Re Irving; McCann v Lamb
[2019] VSC 594
•30 August 2019
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
TRUSTS, EQUITY & PROBATE LIST
S CI 2017 04439
IN THE MATTER of the will and estate of VICTOR JAMES WILLIAM IRVING, deceased
-and-
IN THE MATTER of the CERES TENNIS COURTS TRUST
-and-
IN THE MATTER of section 2 of the Charities Act 1978
-and-
IN THE MATTER of an application pursuant to rule 54.02 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 for the determination of questions arising in the administration of the estate
BETWEEN:
| WILLIAM SYDNEY MCINTYRE MCCANN (as Trustee of the CERES TENNIS COURTS TRUST) and others (according to the Schedule attached) | Plaintiffs |
| v | |
| JOHN WILLIAM BADEN LAMB (in his capacity as the Executor by Representation of the Will of VICTOR JAMES WILLIAM IRVING, deceased) and others (according to the Schedule attached) | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | McMillan J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 5 February 2019 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 30 August 2019 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re Irving; McCann v Lamb |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2019] VSC 594 |
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CHARITABLE TRUSTS — Trust created by minutes of meetings — Gift of land for construction of two tennis courts and for creation of club — Whether trust for advancement of religion — Whether general charitable intention exists — Whether trust should be applied cy-près — Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor (1934) 51 CLR 1 — Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley [1955] AC 572 — Attorney-General v Cahill [1969] 1 NSWR 85 — Anglican Trusts Corporation of the Diocese of Gippsland v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2008] VSC 352.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr R Boaden | Whyte Just & Moore |
| For the Defendant | Mr RC Wells | Ingpen & Bent |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
Victor James William Irving died on 27 March 1963. On 27 June 1963, probate of his will was granted to his widow, Myrtle Harriet Irving. She died on 15 April 1970. On 21 August 1970, probate of her will was granted to Ada Jane Smith. Ada Smith died on 9 November 1977 and on 1 March 1978 probate of her will was granted to the first defendant, John William Baden Lamb. John Lamb became the executor by representation of the deceased’s will and estate.
The plaintiffs are the trustees of the Ceres Tennis Courts Trust (‘the trust’), which was created in 1926 when the deceased made a gift of land at 6 Wheatsheaf Street, Ceres, Victoria (‘the land’) to six persons as trustees. The terms of the trust are set out in the minutes of two meetings that took place in July 1925.
On 8 April 1985, the last surviving trustee of the original six trustees, Ernest Wesley McCann, died. Ernest McCann was survived by his wife and their four children. The children are the plaintiffs in this proceeding. On 11 June 1985, probate of Ernest McCann’s will was granted to the plaintiffs.
A dispute has since arisen over the legal status of the trust.
Plaintiffs’ application
On 2 November 2017, the plaintiffs filed an originating motion, supported by an affidavit of the third plaintiff, seeking answers to the following questions:
1.Is the land situate at and known as 6 Wheatsheaf Street, Ceres in the State of Victoria, being part of Crown Allotment 12, Parish of Barrabool and the subject of the Conveyance registered on 6 October 1926 by the Registrar General as Deed Registered Number 607 Book 520, ‘the land’, held by the plaintiffs as the trustees for the time being of the Ceres Tennis Courts Trust, ‘the trust’, held by the plaintiffs on a valid charitable trust?
2.Was the trust of the land a valid charitable trust at its inception?
3.Did the trust of the land fail as a charitable trust at its inception?
4.Has the trust of the land become impossible to administer?
5.If yes to question 4,
(a)does the land result to the legal personal representative of its original owner and donor, Victor James William Irving; or
(b)should the land now be administered pursuant to a cy-près scheme to be approved by the Court.
If the trust should be applied cy-près, the plaintiffs seek an order approving such a scheme.
Factual background
By conveyance dated 30 September 1926, the deceased conveyed the land to Ernest Wesley McCann, Lawrence Alexander Anderson, Laurence Roderick Bruce Anderson, John William Frank Mann, Horace Edgar Leigh and himself (‘the purchasers’).
The conveyance recited that the deceased desired to make a gift of the land to the purchasers as joint tenants. The conveyance did not specify the purpose for which the purchasers were to hold the land, however, it is common ground that the purpose was to make the land available for construction of two tennis courts for what would later become the United Churches Club (‘the Club’).
