Re Daemar, J.A

[1989] FCA 443

1 \ ,

JUDGMENT NO. ..$	%!..	/?.=	l	.	L :
:  ,

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	1
)
GENERAL DIVISION	) ) No. W 914 of 1986
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE	1
OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND THE	1
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY	)

Re: JAMES ARTHUR DAEMAR

A bankrupt

MINUTE OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER : Neaves J.

DATE OF ORDER	: 18 July 1989
WHERE MADE	: Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The amended application by James Arthur Daemar for the annulment of hls bankruptcy be dismissed.

2.    The application by James Arthur Daemar for an order of discharge from bankruptcy be dismissed.

3.    James Arthur Daemar pay the costs of Willlam Edward Andrew, the trustee of the estate of James Arthur Daemar, of and incidental to the application for discharge from bankruptcy.

Order 124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

4.    There be no order as to the costs of Westpac Banking Corporation or of William Frederick Sheath.

Note:	Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRAGIA	)
GENERAL DIVISION	)

No. W 914 of 1986

BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE	)
OF N W SOUTH 'EJALES AND THE	)
AUSTRAL1.W CAPITAL TERRITORY	1

Re: JAMES ARTHUR DAEMAR

A bankrupt

CORAM: Neaves J.

m: 18 July 1989

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

James Arthur Daemar became a bankrupt on 4 August 1986 upon the making of a sequestration order against his estate on the petitlon of Westpac Banking Corporation ("Westpac"). Mr William Edward Andrew, a registered trustee, became the trustee of his estate. The bankrupt has now applied to the Court, by

Act 1966 (Cth). In the event that that application is	annulment of his bankruptcy pursuant to s.154 of the Bankruptcv an amended application filed on 23 December 1988, for the	unsuccessful, he applies under 5.150 of that Act, for an order of discharge from bankruptcy.
Application for annulment
The petition on which the sequestration order was made was presented on 28 Aprll 1986. It alleged that Mr Daemar was indebted to Westpac in the sum of $15,830.20 comprising the amount due under a flnal judgment obtained by Westpac in the Dlstrict Court of New South Wales at Sydney on 5 March 1985

L '

, -

($14,475.64) and an amount of interest thereon. The act of

,-

bankruptcy relied upon was the failure to comply on or before	.	:	m
. .
14 November 1985 with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice served on Mr Daemar on 31 October 1985.
The petition came before the Court on 24 June 1986 and was adjourned until 4 August 1986. On that date a sequestration order was made by Beaumont J. There was on that occaslon no appearance by or on behalf of Mr Daemar.
The ground upon which the annulment of the bankruptcy is sought is that the sequestration order ought not to have
been made (s.l54(l)(a)). Initially, three matters were relied upon by Mr Daemar but one of the matters was abandoned during the course of the hearing. The two remaining matters may be summarised as follows:

(a)

that at the tlme of the maklng of the	sequestration order an agreement was in
whereby the debt was payable by instalments;

place between Westpac and himself

(b) that, on the assumption that no such agreement had been made, the solicltor for Westpac should have informed the Court that negotiations were proceeding between Westpac and himself for payment of the debt and should have sought an adjournment of the hearing of the petition untll those negotiations were concluded.

Mr Daemar, in his affidavit sworn on 15 November 1988, has stated that on 27 November 1985, that is to say, after the act of bankruptcy had been committed by him by faillng to comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notlce served on him on 31 October 1985, he spoke to the solicitor acting for Westpac and suggested "a number of alternative compromises to pay the debt as then due". He subsequently addressed a letter dated 29 November 1985 to Minter Simpson, the solicitors for Westpac, setting out a list of his assets and liabilities and containing the following paragraph:

"So as to enable creditors to get a reasonable

amount of what is due, I propose either:

(a)	Effecting the provisions of Section 10 of the Bankruptcy Act and offer 30% as soon as funds are to hand, or,
(b)	Compromise with creditors whereby a proportion of earnings are put aside and held in trust by a person appointed by the creditors to act as trustee, that trustee distributing to creditors
equally . "

The reference to Section 10 of the Bankruptcy Act was

clearly Intended to be a reference to Part X thereof.

By letter dated 10 February 1986 Minter Simpson replied in the following terms:

"We refer to your letter of 29 November, 1985.

