Re Dunkerley and Comcare
[2014] AATA 381
[2014] AATA 381
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2013/3127
Re
Ulla-Maija Dunkerley
APPLICANT
And
Comcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Mr S. Webb, Member
Date 18 June 2014 Place Canberra The decision under review is affirmed.
...........................[sgd].............................................
Mr S. Webb, Member
COMPENSATION – accepted psychological injury – subsequent aggravation injury claim rejected – cessation of entitlement to compensation for incapacity for work and medical treatment – incapacity for work not as a result of accepted injury – medical treatment not obtained in relation to accepted injury – decision affirmed
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, s 4, 5A, 5B, 7, 14, 16, 19
Allianz Australia Insurance Limited v GSF Australia Pty Ltd [2005] 221 CLR 568
Ilsley v Wattyl Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 1
Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452O’Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr S. Webb, Member
18 June 2014
Ulla-Maija Dunkerley suffered a psychiatric ailment in the course of her former employment by the Department of Education, Science and Training. She claimed compensation. Comcare decided to reject the claim. Ultimately, in the context of proceedings before the Tribunal, Comcare changed its position and accepted liability for an Adjustment Disorder with anxious mood, and the Tribunal issued a consent decision to that effect.
Some months later, Ms Dunkerley lodged a further claim for compensation, asserting that events in her employment by the Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research aggravated her psychiatric condition. Comcare determined to reject her claim. That decision was upheld on review by the Tribunal (differently constituted): Re Dunkerley and Comcare [2010] AATA 915 (Dunkerley and Comcare). Ms Dunkerley’s appeals against this decision were not successful: Dunkerley v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2012] FCA 41 and Dunkerley v Comcare [2012] FCAFC 132.
Subsequently, after much time had passed, Comcare decided that Ms Dunkerley is not entitled to compensation for medical treatment expenses and incapacity for work as a result of her accepted Adjustment Disorder injury. Ms Dunkerley applied for review.
The brief facts
It is not necessary to recite the factual findings of the Tribunal in Dunkerley and Comcare at [10] to [22]. For present purposes it is sufficient to record that Ms Dunkerley suffered a mental illness in 2007 that was significantly contributed to by her perceptions of bullying and harassment at work, particularly involving her then supervisor Ms Liz Vishner. Ms Dunkerley ‘self-medicated’ with alcohol, consuming large volumes of alcohol on a daily basis. Her mental illness resulted in incapacity for work, but this remitted over time and with treatment. She successfully undertook further tertiary education and resisted being made redundant by her employer. In January 2009 she returned to full-time work in a different Department.
On 2 March 2009, Ms Dunkerley was examined by Dr Graham George, a consultant psychiatrist, who produced a report on 10 March 2009. It was Dr George’s opinion that “Ms Dunkerley presents without a psychiatric diagnosis”, although “she continues to drink alcohol on a daily basis”[1] and “She has slight deficits in cognitive function … exhibited by some problems in attention, concentration and short term memory”.[2] Nonetheless, Dr George confirmed that his original diagnosis on 1 February 2008 of a “chronic adjustment disorder and alcohol abuse” was accurate.
[1] T31 folio 118.
[2] Ibid, folio 119.
Ms Dunkerley says that, for a time, she was happy in her employment. She told me that she became increasingly stressed by work pressures and arrangements – she was engaged in arranging a ‘summit’ for the Prime Minister, and she was not co-located with other members of the team. Nonetheless, it appears likely that she performed her duties well.
With the encouragement of her then supervisor, Mr Michael Schwager, Ms Dunkerley applied for promotion to an EL1 position within the Department. She was short-listed and interviewed by a selection committee, including Mr Schwager. Her application was not successful.
On or about 17 July 2009, Mr Schwager gave her feedback in which it appears that he referred to short-listing Ms Dunkerley for an interview as an act of charity. Whatever words he used, Ms Dunkerley’s mental health was badly affected.
On 21 July 2009, she consulted Dr John Sanderson, a general practitioner, who certified that she was unfit for work from 20 July 2009. Subsequently, her treating doctors, primarily Dr Patricia Batchelor, certified that she was unfit to return to work for an extensive period. Dr Batchelor referred Ms Dunkerley to Ms Anna Crichton, a clinical psychologist, for treatment and prescribed Temazapan and an antidepressant medication, Pristiq.
