Re Erol
[2020] VSC 395
•29 June 2020
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2020 0135
| IN THE MATTER of the Bail Act 1977 |
| and |
| IN THE MATTER of an Application for Bail by GUVEN EROL |
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JUDGE: | TINNEY J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 25 June 2020 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 29 June 2020 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re Erol |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSC 395 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Bail – Family violence offending – While on a community correction order and two separate grants of bail – Long criminal history – Significant history of family violence offending – Deteriorating health of father – Availability of drug treatment – Family support – Exceptional circumstances conceded by respondent – Whether unacceptable risk – Even stringent conditions of bail could not reduce risk to an acceptable one in the circumstances – Bail refused – Bail Act 1977 ss 1B, 3AAA, 4, 4AA, 4D, 4E, 5AAAA.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr M Gumbleton with Mr M Murphy | Emma Turnbull Lawyers |
| For the Respondent | Mr N Watt | Legal Services Department, Victoria Police |
HIS HONOUR:
The applicant applies for bail on the following charges:
(a) Possessing a drug of dependence (methylamphetamine and cannabis, two charges)
(b) Trafficking in a drug of dependence (methylamphetamine)
(c) Carrying a controlled weapon without an excuse
(d) Contravening a family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) (10 charges)
(e) Persistently contravening a FVIO
(f) Criminal damage
(g) Assault with an instrument (hammer)
(h) Unlawful assault
(i) Committing an indictable offence whilst on bail (five charges)
The parties agree that the exceptional circumstances test applies to the applicant. This is because he is charged with the commission of a number of Schedule 2 offences during the period of a community correction order (‘CCO’) for other Schedule 2 offences.
Bail has been refused on two previous occasions. This occurred first in the Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court on 20 February 2020, on the basis that the applicant had failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail and again on 23 April 2020 in the Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court on the basis of unacceptable risk.
At the time of the hearing of the application before me, the charges faced by the applicant were to come before the Broadmeadow Magistrates’ Court the following day, 26 June 2020 for special mention. At the conclusion of the hearing of the application, I reserved my decision to Monday 29 June 2020. In the meantime, I was informed by the legal representatives of the applicant that at the special mention on 26 June 2020, the matters were set down for a contested hearing on 6 November 2020.
Alleged offending
By way of background, at the time of the alleged offending the subject of the present application, the applicant was subject to a CCO originally imposed by the County Court on 3 August 2017 for a period of 18 months. The CCO was imposed in respect of, inter alia, the offences of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail (two charges) and trafficking in a drug of dependence (methylamphetamine).[1] The applicant was found guilty of contravening the CCO in the County Court on 1 November 2018 and the CCO was extended by order of that Court until 30 April 2020.
[1]The CCO was also imposed in respect of the offences of making threats to inflict serious injury, using threatening words in a public place, contravening a FVIO, using a controlled weapon without an excuse, possessing a controlled weapon without an excuse (two charges), possessing a drug of dependence (methylamphetamine) and driving whilst authorisation suspended (three charges).
In addition, the applicant was subject to two separate grants of bail in the Informant Turner[2] and Withanage[3] matters at the time of the alleged offending, as well as a no-contact family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) issued against him in the Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court on 3 July 2019, naming his former partner, Douha Khoder (‘the complainant’), and her daughter as affected family members.
[2]The charges were possessing a drug of dependence (methylamphetamine), exceeding the speed limit, driving whilst disqualified, failing to produce a driver licence on request, and possessing a controlled weapon without excuse.
[3]The charges were possessing a controlled weapon without excuse, and contravening a FVIO.
On 24 December 2019, the applicant allegedly contacted the complainant six times by phone in breach of the FVIO.
The following day, Christmas Day, the applicant allegedly attended the complainant’s Glenroy home four times and contacted her 154 times by phone in breach of the FVIO. It is alleged the applicant first attended the complainant’s address at approximately 12.30am that day and remained outside her house for two hours in an unsuccessful attempt to speak to her.
He then allegedly returned to the complainant’s home at approximately 3.00am and again at 5.30am, both times attempting to force entry into the home through either the front window or by taking pliers to the rear sliding door and damaging the lock in the process. On each occasion, he only desisted when the complainant showed him her phone dialling 000.