Without prejudice to the Bank's rights to proceed wlth a Creditors Petition based upon your failure to comply with the terms of the Bankruptcy Notice served on 21 October, 1985, the Bank would be prepared to consider a Deed of Arrangement under Part X of the Bankruptcy Act provided that that

Deed effectively combines Paragraphs (a) and (b)

set out on the second page of your letter. The period of contribution would be a matter to be determined by Creditors generally.

Unless a meetlnq of Creditors has been called in accordance with the provision of Part X of the Bankruptcy Act within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this letter, we are Instructed to continue Bankruptcy action against you."

Mr Daemar then addressed a further letter to Minter Slmpson. That letter, which is dated 19 February 1986, contained a statement that he preferred to deal with each creditor individually and added:

"As stated to you I anticipate funds to come to hand at the end of this month or the first week of March which will then put me in a position to make an offer and/or call a meeting of creditors, whichever your client prefers."

By letter dated 13 March 1986 Minter Simpson

informed Mr Daemar that Westpac had given instructions that

it required him to call a meeting of his creditors in

accordance with Part X of the Bankruptcy Act in accordance

with the letter dated 10 February 1986. In a telephone conversation on 15 March 1986 with	the solicitor acting for Westpac, Mr Daemar said that there
was, for reasons explained to the solicitor, no point in calllng a meeting of his creditors. Accordlnq to Mr Daemar he was lnformed that "there would be no problem and that the petitioner was always loath to bankrupt someone if there was a vlable alternative". He said he was also told to go to the solicitor's office and make a payment and that an offer

of regular repayments with settlement on or before 15

October 1986 was reasonable and that ~ t s	acceptance would be
recommended to Westpac.

Mr Daemar sald that he endeavoured, without success, to speak to the manager of the Crows Nest branch of Westpac in the latter part of March and in April 1986. Early in June 1986, he attended at the offices of Westpac's solicitors and paid an amount of $1,000 towards reduction of the debt. Westpac, he said, received that money on 24 June 1986. By letter dated 30 July 1986 addressed to the manager of the Crows Nest branch of Westpac following a telephone conversation with the manager on that date, Mr Daemar made the following offer of payment of the debt:

"1. $1,000.00 already paid

2. $2,000.00 payable immediately

3. $2,000.00 payable within three weeks or on or before the 15th August, 1986

4. $5,000.00 on or before the 15th

September, 1986

5. $5,000.00 on or before the 15th October,

1986

It is clear from the letter that Mr Daemar was aware that the petition was listed for hearing on 4 August 1986. According to Mr Daemar, the manager had told hlm in the course of the telephone conversation that he would submlt the matter to Westpac's head office. Later that day, Mr

Daemar again spoke by telephone to the manager who confirmed that the letter had been recelved and "that it was already on its way to head office".

On 3 August 1986, Mr Daemar spoke to the manager of the Crows Nest branch of Westpac and to its sollcltor seeking information concerning the fate of the offer. The manager said that the matter was in the hands of Westpac's solicltor. According to Mr Daemar, he asked the solicitor if he would obtain an adjournment of the petition on 4 August 1986. The solicitor said he would seek instructions. Mr Daemar said he spoke to the solicitor again on the morning of 4 August 1988. Mr Daemar's recollection is that he was told that Westpac would require proof of his ability to pay and that he told the solicitor he could provide such proof but would require an adjournment of the petition. The solicltor said, according to 'Mr Daemar, that "if such proof was available he would not proceed to seek an order for my CMr Daemar'sl bankruptcy".

Mr Daemar sald that he endeavoured to arrange for a solicitor to appear for him on the hearlng on 4 August 1986. However, the solicitor gave him no assurance that he would attend and, in the result, did not do so. Mr Daemar did not attend the hearing himself.

It is clear on the evidence that no agreement was made between Westpac and Mr Daemar for payment of the debt by instalments. It is equally clear that neither Westpac nor its solicitor had given an assurance that an adjournment would be sought when the petition came before the Court on 4 August 1986 or an assurance that a sequestration order would not then be sought. The response made to the request for an adjournment was that a sequestration order would not be sought if proof were available of Mr Daemar's ability to pay the debt. That proof was not forthcoming.

