Re EV (No 2)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

S ECI 2020 01939

IN THE MATTER of a review of a non-custodial supervision order under section 32(5) of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) in respect of EV

AND

IN THE MATTER of an application for revocation of a non-custodial supervision order pursuant to section 31 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) by EV

AND

IN THE MATTER of an application for variation of a non-custodial supervision order pursuant to section 31 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) by EV

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JUDGE:	Elliott J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	3 March 2025
FURTHER SUBMISSIONS	7, 11 March 2025
DATE OF RULING:	18 March 2025
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Re EV (No 2)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VSC 112

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CRIMINAL LAW – Mental impairment – Review of non-custodial supervision order – Application to revoke non-custodial supervision order – Application refused – Alternative application for variation to allow travel out of Victoria without permission of treating psychiatrist but with due notification – Conditions of non-custodial supervision order varied – Application for continuation of existing suppression order granted – Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), ss 27, 31, 32, 33, 38C, 39, 40, 75 – Mental Health and Wellbeing Act 2022 (Vic), s 143.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the applicant	J Chandramohan	Victoria Legal Aid
For the Secretary to the Department of Health	S Pathan	Department of Health
For the Attorney-General of the State of Victoria	B Goding	Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office

HIS HONOUR:

A. Revoke, vary or confirm non-custodial supervision order?

The principal issue in this case is whether a non-custodial supervision order made under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) (“the Act”) should be revoked.
The Secretary to the Department of Health (“the Secretary”) and the applicant (“EV”)[1] say yes. The Attorney-General of the State of Victoria (“the Attorney-General”) disagrees.
[1]A pseudonym has been used to protect the identity of the applicant.
If no revocation is ordered, EV seeks a variation of condition 1(6) of the existing order, concerning his ability to travel outside Victoria (“the Travel Condition”).[2] The Secretary takes no position on the matter. The Attorney-General opposes any variation and seeks that the current order be confirmed; alternatively she proposes the Travel Condition be varied to terms that are stricter than those sought by EV.
[2]See par 6 below.
For the reasons that follow, EV’s application for revocation will be refused. The non-custodial supervision order will be varied; and specifically the Travel Condition, which will be varied in the terms sought by the Attorney-General. This will allow EV to travel out of Victoria without written permission, subject to EV providing advance notice and details of any such travel plans.[3]
[3]See par 59 below.

B. Why the existing order was made

On 30 March 2015, EV was found not guilty of murder by reason of mental impairment with respect to a death he caused in early 2014. A custodial supervision order was made in respect of EV. A detailed background is set out in Re EV.[4]
[4][2023] VSC 498, [1]-[8].
On 13 February 2024, the court varied EV’s custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order in the following terms:
1.Pursuant to section 32(1)(c) of the Act, the custodial supervision order made on 21 July 2015 with respect to the applicant (and extended from time to time as set out above) is varied to a non-custodial supervision order, subject to the conditions that the applicant:
(1)Remains under the supervision of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(2)Resides at a location known and approved by the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(3)Abides by the lawful directions of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(4)Complies with treatment and testing and attends appointments as directed by the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(5) Abstains from the abuse of alcohol and the use of illicit drugs.
(6)Does not leave the State of Victoria without the written permission of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
2.Pursuant to section 32(5) of the Act, the matter is listed for further review at 10.00am on 13 February 2025.[5]
[5]At the request of the parties, this date was extended to 3 March 2025.
This was the first occasion EV was the subject of a non-custodial supervision order.