Following the applicant’s third attendance, police attended the property and took photos of the damage caused to the complainant’s door and a pair of orange pliers allegedly used by the applicant to do so.
He allegedly attended the property a fourth time at approximately 9.00am and attempted to kick in the front door. He fled when the complainant again phoned 000.
On 26 December 2019, the applicant is alleged to have again breached the FVIO by attending the complainant’s home on two separate occasions and contacting her by phone 29 times. It is alleged that he first attended her home at approximately 3.00am that morning. The complainant’s daughter was present at the address at the time, and in an effort to avoid her being exposed to family violence, the complainant decided to let the applicant into her home, where he remained until approximately 6.00pm. He returned to the property at approximately 7.00pm and asked the complainant to take her daughter to her mother’s house so that they could go out to dinner together in the city. The complainant did so.
At approximately 8.00pm, the complainant provided her phone to the applicant at his request and then proceeded to get ready for dinner. It is alleged that after looking through her Facebook messages, the applicant approached the complainant and proceeded to strike her to the head. In the police summary, it was alleged that this assault was carried out with a hammer. As the matter was left before me, it was no longer alleged that this assault was necessarily with a hammer, and I was informed that the assault with an instrument charge would be amended accordingly. As I understand it, the complainant did not claim that she had been struck with a hammer. Rather she said she was struck to the head, and later awoke to find a hammer nearby.
On the prosecution case, the complainant ran from the house and asked some unidentified individuals to call the police, but they ignored her request. The complainant then attempted to get back inside her home when she observed the applicant leaving her premises. However, he caught up with her as she was entering her house, at which time she fell unconscious.
The complainant awoke some time later and attempted to leave her home. The applicant allegedly intervened by grabbing her in the driveway, covering her mouth, and dragging her back into the house. This caused injury to the complainant’s ankles. The applicant left a short time later.
At approximately 1.00am on 27 December 2019, the complainant left her home and asked several passers-by for assistance. A witness, Vince Ursino, picked the complainant up in his car and drove her around the block while she explained her concerns for her safety. Mr Ursino returned the complainant to her home at which time she again observed the applicant at her address. Mr Ursino called 000 on the complainant’s request and reported the incident.
The police attended a short time later and the complainant informed them that the applicant was inside her garage. The applicant attempted to abscond over the back fence but was arrested soon afterwards on a nearby street.
A pat down search was conducted during which the applicant informed police that a black bag in his possession contained ‘ice’ and cannabis. It is not clear on the material as to the quantities of those drugs or whether they have been analysed. It was indicated to me during the application that there were three bags containing what was suspected to be methylamphetamine in quantities of 1.89 grams, 5.87 grams and 6.6 grams.
The applicant was conveyed to the Moonee Ponds Police Station where a full search located a small knife inside his right shoe, multiple plastic ‘deal bags’ and three SIM cards on his person. He provided a ‘no comment’ interview and was charged and remanded in custody.
Applicant’s personal circumstances
The applicant is 32 years old and is the youngest of four siblings. He ceased his education in year eight, having reportedly experienced abuse perpetrated by a staff member at one school and falling in with ‘the wrong crowd’ at another. He went on to obtain employment with Toyota for two years and then commenced work as a forklift operator at Toll for approximately three years before his substance abuse issues affected his employment.
Prior to his remand, the applicant resided with his elderly parents at 6 Appin Court, Meadow Heights, where he provided full-time care to his ill father. The applicant’s parents’ address was one of two alternative addresses proposed during the application.
The applicant has a history of substance abuse beginning with cannabis use at age 17 and progressing to amphetamine and methylamphetamine use by the age of 21. He reported being introduced to gamma-hydroxybutyrate (‘GHB’) by a former partner and having regularly used the substance simultaneously with methylamphetamine. The applicant reported that his substance use increased during this relationship, leading him to commence selling drugs to support the couple’s shared habit. His use further increased as a result of the breakdown of this relationship. In addition, the applicant reported experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’) after having been present during an armed robbery at a TAB at the age of 27. He has not been formally diagnosed with PTSD or treated for these symptoms.