It is idle to speculate as to the order that Beaumont J. might have made if all these matters had been placed before him. It is, however, by no means clear that he would have refrained from making a sequestration order, having regard to the absence of any evidence from Mr Daemar that he was able to pay his debts as they fell due. But, be that as it may, I am unable to conclude, on the material before me, that the sequestration order ought not to have been made.

The application for the annulment of the Application for discharqe from bankruptcv bankruptcy is, therefore, dismissed.

Mr Daemar first made application for an order of discharge from bankruptcy on 16 May 1988. The application for discharge came before the Court on 5 July 1988 but was then adjourned. The application was subsequently further adjourned and eventually came on for hearing on 22 February

, F .

4 1.:  I : ,

t',

1;

In support of the application, Mr Daemar relied upon affidavits sworn by hlm on 17 May 1988, 11 November 1988 and 21 February 1989 respectively. The admissibility of much of the material set out in those affidavits was objected to by counsel appearing on behalf of a creditor, Mr Wllllam Frederick Sheath, who appeared to oppose the grantlng of an order of discharge. However, as Mr Daemar was not legally represented, I received the material objected to as being in the nature of written submissions identifying the matters on which Mr Daemar relied as supporting his application. The Court also has before it a report under sub-s.150(3) of the Bankruptcy Act dated 24 June 1988 made by Mr Andrew, the trustee of Mr Daemar's estate, and a supplementary report by the trustee dated 20 February 1989.

Mr Ilaernar was born in the Netherlands on 4 March
1944. Prior to 1970 he was known by the name of Edward

Michael Van Werkhoven. In that year, he changed his name to

before the Court that in some of hls business dealings since James Arthur Daemar. However, it is clear from the material	July 1984 he used the name Edward Michael Van Werkhoven.
Those deallngs included the obtaining of credit and the operation of bank accounts. He is also shown as a director of some of the companies with which he has been involved under the name Van Werkhoven.
Mr Daemar's statement of affairs, verified by affidavit sworn on 27 January 1987, disclosed assets of
$1,062 and liabilities owing to 19 unsecured creditors
totalling $363,426. There was thus dlsclosed a deficiency of $362,364. The total amount which has been brought to the credit of the estate is $1,059.70 of which $1,000 represents an amount paid to the trustee by Westpac by way of refund of the amount received by it from Mr Daemar on 24 June 1986 and referred to earlier in these reasons. The balance of the moneys brought to the credit of the estate comprises small amounts standing to the credit of Mr Daemar in a number of separate bank accounts which he operated. The prospects of the trustee receiving other moneys for the benefit of creditors appear remote nothwithstanding the matters to which reference is made later in these reasons.
Mr Daemar, in his affidavit sworn on 17 May 1988, describes himself as "an entrepreneur by trade" and says "I invent new ideas and concepts, create Investment and develop
markets". He has clearly been involved over the years in a number of unusual enterprises. For the purpose of these and
of companies. Thosd companies appear to have been floated other enterprises he has been shareholder, director or employee, or a combination of those roles, in a large number
for the purpose of marketing ideas and concepts conceived by him, ideas and concepts in which others were persuaded to invest their funds. In his statement of affairs, Mr Daemar
dlsclosed that, at the date of his bankruptcy, he held
221,251 shares of $1 each but that those shares were valueless. The trustee, in his report dated 24 June 1988,
identified the companies concerned and the number of shares
held by Mr Daemar in each company. Detalls are as follows -

Company No. of Shares

Quik Foods Processing Pty Limited

Food Commodities International

Incorporated (formerly Quik Group
of Companies Pty Limited formerly
Daemar Investments & Finance Pty
Limited)

Mothers Pantry Products Pty Limited Syndicated Frozen Foods Pty Limited

(formerly Torro Frozen Foods

Pty ~imited)

Alr Structures Pty Limited
Burger Bus Enterprises Pty Llmlted

Syndicated Amusements Limited

(formerly Syndicated Amusements

Pty Limited)

Syndicated Finance Facility Pty Limited

The trustee has reported that each of those companies has ceased to trade and appears to have no assets resulting in the shares being valueless. The trustee has also reported that at the date of his bankruptcy Mr Daemar also held 2000 $1 shares in Soft Sculptures Pty Llmlted and 100 $1 shares in Syndicated Corporate Group Pty Limited which were not

disclosed in the statement of affairs. The shares in the

former company appear to be valueless. The shares in the

latter company were transferred by Mr Daemar to Julia Patricia Britten, his de facto wife, on 29 September 1986, that is to say shortly after he became a bankrupt, for a

consideration of $100. The trustee has obtained a transfer

of these shares as being an asset in the bankrupt estate.