C. Expert evidence led in support of revocation

The Secretary and EV relied upon 3 reports:
(1)A case management report by Felicia Nisi (“Nisi”), senior mental health clinician at Hotham Street Clinic, Northern Area Mental Health Service, dated 20 January 2025 (“the Nisi Report”).
(2)A psychiatric report by Dr Tharini Ketharanathan (“Ketharanathan”), consultant psychiatrist at Hotham Street Clinic, Northern Area Mental Health Service, dated 21 January 2025 (“the Ketharanathan Report”).
(3)A psychiatric report by Dr Asiri Rodrigo (“Rodrigo”), consultant psychiatrist at Forensicare, dated 28 January 2025 (“the Rodrigo Report”).[6]
[6]A large number of earlier reports and other records which Rodrigo had reviewed in preparing the Rodrigo Report were listed.
The Nisi Report recorded that EV resides independently in stable private accommodation, is able to engage in all activities of daily living and remains abstinent from use of illicit substances. EV is receiving treatment for schizophrenia and reports consistent adherence to his medication regime. He appears to observe the advice of his treating team in managing his condition and has indicated he is willing to continue to engage with the area mental health service and maintain his medication regime. Nisi stated that the risk factors for violence present in January 2014 are now mitigated by EV’s engagement with treatment, the support he is receiving for his mental health and his abstinence from illicit substances.
In her report,[7] Ketharanathan stated she had formed the impression that EV’s schizophrenic illness was presently stable, albeit with residual symptoms. The Ketharanathan Report included a number of relevant matters: (1) EV did not appear to have a history of self-harm or suicidal ideation and hence is not considered a risk to himself; (2) from the time he was released from custody, EV has not been a risk to others in the community; and (3) there were no paranoid ideations evident at present that could pose a threat to others. Importantly, the Ketharanathan Report concluded with a note of caution:
However, having to solely rely on [EV’s] account, given his unwillingness towards the treating team obtaining any collateral history from his family, or to do pathology tests that would include drug screen (sic) to ascertain abstinence from substances, we are unable to verify his stability in the community by other means.
(Emphasis added.)
[7]The Ketharanathan Report did not contain a risk assessment of EV.
This evidence was unchallenged. Although it appeared to be somewhat inconsistent with Rodrigo’s evidence (to which I will refer),[8] Ketharanathan was unequivocal in stating that EV has been continuously unwilling to fully engage in all aspects of the steps recommended for his treatment and the management of his condition. As such, there has been no independent verification of the information EV has provided (beyond the direct observations made at the time of the various consultations).
[8]See pars 19-22 below.
Rodrigo conducted a risk assessment. The Rodrigo Report stated that EV’s baseline risk of violence was historically assessed as high. This was based on evidence of a history of problems with violence, antisocial behaviour, relationships, issues with employment, substance use, symptoms of a major mental disorder and issues with treatment or supervision response, as well as confirmed evidence of a pervasive violent attitude, personality disorder or traumatic experience.
On the clinical scale, relevant to the dynamic risk factors present over the last 6 months, EV presented with partial evidence of lack of insight, particularly in relation to his awareness of symptoms related to his mental illness and the need for medication to control his condition. He also showed partial evidence of symptoms of a major mental disorder, having ongoing beliefs involving spiritual and philosophical aspects. That said, there was no evidence of violent ideation or intent, instability or problems related to treatment, supervision or treatment response.
In considering the risk management scale, which evaluates EV’s likely adjustment over the next 6 months, there was no clear evidence of future problems with professional services, accommodation, treatment response or subversion. However, Rodrigo noted that EV demonstrated partial evidence of issues with personal support, as shown by his poor engagement with his family.