On 17 August 2009, 18 December 2009 and 22 March 2010 Comcare determined to extend liability for medical treatments obtained in relation to Ms Dunkerley’s accepted Adjustment Disorder injury. This notwithstanding, on 21 January 2010, Comcare decided that Ms Dunkerley was not entitled to compensation for incapacity from 20 July to 20 November 2009 as a result of her accepted Adjustment Disorder injury. On 3 August 2010, Comcare reconsidered and reversed its three earlier determinations in respect of medical treatment. On 11 August 2010, Ms Dunkerley applied for review of this reconsideration decision, but she subsequently withdrew her application on 23 September 2010.
In the meantime, on 1 September 2009, Ms Dunkerley claimed compensation in respect of “Aggravation to “adjustment disorder with anxious mood”” that occurred on 20 July 2009.[3] This claim was rejected. Ms Dunkerley initiated proceedings in the Tribunal and subsequently in the Federal Court, to which I have alluded above. She was engaged in various actions relating to her previous employment and claims for compensation over ensuing months and years.
[3] Exhibit 11, page 4.
Ms Dunkerley returned to full-time work in January 2011.[4] This was short-lived, however. In February 2011, she took leave of absence from her employment when Mr Schwager was promoted to head the Division in which she worked, and she did not return. She utilised all of her accrued leave entitlements and then took leave without pay, before ceasing that employment. Dr Batchelor certified that Ms Dunkerley was fit for full-time work in suitable duties without any stressors.[5]
[4] Medical certificate of Dr Batchelor on 10 January 2011 at T197 folio 504 refers.
[5] See Exhibit 2, for example.
On 3 and 5 May 2013, Ms Dunkerley pressed her claims for compensation in relation to her accepted Adjustment Disorder injury in 2007. By primary determination and on reconsideration, Comcare decided that Ms Dunkerley did not suffer from her compensable condition on or after 2 March 2009 and rejected her claims. It is this that is the subject of Ms Dunkerley’s present application for review.
The issues
The issues for determination are whether, as of 2 March 2009 and presently, Ms Dunkerley is entitled to compensation for incapacity and for medical treatment expenses in respect of her 2007 Adjustment Disorder injury.
Entitlement to compensation
In a nutshell, Comcare says that Ms Dunkerley’s Adjustment Disorder injury resolved before 2 March 2009 to the extent that, at that time and subsequently, the Disorder did not result in an incapacity for work, and it did not require medical treatment. Comcare relies of Dr George’s 10 March 2009 report that, as of 2 March, Ms Dunkerley’s Adjustment Disorder injury had resolved and any subsequent medical treatment or incapacity for work is not compensable.
Comcare maintains, furthermore, that the mental illness Ms Dunkerley suffered on or about 20 July 2009 caused incapacity for work and it required medical treatment, but this illness is not an ‘injury’ for the purposes of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the Act). This was decided by the Tribunal in Dunkerley and Comcare and upheld by the Federal Court. Therefore, Comcare says, Ms Dunkerley is not entitled to compensation for medical treatment expenses or incapacity for work arising from the 20 July 2009 illness.
Ms Dunkerley maintains that she was not entirely well as of 2 March 2009. She says that her accepted Adjustment Disorder injury, being a disease involving depression and anxiety, was then on-going and it continues to affect her now. Even though she returned to full-time work in January 2009, she says she continued to experience symptoms of the Disorder – the symptoms were exacerbated by work stresses she struggled to cope with and she continued to suffer incapacity for work, in that she could not work in the same area as a supervisor who had bullied her. In her submission, the Disorder rendered her vulnerable to suffering increased psychological symptoms as a result of work stresses, such as occurred on or about 20 July 2009. Exacerbations or aggravations of this kind, so her argument goes, cannot properly be disaggregated from the original disease for which Comcare is liable. Ms Dunkerley argues that Comcare’s liability has not come to an end and she is entitled to payment of compensation for medical treatment expenses and incapacity for work from 2 March 2009.
The question of Ms Dunkerley’s entitlement to compensation for medical treatment expenses and incapacity for work on and after 2 March 2009 is to be determined under the SRC Act. The existence of an ‘injury’ under s 5A is central. An ‘injury’ includes a ‘disease’, being an ailment or an aggravation of an ailment to which the particular employment contributed to a significant degree. If an ‘injury’ exists, under s 14 Comcare (or a licensee) is liable to pay compensation to the injured employee ‘in accordance with this Act’ if the injury results in death, incapacity for work or impairment. Once this threshold is passed, the injured employee’s entitlement to compensation (and Comcare’s liability to pay) lies open to be tested from time to time under any relevant head of entitlement the Act provides.
