Re Griffin & Ors; Ex parte Professional Radio and Electronics Institute of Australasia
[1989] HCATrans 33
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sll of 1989 In the matter of - An application for a writ of prohibition and a writ of
certiorari against PAULINE MARCUS
GRIFFIN, a Commissioner of the
Australian Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission
and
OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
and
THE MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATIONS, RALPH WILLIS
Respondents
Ex parte -
PROFESSIONAL RADIO AND ELECTRONICS
INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALASIA
Radio
Prosecutor
BRENNAN J
( In Chambers) TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 22 FEBRUARY 1989, AT 2.33 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
C3Tl/l/RB 1 22/2/89 MR J. L. TREW, QC: If Your Honow:: pleases, I appear with my learned
friend, MR J.P. PHILLIPS, for the applicant.
(instructed by Carneys)
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Trew. MR TREW: I understand Your Honour might have had an opportunity to look at the papers.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have. MR TREW: We move on the affidavit of Michael Gordon Roberts, sworn 20 February, and the claim's denial of natural
justice that the applicant seeks the Court's relief
in respect of is set out in paragraph 14 of the
affidavit.
Your Honour, there is no court ether than this
Court that has been invested with jurisdiction to
deal with an application of this kind and the appealprocedure within the Arbitration Commission does not,
in terms, apply to decisions of the Commissioner.
Would Your Honour wish me to go to that?
HIS HONOUR: Yes. I would be grateful for your assistance on that point because I wonder why that is so.
MR TREW: If Your Honour goes to - there will be two sections
that I will need to look at substantially. Section 35
is the appeals section and if it is appealable it
must be appealable under paragraph (a) of
subsection (2). It does not come within the first arm
of that, in our submission, that the decision that was
made is not "an award made by a member otherwise than
under section 28" and it is our submission that it
is not an award. I will come to that in a moment,
Your Honour, but if I could go through each of the arms.The next arm that might be relevant is a decision of a member not to make an award, and we submit it is
not that either. Or a decision of a member by way of
a - it is not the rest of it. So the only parts, in our submission, that could possibly apply are those
first two limbs of paragarph (a).
Can I take Your Honour to another section - it
will be relevant when I go to the particular documents -
| Tl | section 40(4). That provides that: |
An award or decision made by a single member of the Commission shall be made by an
instrument signed by the member and the
instrument shall be dated with the date on
which it is so signed, which date shall, for
the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be
the date of the award or decision.
C3T2/l/RB 2 22/2/89 Radio I think the only other matters that -Your Honour
need know at the moment about the Act is "award" is
simply defined in section 4 as:
an award made under this Act and includes
an order;
and an "order" is defined as :
an order made by the Commission under this Act.
And that appears in section 4 too. The three documents that we invite Your Honour to look at are, firstly,
the decisionsthat preceeded this one, namely the ones
in September last year. They are at exhibit MGR4 and 5. MGR4 is the transcript of proceedings before the
Commissioner following her reserving her decision on an application which was consented to to increase the
award rates of the persons employed by OTC. There was a dispute between OTC and the union but that was
only as to the date upon which it should operate. The union wanted it upon the date the Commissioner decided
it should operate; OTC wanted it to operate from two
weeks later, but otherwise, it was by consent.
On the last page of that transcript, page 31,
the Commissioner sets that out. Of course she is delivering this orally and she says at the end of that:
This completes my decision. Thank you.
That is in the last line or two. Then that decision was reduced to writing, it would appear in purported
pursuance of section 40(4) - that is the next
exhibit MGRS. It in substance is the same as the oral decision although there are some slight verbal
differences and apart from the one that I have justdrawn Your Honour's attention to, I do not think they
are significant. That decision was delivered on the
next day, 27 September, and she recites in the first
paragraph what the application was and then over on the third page, No 3, there are only three pages - the
first page of the decision is the second page of the
instrument.
In the second-last paragraph she says that:
I believe there are sufficient grounds to approve the date sought by the unions -
and they are set out, and then says:
I so decide.