Based on these matters, Rodrigo rated the overall risk of EV perpetrating violence in the next 6 months as low.
Rodrigo also gave oral evidence. When asked about this rating, Rodrigo stated the clinical test utilised (HCR–20 Version 3) only assessed risk for a maximum period of 6 months. When asked if he would go beyond 6 months, he answered that “perhaps” he might be able to extend or extrapolate the assessment result to a period of 12 months, which would also be low. Rodrigo said he could do this having looked at EV’s previous and more recent engagements with mental health services, and because of his belief that EV will continue to engage in these services and take his medication for the foreseeable future. Rodrigo also stated that EV was “less likely to use recreational substances”.
Although Rodrigo said it was possible to provide an assessment beyond a 12 month period, he indicated that the certainty of any such assessment reduced as the period increased. Rodrigo prefaced this evidence by stating that risk assessments were generally only given for a short period because some risk factors taken into account were categorised as dynamic, and very changeable in a short period.
The Rodrigo Report also set out EV’s progress since the non-custodial supervision order was made. This included a summary of a series of consultations.
Importantly, on 19 April 2024 a case conference was held between Rodrigo and 3 other clinicians responsible for EV’s treatment.[9] It was unanimously decided that EV should be subjected to random urine drug screening at least once every 3 months. This decision was duly acted upon on 28 June 2024, when EV was subjected to a drug screening that showed a negative result for all substances. However, there have been no subsequent tests conducted, despite the decision made on 19 April 2024.
[9]The other attendees were a case manager, a consultant psychiatrist and a psychiatry registrar.
When asked about why this was the case, Rodrigo was not able to provide a satisfactory explanation.
Rodrigo stated that no further screenings had been performed as they had not been requested because “it was not clinically indicated”. When he expanded on this answer, he stated there was no reason to believe EV was using substances so as to justify requesting a urine drug screening. When pressed as to how this approach could be reconciled with the decision on 19 April 2024, Rodrigo stated that “if there are (sic) no sufficient clinical evidence for us to request a urine drug screen perhaps we would not do so” (emphasis added).
He further stated that he understood such an approach was contrary to the decision in April 2024, but explained that as “we” had come to understand EV better, “we felt” drug screening was unnecessary. When asked when this change in position occurred, Rodrigo was unable to answer and speculated that “perhaps” it was after the drug screening in June 2024. He did not refer to any communication after April 2024 between himself and the 3 other clinicians (or anyone else) on this topic.
In summary, some of the evidence on this issue was clear. A decision was made by responsible persons in April 2024, consistent with usual practice for someone in EV’s position, that EV should be subjected to random screening at least once every 3 months to detect illicit drug use. However, the evidence as to why there has been no drug testing since June 2024 was less clear. Rodrigo’s best evidence was that, at an unknown time, unspecified persons (presumably including him, but it was not clear) reversed the earlier decision to mandate drug screening, based on a feeling that it was in fact not necessary and that it was not clinically indicated. Further, Rodrigo’s evidence was given with a significant level of circumspection and uncertainty about the justification for the inconsistent approach.
Rodrigo also gave evidence about the continuation of the existing order. If, contrary to his recommendation, the court considered it appropriate to confirm the existing non-custodial supervision order, Rodrigo believed that the order should continue for a period of either 6 or 12 months.[10]
[10]A supervision order is for an indefinite period of time: the Act, s 27(1). However, the court may make a further order directing the matter be brought back for review at the end of a specified period: s 27(2).