The terms of the trust and the deceased’s intentions with respect to the trust are not recorded in the conveyance. Instead, these matters appear to be set out in the minutes of two meetings: the first held on 21 July 1925 and the second on 30 July 1925. In attendance at these meetings were two members of the Anglican Church, two members of the Methodist Church and two members of the Presbyterian Church.
At the meeting held on 21 July 1925, the following resolution was passed:
Mr Vic Irving’s offer of ground for 2 courts under his condition namely that 2 Trustees from each church be elected, and that the Club be called the United Churches Club, be accepted.
At the meeting held on 30 July 1925, six people—two members from each of the three churches, were elected and designated as ‘trustees’. The conveyance was executed on 30 September 1926 and registered on 6 October 1926.
The minutes of the meetings in July 1925 are scant in content, however, they indicate that the deceased intended to establish a trust over the land. This is apparent from the deceased’s offer of his land as a gift to the purchasers on the condition that two members from each church be elected as trustees and the subsequent election of those trustees. The reference to the trustees in the minutes does not suggest that the trustees were already trustees of the churches or any other organisation and that the term ‘trustees’ was some pre-existing designation. Instead, the deceased intended that these members take the land as trustees and, therefore, he intended to establish a trust, the subject matter of the trust being the land.
The parties were in contention about the terms of the trust. According to the plaintiffs, the minutes of the meetings constitute the terms of the trust. According to the first defendant, neither the affidavit of the third plaintiff nor the minutes themselves reveal the origin of the minutes or the name of the organisation that is meeting.
The minutes are single-page handwritten documents. The handwriting appears to be the same in both documents. Each document, for the most part, is legible and records motions and resolutions made at the respective meetings. The author of the minutes, assuming it is the same person, is unknown and the minutes do not record the name of the organisation, if any, that is meeting. Nothing turns on these omissions. The parties are agreed that no organisation had been in existence at the time of the meeting and that those present at the meeting intended to establish the Club upon the gifting of the land. Despite their deficiencies, and in the absence of any evidence that casts doubt over their authenticity, the minutes should be taken to constitute the terms of the trust.
It seems that the tennis courts were constructed and initially used as the deceased had intended, however, at some unknown date, they fell into disuse. The local council has not granted permission for the land to be used as tennis courts and the land now lies vacant, not being used for any particular purpose.
Applicable principles
The creation of a charitable trust requires certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter and identification of a charitable purpose.[1] A charitable trust is a trust for a purpose, not for a person.[2] In determining whether a trust is charitable, it is necessary to determine the purpose of the trust. That purpose must be public, not private, and carrying out the trust’s object must confer a benefit on the public or at least a section of the community.[3]
[1]Re Marks; Letcher v Indian [2017] VSC 665, [49] (McMillan J), citing Westlaw, Ford and Lee: The Law of Trusts (at 1 June 2017) [2000]; GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2017) 421.
[2]BSH Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2000) 2 VR 454, 456 [9] (Hansen J), citing Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1940) 63 CLR 209, 222 (Dixon and Evatt JJ).
[3]Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531, 566 (‘Pemsel’).
A charitable trust must fall within one of the following four classes identified by Lord Macnaghten in Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel:
(a) trusts for the relief of poverty;
(b) trusts for the advancement of education;
(c) trusts for the advancement of religion; and
(d) trusts for other purposes that are beneficial to the community but that do not fall under any of the preceding classes.[4]
[4]Ibid 583.
Where a charitable purpose has altogether failed to take effect, the trust will also fail from the outset unless a ‘general charitable intention’ can be identified.[5] Identifying a general charitable intention requires considering the end to be achieved and any wider purpose beyond the particular plan detailed.[6] That wider purpose must be the dominant or substantial object to which the gift is devoted.[7] If a general charitable intention exists, the trust will be given effect and can be applied cy-près.
[5]Beggs v Kirkpatrick [1961] VR 764, 767 (Adam J).
[6]Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General (NSW) (1938) 60 CLR 396, 428 (Dixon J).
[7]Ibid.