Criminal record
The applicant has an extensive criminal history dating back to 2002, when he was 14 years-old. His criminal record includes convictions for a number of relevant offences including multiple violent offences, weapons, criminal damage, trafficking in and possessing drugs of dependence, as well as multiple instances of contravening FVIOs (2016, 2019 x 2, 2020). He also has previous convictions related to breaches of court orders including contraventions of suspended sentence orders (2013, 2015 x 2, 2016 x 2), CCOs (2018 x 2), failing to answer bail (2015), committing indictable offences whilst on bail (2015, 2019) and contravening a conduct condition of bail (2019).
The law
Section 1B of the Bail Act 1977 (‘the Act’) sets out the guiding principles of the Act and reads in part as follows:
(1) The Parliament recognises the importance of –
(a) maximising the safety of the community and persons affected by crime to the greatest extent possible; and
(b) taking account of the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty;
...
(2) It is the intention of the Parliament that this Act is to be applied and interpreted having regard to the matters set out in subsection (1).
Section 4 of the Act makes plain the fact that there is generally to be a presumption in favour of the granting of bail. In a number of situations set out in the Act, however, that presumption is displaced by the requirement that the applicant establish the existence of either exceptional circumstances or a compelling reason that would justify a grant of bail.
Section 4AA(2) of the Act dictates that the exceptional circumstances test applies in this case. Pursuant to s 4A(1A) of the Act, the Court must refuse bail unless ‘satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail’.
The applicant bears the burden of satisfying the Court as to the existence of exceptional circumstances. In considering whether exceptional circumstances exist, the Court is required to take into account the surrounding circumstances as outlined in the non-exhaustive list of matters in s 3AAA of the Act.
If satisfied of the existence of exceptional circumstances, the Court is required to move to step 2 of the bail process, the unacceptable risk test. Section 4E(1) of the Act requires the Court to refuse bail if satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that, if released on bail, the applicant would:
i. endanger the safety or welfare of any person; or
ii. commit an offence while on bail; or
iii. interfere with a witness or otherwise obstruct the course of justice in any matter; or
iv. fail to surrender into custody in accordance with the conditions of bail.
The respondent bears the burden of proof in respect of the unacceptable risk test. In considering the test, again, the Court is required to take into account the surrounding circumstances pursuant to s 3AAA. The Court is also required to consider whether there are any conditions of bail that may be imposed to mitigate the risk so that it is not an unacceptable one.
Given that the allegations against the applicant involve family violence offences, s 5AAAA(2) of the Act requires the Court to consider whether, if the applicant were released on bail, there would be a risk that he would commit family violence and whether that risk could be mitigated by the imposition of bail conditions or the making of a FVIO.
Exceptional circumstances
The meaning of exceptional circumstances has been considered in many decisions of this Court. Kaye J (as he then was) in DPP v Muhaidat[4] stated the relevant principle as follows:
Effectively, the applicant has to establish circumstances right out of the ordinary. They have to be exceptional to the ordinary circumstances which would otherwise entitle the applicant to bail.[5]
[4][2004] VSC 17.
[5]Ibid [13]; See also Re Sipser [2019] VSC 362 [43] and Re Reker [2019] VSC 81 [39].
Further, in the recent decision of Re Brown,[6] Lasry J noted:
… the phrase, 'exceptional circumstances' has been the subject of regular consideration in this Court, although it is not defined in the Act. In order to be ‘exceptional’, it has been accepted that:
·The circumstances relied upon must be such as to take the case out of the normal so as to justify the admission of the applicant to bail.
·Whilst the threshold of exceptional circumstances is high, it is not an impossible standard to reach.
·Furthermore, exceptional circumstances may be established by a combination of circumstances which may, by themselves, not be considered exceptional.[7]
[6][2019] VSC 751.
[7]Ibid [65]-[66] (citations omitted).
The evidence
Ms Aysche Ates, the sister of the applicant, gave evidence before me in which she indicated that she and her husband would offer the applicant a place to live with them and her daughter in Craigieburn. She told me about the medical condition of her father, who has suffered a number of heart attacks and whose prognosis is not good. She detailed the care she would continue to provide to her father in the event that the applicant was bailed to live with her. The applicant would be able to provide some care to his father who would be collected from his own home and brought to Craigieburn by her. She indicated that she would keep a close eye on the applicant, particularly his drug use, and would report him to the police should he breach any conditions of bail. She understood that the surety of $10,000 she was willing to offer would be in jeopardy if bail was breached.