D. Submissions

Based on the reports of Nisi, Ketharanathan and Rodrigo, Rodrigo’s additional expert evidence given orally and EV’s history since his first grant of extended leave as part of his custodial supervision order, the Secretary and EV both contended that the non-custodial supervision order should be revoked. Alternatively, EV sought an amendment to the Travel Condition to allow him to travel outside of Victoria without written permission. Pursuant to the proposed amendment, he would instead be required to inform his treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee prior to leaving the State of Victoria, and to remain accessible by telephone when outside the State of Victoria.
Contrastingly, the Attorney-General submitted that EV’s non-custodial supervision order should not be revoked. The Attorney-General submitted there are 3 key factors militating against revocation.
First, both EV’s ongoing frustration in being the subject of questioning about the taking of his medication and his reluctance or refusal to allow appropriate protective measures to be put in place are of concern.
Secondly, the relative social isolation that EV experiences needs to be considered in the context of his relatively recent relapse in late 2021 and early 2022, particularly in light of his lack of candour in the lead up to that relapse.[11]
[11]See Re EV [2023] VSC 498, [21]-[23].
It was submitted that in combination, these first 2 factors created a barrier to an early recognition of any symptoms indicating a relapse or precursors to a relapse.
Thirdly, it was submitted the history of this matter more generally demonstrated that EV had not spent a sufficient period of time on a non-custodial supervision order to consider revocation. In again referring to EV’s recent relapse, it was submitted important interventions were currently available to the professionals assisting EV to compel him to take appropriate measures which would not be available if the order were revoked. In light of EV’s attitude, it was submitted a further period of time was necessary before the court could be satisfied that such compellability was no longer necessary.
In response to Rodrigo’s evidence about the possibility of compelling EV to receive appropriate treatment under the Mental Health and Wellbeing Act 2022 (Vic) if required, it was submitted that the high thresholds under that Act that need to be met before EV may be made subject to a treatment order meant that that regime would not make any material difference.[12] Because of these thresholds, it was contended there were insufficient safeguards available to EV’s mental health treating team in the event that he was not the subject of a non-custodial supervision order and he suffered any decline in his condition, or failed to properly engage with treatment or medication.
[12]Section 143 of the Mental Health and Wellbeing Act relevantly provides that the compulsory treatment criteria for a person with a mental illness to be made subject to a temporary treatment order or treatment order are that the person requires immediate treatment to prevent serious deterioration in her or his own mental or physical health, or serious harm to the person or another person.
The Attorney-General also opposed any change to the Travel Condition, but her counsel did not have any instructions on the precise terms that would be satisfactory in the event the court were minded to make such a variation. Instructions were not able to be obtained in a timely manner. As a result, the Attorney-General was invited to put her position in writing after the hearing.
In written submissions filed on 7 March 2025, the Attorney-General, as an alternative to her primary position, submitted the wording of any amended Travel Condition should be as follows:
Pursuant to section 33(1)(b) of the Act, the non-custodial supervision order made on 13 February 2024 with respect to the applicant is varied, and is now subject to the conditions that the applicant:
…
6A. Does not leave the State of Victoria without informing his treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee, not less than 72 hours, or as otherwise permitted by his treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee, prior to leaving the State of Victoria of:
i.        The location of travel;
ii.        The dates of travel;
iii.       Details of flights or other transportation; and
iv.       His address(es) whilst outside the State of Victoria.
6B.      Remains contactable via telephone when outside the State of Victoria.
This submission was made on the basis that the variation as sought by EV[13] did not provide sufficient safeguards in the event of disengagement, non-compliance with medication, psychiatric relapse or relapse into drug or alcohol abuse.
[13]See par 25 above.
The Attorney-General referred to Rodrigo’s evidence that the impact of travel on EV’s treatment and compliance with medication would be assessed over telephone or telehealth. While it was noted there is also a condition that EV must abide by the lawful directions of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare (or her or his delegate or nominee), which would enable relevant personnel to direct EV to return to Victoria and attend appointments in person, it was submitted that this would not allow for meaningful intervention if EV were out of Victoria.
For example, if EV were to cease engagement with his treating team, including by not attending online appointments or not answering his phone, his whereabouts would be unknown, such that police or mental health services would have minimal information available to perform a welfare check or intervention. In such circumstances, it was submitted that it would be unlikely that EV would abide by lawful directions to return to Victoria, if indeed they could even be conveyed to him.
Accordingly, it was submitted that the Attorney-General’s proposed wording, which would require EV to provide certain details prior to travelling and remain contactable by telephone when outside the State of Victoria, struck the appropriate balance in enabling EV the freedom to travel without having to seek permission, but with appropriate and limited protective conditions in place.[14]
[14]See the Act, s 39.

In reply, EV, as an alternative to his primary position in seeking revocation, submitted that the wording of any order should not include the level of specificity sought by the Attorney-General. Instead, it was submitted the proposed variation of the Travel Condition should be limited to the requirements that EV inform his treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee at least 72 hours prior to leaving the State of Victoria, as well as remain contactable by telephone when outside Victoria.
This submission was made on the basis that, by creating an order with a high degree of specificity required, EV could be confused by the requirements and there would be a risk of inadvertent breach of the orders, requiring unnecessary court supervision or intervention. Further, if any of the proposed information concerning EV’s movements while outside Victoria were required by EV’s treating team, it was submitted that it could be requested pursuant to the condition requiring EV to abide by the lawful directions of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare (or her or his delegate or nominee).
The Secretary confirmed that as an alternative to her primary position in seeking revocation, the Secretary supported the least restrictive conditions available, but took no position on the specific wording of the proposed new condition.