The trustee has also reported that Mr Daemar failed to disclose to him that, at the date of his bankruptcy, he had an interest under an agreement of purchase in a certain residential property at Auckland, New Zealand. That agreement was rescinded by the vendor but not until 3 June 1987, some ten months after Mr Daemar was made bankrupt. During the course of the hearing the trustee informed the Court that he was prepared to accept that Mr Daemar's omission from the statement of affairs of any reference to the residential property was based on legal advice. He added, however, that he did not accept the correctness of that advice.

Mr Daemar asserts that he became a bankrupt as a direct result of a judgment given against him by Macken J. In the Industrial Commission of New South Wales on 1 November 1984 and the adverse publicity which resulted from the publication of extracts from that judgment, including references to the serious criticism of his conduct which the judgment contained. He asserts that, as a result of that publicity, "sensitive negotiations as between my then

Charter Finance Limited to refinance several capltal company, The Daemar Corporation Limited, and Standard	intensive projects was cancelled", the sum involved, he
says, being in excess of $600,000. It followed, so Mr Daemar asserts, that all the companies in the group, some 13 in all, were eventually wound up or ceased to trade.

The relevant proceedings, which were commenced by

Mr Sheath against Quik Foods Pty Limited, The House of

Daemar Pty Limited and Mr Daemar, sought an order under s.88F of the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940 (N.S.H.) declaring void a franchise or licence agreement entered into on 14 January 1983 by Mr Sheath with Quik Foods Pty Limited, a company owned and controlled by Mr Daemar, and the recovery of certaln moneys paid pursuant to that agreement. Under the agreement, which was part of a scheme devlsed by Mr Daemar, Mr Sheath was to have the exclusive right, within a defined geographical area, to supply frozen hamburgers to special vendlng machines which would serve them hot and to supply other frozen foods to households and retail outlets. Macken 3. declared that the contract or arrangement was void

- ab initio save in so far as moneys had been paid under it to

Mr Sheath and ordered Mr Daemar and The House of Daemar Pty Limited jointly and severally to pay to Mr Sheath amounts totalling $22,850. The basis upon which the contract or arrangement was declared void was that, contrary to s.88F(l)(d) of the Industrial Arbitration Act, it provided to Mr Sheath less than he would have received under the Van Salemen's (State) Award as an employee performing the work for which the contract or arrangement provided. However, in

the course of giving reasons for his judgment, Macken J. was

very critical of Mr Daemar's conduct. In particular, his Honour found that, in the negotiations with Mr Sheath, Mr Daemar had made a number of representations which were false and known to be false as an inducement to him to enter into the agreement. It may also be noted that Macken J. referred to the fact that, after Mr Sheath had ceased to operate in the designated territory, the franchise area had been sold to another person who had also lost his money in the

venture.

An application by Mr Daemar to the Industrial Commission of New South Wales in Court Sesslon for leave to appeal from the judgment of Macken J. was dismissed on 19 December 1985, reasons for the dismissal being given on 13 February 1986. The Court (Fisher P-, Cahill and Watson JJ.) stated that, having heard Mr Daemar fully on the merits of the matter, it was not a case where, assuming leave to appeal were granted, the appeal would have succeeded. The Court, although commenting adversely on two aspects of the judgment from which leave to appeal was sought, concluded that Mr Daemar's position had not been vindicated and that, on the evidence, his conduct "was clearly open to precise and accurate criticisms".

