Re Gray

Case [2000] QSC 390


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390
PARTIES: IN THE MATTER OF WARREN ANDREW GRAY
(deceased)
FILE NO: No 8459 of 2000
DIVISION: Trial Division
DELIVERED ON: 12 October 2000
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 27 September 2000
JUDGE: Chesterman J
ORDER: Application refused
CATCHWORDS:

PERSONAL PROPERTY – OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION – NATURE AND MEANING OF OWNERSHIP OF AND PROPERTY IN PERSONALTY – application by wife of deceased husband for order to remove sperm sample – whether parens patriae jurisdiction applicable – whether applicant had proprietary rights in body

Criminal Code (Qld), s 236
Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic), s 43

Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, s 8

Transplantation & Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld), s 23

AB v Attorney-General of Victoria BC 9803488, 12 July 1998;  23 July 1998
Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1997] 1 WLR 596
Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406
Fountain v Alexander (1982) 150 CLR 615
MAW v Western Sydney Area Health Service BC 200003155, 24, 25 April;  3 May 2000
Peirce v Swan Point Cemetery 14 Am Rep 667
Rees v Hughes [1946] KB 517
Reg v Sharpe Dea & Bell CC 160
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JMB & SMB (1991-1992) 175 CLR 218
Williams v Williams [1882] 20 Ch D 659

COUNSEL: D A Skenner for the applicant
SOLICITORS: Hogan & Besley Lawyers for the applicant
  1. CHESTERMAN J:  The applicant’s husband died in his sleep between 10 pm on 26 September 2000 and 6 am on 27 September.  He was 37 and was believed to be in good health.  His death was completely unexpected.  He and the applicant had lived together for about 14 years.  They married in 1994 and had one child, a son born on 13 August 1999.  The applicant is 42 years old.  She and her husband had discussed having another child.  It was their intention to attempt to do so in the near future. 

  1. The applicant wishes to become pregnant by means of artificial insemination utilising semen taken from her dead husband.  The feat is technologically possible but to have any chance of success the fluid must be extracted within 24 hours of death. 

  1. The extraction of semen, if it is to be done, would be performed by a doctor associated with Monash IVF Queensland.  The procedure apparently involves the surgical removal of a section of testicle.  Monash IVF will not perform the operation without an order of the Supreme Court.  According to its fact sheet:

“·          Little is known about sperm quality after death.  The attempt at sperm recovery may be ultimately unsuccessful or ineffective . . .

·Ethics committee approval would be required . . . and Monash IVF would not agree to proceeding with treatment unless a year had passed since the death and evidence of appropriate counselling had been obtained”.

If the extraction is to proceed the body samples taken from the corpse will be kept frozen by Monash IVF for at…

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AGLC
Re Gray [2000] QSC 390
Case
[2000] QSC 390
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Re Gray involved a wife, the applicant, who sought an order for the removal and destruction of a sperm sample of her deceased husband. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The central dispute was whether the applicant had any proprietary rights in the sperm sample that would warrant the court's intervention in ordering its removal and destruction.

The legal issues before the court included whether the court had the jurisdiction to hear the matter under the parens patriae principle, and if so, whether the applicant possessed proprietary rights in the sperm sample. The court was required to determine the nature and extent of ownership and property rights in personalty, particularly in the context of a deceased individual's bodily material. The applicant argued that she had a proprietary interest in the sperm sample, which entitled her to seek its removal and destruction.

The court found that the parens patriae jurisdiction was not applicable in this instance. It concluded that the applicant did not have proprietary rights in the sperm sample. The court reasoned that while the applicant might have personal and emotional interests in the disposition of her husband's remains, these did not translate into legal proprietary rights. Consequently, the application was refused. The court's decision rested on the lack of legal recognition of proprietary rights in bodily material after death, and the absence of any applicable statutory or common law provisions that would support the applicant's claim.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application refused

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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