Plaintiffs’ submissions
The plaintiffs submit that the trust was a charitable trust from its inception. According to the plaintiff, its purpose was the advancement of religion insofar as it provided members of the local Protestant churches with a venue for social and other activities. The plaintiffs submit that the trust’s purpose ceased at some later stage to provide a means for the use of the tennis courts. Since it had by then ‘vested in charity’, the trust did not fail and the plaintiffs submit that the trust should be applied cy-près. In the alternative, they contend that a general charitable intention existed on the part of the deceased and that the trust should therefore be applied cy-près.
First defendant’s submissions
The first defendant submits that the trust is not charitable and remains the property of the deceased’s successors at law.
The first defendant relies on the dearth of evidence as to the terms of the trust and the deceased’s original intentions. He submits that the deceased’s gift was made to facilitate the playing of tennis on courts to be constructed on the land and that members of the Club were to use the courts. The first defendant submits that in making the gift, the deceased had a specific intent, namely, that members of the Club would play tennis on the land, rather than a general charitable intention. He says that even if the promotion of the playing of tennis among members of the local Protestant churches was a means of advancing religion, the substantial purpose of the gift was not the advancement of religion, but the playing of tennis.
Is the trust a valid trust?
A trust for ‘mere sport’ is not charitable.[8] In Re Nottage, the testator bequeathed a sum of money on the condition that the interest accruing on that money would be spent on providing a cup to encourage yachting.[9] Lopes LJ did not accept that ‘a gift, the object of which is the encouragement of a mere sport or game primarily calculated to amuse individuals apart from the community at large’, was charitable, even if that sport or game benefited the public.[10] His reasoning was motivated by a reluctance to ‘open a very wide door’ through which courts would classify gifts for promoting other sports and games as charitable on the ground that they ‘promote[d] the health and bodily well-being of the community’.[11] Since then, courts have struck down trusts to promote other sports as non-charitable.[12]
[8]Re Nottage [1895] 2 Ch 649, 656 (Lopes LJ).
[9]Ibid.
[10]Ibid 656.
[11]Ibid 656.
[12]See, eg, Re Patten [1929] 2 Ch 276, which considers the teaching of cricket; Laing v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1948] NZLR 154, which considers rowing, swimming and athletics.
In determining whether a gift is charitable, the donor’s motive in making the gift is irrelevant.[13] The minutes of the meeting on 21 July 1925 envisage the construction of two courts, the election of trustees from different Protestant Churches and the creation of the United Churches Club. This suggests that the gift of the land was not likely to create a trust merely for sport. These last two features of the minutes raise the question whether the promotion of the playing of tennis is incidental to an accepted charitable purpose.
[13]Hoare v Osborne (1866) LR 1 Eq 585, 588.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor, Dixon J made the following remarks about the purposes of trusts for the advancement of religion:
In order to be charitable the purposes themselves must be religious; it is not enough that an activity or pursuit in itself secular is actuated or inspired by a religious motive or injunction: the purpose must involve the spread or strengthening of spiritual teaching within a wide sense, the maintenance of the doctrines upon which it rests, the observances that promote and manifest it …[14]
[14](1934) 51 CLR 1, 32 (citation omitted) (‘Lawlor’).
Dixon J listed several examples of gifts that may serve to execute a religious purpose:
The purpose may be executed by gifts for the support, aid or relief of clergy and ministers or teachers of religion, the performance of whose duties will tend to the spiritual advantage of others by instruction and edification; by gifts for ecclesiastical buildings, furnishings, ornaments and the like; by gifts to provide for religious services, for sermons, for music, choristers and organists, and so forth; by gifts to religious bodies, orders, or societies, if they have in view the welfare of others.[15]
[15]Ibid.
Dixon J further observed that ‘[a] gift made for any particular means of propagating a faith or a religious belief is charitable’.[16] The same applies to a disposition that, in general terms, devotes property to religious purposes or objects. Dixon J concluded:
But, whether defined widely or narrowly, the purposes must be directly and immediately religious. It is not enough that they arise out of or have a connection with a faith, a church, or a denomination, or that they are considered to have a tendency beneficial to religion, or to a particular form of religion.[17]
[16]Ibid.
[17]Ibid.
In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley, the testator made a bequest in the form of two conveyances of the same property.[18] The conveyances required the trustees to permit the leaders of a Methodist mission to use the property ‘for the promotion of the religious social and physical well-being’ and ‘for the promotion of the moral, social and physical well-being’ of residents in two boroughs.[19]
[18][1955] AC 572 (‘Baddeley’).