E. Basis for determining whether to revoke

The court is required to apply the principle that restrictions on a person’s freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to a minimum consistent with the safety of the community.[15] It also must have regard to various matters.[16] In this case, this requires the court to consider the nature of EV’s mental impairment or condition; the relationship between this and the offending conduct; whether EV is likely to endanger himself, another person or other people generally because of his mental impairment if released; the need to protect people from such danger; whether there are adequate resources available for treatment and support of EV in the community; and any other matter the court thinks relevant.
[15]The Act, s 39.
[16]Ibid, s 40(1).
The court is precluded from, relevantly, making an order releasing a person unconditionally or significantly reducing the degree of supervision to which a person is subject unless certain reports are filed and notifications are given to victims and family members.[17]
[17]Ibid, s 40(2).
Suffice to say that the reports referred to above satisfy the relevant prerequisites. Further, evidence was filed on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions concerning notification requirements under the Act.[18] There was no issue that these requirements have been met.
[18]Ibid, s 38C.

F. No revocation, but the non-custodial supervision order will be varied

Revocation of EV’s non-custodial supervision order would amount to the final step in achieving his reintegration back into the community.[19] If such an order were made, it would remove entirely the court’s supervision of EV’s treatment and disposition. For several reasons, it is not presently appropriate to take this serious step.
[19]Re Stein [2020] VSC 843, [17] (Taylor J).
These include the reservations expressed in the Ketharanathan Report about EV’s ongoing resistance to those responsible for his treatment obtaining collateral history from his family and reluctance towards pathology testing, such as drug screening.[20]
[20]See par 10 above.
A related matter directly relevant to the question of the likelihood of EV’s engagement is that much of the expert evidence in relation to risk assessment depended upon EV’s self-reporting, rather than being based on matters that could be independently verified. Rodrigo acknowledged that EV had a history of concealing his symptoms and made efforts to delay the identification of them at the time of his relapse in late 2021. Thus, the probative value of an assessment of risk that is based to a significant extent on self-reporting by someone previously proven to be unreliable cannot be high.
Further, it is clear that ongoing treatment is necessary to ensure EV continues to reintegrate successfully into the community. If his non-custodial supervision order were revoked, EV’s involvement in the necessary treatment would be on an entirely voluntary basis. Despite the opinions expressed by Rodrigo, I am not satisfied that EV will continue to receive the necessary treatment or act in accordance with future advice he is given concerning his mental illness. On the contrary, the evidence of his attitude over the past 12 months indicates there is a substantial risk, if not a likelihood, he will be dismissive of some material aspects of the advice he will receive. Further, the thresholds that exist under the Mental Health and Wellbeing Act mean that sufficient safeguards would not be in place in the absence of the non-custodial order continuing.[21]
[21]See fn 12 above.
Continuation of the non-custodial supervision order, on the other hand, will ensure that his reintegration continues with appropriate treatment and medication in circumstances where he must also abstain from abuse of alcohol and use of illicit substances.[22]
[22]It is noteworthy that when EV suffered a relapse in late 2021 and up to May 2022, he was consuming excessive amounts of alcohol.
In the current situation, there must also be significant concern about EV’s apparent inability to properly appreciate his condition. EV’s lack of insight persists, particularly in relation to his limited awareness of symptoms related to his mental illness and the need for medication to control his condition. Under cross-examination, Rodrigo accepted that it was possible that this created a risk because without an underlying insight into the reason his medication is necessary, EV could lessen or cease his usage.
Obviously, there must be limits upon the extent to which any psychiatrist could predict the future with confidence in circumstances where the tool relied upon to provide the opinion only relates to a period of 6 months and much of the content informing the risk assessment relies on self-reporting. Rodrigo’s tentative approach to providing a prediction beyond 6 to 12 months is entirely understandable and consistent with his professional approach. However, the evidence demonstrates that further time is required before the court could be satisfied that interventions available to EV’s treating team to compel him to take appropriate measures or obtain appropriate treatment are no longer necessary.
So there can be no misunderstanding, I accept both the genuineness and the path of reasoning of Rodrigo’s expert opinion. However, the somewhat sketchy premise upon which he has been required to rely because of the absence of verification by independent means requires a substantial reduction in the weight to be given to his opinion. Countervailing factors, including EV’s relatively recent relapse and failure to report accurately in the lead-up to that occurring, and his continuing unwillingness towards certain aspects of his treatment, weigh heavily against revocation.
Considering the evidence as a whole, the revocation of EV’s non-custodial supervision order would be inconsistent with the objective of protecting the safety of the community which the procedures in the Act are intended to promote. The evidence demonstrates revocation would pose a real risk of endangerment to persons in the community, despite the availability of adequate resources for treatment. This is because (notwithstanding his stated intention) the court cannot come close to being satisfied that EV will continue to use these resources appropriately. This is in part because of the limited time EV has been subject to the existing order, together with the heavy reliance on self-reported information, when EV’s reporting has been unreliable in the not-too-distant past (with potentially serious consequences).
Accordingly, having taken the relevant matters into account, including the matters expressly referred to in sections 39 and 40 of the Act, pursuant to section 33(1)(b) the non-custodial supervision order will be varied, specifically to amend the Travel Condition in the terms proposed by the Attorney-General.
The Attorney-General’s primary position that the Travel Condition should remain as it is finds no support in the evidence. There is nothing to suggest that there is any good reason why EV should not be able to travel outside Victoria when he chooses. However, for the reasons above, it remains essential that EV’s treating team is able to compel EV to maintain his necessary treatment. To ensure this, it will be necessary for them to be able to contact EV and to have prior knowledge of his whereabouts should he fail to answer a telephone call.
In making this finding, I have taken into account EV’s submission that the level of specificity required by such a condition may cause him difficulty or confusion. However, it is difficult to see how any real confusion could arise. The details that are required to be provided are straightforward. Further, given the time for notification is at least 72 hours prior to travel, if there happened to be any deficiency in the information supplied, this could be brought to EV’s attention and remedied well before any departure.[23]
[23]The terms of the Travel Condition contemplate a period of less than 72 hours’ notice if permitted by EV’s treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee: see par 59 below.
In short, no real hardship or difficulty will be occasioned to EV by the imposition of this condition.
In conclusion, it is uncontroversial that in order to minimise the real risk of EV relapsing, it is imperative that he continues to use and engage with the resources presently available to him and maintain his medication regime. Thus, a non-custodial supervision order involving the conditions as amended represents the minimum interference with EV’s freedom and personal autonomy that is consistent with the safety of the community.