Then she says:
The unions are requested to provide draft orders
C3T2/2/RB 22/2/89 Radio to give effect to this decision. Orders
varying the respective awards will come into
effect from the first pay period -
et cetera. Then she signed it. In our submission, what the Commissioner seems to have done is to act
pursuant to section 40(4) and reduce the decision to
the form of an instrument and sign it and, of course,it has a date on the top of it so that it then operates
from that particular date. The procedure seems to be that she then directed one of the parties, the unions,
to bring in the relevant order.
HIS HONOUR: What order is that? That is a different order from
the one that she has signed.
MR TREW: Yes, Your Honour, and it may be arguable that indeed this is sufficient compliance with that part of
| r2 | subsection (4) to constitute the award. But if |
| Your Honour has a look at one of the earlier exhibits - | |
| I think it is exhibit MGRl, that has attached to it | |
| a pamphlet form of the award. Does Your Honour see | |
| this? It is a yellow document. That first document appears to be a printed form of the award originally | |
| made and then attached to that are a number of documents | |
| called orders. In terms they are somewhat like the minutes of an order of judgment made by a court following the delivery of reasons. |
HIS HONOUR: Am I right in thinking that those documents, those orders, are in that form in conformity with the
requirements of regulation 8?
MR TREW: Yes, I think that is'right, Your Honour. Perhaps I
too hastily agreed with Your Honour. That deals only
with a finding for the purpose of the prevention or
settlement of an industrial dispute.
HIS HONOUR: Is that not what this decision is? In fact, it
would be hard to find any other foundation- - -
MR TREW: Yes, I am sorry, I think I might have misread that, Your Honour. Section 24 of the Act requires, when
there is an interstate industrial dispute brought
before the Commission, requires the Commissioner before
whom it comes to record the parties to the dispute,the subject-matter and the like, and I think I have
misread that. So my agreement with Your Honour, in
my submission, that is correct. That seems to be a
regulation form of giving effect to section 40(4).
HIS HONOUR: Yes. If that has not been complied with, that is what the Commissioner had in mind in the last
paragraph of her decision.
MR TREW: Yes. It may not be entirely clear that the two C3T3/l/RB 4 22/2/89 Radio documents are necessary, Your Honour, but that is
certainly the procedure that the Commission seems to
adopt and here, it is what the Commissioner certainly
seems to have had in mind. And that becomes even clearer when one goes to exhibit MGR12 which is the
decision about which this application is made because -
that is described as a supplementary decision. At
the bottom of the first page, apart from - I can come
back to that. I will deal with only this matter. She says at the bottom of the second page, in the
two last paragraphs:
In the light of these facts I have decided to
change my decision of 26 September -
and then she says:
The order varying the award to give effect to my decision of 26 September has not yet been signed.
And then goes on to deal with the practical effect
of it. Now, that indicates, in our submission, that the Commission at least concedes it was not making an award and when one looks at - - -
HIS HONOUR: I do not follow why that is so. If the order is one which varies the rates of pay and the rates of
pay are included in an award which was made in partial
settlement of an industrial dispute, why is it that
the order that is made to vary those rates of pay does not answer the description of "award" as defined in ·
section 4?
MR TREW: For this reason, Your Honour, that it is our submission that it is not an award in the form in which it has
been made; it is simply a step prior to that. It is
a decision to make that order and until the order is
made in the form that I took Your Honour to in exhibit MGRl, it only has the status of a decision. It only has the status of order or award when it is reduced to writing and a further document is signed.
(Continued on page 6)
C3T3/2/RB 5 22/2/89 Radio MR TREW (continuing): Section 40(4) proceeds on the basis
that both a decision has to be reduced to
writing and signed and so does an award.
And regulation 8 speaks in the same - well, it
least, it speaks in terms of the decision and
finding and that then says, "shall forth" -
regulation 8 seems to proceed in the words:
shall be forthwith reduced to writing
and embodied in an award -
on the basis that it is just the one document,
whereas the section speaks of the possibility of
there being two documents and that is certainly,
as I understand the procedure adopted by the
Commission, and I am not certain that I understand
fully, but it seems that is the procedure followed
and it is our submission that that is what the two decisions that I took Your Honour to.
HIS HONOUR: Had not reached the stage, then, of making an award, you say?
