Re Edwards, Walter Percival Ex Parte Wansley, Michael Irvine v Edwards, Inese
[1996] FCA 93
•21 FEBRUARY 1996
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY - Administration of property - property available for payment of debts - avoidance of voluntary and marriage settlements - disposition of property under Family Court Order - non-disclosure of potential liabilities - whether valuable consideration - whether in good faith - whether intent to defraud creditors
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) s 10(1)
Barton v The Official Receiver (1986) 161 CLR 75
Re Hyams (1970) 19 FLR 232
Official Trustee v Mitchell (1992) 110 ALR 484
Simpson v Grellman (Full Court) unreported, 28 June 1990
Re: Walter Percival Edwards
Ex Parte: Michael Irvine Wansley
No. VB 979 of 1994
Judge: Heerey J
Date: 21 February 1996
Place: Melbourne
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VB 979 of 1994
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
Re: WALTER PERCIVAL EDWARDS
A Bankrupt
Ex parte: MICHAEL IRVINE WANSLEY
(as trustee of the bankrupt estate
of Walter Percival Edwards)
Applicant
And:INESE EDWARDS
First Respondent
And: WALTER PERCIVAL EDWARDS
Second Respondent
And:THE REGISTRAR OF TITLES OF THE
STATE OF VICTORIA
Third Respondent
JUDGE: Heerey J
DATE: 21 February 1996
PLACE: Melbourne
MINUTE OF ORDERS
The Court orders that:
The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent's costs, including reserved costs.
The applicant pay the second respondent's out-of-pocket expenses.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VB 979 of 1994
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
Re: WALTER PERCIVAL EDWARDS
A Bankrupt
Ex parte: MICHAEL IRVINE WANSLEY
(as trustee of the bankrupt estate
of Walter Percival Edwards)
Applicant
And:INESE EDWARDS
First Respondent
And: WALTER PERCIVAL EDWARDS
Second Respondent
And:THE REGISTRAR OF TITLES OF THE
STATE OF VICTORIA
Third Respondent
JUDGE: Heerey J
DATE: 21 February 1996
PLACE: Melbourne
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant is the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Walter Percival Edwards. The applicant applies under ss 120(1) and 121(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) for orders setting aside a transfer by the bankrupt to his wife Inese Edwards of his interest in a property at 319 Richardson Street, Middle Park.
The property in question was the matrimonial home of Mr and Mrs Edwards. They were married in 1982. They have two children who are now aged 9 and 7. They are both solicitors. Mrs Edwards has for some 20 years carried on a practice under the name Eglite & Edwards. In recent years that practice has been conducted from
the house in Richardson Street.
Mr Edwards was employed as a solicitor by Monash University. That employment ceased in October 1991. Since then he has not been able to obtain employment as a solicitor, or indeed at all. The one exception to this is that for a few months in the early part of 1992 Mrs Edwards employed him at a token wage. He did not do any work and the purpose of this arrangement was so that he would not appear to be unemployed when making application for employment.
Mr Edwards for many years had a connection with the Dental Technicians Association of Victoria. He was the secretary to that body. He became embroiled in a bitter and complex dispute with two officials of the association, Mr Terrence Wort and Mr Ronald Anderson. Mr Wort and Mr Anderson made complaints to a meeting of the association that Mr Edwards had engaged in improper financial dealings in connection with the association's affairs. They also made similar complaints to the Victorian and Federal Police, and to the Law Institute of Victoria.
Mr Edwards was deeply concerned about these allegations which, I might add, did not result in any action by the police. On 24 June 1991 he commenced defamation proceedings against Messrs Wort and Anderson in the County Court.
Mrs Edwards agreed to act as her husband's solicitor in connection with this action. He had some funds available by way of
savings and release of superannuation funds. In the event, these were to amount to approximately $20,000. On a number of occasions Mr Edwards assured his wife that he would make such further provision as was necessary for the costs of the action out of his half share in the matrimonial home. As far as the evidence discloses, the home was the only substantial asset of Mr and Mrs Edwards.
In October 1992 Mr Edwards obtained a loan of $40,000 from the Latvian Australian Credit Co-operative for the further funding of the action. Mrs Edwards joined with her husband in giving a third mortgage on their home to secure this advance.
