Re Evans, J.D.

Case

[1989] FCA 525

28 Aug 1989

No judgment structure available for this case.

UUDGMENT No. 52s. ;l .... K2
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISION
) QLD BN443 of 1989
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND )

RE: JOHN D. EVANS

EX PARTE:  JOHN D. EVANS

Applicant

THE HEATHER THIEDEKE GROUP PTY LTD

Respondent

MINUTES OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:  PINCUS J .
DATE OF ORDER:  28 AUGUST 1989
WHERE MADE:  BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 

1.   the application for a further extension of time filed on 24 August 1989 be dismissed;

2.    in the event of a sequestration order being made on the application of the petitioner, its costs be allowed with the priority prescribed by rule 40, but in the event no sequestration order being made within the prescribed time on the petitioner's application, then the debtor pay such costs, to be taxed.

, .

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

3.     the prescribed time for the purpose of order 2 is 30 November 1989.

NOTE  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt
Rule 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

-8SEPl?89
AUSTRALIA

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISION
) QLD BN443 of 1989
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE SOUTHERN )
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND

RE: JOHN D. EVANS

EX PARTE:  JOHN D. EVANS

Applicant

THE HEATHER THIEDEKE GROUP PTY LTD

Respondent

PINCUS J. 28 AUGUST 1989

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application by Mr J.D. Evans to obtain an extension of time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice. The circumstances of the case appear in part from reasons for judgment I gave on 19 Ray 1989 which should be read with the reasons of the Full Court on appeal from my judgment.

The origin of the litigation is a judgment of the Supreme Court, which also went on appeal, and the question is the propriety of that judgment. That question has been raised before this Court on two occasions, in respect of bankruptcy notice no. 236 of 1988 and in respect of bankruptcy notice no. 443 of 1989. Each attack has been unsuccessful, and my decision as to the second notice was upheld by the Full Court.

Mr Evans has informed me in his admirably succinct, yet comprehensive, argument of the points which are proposed to be taken on application to the High Court; that is, Mr Evans desires to take his case further, and he says that the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice, which was extended by the Full Court to today, should be further extended.

The view which I take is that the question whether this Court should extend time, in those circumstances, depends to some extent upon its assessment of the prospects of the application to the High Court. It is, as fir Evans implied, rather an invidious task for me to say anything about that, because the judgment under attack is mine. Nevertheless, it cannot be the law that a person who attacks a bankruptcy notice, and does so unsuccessfully, is as a matter of routine entitled to have the time for compliance extended until the case has been to the High Court.

If that were so, then the law would be, in effect, that
time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice is that set out in

it, with the exception that if it is attacked, then it is such

extent.

time as it may take to pursue the attack to its fullest possible

I do not, by any means, say that the points proposed to be taken before the High Court are hopeless, but they seem to me unpromising. The circumstances which I take into account are those just mentioned and also the fact that the bankruptcy notice has been attacked (in a sense) twice. It is true the attack

before Spender J. was slightly different, in that the amount was not the same; nevertheless, the substance of the attack was the same.

The order will therefore be that the application for a further extension of time filed on 24 ~ u g u s t

be dismissed.

-p- t~{y !!v+ th15 and t h e k prcccd:ny
- *?S are a trr13 copy of the reasons for
iudgn-ent l lcre~n of t lis l-lonour

Mr . Justice Pincus

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