MR TREW: It had not reached the stage of making an award and that is why, in our submission, what has
happened here does not fall within the appeal
provisions of section 35(2).
HIS HONOUR: It is a very technical distinction.
MR TREW: It is incredibly technical, Your Honour. Even if the applicant here were to appeal and put to the Full
Bench of the Commission what Your Honour is
discussing with me that, namely, that does
constitute an award, that would be a matter that
would have to be then determined by that by this Court. The award or the decision that
has been changed in part, that is as to the
$10, comes into effect from 26 March next.
HIS HONOUR: But it does not on that argument. MR TREW: It does not on that argument, Your Honour, that is right. But at least if there is - it can come
into effect subject, of course, to, no doubt,
some other opposition that one might anticipate,
once the decision that is challenged here is put
to one side and that is, of course, the purpose
of this application, to get that removed. And I
regret to say that it is our submission that this
Court is the only Court that can do that and that
is why it is necessary to proceed by prerogative
writ rather than use the internal appeal procedures
of the Commission.
C3T4/l/PLC 22/2/89 Radio
HIS HONOUR: I understand the way you put it. If ~our argument, based on the distinction between the document which
is exhibit 5 and an award,as defined, is not
accepted, would you wish to grapple the more
substantive problem as to whether you should have
an order nisi before you have made application
at least to try the Full Bench of the Commission?
MR TREW: The answer to that must be no, Your Honour, but the difficulty is, of course, in having an
authoritative decision rather than an expression of opinion as to what that section means because until there is an authoritative decision about the
meaning of that subsection, the matter is at large.
I have just remembered, Your Honour, that the Commission itself has proceeded on that view.
I think there is a decision we have given Your Honour a reference to in 99 CAR 585 at page 590.
Sufficient of what it is about can be gleaned
| :4 | from page 590. At the top-of page 590 is the last |
| paragraph of the decision of a member of the | |
| Commission, Commissioner Horan. It is a demarcation | |
| dispute and what he says, that work shall be | |
| allotted to one union rather than another and then he said: |
The Commission so decides.
That then went on appeal to a Full Bench
and the Commission, in the first couple of paragraphs,
deals with the matter:
The question before us is whether or
not appeals, pursuant to section 35 of the
Act lie from the decision of the Commissioner
which the appellants seek to have examined
by this Full Bench. To put this in a
negative form the fact that a Commissioner,
well aware of the many methods of seeking
to achieve the object of the legislation,did not see fit to reduce his decision to the form of an order or award is not under
examination. We have to decide the question whether, the Commissioner having done what he did, appeals lie under the section. Having considered the terms of
section 35 of the Act we are of opinion
that what the Commissioner has done isneither in form nor substance an award
(which includes an order) under sub-section(2)(a)
of the ~ection. The appeals are held notto lieand are struck out.
Now, that has been applied in more recent times
and we have not given Your Honour a reference to
that, but by another Full Bench in, I think, 1971.
C3T5/l/PLC 7 22/2/89 Radio It is in an-informal set of reports called the
Industrial Information Bulletin for 1971. It is
in volume 26 and it is on page 3100 and it goes
into the next page. That Full Bench referred to
the decision I have just told Your Honour about
and applied it.
HIS HONOUR: What was the nature of the proceedings in that case?
MR TREW: In that one. A Commissioner there - this was a
question of over-award payments. He said: In my view there should be no absorption
into over-award payments of increased
rates of pay arising from the decision
of Mr Commissioner Deverall.
And the Commission applied then the earlier decision
that I have referred Your Honour to.
So, in the face of those expressions of view
by Full Benches of the Commission, if the applicant
here were required to move the Full Bench of the
Commission, it would be faced with an argument
that the section did not permit an appeal.
HIS HONOUR: Well now, Mr Trew, the question arises what the effect is of what the Commissioner has done. If
this is not an award for the purposes of
section 35(2)(a), has it any, and what effect,
upon the entitlement of employees under the existing
awards as varied?
MR TREW: I have got to approach that in two steps in answering it, Your Honour. If that is the case it must be
the case also in relation to the first decision.