Ms Brooke Moreland from Lamberti Associates, a drug treatment organisation, gave evidence in the place of Amanda Brown from that organisation who provided a report as to the availability of services to the applicant. Ms Moreland indicated that a known failure by the applicant to abide by conditions would be reported to the police.
The applicant’s contentions
Mr Gumbleton for the applicant relied upon a combination of matters in support of the proof of exceptional circumstances, and in resisting the prosecution contention of unacceptable risk. The matters were as follows:
(a) Delay. The applicant has been in custody since his arrest on 27 December 2019. At the time of the hearing of the application, there was some uncertainty as to when the matter would come on for hearing as a contest. That uncertainty has been removed as a result of the date being allocated by Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court. That date is 6 November 2020, meaning that the applicant would have been on remand for over ten months by the time of the contested hearing. Mr Gumbleton submitted that in spite of the repeated and serious nature of the offending, even if the applicant was found guilty of all of the offences he faces, and accepting that a term of imprisonment would be inevitable, there would be a real prospect that he would spend a period on remand which would exceed the sentence likely to be imposed. Mr Gumbleton submitted that the offending here could be properly met with a combination sentence of imprisonment and a CCO. Any term of imprisonment would be unlikely to exceed 12 to 18 months.
(b) The strength of the prosecution case. Mr Gumbleton acknowledged the strength of the case on the charges of breaching an intervention order and some of the other charges, but submitted that the case on the assault charges was not so strong. The account of the complainant was entirely uncorroborated on these charges and her claims did not sit comfortably with the lack of injuries observed to the complainant. Mr Gumbleton did not assert that the case was hopelessly weak, but did submit that there was certainly a prospect of success from the applicant’s point of view.
(c) Onerous conditions of remand due to COVID-19. It was submitted that the applicant’s time in custody is more onerous and stressful than would otherwise be the case due to the pandemic. A specific aspect of that in the applicant’s case is that he is now locked down for 21 hours per day, compared with his previous situation of being permitted out of his cell for ten hours per day.
(d) The availability of support and treatment. The use of illicit drugs has been an important aspect of the applicant’s previous offending. In order to ameliorate the risk of further offending, arrangements have been made for the applicant to receive counselling once per week with Lamberti Associates, with the taking of urine drug screens twice weekly.
(e) The availability of stable accommodation and ties to the jurisdiction. At the time of the filing of his outline of submissions, Mr Gumbleton put forward two alternative plans, insofar as conditions of bail were concerned. One of them proposed that the applicant reside with his parents. The other proposed that he reside with his sister and her family in Craigieburn. The latter was the proposal relied upon by Mr Gumbleton in the oral application. In any event, it was plain that the applicant continues to have the support of his family which is a significant matter.
(f) Caring obligations. At the time of the filing of the outline, it was contended that in residing with his parents, the applicant could continue to provide the care to his father which he has provided for some years. As things transpired in the application, this plan was no longer pursued, and nor were visits by the applicant to his parents at their home envisaged. Rather, it was put that he would be able to provide some care to his father who would be transported to the Craigieburn address. More importantly, however, the serious and deteriorating medical condition of the father of the applicant was relied upon in two ways. First, because it raised the prospect that if not released on bail, the applicant may not see his father again. Secondly, it was said to constitute a powerful matter pointing to the strong motivation for the applicant to do the right thing should he be released on bail. He would know that if he were to slip up, he would end up back in custody, and may not be present for his father’s last days.
(g) Availability of a surety. The sister of the applicant offered a surety of $10,000. Alternatively, the parents of the applicant could offer a surety of $100,000 by way of equity in their home. The presence of a surety would be an important matter encouraging compliance with bail.
On the question of risk, Mr Gumbleton acknowledged that the applicant would plainly present an unacceptable risk were he to be bailed without conditions. He submitted, however, that stringent conditions outlined by the applicant could render the risk acceptable. He submitted the imposition of a curfew would be significant in light of the fact that much of the present offending occurred overnight. A prohibition on the applicant possessing a phone would address his use of a telephone for many of the breaches of the FVIO. The geographical restrictions proposed would keep him well away from the complainant. He has withdrawn from drugs in his time in custody to date and the presence of a drug treatment condition would reduce his chance of a relapse. The surety would impose upon him the knowledge of how his conduct could financially harm his sister or parents. The poor health of his father made it clear to him that he was at risk of not being out of custody for what might be the last days of his father’s life. While bail conditions have not worked in the past, the battery of strict conditions proposed would now serve to make what would otherwise be an unacceptable risk an acceptable one.