Mr Daemar, by summons filed on 10 March 1986,
commenced a proceeding in the Court of Appeal. of the Supreme

Court of New South Wales seeking relief in the nature of the

prerogative writs quashing the orders made by the Industrial	commission of New South Wales. In that proceeding Mr Daemar
also sought various declarations and damages. Before that summons came on for substantive hearing, a sequestration order had been made against Mr Daemar. On 4 March 1988, the Court of Appeal (Kirby P., Samuels and Clarke JJ.A.) held that, in the absence of an election by the trustee in bankruptcy to continue the proceedings, the proceeding was
stayed by force of sub-s.60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. An application by Mr Daemar to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal agalnst the judgment of the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 16 September 1988.
Contrary to the positlon taken by Mr Daemar, the trustee has concluded, as a result of his investigations, that the companies through which Mr Daemar conducted his business affalrs had insufficient capltal resulting in the need for substantial borrowings belng required to finance operations, borrowings which Mr Daemar personally guaranteed. The trustee also concluded that the companies had serious liquidity and cash flow problems. He has also adverted to the circumstance that Mr Daemar appears not to have received regular payments from the companies for his services to them, this being a factor which contributed to his lnabllity to satisfy the guarantees when he was called upon to do so.
One of the reasons advanced by Mr Daemar why he should be granted an order of discharge from his bankruptcy is that, once discharged, he would be free to pursue, as he
wishes to do, other proceedings in order to have his name cleared of the critical comments made concerning him in the
judgments of the Industrial Commission of New South Wales and his standing in the eyes of the business community restored. It must be said, however, that, although Mr Daemar does not accept the correctness of the findings made in relation to his conduct towards Mr Sheath, there 1s
nothing in any of the material now before the Court to suggest that the adverse comments as to his conduct made by the Industrial Commission of New South Wales in Court Sesslon were not entirely justified on the evldence before that court.
On 20 September 1986, that is shortly after he became a bankrupt, Mr Daemar resigned as a director of Syndcorp Limited and was appointed sales manager and marketing co-ordinator of that company. He was apparently employed on the basis that the company would pay his rent, reasonable expenses and a commission. The books of the company show the company as being indebted to him on 7 October 1987 in the sum of $49,000 for cash advances and arrears of wages and fees. Mr Daemar assigned this debt to Julla Patricia Britten to satisfy his alleged indebtedness to her. On 7 October 1987, in purported satisfaction of the asslgned debt and further indebtedness of the company to her, the company transferred to Julia Patrlcia Britten 99,999 $1 ordinary shares in a company known as Leisure Time International Pty Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Syndcorp Limited. The trustee has claimed that part of this shareholding forms part of the bankrupt estate but the clam is disputed. The trustee, in his report dated 24 June 1988,
has also referred to the transfer of assets as between companies with which Mr Daemar is involved, transfers which he believes have been made with a view to obstructing and delaylng any clalm he has as trustee to a proprietary
Interest in those assets.
The trustee has also reported that on 7 October 1987 a resolution was passed at a meetlng of directors of Leisure Time International Pty Limited to the- effect that before any dividend is paid to shareholders, the sum of $100,000 be pald to Mr Daemar. The trustee states that he
is seeklng payment of that amount from the company. The
company appears, however, to have transferred all its assets to another company, Koala & Co. Pty Limited.
Mr Daemar's general attitude is exemplified by the statements made in his affidavit sworn on 17 May 1988 and in his submissions to the Court that he has no assets, that he can make no contribution to his bankrupt estate, that there is no benefit to his creditors or anyone else in his
remaining a bankrupt and that his continuing bankruptcy serves no useful purpose but causes hardship and embarrassment and denies to him a right of access to the courts for the judicial revlew of the judgment of the Industrial Commission of New South Wales to which reference has been made.
Mr Daemar disputed much of what is set out in the trustee's report and supplementary report, contending that the trustee had failed to give adequate weight to matters disclosed by him during the course of his public examination. I have carefully studied the whole of the material before the Court including the transcript of the public examination of Mr Daemar on 20 January 1987, 16 December 1987, 25 February 1988 and 18 March 1988. Much of what Mr Daemar says consists of unsubstantiated assertion on

his part, unsupported by oral or documentary evidence. The concerns whlch the trustee has expressed in his report and supplementary report are well founded and I am far from satisfied that Mr Daemar has given a full and truthful account of his trade dealings and affairs or that he has given to the trustee a full measure of assistance in identifying and recovering property which should be

available for distrlbutlon amongst his creditors.