Presently, two heads of entitlement are in issue – entitlement to compensation for medical treatment expenses under s 16, and entitlement to compensation for incapacity for work under s 19.
Each section uses slightly different language to establish specific liability against Comcare. Under s 16, Comcare is liable to pay compensation ‘in respect of the cost of medical treatment obtained in relation to the injury’. Whereas under s 19, Comcare is liable to pay compensation ‘to an employee who is incapacitated for work as a result of an injury’. In each case, liability to pay is established in reference to an injury by the phrases ‘in relation to’ and ‘as a result of’.
Unless otherwise indicated by express terms or the context in which it is used, the phrase “in relation to” has a broad meaning, requiring “no more than a relationship whether direct or indirect, between two subject matters”.[6] Nonetheless, if the relationship between an injury and particular medical treatment is so distant or remote that the injury, directly or indirectly, is not an operative factor in the need for treatment, the evaluative threshold necessary to enliven an entitlement to compensation under s16 of the Act will not be met.
[6] O’Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16, per McHugh J at [27].
The phrase ‘as a result of’ involves causation, but the operative element is not limited to “the immediate proximate cause of incapacity”.[7] It refers to a relationship of cause and effect that is less direct than the term ‘caused by’ – the emphasis is on the ‘result’ or the effect, rather than on the proximity of cause and effect.[8] Where the sequence of events reveals more than one injury or other alleged causes of incapacity, a commonsense assessment of the causal chain is required in order to determine whether the initial injury is an effective or operative cause of the incapacity such that compensation is payable.[9]
[7] Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452 at 463-464.
[8] Allianz Australia Insurance Limited v GSF Australia Pty Ltd [2005] 221 CLR 568, per McHugh J at [38].
[9] Ilsley v Wattyl Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 1 at 6.
Applying these tests in Ms Dunkerley’s case, I am unable to conclude that her need for medical treatment after 2 March 2009, or the medical treatment she subsequently obtained, was ‘in relation to’ her 2007 injury. On Dr George’s evidence, Ms Dunkerley did not suffer from a diagnosable Axis 1 psychiatric disorder as of 2 March 2009, although he records that she was still drinking alcohol on a daily basis and she suffered from some cognitive deficits.
The present evidence does not establish that Ms Dunkerley required medical treatment for her 2007 injury from 2 March 2009 to 20 July 2009, when Dr Sanderson certified that she was unfit for work following the incident with Mr Schwager.
In the medical certificate he provided on 21 July 2009, Dr Sanderson recorded the injury as “Adjustment disorder” and the date of injury as “10/07”.[10] This may suggest that the Doctor thought Ms Dunkerley’s psychological symptoms and incapacity for work related to her 2007 Adjustment Disorder injury. No adequate explanation of why Dr Sanderson might have formed this conclusion arises from the evidence – it is quite clear that Ms Dunkerley suffered a sudden increase in psychological symptoms in response to events involving Mr Schwager on or about 20 July 2009 that caused her to consult Dr Sanderson on 21 July 2009. As Dr Sanderson was not called, the point could not be tested.
[10] T197 folio 496.
Dr Sanderson and Dr Batchelor practiced from the same medical centre. On Dr Batchelor’s evidence, details of the ‘injury’ and the ‘date of injury’ on medical certificates she provided may have simply been carried forward from previous medical certificates. Whether that is what occurred with Dr Sanderson’s medical certificate on 21 July 2009 is not clear. Once again, this point could not be tested.
To my mind, the ‘injury’ and the ‘date of injury’ recorded in the medical certificate of 21 July 2009 are not compelling evidence that Ms Dunkerley’s presentation at that time was causally related to her Adjustment Disorder injury, although that possibility lies open. Similar findings can be made about other medical certificates setting out similar details – see certificates of Dr Batchelor dated 11 and 28 August 2009.[11] These certificates must be viewed in the light of Dr Batchelor’s oral evidence about how they were completed and what information she was provided at the time by Ms Dunkerley - it is probable that Dr Batchelor was not then aware of the full history of relevant events affecting Ms Dunkerley’s psychiatric illness.