[19]Ibid 573.
The pursuits mentioned in the conveyances were to be promoted in two ways: first, by providing ‘facilities for religious services and instruction and for the social and physical training and recreation’ of those who are ‘members or likely to become members of the Methodist Church and of insufficient means’; and second, by providing ‘facilities for religious social and physical training and recreation and by promoting and encouraging all forms of such activities as are calculated to contribute to the health and well-being of such persons’.[20]
[20]Ibid.
Viscount Simonds (with whom Lord Porter agreed), Lord Tucker and Lord Somervell of Harrow each held that the trusts were not charitable as they did not fall into any of the classes identified by Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel.
Viscount Simonds said that the language used in the conveyances, including the references to ‘social’ wellbeing, were vague and general.[21] He also observed that while ‘[t]he moral, social and physical well-being of the community or any part of it is a laudable object of benevolence and philanthropy’, its ambit was ‘far too wide to include only purposes which the law regards as charitable’.[22]
[21]Ibid 589.
[22]Ibid.
In obiter, Viscount Simonds remarked that ‘a gift of land for use as a recreation ground by the community at large or by the inhabitants of a particular geographical area may well be supported as a valid charity’.[23] However, he left open the question whether the same principle would apply to a narrower class of beneficiaries determined, for example, by adherence to a particular religion.[24] Viscount Simonds held that the trusts did not confer a public benefit; the intended beneficiaries were ‘a class within a class’, namely, ‘inhabitants of a particular area who are members of a particular church’.[25]
[23]Ibid.
[24]Ibid.
[25]Ibid 591.
Lord Tucker considered ‘the promotion of social well-being’ to be ‘an extremely vague phrase which may have different meanings to different minds and may include things considered by some, but not by others, to be advantageous’.[26]
[26]Ibid 613.
Lord Somervell of Harrow held that the trusts did not benefit the public in such a way as to fall within the fourth class of charitable trusts in Pemsel. Echoing Viscount Simonds on the potential status of a gift of land for use as a recreation ground, Lord Somervell said:
There might well be a valid trust for the promotion of religion benefiting a very small class. It would not at all follow that a recreation ground for the exclusive use of the same class would be a valid charity, though it is clear from the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888, that a recreation ground for the public is a charitable purpose.[27]
[27]Ibid 615.
In Attorney-General v Cahill, the testator made a bequest ‘for formation and advancement of a Roman Catholic Boys’ Club’.[28] The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the gift was not incidental to a religious object. Wallace ACJ, with whom Asprey JA agreed, said:
The phrase ‘Boys’ Club’ without qualification would not … import or suggest elements such as underprivilege or age, illness, poverty, being orphaned and so on. The word ‘club’ conveys to my mind mainly an association of persons for purposes of social intercourse or some form of sport or for entertainment or the like. At all events in the context of the will I do not think the phrase can qualify for the carrying out of a charitable purpose. The addition of the qualification ‘Catholic’ merely creates another difficulty, namely, the intrusion of what has been described as irrelevance.[29]
[28][1969] 1 NSWR 85 (‘Cahill’).
[29]Ibid 93.
His Honour added that a ‘Catholic Boys’ Club’ was not an expression like ‘orders of nuns’ that included orders as used in a strict canonical sense.[30] Moreover, the phrase ‘Catholic Boys’ Club’ was too uncertain to have any charitable content.[31]
[30]Ibid.
[31]Ibid.
In Anglican Trusts Corporation of the Diocese of Gippsland v Attorney-General (Vic), the testatrix’s will established two trusts.[32] One of the trusts required the devised property to ‘be used for a camp by the girls of the Church of England, Diocese of Gippsland’.[33] Judd J held that this requirement was not for the advancement of religion and therefore not a valid charitable purpose. Drawing on the remarks of Dixon J in Lawlor, Judd J explained:
The advancement of fellowship amongst girls who are practising members of the Church of England may incidentally advance their religious faith or experience. But the use of the land as a camp for girls more accurately resembles a secular activity or pursuit which, although inspired by a desire to encourage fellowship amongst girls of similar faith, is not a purpose which is directly and immediately religious …[34]
[32][2008] VSC 352 (‘Anglican Trusts Corporation’).