G. Suppression order

The court has previously heard evidence about why a suppression order is in the public interest.[24] Rodrigo gave evidence consistent with the desirability of such an order to avoid the risk of EV relapsing if information the subject of this application became widely known. Accordingly, it is appropriate that the suppression order previously made pursuant to section 75(1) of the Act continues.
[24]See, for example, Re EV [2023] VSC 498, [64].

H. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the application for revocation will be refused and EV’s non-custodial supervision order will be varied to read as follows, with a review to be conducted in 12 months’ time:[25]
[25]See par 24 above. In light of the matters set out above, including the limited period for which EV has been subject to a non-custodial supervision order, it is appropriate that the next review be in 12 months. This will allow a sufficient period of time to pass so that a more informed assessment may be made at that time as to whether the non-custodial supervision order should be revoked.
1.Pursuant to section 33(1)(b) of the Act, the conditions of the non-custodial supervision order made on 13 February 2024 with respect to the applicant are varied to read as follows, namely that the applicant:
(1)Remains under the supervision of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(2)Resides at a location known and approved by the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(3)Abides by the lawful directions of the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(4)Complies with treatment and testing and attends appointments as directed by the authorised psychiatrist of Forensicare or her or his delegate or nominee.
(5)       Abstains from the abuse of alcohol and the use of illicit drugs.
(6)Does not leave the State of Victoria without informing his treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee, not less than 72 hours, or as otherwise permitted by his treating psychiatrist or her or his delegate or nominee, prior to leaving the State of Victoria of each of the following:
(a)       the location of travel;
(b)       the dates of travel;
(c)       details of flights or other transportation;
(d)his address(es) whilst outside the State of Victoria;
and must remain contactable via telephone when outside the State of Victoria.
2.Pursuant to section 33(2) of the Act, the matter is to be brought back to this court for further review within 12 months of the date of these orders, that is, by no later than 18 March 2026.

[2025] VSC 112

18 March 2025