Sub-section 150(5) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the Court shall, if any of the matters specified in sub-S. 150(6) is established - (a) refuse to make an order of discharge; or (b) make an order of discharge but suspend the operation of the order as the Court thinks proper, either unconditionally or subject to conditions. One of the matters specified in sub-S. 150(6) - that referred to in par.(c) - 1s that the bankrupt has contracted a debt provable in the bankruptcy without having at the time of

contracting it any reasonable or probable grounds of

expectation (proof of which lies on him) of being able to

pay it after taking into consideration his other liabilities	at the time. I am satisfied on the material before the
Court that Mr Daemar entered into guarantees securing the repayment of substantial sums at times when he had few personal assets of any value and only a limited, if any, source of regular income. In doing so, he contracted a debt provable in the bankruptcy within the meaning of that expression in par.l50(6)(c): Re Benda; Ex parte Benda (1985)
6 F.C.R. 346. Although Mr Daemar may have believed at the
time that the companies whose debts were guaranteed would be able to meet their obligations so that he would not be called on to make any payments under those guarantees, I am satlsfled that, at the time the guarantees were given, his personal financial position was such that he was not able to meet, and had no reasonable prospects of belng able to meet, any claim made against him in the event of default by the companies concerned or any of them. It is clear on the material before the Court that Mr Daemar regarded the giving of such guarantees as no more than a formality.

I have not found it necessary to refer in these

reasons to each and every matter mentioned by the trustee in his report and supplementary report. However, I should make it clear that, in reaching my decislon upon the application,

I have not taken into account those parts of the trustee's report that refer to the possibility of crimlnal charges being laid against Mr Daemar for offences against the Bankruptcy Act. I have not done so because the information before the Court is not sufficient to enable a definitive	view to be formed. It appears that prior to June 1988 the	trustee referred certain matters to the Director of Public
Prosecutions for his consideration. The materlal before the Court, however, does not dlsclose whether any, and if so what, action has been taken by the Director in relation to those matters.

The principal matters to which I have had regard

are -

(a)	That Mr Daemar has made no contribution to his estate for the benefit of his creditors and has made no offer to make any payment for their benefit from future earnings.
(b)	That the cause of his bankruptcy was largely,

if not solely, due to the manner in which he

chose to conduct his affairs and was not the result of extraneous circumstances over which he had no control.

(c)	Mr Daemar's fallure to disclose certain assets in his statement of affairs.
(d)	The conduct of Mr Daemar in his business dealings with Mr Sheath, conduct which, after full inquiry, was criticised by the Industrial Commission of New South Wales.
(e)	The circumstance that Mr Daemar appears not to have learned from his experience as is exemplified by his general attitude to his bankruptcy and his creditors.
(f)	My lack of satisfaction that Mr Daemar has given a full and truthful account of his trade dealings and affalrs and a full measure of assistance to the trustee in administering his estate.
(g)	The circumstance that Mr Daemar entered into a number of guarantees without having at the time any reasonable or probable expectation of being able to meet his obligations thereunder ~f called upon to do so.

I am conscious that, absent any of the circumstances mentioned in sub-s.149(3) of the Bankruptcy

Act, Mr Daemar will be discharged from his bankruptcy by

operation of law upon the expiration of 3 years from the

date of the bankruptcy, a period which will shortly expire. However. taking into account the whole of the material before the Court and, in particular, the matters referred to above and having regard to the principles and guidelines referred to by Sheppard J. in Re Kerstan (1986) 65 A.L.R.

372, I am of opinion that Mr Daemar has failed to establish

a case for the grant of an early discharge. The application

15, therefore, dismissed.

Mr Daemar must pay the trustee's costs of and incidental to the application for discharge. Two creditors, Westpac and Mr Sheath, appeared by counsel on the hearing of the application. Counsel for Westpac took no active part in the matter and, although counsel for Mr Sheath actively opposed the granting of the applicatlon, no material additional to that relied upon by the trustee was put before the Court on Mr Sheath's behalf. In all the circumstances, I think it is appropriate to make no order as to the costs of Westpac or Mr Sheath.

I certify that this and the preceding 19 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Mr Justice Neaves

Dated: 18 July 1989

The bankrupt appeared in person

The trustee appeared in person

Counsel for Westpac Banking

Corporation : Mr M. Hughes

Solicitors for Westpac Banking

Corporation : Minter Ellison

Counsel for Willlam Frederick Sheath	: Mr G.L. Turner
Solicitors for
William Frederick Sheath	: Griffiths, Delaney

& Co.

Date of hearing : 22 February 1989