The work Mrs Edwards did was substantial. She described the case as "huge". Amongst other things she carried out much detailed examination of financial documents. The trial was listed for hearing in the County Court on 19 October 1992, but was not reached and was re-fixed for 3 March 1993.
About the end of June 1992 a disruption occurred in the marriage relationship between Mr and Mrs Edwards. Without any warning to his wife, Mr Edwards left the home. He stayed away for about three months, and only came home on short visits to see the children. In the meantime, Mrs Edwards continued with work on the defamation case. Some time in about September Mr Edwards told Mrs Edwards that he was returning home, but that he had something to tell her.
He told her that for the last six years he had been secretly meeting a woman friend, one Carol Harris, on a regular basis after work, and that on occasions when he had told Mrs Edwards he had late meetings and other absences, he was in fact visiting Ms Harris. He told his wife that the relationship had commenced when she was pregnant with their first child in 1986. He was very apologetic, and said that Ms Harris was now only "just a friend", that she had a de facto husband of her own, but that he still wished to visit "them" as "friends".
From this occasion onwards, Mr Edwards would from time to time stay at Ms Harris's home overnight. On occasions he telephoned her from the Edwards' home from behind closed doors. Mrs Edwards, as might be imagined, was extremely upset about this conduct. On a number of occasions she told her husband that unless he changed his behaviour she would no longer agree to act for him, nor incur any more liabilities on his behalf for the defamation case. She said she would file a notice of withdrawal as practitioner, and in January 1993 in fact prepared such a notice. Although Mr Edwards' behaviour did not change, she nevertheless felt she had to continue on acting for him.
On 10 February 1993 Mrs Edwards gave her husband a letter in these terms:
Dear Wally,
With this letter I am advising you that I am unable to further assist in this case. As I have stated to you on many occasions, the last one only just a week ago, I cannot cope with the physical and mental distress that you are causing me. You have promised on many occasions to modify your behaviour and that is
all I have asked in order to help me help you through this matter. It is clear to me that your promises mean absolutely nothing.
In any event, your case preparation is virtually complete. The Brief can be delivered to Mark [Dreyfus of Counsel] and I have prepared a memo of the 9th February which goes with the Brief.
Remember you have Tony Hinz as solicitor to assist through the hearing and any final preparations you may need. You should contact him as soon as possible.
As a reminder of a few final matters which need to be done and which you can quite easily do yourself, I list them below:-
Check with Mark as to what witnesses are required.
Prepare and arrange for service of any final subpoenaes (including on Wort and Anderson to produce documents and Ricky Robertson to produce documents).
Ask Mark whether he needs to have folders for the jury as did Ruskin [of Counsel who had been briefed for the hearing in October].
Also, please ask Mark in good time whether a copy of any documents, as we have previously discussed, needs to be sent to the other parties prior to the hearing.
Update Bruce and Craig's statements.
Yours faithfully,
EGLITE & EDWARDS
Mr Edwards pleaded with her to continue and not to abandon his case. He said he could not proceed without her help. He assured her that she would not suffer financial loss. About a week after Mrs Edwards' letter, Mr Edwards gave her a letter in reply, which was as follows:
Dear Inese,
Your letter of 10th February was very kind and much nicer than I could have expected.
As you realise, this case means, and has meant almost everything that I have stood for in my life, and I must ask you at this time not to drop the case as my solicitor, because I have no way that I can engage another solicitor. Furthermore, you know all of the proceedings and all of the difficulties that have arisen as a result of bringing on these proceedings.
As to your costs and disbursements and your obligations as solicitor for payment of Counsel fees and other disbursements, I
confirm my indemnity to you as already previously discussed.
I confirm our understanding and my assurances to you that my equity in our home is security for my above obligations and indemnity to you.
I am prepared to sign a transfer of land to you in respect of our house at 319 Richardson Street, Middle Park should you request it.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for all the help and assistance that you have provided to me during this most difficult and unpleasant time. I acknowledge that without you [sic] help and assistance I would not have been able to proceed this far with the case.
Thank you in every way for your support.
Wally.
It was not suggested to either Mrs Edwards or Mr Edwards in cross-examination that these letters were anything other than genuine and contemporaneous documents.