And the first decision, all thatneeds, in our
submission, is a ministerial Act to reduce it into
the form of an award in respect of which the
applicant would have a basis for seeking relief. Now,- the present decision, until that is set
aside, in our submission, will have the effect
of the Commission not issuing an order or award
pursuant to the first decision in the form in which
the Commission in the first decision said it should
be issued. So, the effect it has is that the
persons entitled to the benefit of the award will
be denied the particular - the $10 increase that thedecision purports to take away from them.
(Continued on page 9)
C3TS/2/PLC 8 22/2/89 Radio
HIS HONOUR: They would be denied also the 3 per cent, would they not?
MR TREW:
Yes, that is true, but all that requires is no further consideration by the Conunission, in our
submission, but merely a ministerial act to reduce in terms - to produce an award in the appropriate terms.
HIS HONOUR: Well, if we reduce this to somewhat practical terms,
the situation is very unsatisfactory, is it not,
because as you say, this Court is the only court with
jurisdiction; the problem is one which concerns the
rate of weekly pay of employees under an award, and if
you are driven necessarily to the jurisdiction of this
Court and this Court alone, you must take your turn in
the list of litigants whose cases are awaiting hearing
and take your turn with the list of cases which areawaiting judgment.
MR TREW: I appreciate that, Your Honour. There is a - - - HIS HONOUR: Now, is there no other practicable way of dealing
with this because that seems to me to be a very
unsatisfactory situation from the point of view of the
parties to this award and, indeed, those who areinterested in either supporting or rejecting the decision that has been made. MR TREW: In our submission, there is not. There is one matter
of fact that is not in the affidavit that I should tell
Your Honour about and it would be in the further
affidavits that leave is sought to file, and that is
the date in September last year upon the basis of the
decision that was delivered and signed on 27 September.this, that the 3 per cent has been paid by OTC from to believe that OTC would not continue to act in
accordance with the procedure that it had applied in the past and if the present application were stayed, which
is also sought in the order nisi - I am sorry, the most recent decision were stayed, that they would pay in accordance with the order that had been made in September last year.
HIS HONOUR:
Mr Trew, I would not be prepared to make an order of stay until the parties affected had been notified.
MR TREW: If Your Honour pleases. It is only ex parte at this
stage, yes. That would be -as soon as the status of the present application had been determined that would
be the next step that would be made by the present
applicant.
HIS HONOUR: And there is no other way in which you see the problem is capable of solution?
C3T6/l/RB 9 22/2/89 Radio
MR TREW: No, Your Honour, that is the difficulty. That is the way the CONSTITUTION and the legislation has confined
the game, as it were.
HIS HONOUR: It is most regrettable.
MR TREW: It is extraordinary that this Court should have to be troubled with this.
HIS HONOUR: It is not a matter of the troubling of this Court, it is the matter of this Court being an unsuitable
repository for the sole supervisory jurisdiction in
matters which are necessarily attended with some
urgency and which really ought to be dealt with by a
court which is both familiar with the area and
organized to exercise on a day to day basis its
original jurisdiction. But that seems to be precludedby an express provision of the ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS (JUDICIAL REVIEW) ACT which takes this
jurisdiction out of what might ordinarily be expected
to be the jurisdiction of the Federal Court.
MR TREW: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: I understand the submission that you make. I would, however, like your further submissions on the
question of whether this ought not to be dealt with
by way of a direction to move for the relief that
you seek rather than by order nisi, and the reason why
I raise that is because it seems to me that there is a
very real question as to whether the course which has
been taken by the Commissioner does answer the
description of "award" in section 4 and, if so, whether
it is appropriate for this Court to grant an order nisi
in advance of the application being made to the Full
Bench of the Commission for relief on the assumption
that that relief is within the jurisdiction of the
| rs | Full Bench to grant. |
MR TREW: It is our submission, Your Honour, that the order nisi. should be granted because there is a prima facie case,
indeed, in our submission there is a strong case for
relief, leaving aside the discretionary question about
the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Commission. Thatmatter, in our submission, as to whether or not the
Commission does have that jurisdiction-the Commission
itself has decided on at least two occasion that it
does not have that - and the applicant cannot be
confident that that view will not prevail, and it is
our submission that faced with that, there is sufficient
before the Court to grant the order nisi rather than to,
as it were, have two attacks and go firstly to the
Commission itself and ask for those decisions to be
overruled, which they may not be, and then have to
move this Court - it may be that because of the need
for the applicant to go to the_ Full Bench of the
Commission that that appeal may not be heard for some
C3T7/l/RB 10 22/2/89 Radio little time and this application would then lose its
place in the queue before this Court.