[33]Ibid [1] (Judd J).
[34]Ibid [12].
From these authorities, the following principles emerge:
(a) A trust for sport or recreation alone is not charitable,[35] but a trust whose purpose is incidental or pursuant to an accepted charitable object may be upheld.[36]
[35]Re Nottage (n 8) 656; Re Patten (n 12); Laing v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (n 12).
[36]See generally GE Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts in Australia (Lawbook, 7th ed, 2019) 885.
(b) In determining whether a gift is charitable, the donor’s motive in making the gift is irrelevant.[37]
[37]Hoare v Osborne (1866) LR 1 Eq 585, 588.
(c) A trust for the advancement of religion must have religious purposes that involve the spread or strengthening of spiritual teaching generally, the maintenance of the doctrines on which it rests and the observances that promote and manifest it.[38] Examples include gifts made for any particular means of propagating a faith or a religious belief or the use of property for religious purposes or objects.[39]
(d) The purposes of a trust for the advancement of religion must be directly and immediately religious. It is immaterial that they relate to a faith, a church, or a denomination, or that they are considered to have a tendency beneficial to religion, or to a particular form of religion.[40]
(e) A gift of land for use as a recreation ground by the community at large or by the inhabitants of a particular geographical area may have a valid charitable purpose, but it does not follow that the same gift for the exclusive use of a small class determined, for example, by adherence to a particular religion would be valid.[41]
[38]Lawlor (n 14) 32. See also United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council [1957] 1 WLR 1080, 1081, where the Court stated per curiam that ‘to advance religion means to promote it, to spread its message ever wider among mankind; to take some positive steps to sustain and increase religious belief; and these things are done in a variety of ways which may be comprehensively described as pastoral or missionary’.
[39]Lawlor (n 14) 32.
[40]Ibid.
[41]Baddeley (n 18) 591 (Viscount Simonds), 615 (Lord Somervell of Harrow).
The parties seem to agree that the purpose of the gift was not only to make the land available for construction of two tennis courts but also to facilitate the playing of tennis by members of the Club. They differ on the purpose of the gift. The plaintiffs submit the deceased’s gift was designed to provide ‘a venue for social activities and health giving activities’ among the church members and to give them an opportunity to mingle in a social environment. The first defendant frames the purpose more narrowly, and submits that it was to promote the playing of tennis by the church members on tennis courts to be constructed on the land.
The minutes of the meetings in July 1925 make no reference to the promotion of the playing of tennis by the Club’s members. They merely record the acceptance of the deceased’s offer of his land for the construction of two tennis courts on the condition that two trustees from three different churches be elected and that a club be named the United Churches Club.
To construe the terms of the trust in the manner submitted by the plaintiffs, and to some extent by the first defendant, would require satisfaction of two matters: first, an inference from the minutes that the purpose of the gift was to promote the playing of tennis by the church members on the land; secondly, a finding that the provision of a venue for social and physical activity, including the opportunity for the church members to mingle in a social environment, was incidental to this purpose. On the evidence, neither the inference nor the finding can be satisfied.
The content of the minutes reveals far less about the deceased’s intentions with respect to the land than the terms of the trusts in issue in Baddeley and Anglican Trusts Corporation. The minutes bear some resemblance to the bequest in Cahill ‘for formation and advancement of a Roman Catholic Boys’ Club’. Whatever the analogy, the language in the minutes does not rise to the level of specificity that is required to find a valid charitable purpose as discussed by some of the Law Lords in Baddeley.[42]
[42][30], [32] above.
The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a connection between the establishment of the Club following the construction of two courts and the election of trustees from three different Protestant Churches, on the one hand, and the spread or strengthening of spiritual teaching, on the other.[43] They have not suggested that the Club, through the playing of tennis or otherwise, maintained the doctrines promulgated by any of the Protestant churches or any related religious observances. The plaintiffs did submit that the trust had the effect of fostering harmony among the three Protestant denominations. Even if this was the case, it is difficult to see how the formation and maintenance of connections among members of three different Protestant Churches has a directly and immediately religious purpose.[44] At best, this purpose has a tendency beneficial to religion and falls short of advancing religion.[45]
[43][37(c)] above.