Mrs Edwards decided not to abandon the case. The trial commenced on 3 March and continued for 17 days before the late Judge Howden and a jury. Mr Edwards was represented by counsel, as were each of Mr Wort and Mr Anderson, one of them by two counsel. Mrs Edwards did not attend as instructing solicitor, but employed another solicitor to do so. She visited the court on a few occasions.
On 26 March the proceedings concluded with a verdict for the defendants. An order was made that Mr Edwards pay the defendants' costs. Mr Edwards said in evidence that he was "devastated" by this outcome. He had been confident of success and had expected the case to settle. His conduct towards Mrs Edwards on this critical occasion aggravated considerably the distress she already felt. Mr Edwards did not tell his wife of
the result; she only found out about it when the solicitor attending the court telephoned her. Mr Edwards arrived home briefly, took a bottle of some kind of liquor, and went off to see Ms Harris. Much later that evening Ms Harris telephoned Mrs Edwards and said that she did not want Mr Edwards "mooching" around her home any more.
In the days that followed, Mrs Edwards was also disturbed by Mr Edwards making strenuous efforts to borrow monies to fund an appeal. He telephoned friends and relatives in her presence. Mrs Edwards was concerned that he might further encumber the property.
Mrs Edwards took immediate steps to secure her interest in the property. On 29 March she lodged a caveat against the property claiming an estate in fee simple. The grounds of claim stated in the caveat were
By virtue of the caveator having made payments on behalf of the other joint registered proprietor Walter Percival Edwards towards the acquisition of the said property and the said Walter Percival Edwards thereby holds his part or share of the said land in trust for the caveator pursuant to an implied or constructive trust and also by virtue of the caveator's entitlement pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act of 1975.
On the same day she prepared a transfer of Mr Edwards' interest in the property to her. The transfer was signed both by her and Mr Edwards in the presence of Mrs Edwards' secretary. The consideration panel was left blank. Mrs Edwards prepared a brief statement setting out her claims in respect of the property. That document was in the following terms:
EDWARDS - Property settlement
(2 children in custody of wife - ages 5 and 6)
Valuation of house $30,000
Less- First mortgage 60,000 + 10,000 $ 70,000
- Second Mortgage 25,000 + 14,000 39,000
- personal loan 5,000
- balance due on overdraft 1,700 115,700
Total equity $214,300
70/30 settlement
70% to the wife = $ 150,010
30% to the husband = $ 64,290
From husband's share $ 64,290
Third mortgage and disbursements
paid by wife (all re husband's
court case) 59,773
$ 4,517 = token maintenance
for children
Balance to husband - NIL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Also each party keeps an old car
and each has equal modest superannuation benefits.
The value of the property ($330,000) was based on an opinion Mrs Edward obtained from an estate agent. She showed the document to her husband and he in substance agreed with it. On 5 April she rendered a bill in the name of her firm to Mr Edwards in connection with the County Court action. This bill, which was only for disbursements, totalled $76,710.99. Included in that sum were counsel's fees of $40,470, for which of course Mrs Edwards was personally liable (Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) s 10(1)). She added an amount of $3,118 being tax of Mr Edwards paid by her on his behalf. The amount claimed by Mrs Edwards from her husband ($59,773) was the balance after allowing
for part payment from his own funds.
There was unchallenged evidence in the affidavit of a costs consultant of an estimate of Mrs Edwards' professional profit costs in respect of the action amounting to $24,945.80.
On 7 April Mrs Edwards consulted Ms Annemaree Lanteri, a partner in the firm of Wisewoulds. Ms Lanteri is an accredited family law specialist and practices extensively in that area. Mr Edwards also consulted solicitors. On 30 April Wisewoulds on behalf of Mrs Edwards issued a Family Court application. It included minutes of a consent orders which had in the meantime been agreed upon between Mr and Mrs Edwards through their respective solicitors. Both Mr and Mrs Edwards filed in the Family Court statements of financial circumstances. Neither of these documents referred to the County Court costs order in favour of Messrs Wort and Anderson.
In the meantime, on 23 April, Mr Edwards lodged a notice of appeal against the County Court judgment. Mrs Edwards signed the notice as his solicitor. On 28 April she ceased to act for him. In early May Mr Edwards lodged an application in the Supreme Court seeking a stay of execution of the costs order.
