1994) 14 ACSR 480, applied.
Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v Levinstein (1883) 24 Ch D 156; Chapman v Luminis (No 4) (2001) 123 FCR 62; Corporate Affairs Commission v ASC Timber Pty Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 109; David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294; McLachlan v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (No 2) [1998] SASC 7005; Mellor v Thompson (1886) 31 Ch D 55; R v Chief Registrar of Friendly Society; ex parte New Cross Building Society [1984] QB 227; re A Former Officer of ASIO [1987] VR 875; re Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (2005) 23 ACLC 834; re Parker (deceased); Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Company Ltd v King [1948] SASR 141; TK v Australian Red Cross Society (1989) 1 WAR 335; Woolworths Ltd v Olson (2004) 184 FLR 121, considered.

RE: JN TAYLOR HOLDINGS LIMITED (IN LIQ)
[2007] SASC 193

Civil

  1. DEBELLE J.        This is an application by a liquidator for leave to compromise a debt and for leave to enter into an agreement to effect that compromise where the agreement…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 193
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Re JN Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Liq) involved the liquidator of JN Taylor Holdings Ltd, who applied for leave to compromise a debt. The liquidator also requested that the hearing of this application be conducted in a closed court, where only the parties, their legal representatives, and other persons authorised by the court could be present. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The primary legal issues revolved around whether the court had the power to close the court, under what circumstances this power could be exercised, and whether the court had the authority to seal up confidential documents and other materials presented as evidence.

The court examined the inherent power of the judiciary to control its own proceedings, as well as the provisions of the Evidence Act concerning suppression orders. It found that the court has the power to close the court and conduct the hearing in camera to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information and ensure the proper administration of justice. The court also determined that it has the authority to seal up confidential documents and transcripts to maintain their confidentiality, in line with section 69A(2) of the Evidence Act. The decision in Re HIH Insurances Ltd highlighted the competing public interests at play, including the public interest in the open administration of justice and the due and beneficial administration of insolvent estates by liquidators. The court concluded that in certain circumstances, such as those presented in this case, the special circumstances and need for confidentiality outweighed the public interest in open justice.

In summary, the court granted the liquidator's application for leave to compromise the debt and also allowed the hearing to be conducted in a closed court, with orders to seal up confidential documents and other materials to preserve their confidentiality. The decision underscored the importance of balancing the public interest in open justice with the need to protect sensitive information and ensure the proper administration of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In his reasons for referring this application to a judge, the Master noted that, with one exception, the practice of placing documents and exhibits in sealed envelopes at the request of liquidators is not authorised by any rule of court or by any considered judicial decision. The exception is Rule 11.3 of the Corporations Rules which authorises documents in support of an application under s 596A and s 596B of the Corporations Act to be placed in sealed envelopes. As the Master observed, that rule has no operation on this application. With respect the Master has failed to take into account the full extent of the inherent power of the court to control its proceedings. Regard must also be had to the effect of s 69A of the Evidence Act.Should a court order that proceedings be heard in closed court, the order would be frustrated if steps were not taken to preserve the confidentiality of those confidential documents tendered at the hearing. It is for that reason that, as a matter of practice, documents are placed in sealed envelopes which may not be opened except by order of a judge of this court. Section 69A(2) of Evidence Act An order placing documents in a sealed envelope is effectively a form of suppression order. Section 69A(1) permits this court to make a suppression order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. Section 69A(2) of the Evidence Act spells out matters to which the court should have regard when making that suppression order. It is in these terms:If a court is considering whether to make a suppression order (other than an interim suppression order), the court – (a) must recognise that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice and the consequential right of the news media to publish information relating to court proceedings; and (b) may only make a suppression order if satisfied that special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice, or undue hardship, to justify the making of the order in the particular case. Section 69A(2)(b) does not prevent an order sealing up documents where it has been determined that the public disclosure of those documents would defeat the interests of justice. The purpose of an order sealing up confidential documents is to provide a means of preserving the confidentiality of those documents in a case where the court has already determined that the court should be closed or other measures taken to preserve that confidentiality. It is an instance of the principles of open justice yielding to the more fundamental principle of ensuring that justice is done and that the subject matter of the action is not destroyed. Implicit in that decision is that there are special circumstances which give rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice as to warrant the documents being sealed up. In that way the terms of s 69A(2)(b) are satisfied.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DEBELLE J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DEBELLE J