[44][37(d)] above.
[45]Ibid.
The plaintiffs submit the purpose of the trust was the advancement of religion by providing a venue for ‘social activities and health giving activities’ by the church members. Even if the minutes referred to the playing of tennis and its accompanying social and health benefits, this purpose does not advance religion. As the speeches of Viscount Simonds and Lord Tucker in Baddeley make clear, references to such notions as social and physical wellbeing are too imprecise on their own to evince a charitable intention on the part of a testator.[46] For this reason, it also cannot be accepted that the stated purpose would be a valid charitable purpose or that the deceased had a general charitable intention.[47] In such circumstances, the trust cannot be applied cy-près.
[46][30], [32] above.
[47]See Beggs v Kirkpatrick [1961] VR 764, 767 (Adam J).
The fact that it was not the community but adherents of the three Protestant denominations who enjoyed these benefits does not assist in the circumstances. It may be accepted that playing tennis in the environment created by the Club would have given rise to social and health benefits among members of the Club and that these benefits may have incidentally advanced their religious faith or experience. However, the use of tennis courts resembles a secular activity or pursuit with no direct and immediate religious purpose.[48]
[48][36] above.
The trust also does not amount to a gift of the land for use as a recreation ground by the community at large or by the inhabitants of a particular geographical area.[49] The minutes do not state or imply that the tennis courts were open to be used by people outside the Club.
[49][37(e)] above.
Finally, the plaintiffs submit that the provision of sporting facilities will be a valid charitable purpose if there is a nexus between the provision of the facilities and an educational purpose.[50] That may be correct, but the plaintiffs have not pointed to any educational purpose in the promotion of the playing of tennis. Nor have they seriously suggested that the trust was established in the advancement of education, for the relief of poverty or for other purposes that are beneficial to the community.
[50]Relying on Re Mariette [1915] 2 Ch 284, 288. The factual background in that case, involving a gift to a public school whose educational work included the physical development of students, is far removed from the facts in this proceeding.
Conclusions
The Court answers the questions in the originating motion as follows:
Question 1:
Is the land situate at and known as 6 Wheatsheaf Street, Ceres in the State of Victoria, being part of Crown Allotment 12, Parish of Barrabool and the subject of the Conveyance registered on 6 October 1926 by the Registrar General as Deed Registered Number 607 Book 520, ‘the land’, held by the plaintiffs as the trustees for the time being of the Ceres Tennis Courts Trust, ‘the trust’, held by the plaintiffs on a valid charitable trust?
Answer: No
Question 2:
Was the trust of the land a valid charitable trust at its inception?
Answer: No
Question 3:
Did the trust of the land fail as a charitable trust at its inception?
Answer: Yes
Question 4:
Has the trust of the land become impossible to administer?
Answer: Yes
Question 5:
If yes to question 4,
(a)does the land result to the legal personal representative of its original owner and donor, Victor James William Irving; or
(b)should the land now be administered pursuant to a cy-près scheme to be approved by the Court.
Answer:The land vests in the personal representative of Victor James William Irving.
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SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
| S CI 2017 04439 | |
| BETWEEN: | |
| WILLIAM SYDNEY MCINTYRE MCCANN (as trustee of the CERES TENNIS COURTS TRUST) | First named Plaintiff |
| GREGOR DONALD MCINTYRE MCCANN (as trustee of the CERES TENNIS COURTS TRUST) | Second named Plaintiff |
| JENNIFER JESSIE MCINTYRE HEATH (as trustee of the CERES TENNIS COURTS TRUST) | Third named Plaintiff |
| ELIZABETH MCINTYRE DOUGLAS (as trustee of the CERES TENNIS COURTS TRUST) | Fourth named Plaintiff |
| -and- | |
| JOHN WILLIAM BADEN LAMB (in his capacity as the Executor by Representation of the Will of VICTOR JAMES WILLIAM IRVING, deceased) | First named Defendant |
| THE MELBOURNE ANGLICAN TRUSTS CORPORATION | Second named Defendant |
| THE UNITING CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA PROPERTY TRUST (VICTORIA) | Third named Defendant |
| PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF VICTORIA TRUSTS CORPORATION | Fourth named Defendant |
| THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA | Fifth named Defendant |
0
4
0