On 18 May Mr and Mrs Edwards signed minutes of proposed final orders and, subject to some minor amendments of a formal nature, those minutes became part of the order of the Family Court on 20 May. The minutes dealt with custody of the children, and then
went on to provide:
THAT the husband transfer to the wife all his right title and interest in the property at 319 Richardson Street, Middle Park being the whole of the land in Certificate of Title Volume 3775 Folio 870.
THAT the wife shall remain solely responsible for the Mortgages on the said property, namely First Mortgage to J. Zenkis; Second Mortgage to V. Rengats; and (in respect of the husband's personal debt) Third Mortgage to Latvian Australian Credit Co-operative Society Limited and the wife indemnifies the husband accordingly.
THE wife shall remain solely responsible for repayment of a joint personal debt to Mr. A. Lazdins and indemnifies the husband accordingly.
THE wife to retain as her own property absolutely motor vehicle Ford Fairmont registration number 040V.
THE husband to retain as his own property absolutely motor vehicle Ford Laser registration number 040C.
THAT each party is solely entitled to the exclusion of the other of the respective benefits of their superannuation or Rollover Fund policies standing in their respective names as follows:-
(a)Husband
-Commonwealth Rollover Fund Policy 10618473;
-A.M.P. Superannuation Policy V5056041-U.
(b)Wife
-Legal and General Superannuation Policy - plan number 9486336/K.
THAT the husband has no claim to nor interest in the wife's business, namely "EGLITE & EDWARDS" Solicitors, nor is he responsible for its debts or liabilities.
10.THAT the personal possessions and chattels at the said property at 319 Richardson Street, Middle Park be distributed by mutual agreement between the parties.
11.ANY joint tenancy of the parties in any real or person estate is hereby expressly severed.
IT IS DIRECTED:
12.THAT the Minutes of Consent Orders remain on the Court file.
THE COURT NOTES
13.THAT the parties intend that these orders shall as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them so as to avoid further proceedings between them.
The transfer already referred to was completed by the insertion
in the consideration panel of the words "Pursuant to orders of the Family Court of Australia made on 20th May 1993." It was lodged with the Titles Office, but registration of Mrs Edwards as sole proprietor has been withheld as a result of proceedings launched by Messrs Wort and Anderson in the Family Court.
On 4 July in the Supreme Court Mr Edwards' application for a stay of the costs order was dismissed, and on the same day Messrs Wort and Anderson obtained orders for security for costs of the appeal in the amount of $12,000 each.
On 16 August Mrs Edwards wrote to her husband demanding that he leave the property, which he finally did the following month.
On 12 September Mr Edwards' appeal was struck out due to his failure to provide security for costs. On 20 October Mr Anderson's costs of the County Court action were taxed at $72,212.25. The evidence does not disclose whether Mr Wort's costs have been taxed. On 10 January 1994 a bankruptcy notice was issued on the application of Mr Anderson, and on 28 April a sequestration order was made.
Credibility
Both respondents were cross-examined. I found Mrs Edwards an impressive witness, both intelligent and honest. I accept her evidence. Mr Edwards was shown to be not so reliable on matters of detail. For example on the issue as to when the blank transfer was signed he gave at different times conflicting dates.
Nevertheless, his evidence as to the dealings between himself and his wife was substantially in accordance with her account and I am satisfied he was giving truthful evidence.
Insofar as his evidence touched on the merits of his dispute with Messrs Wort and Anderson, I do not make any findings one way or the other. I am satisfied, however, as to his having a genuine belief in the justice of his cause.
Section 120(1)
Section 120(1) provides:
A settlement of property, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act not being:
(a)a settlement made before and in consideration of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration; or
(b)...
is, if the settlor becomes a bankrupt and the settlement came into operation after, or within two years before, the commencement of the bankruptcy, void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy.
The transfer in the present case was a disposition of property, and hence a "settlement": s 120(6). It was nonetheless a disposition because it was made in obedience to the Family Court order. That order was not an order in rem, but an order which, amongst other things, was directed to Mr Edwards and required him to transfer his interest in the property. Since the transfer was effected within two years prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy on 10 February 1994, the trustee will succeed if he can establish the disposition was not made in favour of Mrs Edwards as a purchaser in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The onus is on the trustee: Official Trustee v Mitchell (1992) 110 ALR 484 at 490.