The respondent’s contentions
Mr Watt for the respondent conceded that it would be open to the Court to find that exceptional circumstances exist that would justify the grant of bail. This concession was made predominantly on the basis of the fact that the time on remand may well exceed the sentence likely to be imposed on a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, the respondent opposed bail because of the asserted unacceptable risk of the applicant endangering the safety and welfare of the public, committing an offence while on bail, or interfering with a witness, namely, the complainant.
Mr Watt challenged the contention as to the weakness of the prosecution case, even on the assault matters. He submitted that the complainant did not claim to have been struck with a hammer, and there was no inconsistency between her account and the injuries she received. Indeed, she did have some minor injuries consistent with an assault upon her, and there was some evidence supportive of her account, including the observations of the civilian witness who called 000 and the evidence of a neighbour who confirmed he had heard a male voice present. In any event, corroboration is not a necessary thing in the prosecution case.
Mr Watt pointed to the seriousness of the alleged offending. It was repeated family violence offending by a person with repeated convictions for family violence and other violent offending which occurred in the context of a contravention of a court order. The serious criminal history of the applicant for violence, especially of a family violence nature, was emphasised. So too was the poor history of the applicant on bail and his demonstrated history of non-compliance with orders of courts. In particular, the applicant has a history of carrying and using knives in a family violence setting. Yet again, he was carrying a knife when finally arrested on these matters.
In the circumstances of this case, it was submitted, there was no reason to consider that the applicant would be willing to comply with the strict bail conditions proposed. He was on bail at the time of the offending. In his conduct in respect of those and previous grants of bail, he has shown his unwillingness to comply. He has also shown an inclination to ignore FVIOs where this complainant is concerned. In addition, he ignored the requirements of the CCO he was on at the time of these events. The risk posed by the applicant in the respects alleged is unacceptable, and bail should be refused.
Analysis
For brevity, I can indicate, as I suggested in the running, that having considered the circumstances of this case, including, importantly, the fact that the respondent conceded the matter, I am satisfied that the applicant has established the existence of exceptional circumstances. This application comes down, then, to the question of whether the respondent has satisfied me that the obvious and significant risk posed by the applicant could not be rendered acceptable by the imposition of the very stringent conditions proposed on his behalf.
In considering that question, I am required to have regard to the surrounding circumstances. I have done so, paying due regard to the list of matters set out in s 3AAA of the Act.
It was not challenged by the applicant that the offending alleged here is serious. It is alleged, and was not challenged, that on numerous occasions, the applicant flagrantly breached the terms of an FVIO that applied to him. These breaches occurred on numerous occasions at all hours of the day and night, and were calculated to be annoying, confronting, and indeed, frightening for the complainant. The offence of persistently breaching an intervention order is a serious offence with a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment, albeit of course that the maximum penalty for any individual crime dealt with in the Magistrates’ Court is two years’ imprisonment. The applicant is also accused of being violent towards the complainant, of trafficking in drugs, of being in possession of a controlled weapon, of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail, and of other offences.
In respect of the strength of the prosecution case, for present purposes, I do not consider that I can act on any basis other than that for some of the offending, the case is very strong, and for the rest of the offending, including the crimes of violence, the case would be of reasonable strength. It will depend on the credibility of the complainant. At this stage at least, there is nothing to indicate her credit will be materially impaired. In reality, the indications are that this case may well be resolved as a plea of guilty.
The third matter in the list of considerations in s 3AAA is the criminal history of the applicant. On that score, it must be noted that his criminal history makes concerning reading. He commenced offending as a 14 year old, and unfortunately, has accrued a litany of prior convictions in the ensuing years, with few long gaps in his court appearances in the interim. On my calculation, he has had something of the order of 25 court appearances for offending which has covered a good part of the available field. There have been numerous convictions for violence, weapons, drugs, bail offences, contravening FVIOs, and other crimes. He has a long history of breaching suspended sentences, CCOs, and other court orders. He has been imprisoned on numerous occasions, but has seemingly steadfastly failed to learn the required lessons. The picture painted by the criminal record of the applicant as to his prospects of compliance with a grant of bail by this Court is not an encouraging one.
