Re Gregg Prechelt

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IN THE SUPREME COURT  

OF QUEENSLAND
  OS No. 119332 of 1998

Brisbane

Before Mr Justice Muir       

[Re Gregg Prechelt]

IN THE MATTER OF Order 64 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

and

IN THE MATTER OF the Customs Act 1901 and the Customs Tariff Act 1995

and

IN THE MATTER OF an application by GREGG PRECHELT in relation to certain goods imported from Norfolk Island the subject of Master Air Waybill 777-19706735 and House Air Waybill 334

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - MUIR J

Judgment delivered 3 March 1999

CATCHWORDS:     Customs Act 1901, Customs Tariff 1995 - relationship between s. 132 of the Customs Act and ss. 15 and 16 of the Customs Tariff Act 1995 - whether customs duty payable on goods not liable for entry for home consumption - statutory construction.

Counsel:J.A. Logan for the applicant

F.W. Redmond for the respondent

Solicitors:Shand Taylor Lawyers for the applicant

Australian Government Solicitor for the respondent

Hearing Date:              15 January 1999
IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND
  OS No. 119332 of 1998

Brisbane

Before Mr Justice Muir       

[Re Greg Prechelt]

IN THE MATTER OF Order 64 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

and

IN THE MATTER OF the Customs Act 1901 and the Customs Tariff Act 1995

and

IN THE MATTER OF an application by GREGG PRECHELT in relation to certain goods imported from Norfolk Island the subject of Master Air Waybill 777-19706735 and House Air Waybill 334

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - MUIR J

Judgment delivered 3 March 1999

  1. The issue for determination on this application is whether customs duty is payable on a consignment of 25 cartons of cigarettes imported into Australia by the applicant from Norfolk Island on 13 December 1998. It is common ground that these goods fall within s.68(1)(f) of the Customs Act 1901 (“the Customs Act”).

  2. The release of the goods by the Australian Customs Services (“Customs”) was declined and the applicant was informed of the determination of the Customs in a letter from Customs of 18 December 1998 stating that -

    (a)the goods would not be authorised for delivery into home consumption until the duties imposed by section 15 of the Customs Tariff Act 1995 (“the Tariff Act”) had been paid;

    (b)section 68(1)(f) of the Customs Act was applicable to the goods and no formal customs entry for home consumption was required before Customs would be able to authorise delivery of the goods;

    (c)upon provision of the information required by s.71(1) of the Customs Act in relation to the goods, duties imposed by s.15 of the Tariff Act could be paid by the applicant; and

    (d)the applicant was required to supply sufficient information to allow a customs officer to determine the value of the goods in accordance with s.68(5) of the Customs Act.

  3. Mr Logan, who appears for the applicant, submits that since the coming into force of the Customs and Excise Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Act No. 34 of 1992) (“the 1992 Amendment Act”) there has been no provision in…

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Details
Case
[1999] QSC 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of an application by Gregg Prechelt in relation to certain goods imported from Norfolk Island, the Supreme Court of Queensland was required to determine whether customs duty was payable on the consignment of cigarettes. The applicant argued that since the Customs and Excise Legislation Amendment Act 1992, no provision in the Customs Act or the Customs Tariff Act imposed customs duty on the goods in question. The respondent, represented by the Australian Government Solicitor, contended that the obligation to pay duty on imported goods arose at the time of importation, and the goods were not exempt from duty.

The court examined the legislative framework, including the Customs Act and the Customs Tariff Act, and noted that customs duties were imposed by sections 15 and 16 of the Tariff Act. The court found that although sections 15 and 16 of the Tariff Act imposed customs duties, they operated in conjunction with other provisions of the Customs Act and Tariff Act. The court concluded that the Customs Act and the Tariff Act should be construed as together setting up an overall scheme for the collection of customs duties on imported goods. Section 132 of the Customs Act performed the function of stipulating the rate of duty applicable to imported goods and fixed the rate by reference to the date of entry for home consumption.

The court held that the subject goods were not dutiable, as the legislation's scheme had been to fix the rate of duty by reference to the date of entry for home consumption since its inception. The court declined to fill any perceived "gap" in the legislation by judicial re-amendment, as this would subject importers of such goods to duty without access to the provisions of the Act enabling Customs decisions to be challenged. The court would hear submissions on the appropriate form of order and costs.

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