The question is whether Mrs Edwards has given consideration which had "a real and substantial value and not one which is merely nominal or trivial or colourable": Barton v The Official Receiver (1986) 161 CLR 75 at 86. In Simpson v Grellman (Full Court unreported) 28 June 1990, referred to in Mitchell at 490, it is made clear that the consideration given by a purchaser need not be equal, or even nearly equal, to the value of the property.
In the present case the value of the property transferred by Mr Edwards, that is to say his half share of the equity in the property, was worth $107,150. He was subject to a potential claim by Mrs Edwards in the Family Court, which was reasonably estimated to be likely to result in at least a 70/30 division against him.
To meet his wife's claims for the legal costs and disbursements incurred by her on his behalf as his solicitor, Mr Edwards could thus be rationally treated as having property worth $64,290 available. The wife's disbursements, paid or payable by her, after allowing for Mr Edwards part-payment, amounted to $59,773. Whether one takes the balance of $4517 as attributable to "token maintenance for children" or takes into account some $25,000 she was entitled to for profit costs, or the fact that she might have recovered an 80/20 or 90/10 award, which would have reduced the value of Mr Edwards' available property to $42,860 or $21,430
respectively, it seems to me quite impossible to find that what she effectively paid for her husband's share was not "something real and substantial". Indeed, I think Mr Edwards' assessment of the situation was accurate when he said in evidence that he was "getting off lightly." In full satisfaction of Mrs Edwards' claims under the Family Law Act and for the professional work done and disbursements incurred on his behalf, Mr Edwards was transferring property which was probably worth substantially less than the value of those claims. Ms Lanteri deposed in her affidavit:
It was then [speaking of the time she took instructions] and it is still my view that there was nothing unusual or extraordinary about the compromise or the orders which were intended to affect the transfer or divesture of the husband's interest in the real property to the wife.
...
The demands of the wife appeared to be and in my opinion were genuinely advanced and on a contested hearing to have very good prospects of success. They could not have been described as an ambit claim. Not only was there nothing fanciful or unusual about them, but on the contrary, in the light of general Family Law standards, and general patterns of Family Court regulation, each of the demands, the compromise and the Family Court order was unexceptionably ordinary. There was nothing in or about the demands, the compromise or the order which was at odds with established Family Law principles.
In my professional opinion and experience, the terms of the orders were within the range of outcomes which might have been expected had there been a trial of matrimonial property matters, given the ages of the children and their long term financial dependency, the contributions made by each party, the fact that no child maintenance payments were likely to be received from the husband for the foreseeable future, and the size of the asset pool.
Ms Lanteri was not cross-examined. I accept her evidence.
Turning to the question of good faith, this requires an examination of the actual subjective intention of the disponee: Mitchell at 492. The Full Court in Mitchell at 492-493 has
adopted the test of Gibbs J, as he then was, in Re Hyams (1970) 19 FLR 232 256, namely:
... without knowledge that any fraud or preference contrary to the statute is intended.
In my opinion the trustee has not established lack of good faith on the part of Mrs Edwards. As she bluntly put it in evidence:
I didn't expect ever to get any maintenance, I was working and I would continue to work. I had two small children to put through school. I am 49 years old, and I have two little kids that I have to put through school, and he has not worked for four and a half years. For half of the children's lifetime, my husband has not worked, that is what it boils down to now.
Moreover it was apparent to Mrs Edwards that her husband had no reasonable prospects of getting work. He had no assets other than his share in the matrimonial home. He had become totally obsessed with the pursuit of his defamation litigation. He had grievously betrayed her trust by his relationship with Ms Harris. Notwithstanding this, Mrs Edwards had stuck by him until the end of the defamation trial, incurring very large personal liabilities and receiving no payment for her own services. She had gone far beyond the call of duty, both as wife and legal practitioner. When the case ended in disaster, the long postponed settlement of the matrimonial and financial affairs between her husband and herself had to be attended to urgently. This urgency was compounded by Mr Edwards immediately embarking on a search for yet more borrowings to fund an appeal, with the risk that his interest in the house might be further encumbered. Mrs Edwards was aware that Messrs Wort and Anderson had obtained an order for costs against Mr Edwards and that the amounts, when
taxed, were likely to be substantial. However, the taxation of the costs was likely to be some way off, and on appeal might be successful. Mrs Edwards said in evidence,
I thought potentially the costs would be large, but I did not think too much about it, and I did not make calculations. My husband immediately spoke of appealing, which he did do.