That finding would be entirely in keeping with the fact that at the time of the offending alleged here, much of which is in no way challenged by the applicant, he was subject to two grants of bail and a CCO. Those orders related to offending which was very significant in light of the offences alleged now. The offending included committing an indictable offence whilst on bail and two charges of being in possession of a controlled weapon. The existence of these orders at the time of the current offending heightens the real concerns the Court would feel as to his prospects of complying with bail. He has shown a complete lack of respect for bail in the past. Why would anything be different in future?
Section 3AAA(1)(f) and s 5AAAA of the Act require me to focus upon the family violence risks posed by the applicant. In this case, those risks can only be viewed as substantial. The applicant has a history of family violence towards multiple partners and family members. There is an active FVIO in place in respect of the current complainant, and have been repeated instances of earlier family violence towards her. The applicant is also the respondent to an active FVIO with his former partner Bianca Pascal listed as the affected family member. Records set out in the respondent’s report indicate three particular incidents of family violence in which the applicant has produced and used a small concealed knife upon Ms Pascal or upon her property. Two of the three incidents resulted in convictions of the applicant for criminal offences including contravening a FVIO with intent to cause harm or fear and intentionally causing injury. In addition, the applicant in the past was the respondent to a FVIO in which his father was listed as the affected family member. A number of incidents were summarised in the respondent’s report which concerned the threatened use by the applicant of a knife or other weapon.
To my mind it is telling that yet again in the current case, not only has the applicant allegedly perpetrated family violence against a partner, but again he has been found in possession of a small concealed knife. The potential for the applicant to carry out family violence should he be released on bail is an important matter for consideration by the Court.
Turning to the personal circumstances and family support of the applicant, he is indeed fortunate to retain the support of his sister and parents. The fact is, of course, that he has always had that support, and yet it has not been sufficient to prevent his repetitive offending over the years.
As for the availability of drug treatment for the applicant should he be released on bail, whilst it must be acknowledged that any moves by the applicant towards rehabilitation in this respect are positive, he has been provided rehabilitative services in the past under the auspices of a CCO. He has failed to take advantage of the opportunities extended to him. It is to be hoped that in future he will take strides in the direction of rehabilitation. However at this time, there is little to indicate he is actually ready to do so, and the level of supervision on offer is far from stringent.
Turning to the length of time the applicant would spend on remand pending a contested hearing, there is now a set date when such a hearing would proceed. The period of a little over ten months in prospect is clearly a significant one. Mr Watt fairly conceded that this period may exceed the sentence likely to be imposed upon the applicant should he be found guilty. There is certainly a prospect of that being so, but Mr Gumbleton himself conceded that the offending here will inevitably result in imprisonment upon conviction. To my mind, this is certainly not a case where the period on remand would necessarily exceed the likely sentence. The applicant has received quite moderate terms of imprisonment in the past for significant offending. Sadly, he has seemingly not been deterred and has continued his offending, even as he has gone into his 30s. Just punishment, denunciation, and deterrence both general and specific would no doubt be considered to be important sentencing purposes by a court coming to sentence him in future.
I should note that I was in a position to observe the conduct of the applicant during the application. At a number of stages, and in particular, when his sister gave evidence before me of the serious medical condition of her father, the applicant was visibly distressed. It would be very difficult not to feel sympathy for the position of a man who may finally have come to the realisation that his continued offending will have him in custody at the very time that his father is going through such tribulations. I take that into account in light of the reliance of Mr Gumbleton about the changed attitude of the applicant. Having said that, however, it must be noted that the applicant has been able to see at first hand the deteriorating health of his father for some years. In the last two years, as I was informed, there have been no fewer than five hospital admissions. The precarious position of his father must have been obvious to the applicant, as was the fact that if he continued to offend, and continued to ignore conditions of bail and other court orders, he would end up in custody and powerless to assist his father.
I have anxiously considered all of the circumstances of this case. Having done so, I consider that the risk posed by the applicant which was frankly conceded by Mr Gumbleton to be unacceptable in the absence of stringent conditions cannot be ameliorated such as to be acceptable even by the imposition of such conditions.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this application for bail must be refused.
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