[11] T197 folios 497 and 498.
Ms Dunkerley gave evidence that she was happy in her job in March 2009, but that she was not entirely well at that time. She told me that her mental health deteriorated in April 2009 and that she was struggling to cope with the stresses of her new job, particularly as she was physically removed from her team and the job was not secure. She says that she became increasingly stressed and anxious, and she consumed more alcohol, before the events in July 2009 that caused her to absent herself from work and to seek medical treatment. All of this, she attributes to her accepted Adjustment Disorder injury.
There are three things to say about this. Firstly, the present medical evidence is not sufficient to establish that Ms Dunkerley required medical treatment in relation to her accepted Adjustment Disorder injury in the period from 2 March 2009 to 21 July 2009, or that she suffered incapacity for work as a result of that injury during this period. Ms Crichton reported that Ms Dunkerley described her employment from January 2009 as “not an ideal work solution but that she had coped for several months”.[12] Ms Crichton concluded that Ms Dunkerley “suffered an aggravation to her existing injury which was, at the time of being reinjured [in July 2009], in temporary remission”.[13] This is consistent with Dr Batchelor’s report of 21 January 2010.[14] The Tribunal in Dunkerley and Comcare recorded at [11] that Ms Dunkerley’s accepted Adjustment Disorder “had been in remission” before the aggravating incident with Mr Schwager on or about 20 July 2009.
[12] Exhibit 4, page 2.
[13] Ibid, page 6.
[14] T73 folio 184.
Secondly, it is quite clear that the incident involving Mr Schwager on or about 20 July 2009 caused Ms Dunkerley to experience a sudden escalation of psychological symptoms that required medical treatment. In the months prior to 20 July 2009 she did not require medical treatment for a psychiatric illness, whereas after the incident with Mr Schwager she did. It was this sudden escalation of symptoms and incapacity that Ms Dunkerley claimed was an injury on 1 September 2009. The Tribunal in Dunkerley and Comcare concluded that the escalation was an ‘aggravation’ of Ms Dunkerley’s accepted Adjustment Disorder injury, and ultimately found that the aggravation was suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action undertaken in a reasonable manner in Ms Dunkerley’s employment. This means that the aggravation of Ms Dunkerley’s adjustment disorder is not an ‘injury for the purposes of the Act, and Ms Dunkerley is not entitled to compensation in respect of it. It was for this reason the Tribunal as previously constituted affirmed Comcare’s decision to reject Ms Dunkerley’s claim for compensation (Exhibit 11). That decision is not open for reconsideration in these proceedings.
Thirdly, while the Tribunal in Dunkerley and Comcare did not make findings about when the remission came to an end at [23] to [26], the Tribunal found that the date of the “aggravation of adjustment disorder with anxious mood” was 20 or 21 July 2009. Consistent with the finding of an ‘aggravation’, it is conceivable that Ms Dunkerley experienced psychological symptoms prior to this date, as she now asserts. But her evidence stands contrary to the more contemporaneous materials (and the previous Tribunal’s findings) that her Adjustment Disorder was in remission, including reports by Ms Crichton and Dr Batchelor. I prefer the contemporaneous reports of Ms Crichton and Dr Batchelor over Ms Dunkerley’s retrospective account.
Dr Hundertmark, a consultant psychiatrist, gave evidence that Ms Dunkerley has a history of depression that is of long-standing. On 2 December 2013, he described this as a “minor Depressive Disorder which has affected her on and off in recent years”.[15] Dr Hundertmark’s suggested diagnosis does not sit easily or well with Dr George’s diagnosis of an Adjustment Disorder. An Adjustment Disorder is a residual or differential diagnosis in presentations that do not meet the diagnostic criteria for any other Axis 1 disorder, such as a Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. While, by definition, an Adjustment Disorder would be expected to remit once exposure to the causal stressor is removed, Dr Hundertmark explained that a depressive disorder would have an episodic character.
[15] Exhibit 13, page 5.
On Dr Hundertmark’s evidence, Ms Dunkerley’s description of escalating psychological symptoms from April to July 2009 may be consistent with the preliminary onset of another episode of her previously existing and ongoing Depressive Disorder. This possibility lies open, but it does not assist her case as there is ample evidence that the episode or the Adjustment Disorder she suffered in late 2007 was in remission from at least March 2009.