She was also asked in cross-examination:
Q.Did you have any discussions after 26 March 1993 and before you instituted Family Court proceedings, about satisfying the judgment for costs in favour of Mr Wort and Mr Anderson?
A.No, I did not concern myself with that. I was concerned with having my property settlement with him.
Q.Were you personally concerned that Mr Wort and Mr Anderson might enforce a judgment for costs against Mr Edwards?
A.I did not really concern myself with that very much at all. I was concerned with having my property settlement and securing my entitlement and my rights for myself and the children. I knew that he was not going to work for a long time. He still hasn't worked. Its over four years now he hasn't worked and my main concern was to settle my property matters with him.
I am satisfied that Mrs Edwards was not, in relation to the transaction at issue in this proceeding, motivated by any intention to defeat any claims of Messrs Wort and Anderson or to commit any fraud or obtain any preference contrary to the Bankruptcy Act. Rather she was concerned to protect and enforce her rights against her husband in the legitimate interest of herself and her children.
Counsel for the trustee stressed that the statements of financial circumstances submitted to the Family Court by both Mr and Mrs Edwards did not refer to Mr Edwards' liability under the costs order. However, I do not infer from that any intention to
deceive the Family Court. Nor can I infer that, had the liability been disclosed, the Family Court would not have made the same consent orders. That court might well have taken the view that the settlement was still appropriate as between Mr and Mrs Edwards, the liability was purely personal to Mr Edwards and if he, as a solicitor himself and having his own legal advice, thought he could manage his potential liability under the costs order as well as his agreed settlement with Mrs Edwards, that was a matter for him. Counsel for the trustee did not cross-examine Ms Lanteri at all and thus did not avail himself of the possibility of showing that the disclosure of the costs liability was something which, in the view of an experienced Family Law practitioner, would or might have affected the outcome.
Section 123(6)
Section 123(6) provides:
Subject to section 121, nothing in this Act invalidates, in any case where a debtor becomes a bankrupt, a conveyance, transfer, charge, disposition, assignment, payment or obligation executed, made or incurred by the debtor, before the day on which the debtor became a bankrupt, under or in pursuance of a maintenance agreement or maintenance order.
In the view I take it is not necessary for the respondents to rely on this provision. Were that not so, I am inclined to think that the Family Court order was not a "maintenance" order: see Re Pearson (1993) 46 FCR 55. It was in substance a one-off dealing with an asset. However I would prefer not to express a concluded view on this point.
Section 121(1)
Section 121(1) provides:
Subject to this section, a disposition of property, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, with intent to defraud creditors, not being a disposition for valuable consideration in favour of a person who acted in good faith, is, if the person making the disposition subsequently becomes a bankrupt, void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy.
The findings I have made in relation to the claim under s 120(1) in relation to good faith and consideration must effectively dispose of this claim. I find also that the disposition was not made by Mr Edwards with intent to defraud creditors generally or Messrs Wort and Anderson in particular: see s 6. Mr Edwards really played a fairly passive role; the transaction was instigated and completed very much on the initiative of Mrs Edwards. I think Mr Edwards realised he had no legal or moral answer to his wife's demands. He did not, as I find, act with the intention of placing his property beyond the reach of Messrs Wort and Anderson.
The application will be dismissed. There will be an order that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs, including reserved costs, and the out-of-pocket expenses of the second respondent.
I certify that this and the preceding (18) eighteen pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of his Honour Mr Justice Heerey.
Dated: 21 February 1996
Associate
Appearances
Counsel for the applicant: Mr G T Bigmore QC
Mr M Galvin
Solicitor for the applicant: J M Smith & Emmerton
Counsel for the 1st respondent: Mr D Perkins
Solicitor for the respondent: Irlicht & Broberg
2nd respondent appeared in person
Date of hearing: 19, 20, 21 February 1996
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