For these reasons, the court has inherent power to close the court and sit in camera for either the whole or part of the hearing of this application. The court also has power to make orders to the extent necessary for the purpose of preserving the confidentiality of confidential documents and the transcript relating to the application. The Public Interest in the Beneficial Administration of Liquidators In re HIH Insurances Ltd [2005] NSWSC 731 at [10] to [12], an application by liquidators for approval of a compromise, Barrett J identified two other aspects of the public interest which compete with the public interest of open justice. Exercising the power invested in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by s 80 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), he closed the court to hear the application for approval of the compromise. He said:10In the present case, I see two other public interests as competing with the public interest in the open justice. The first is the public interest in the due and beneficial administration of the estates of insolvent companies under the Corporations Act by liquidators appointed by and answerable to the court, that administration being for the benefit of creditors. The public interest in the due administration of the insolvent estates of the HIH companies is particularly pronounced where there are many thousands of creditors from all walks of life. The liquidators are officers of the court and are entitled to have the court appropriately facilitate such actions as they may properly take in the interests of creditors and in the furtherance of the public interest to which I have just referred.11The second competing public interest arises from the fact that the agreements in respect of which application is made under s 477(2B) are agreements concerned with the pursuit of litigation. All the actions in contemplation are actions in this court. There is a clear public interest in the due administration of justice in that litigation. The liquidators who propose to pursue it for the benefit of creditors should, as a general matter, have an expectation that they will be able to do so free from distortions of a kind that would not arise if the litigation were pursued by an ordinary litigant in the ordinary way. Unlike ordinary litigants who pursue litigation in the ordinary way, liquidators in the position of the present applications are required to come to the court to seek approval if and when it becomes appropriate for them to enter into contracts not to be performed within the space of three months. Were it not for that requirement and for the supervision of the Court in that respect, the liquidators would, like other litigants, merely go ahead and enter into the agreements to which the confidentiality concerns relate. 12The administration of justice is, in my view, very likely to be prejudiced in two ways by availability to the potential defendants of (and any public airing of) the information concerning the liquidators’ proceedings that will inevitably be divulged by the adducing of evidence and the making of submissions on the hearing of the s 477(2B) applications. There is a likelihood of a real and negative impact upon the due and orderly conduct of the proposed proceedings themselves, in that the defendants in them will have access to information that, in the ordinary course, a plaintiff is entitled to keep confidential in the plaintiff’s own interests. Any such access would produce an undue distorting effect in relation to the due conduct of those proceedings themselves. There is also a likelihood of a real and negative impact upon the due conduct of the several windings up by the court in the interests of the creditors of the respective companies. Although there have been changes in the legislative landscape since the decision of Marks J in Re Timberland Ltd; Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Harvey [1980] VR 669, I think it is still generally true to say, as his Honour there said, that “[t]he winding up is by the court which for the purpose of the liquidator is”. In saying this, I do not mean to imply that a liquidator in a court ordered winding up enjoys some privileged position, as compared with any other litigant; merely that the fact that a winding up is a winding up by the court means that it in its own right an aspect of the process of the administration of justice. His Honour was satisfied that in the particular circumstance of the application before him, those two interests outweighed the public interest in open justice. He expressed his conclusion in these terms at [13]: The special circumstances of the liquidators and the statutory functions they perform, coupled with the need for them to come to court on this occasion to seek leave in a way that an ordinary litigant does not have to seek, sets the case apart in such a way that justice will best be served by an examination of the matters the liquidators are bound to raise with the court in an atmosphere where they can lay them before the court fully and frankly and without any apprehension that the interests they are bound to serve will thereby be prejudiced. Applying the terminology used by Viscount Haldane LC in Scott v Scott, I am of the opinion that the paramount object of securing that justice is done in both the proceedings instituted by the liquidators’ filing of statements of claim and the respective windings up will really be rendered doubtful of attainment if an order under s 80 is not made. His Honour then proceeded to hear the application in camera.