HIS HONOUR: Not necessarily. In other words, if a direction were given instead of an order nisi under the
provisions of this Court's rules that you should move
on notice for the relief which you seek before the
Full Bench, it would have in substantially practical
terms the same effect as an order nisi. But it would leave the way open, as it seems to me, for an
application to be made if any party were so minded to
make it, to the Full Bench of the Commission in order
to, as it were, try that jurisdiction to see whether or
not a more speedy solution to what must be a very acute
practical problem could be arrived at.
In other words, it is not by any means coming to
a conclusion about that question but simply leaving
the maximum opportunities open to the parties to seekrelief if they can get it.
MR TREW: Your Honour, the applicant is then faced with the additional costs whereas, if it was dealt with once
only, the matter could be finally determined and in
our submission the applicant should not be put to the
extra burden of preparing more appeal papers and then
appearing before the Commission in circumstances where
the costs cannot be recovered in any event.
HIS HONOUR: That is a matter for the party, if they wish to
apply or whether they do not. I understand on inquiries that the lists of this Court are presently assigned either absolutely or provisionally to other cases until the May sittings. I do not know whether
you are aware of that.
MR TREW: No. We arrived too late to make that inquiry, I regret to say.
HIS HONOUR: That means that you would not get a hearing, at
the earliest, until the May sittings of this Court. That is what has given me particular concern about the
absence of any other avenue of relief for any party
who may be wishing to seek it.
MR TREW: The applicant, Your Honour, would wish to take that course and, as I said earlier, will make an application
for a stay forthwith after the proceedings today to
try and hold the position at least until the Court can
look at it.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. It is regrettable that that application for
a stay was not made on notice today. If there are to be proceedings between the parties for the purposes of
a stay would it not be desirable that this application
itself be the subject of any submissions which the
parties may wish to make?
C3T7/2/RB 11 22/2/89 Radio
MR TREW: Might I just consider that for a moment, Your Honour?
HIS HONOUR: Yes. I might say, Mr Trew, that I will be available to hear such an application on notice if
the time is either in conformity with the rules are
the parties otherwise agree on any day of this week.
| 7 | MR TREW: | I am instructed to take advantage of that, |
Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Then shall I adjourn the application now? MR TREW: If Your Honour pleases.
HIS HONOUR: Well, is that - - -?
MR TREW: I ask Your Honour to grant the order nisi. Perhaps I should ask Your Honour to determine that and in
the event that Your Honour is against me on that,
I would ask that the application be adjourned so
that the applicant can then give notice to the
other parties of the application so that Your Honour can
determine that as well as a stay application.
HIS HONOUR: I am not sure that we are talking of the same matter. The alternative solution which I was putting
for your submission earlier was that either an order
nisi is made by me as a Judge at first instance
or that an order is made under the Rules of Court
directing the applicant party to move the Full Bench on notice to the other parties. In neither event is
there any final order made by me which deals with the
matter so that if it is a question of one form oforder rather than another, it seems to me that that
is something which can easily wait until we see what
the party who is interested in this and who will be
called before the Court in any event because you are
going to seek a stay, wishes to say about it.
MR TREW: Yes. In that case, Your Honour, the proceedings should be adjourned for that purpose.
HIS HONOUR: Very well. Well then, until what day or date? MR TREW: It had better be Friday, Your Honour, if Your Honour has this week available.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, very well. At what time? MR TREW: And we will give notice this afternoon to the other parties of the application.
HIS HONOUR: At what time?
MR TREW: Would 2.15 be a suitable time, Your Honour? HIS HONOUR: It would. Very well, we will adjourn until 2.15 on
Friday next.
AT 3.08 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED UNTIL FRIDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1989
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Natural Justice
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Jurisdiction
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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