Ms Dunkerley says that, in his 10 March 2009 report, Dr George re-affirmed his diagnosis of a chronic Adjustment Disorder, despite finding no Axis 1 psychiatric disorder at that time. This is correct. And it is entirely consistent with the finding that the Adjustment Disorder was then in remission.
Dr Hundertmark agreed that an Adjustment Disorder triggered in response to a stressor might elevate a sufferer’s sensitivity to similar stressors in the future. Similarly, each episode of the Depressive Disorder he identified would probably increase Ms Dunkerley’s susceptibility to suffer a further episode, but further episodes might arise spontaneously or in response to a triggering stressor of some kind – this is in the nature of the Disorder, which he suspected she had suffered “for her entire adult life”.[16]
[16] Ibid, page 8.
Thus, on this evidence, whether Dr George’s diagnosis of a chronic Adjustment Disorder or Dr Hundertmark’s diagnosis of a minor Depressive Disorder is correct, the mental illness that was triggered in Ms Dunkerley by the events in 2007 is likely to have increased her sensitivity to similar stressors and rendered her more susceptible to suffer further episodes of psychiatric illness.
It does not follow, however, that the medical treatment she obtained on and after 21 July 2009 was obtained ‘in relation to’ her 2007 injury. I am satisfied that it was not. The treatment she obtained from Dr Sanderson, Dr Batchelor and Ms Crichton after 20 July 2009 was in relation to psychological symptoms triggered by the incident involving Mr Schwager on or about 20 July 2009. This is confirmed by Ms Dunkerley’s own evidence. I note that in 2011 she went to considerable pains to avoid exposure to him, ultimately at the cost of her Commonwealth employment.
I do not accept Ms Dunkerley’s submission that Mr Schwager was not a significant stressor who affected her mental health on and after 20 July 2009, arguing that she was already unwell and that she would have reacted in the same way to anyone giving her feedback of a similar kind at that time. On balance, the actions Ms Dunkerley took and the accounts she later gave in respect of Mr Schwager, coupled with the evidence of Ms Crichton and Dr Batchelor, clearly establish the central significance of Mr Schwager as a primary stressor that preyed upon her mind and acted upon her mental illness on and after 20 July 2009.
I am reasonably satisfied that the relational link between the medical treatment Ms Dunkerley obtained on and after 21 July 2009 and her 2007 Adjustment Disorder injury is too distant and too remote, and it does not rise above the evaluative threshold necessary to enliven an entitlement to compensation under s 16 of the Act. If there was an increase in Ms Dunkerley’s susceptibility to suffer psychological symptoms as a result of her 2007 injury, I am satisfied that this was a very minor contextual factor in Ms Dunkerley’s response to the incident involving Mr Schwager on or about 20 July 2009, and it was entirely overwhelmed by her psychiatric reaction to that incident. The increase in susceptibility was not an operative element sufficient to establish a relationship for the purposes of s 16 of the Act between her accepted 2007 Adjustment Disorder injury and the medical treatment she obtained on and after 21 July 2009.
With respect to the issue of compensation for incapacity on 2 March 2009 and presently, I am compelled to reach a similar conclusion, albeit applying the causal ‘as a result of’ test.
Consistent with the earlier medical certificates of Dr Lawrence, by 2 March 2009 Ms Dunkerley was fit for her full-time pre-injury duties so long as she was able to work in a different area and not exposed to identified stressors.[17] I accept the evidence of Dr George that Ms Dunkerley did not suffer incapacity for work as a result of her 2007 injury as of 2 March 2009. And I am not persuaded by the evidence of Dr Batchelor, Dr Sanderson and Ms Crichton that the 2007 injury continued to have operative and incapacitating effects thereafter. I am satisfied that Ms Dunkerley did not suffer incapacity for work as a result of her 2007 injury from 2 March to 20 July 2009 as her Adjustment Disorder injury was then in remission.
[17] See T197 folios 494 and 495 for example.
To the extent that medical certificates at various times suggest Ms Dunkerley was fit for pre-injury duties or suitable duties so long as she is not exposed to identified stressors, there is a question whether this represents a partial incapacity for work under s 4(9) of the Act. If it was, it did not rise to the level necessary to enliven an entitlement to compensation under s 19 of the Act from 2 March to 19 July 2009 – the evidence does not establish that Ms Dunkerley’s Adjustment Disorder injury caused her to take time off work or that it rendered her unable to work at her pre-injury level in this period. Dr Lawrence’s medical certificates in the latter part of 2008 do not compel a different conclusion.
