| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
TRUSTS, EQUITY AND PROBATE LIST
S ECI 2019 00896
IN THE MATTER of the estate of CHARLES CAMPBELL COGHLAN, deceased
| MARIE BERNADETTE MERRIMAN | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA (and others according to the attached schedule) | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | McMillan J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 9 October 2020 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re Coghlan; Merriman v Attorney-General (No 2) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSC 668 |
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EQUITY & TRUSTS — Charitable trusts — Where will named one entity but gave address of another — Previous finding that Court unable to determine proper recipient of gift — Whether gift made for a general charitable purpose — Whether administrative scheme appropriate to remedy defect in description of recipient — Identification of proper recipient of gift pursuant to administrative scheme — Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General (NSW) (1938) 60 CLR 396; Phillips v Roberts [1975] 2 NSWLR 207; Corish v Attorney-General’s Department of NSW [2006] NSWSC 1219; Re Niall (2019) 60 VR 1.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr J McComish | Coulter Roache |
| For the First Defendant | Victorian Government Solicitor | |
| For the Second to Fourth Defendants | Ms E Konstantinou | Health Legal |
HER HONOUR:
On 26 June 2020, the Court delivered reasons for judgment on the plaintiff’s application for answers to questions in relation to the interpretation of clause 6(c) of the will of Charles Campbell Coghlan dated 5 June 2013.[1]
[1]Re Coghlan; Merriman v Attorney-General [2020] VSC 392 (‘Re Coghlan’).
The application concerned a gift of one third of the residue of the deceased’s estate to ‘Diabetes Australia of 26 Arundal [sic] Street Glebe New South Wales’. The plaintiff, as executor, wished to know which, if any, of three possible entities the clause referred to. The three entities (collectively, ‘the charities’) were as follows:
(a) the second defendant, Diabetes Australia (ACN 008 528 461) (‘Diabetes Australia’), the entity named in the will;
(b) the fourth defendant, Diabetes NSW (ACN 001 363 766) (‘Diabetes NSW’), which operates from 26 Arundel Street, Glebe, NSW; or
(c) the third defendant, Diabetes Australia – Victoria (ACN 005 239 510) (‘Diabetes Victoria’), an entity with which the deceased had substantial contact throughout his life.
The Court held that it was not possible to determine which entity was referred to in clause 6(c). This was so because the Court could not, on the evidence before it or upon the application of generally accepted construction principles, identify to which of the three entities the deceased intended to make the gift. The Court invited the parties to provide further submissions as to the appropriateness of an administrative scheme as a means of administering the gift, by 31 July 2020.
The charities filed written submissions on 31 July 2020. The plaintiff filed submissions on 25 August 2020. In light of the late filing of the plaintiff’s…
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- Case
- [2020] VSC 668
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the gift was intended for a general charitable purpose, and if so, whether the court could employ an administrative scheme to address the defect in the description of the intended recipient. The court was also required to consider the applicability of previous decisions such as Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General (NSW), Phillips v Roberts, and Corish v Attorney-General’s Department of NSW.
The court held that the gift was indeed made for a general charitable purpose, as evidenced by the clear intention of the deceased to benefit a charitable entity. The court found that the administrative scheme was an appropriate tool to identify and remedy the defect in the description of the intended recipient. By applying the principles established in previous cases, the court concluded that the gift could be properly allocated to a suitable charitable entity. The court's decision provided clarity on the application of administrative schemes in rectifying defects in the description of intended charitable recipients.
The final orders of the court directed that the gift should be allocated to a charitable entity suitable in the circumstances, following the guidelines set out in the court's judgment. This decision reinforced the importance of ensuring that charitable gifts are effectively and properly administered, even in the face of defects in the description of the intended recipients.