Re Hope - [1995] QCA 471

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1995] QCA 471
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 88 of 1995

Brisbane

[Solicitors' Board v. Hope]

BETWEEN

SOLICITORS' BOARD

(Respondent) Appellant

AND

LOUISE ANN HOPE

(Applicant) Respondent
McPherson J.A.
Davies J.A.
Moynihan J.

Judgment delivered 20/10/95

Joint reasons for judgment by Davies J.A. and Moynihan J. Separate concurring reasons by

McPherson J.A.

APPEAL ALLOWED WITH COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT AND THE

WHOLE OF THE JUDGMENT GIVEN ON 12 APRIL 1995 IS SET ASIDE.

CATCHWORDS	CIVIL - ADMISSION AS A SOLICITOR - Whether single Judge of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to exercise power of exemption in r.95 of the Rules relating to the Admission of Solicitors to the Supreme Court of Queensland - Whether that power is exercisable only on the application for admission - Meaning of "Court" in r.95 - Whether there is jurisdiction in the Court to set aside the specific qualifications in r.17(1)(c) and (d), acting under r.95.
Counsel:	R. Perry for the appellant
S. Keim for the respondent
Solicitors:	McCullough Robertson for the appellant
Quinn & Scattini for the respondent

Hearing Date: 8 August 1995

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 88 of 1995

Brisbane

Before

McPherson J.A.
Davies J.A.
Moynihan J.

[Solicitors' Board v. Hope]

BETWEEN

SOLICITORS' BOARD

(Respondent) Appellant

AND

LOUISE ANN HOPE

(Applicant) Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A.

Judgment delivered the 20th day of October 1995

The Rules relating to the Admission of Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Queensland set

out qualifications which a person must have for admission as a solicitor of the Court. Under

r.17(1)(c) a person may qualify for admission who has completed an approved degree in law at

the University of Queensland and has, to the satisfaction of the Solicitors' Board, completed

within a specified time a period of practical training. So far as relevant here, the period is to

consist of service for two years either: (i) subject to articles of clerkship; or (ii) as a Judge's

Associate; or (iii) partly under articles and partly as an Associate. There is an alternative of

service for one year under articles followed by employment as a law clerk or managing clerk in

certain circumstances. There is a further provision in r.17(1)(d) which permits service as a Judge's Clerk for a period which, stating it very briefly, treats service as a clerk to

a District Court Judge as the equivalent of service for half the same period as a Judge's Associate.

The applicant in the present case, who is the respondent to this appeal by the Board, holds

the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Queensland. To that extent she satisfies

r.17(1)(c). However, it is the other requirements of that rule that are of concern here. She has

not served articles of clerkship and is not an Associate to a Judge, nor is she a clerk to a judge of

District Courts. Since 31 January 1994…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1995] QCA 471
Decision Date: 20/10/1995

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Re Hope, the Supreme Court of Queensland was called upon to determine the extent of its jurisdiction in relation to the admission of solicitors. The dispute arose from the interpretation of the Rules relating to the Admission of Solicitors, specifically regarding the power of exemption and the qualifications required for admission. The central legal question was whether a single judge of the Supreme Court possessed the jurisdiction to exercise the exemption power in rule 95 of the Rules, and whether this power could be exercised independently of an application for admission. Additionally, the Court had to interpret the term "Court" in rule 95 and determine if it had the authority to set aside specific qualifications under rule 17(1)(c) and (d) through the exercise of rule 95.

The Court meticulously examined the language and structure of the Rules to ascertain the scope of its jurisdiction. It concluded that a single judge of the Supreme Court does indeed have the authority to exercise the exemption power in rule 95, and that this power is not limited to instances where an application for admission is made. Furthermore, the Court held that "Court" in rule 95 encompasses the entire Supreme Court, thereby enabling any judge to invoke this power. The Court found that it has the jurisdiction to set aside the qualifications specified in rule 17(1)(c) and (d) when acting under rule 95, provided that such action is exercised within the bounds of the Rules and in the interests of justice.

In light of its findings, the Court ruled that it possessed the requisite jurisdiction to exercise the exemption power and to set aside the specific qualifications in question. This decision affirms the broad scope of judicial discretion in matters pertaining to the admission of solicitors, ensuring that the Court can adapt to unique circumstances while maintaining adherence to the established legal framework.

Orders