If Ms Dunkerley’s fitness was conditioned by prevention from exposure to Ms Vishner, a primary stressor operative in the onset of Ms Dunkerley’s 2007 Adjustment Disorder injury, I am satisfied, on balance, that this was a residual or contextual factor that did not give rise to an entitlement to compensation for incapacity from 2 March to 19 July 2009. I am also satisfied that it was not an operative or effective factor in the incapacity for work Ms Dunkerley suffered on and after 20 July 2009. Furthermore, whatever residual incapacity may have persisted from 2 March to 20 July 2009, such as increased susceptibility to aggravation, lingering cognitive deficits or protection from exposure to identified stressors, was overwhelmed and entirely displaced by the incapacitating effects of the incident involving Mr Schwager on or about that date.
Ms Dunkerley makes much of the evidence of Dr Batchelor and Ms Crichton, and serial medical certificates. But the evidence of Dr Batchelor and Ms Crichton serves to reinforce the significance of the incident with Mr Schwager in Ms Dunkerley’s subsequent presentation. It must be noted, too, that Dr Batchelor commenced treating Ms Dunkerley after July 2009, and she relied on the history she was provided by Ms Dunkerley. It appears that Dr Batchelor was not initially aware of the full history when she issued medical certificates and referred Ms Dunkerley to Ms Crichton for treatment. With due respect to Dr Batchelor, the ‘report’ Ms Dunkerley prepared for Dr Batchelor to sign (Exhibit 15) can be given little weight.
After months of being fit for her pre-injury duties and performing well at work, on 21 July 2009 Dr Sanderson certified that Ms Dunkerley was unfit for work as of 20 July 2009. It is quite clear that Ms Dunkerley’s condition suddenly changed at this time to the extent that she was rendered totally incapacitated for work for a long period. This change and the resulting incapacity was the direct proximate result of immediately preceding events involving Mr Schwager. I am not persuaded, and the present evidence does not establish, that subsequent periods of incapacity Ms Dunkerley experienced are attributable in any meaningful way or in any causal degree to her 2007 injury – the incapacity for work she experienced on 20 July 2009 and subsequently is not ‘as a result of’ that injury. Evidence addressing subsequent periods of incapacity from then until now does not, on the balance of probabilities, compel or permit a different conclusion.
I am satisfied that the incident involving Mr Schwager on or about 20 July 2009 entirely overtook and displaced any lingering effects of her 2007 injury. Any residual incapacity for work and any increased susceptibility to suffer psychiatric symptoms that may be attributed to the 2007 injury, if they existed at all, were very minor contextual factors in what occurred on or about 20 July 2009 and they were not operative or effective factors.
I have carefully considered the written and oral submissions Ms Dunkerley made in these proceedings and at the hearing. I am mindful of the difficulty she faces representing herself, and I have done what I reasonably and properly can to ensure that all aspects of her case were exposed and ventilated. Unfortunately, I am unable to find in her favour.
Conclusion and decision
Ms Dunkerley’s case is not made out. Dr George reported that, as of 2 March 2009, she did not suffer from an Axis 1 psychiatric disorder. At that time, Ms Dunkerley did not suffer incapacity for work and she did not require further medical treatment for her 2007 injury.
On the balance of the present evidence, I am satisfied that the medical treatment Ms Dunkerley obtained on and after 21 July 2009 was not obtained in relation to her 2007 injury. It follows that she is not entitled to compensation under s 16 of the Act on 2 March 2009 or presently.
Furthermore, I am satisfied that the incapacity for work Ms Dunkerley experienced after 2 March 2009 does not entitle her to compensation under Division 3 of Part II of the Act. The incapacity for work Ms Dunkerley suffered on and after 20 July 2009 is not attributable to or as a result of her 2007 injury.
It follows that the decision under review must be affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 51 (fifty -one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr S. Webb, Member
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Associate
Dated 18 June 2014
Date(s) of hearing 26 to 28 May 2014 Applicant In person Counsel for the Respondent Peter Woulfe Advocate for the Respondent Shelley Mulherin Solicitors for the Respondent Dibbs Barker
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