Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Equiticorp Australia Limited (In Liquidation) [2011] NSWSC 1368 Hearing dates: 21 October 2011Written submissions: 2 November 2011 Decision date: 11 November 2011 Jurisdiction: Equity Division - Corporations List Before: Barrett J Decision: Refer to paragraph 21
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS - winding up - winding up by the court - resignation of liquidator - source of court's power to appoint new liquidator - where winding up application made under pre-1991 legislation Legislation Cited: Companies Act 1981 (Cth). Ss 352, 372(1)
Companies (New South Wales) Code, ss 364(1). 365(2), 372(1)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Division 2, Part 5.4B, Part 2A.2, ss 9, 58AA, 472(1), 472(4), 472(6), 473(5), 473(7), 473(8), 474(1), 474(2), 475, 1408
Corporations Law, Part 2A.1, s 601Cases Cited: Rains v Project Technology Pty Ltd (1989) 15 ACLR 609
Re Crust 'n' Crumbs Bakers (Wholesale) Pty Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 70
Re Kershaw (as liquidator of Equiticorp Tasman Ltd) [2005] NSWSC 313; (2005) 54 ACSR 214
Re National Safety Council if Australia (Vic Division) [1990] VR 29
Re Tahore Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 397; (2004) 49 ACSR 550Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Joseph David Hayes and Murray Campbell Smith - Plaintiffs Representation: Mr C Bova - Plaintiffs
Baker & McKenzie - Plaintiffs
File Number(s): 2011/00270272
Judgment
Mr Kershaw was, until his recent resignation, the sole liquidator of each of Equiticorp Tasman Ltd, Equiticorp Investments (Australia) Ltd, Sowani (No 2) Pty Ltd and Tahore Holdings Pty Ltd.
In consequence of that resignation, Mr Hayes and Mr Smith, official liquidators who are partners in Mr Kershaw's former firm McGrath Nicol, seek an order that they be appointed liquidators in Mr Kershaw's place.
A question has arisen as to the source of the court's power to make such an appointment.
Each winding up order was made by this court upon an application filed in 1989. In each case, the application was made under the Companies (New South Wales) Code . By force of s 365(2) of that Code, the winding up was deemed to have commenced upon the filing of the application. When, on 1 January 1991, the Corporations Law of New South Wales came, for most purposes, to supersede the Companies (New South Wales) Code , each winding up continued to be governed by the Companies (New South Wales) Code) as if the Corporations Law had not been enacted. This was the effect of s 601 of the Corporations Law:
"The provisions of this Law with respect to winding up do not apply to any body corporate the winding up of which was started before the commencement of this Chapter and:
(a) any such company is to be wound up in the same manner, and with the same incidents, as if this Law had not been enacted; and
(b) for the purposes of the winding up, the previous law of this jurisdiction corresponding to this Chapter is taken to remain in force and to apply, with such modifications…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWSC 1368
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the court's power to appoint a liquidator stemmed from the inherent jurisdiction of the court or from specific statutory provisions under the Companies Act. The court was required to determine the source of its power to intervene in the liquidation process and appoint a new liquidator when the original liquidator resigned.
In addressing the issue, the court held that the power to appoint a liquidator in the context of a winding up application made under the pre-1991 legislation derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The court emphasised that the inherent jurisdiction allowed it to manage the administration of justice and ensure that the winding up process proceeded fairly and efficiently. The court found that the statutory provisions under the Companies Act did not exclusively confer this power, as the inherent jurisdiction complemented the statutory framework by providing the court with the necessary flexibility to address unforeseen circumstances, such as the resignation of a liquidator.
The court's decision clarified the source of its power in appointing a new liquidator in the context of pre-1991 winding up applications. By affirming that the power derived from the inherent jurisdiction, the court underscored its ability to maintain control over the winding up process and ensure the protection of creditors' interests.
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