Re Clegg

[2006] QMHC 22

MENTAL HEALTH COURT

CITATION:

Re Clegg [2006] QMHC 022

PARTIES:

REFERENCE BY THE DISTRICT COURT IN RESPECT OF SHANE WILLIAM CLEGG

PROCEEDING: 

No 0110 of 2005

DELIVERED ON:

7 June 2006

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 June 2006

JUDGE:

Philippides J

ASSISTING PSYCHIATRISTS:

Dr J F Wood
Dr D A Grant

FINDINGS AND ORDER:

1. That when the alleged offences were committed the
    defendant was not suffering from unsoundness of  
mind as described in Schedule 2 to the Mental Health

     Act 2000 (Qld)

2.  That the defendant is fit for trial 

3.  That the proceedings continue according to law

CATCHWORDS:

MENTAL HEALTH – DECLARATION OR FINDING OF MENTAL ILLNESS OR INCAPACITY – where defendant charged with break and enter and wilful damage – where expert psychiatric evidence that defendant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia – where defendant was intoxicated at time of offences – whether intentional intoxication contributed to offending behaviour – whether defendant was of unsound mind as defined in Schedule 2 of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) at the time of the offences – whether defendant fit for trial

Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), Schedule 2

COUNSEL:

Mr J Farmer for the defendant
Mr J Tate for the Director of Mental Health

Mr C Cassidy for the Director of Public Prosecutions

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the defendant
The Crown Solicitor for the Director of Mental Health

The Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)

PHILIPPIDES J: 

1. Mr Clegg is charged with a count of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent and two counts of wilful damage, all alleged to have occurred on 26 October 2003.

1. It is accepted by the psychiatrists, whose reports the court has and who have given evidence orally, that the defendant had, at the relevant time, a mental illness.  Professor James describes it as paranoid schizophrenia.  Dr Neillie describes it as a delusional disorder.

1. The present case is complicated by the evidence of intoxication.  The evidence indicates that in the period leading up to the offences the defendant had been smoking cannabis daily and had been drinking alcohol regularly, although he was not a regular drinker of spirits.

1. On the day in question, it is clear that the defendant had been drinking a considerable amount of alcohol.  This included very large quantities of spirits.  His consumption of alcohol was such that he had difficulty remembering what happened and, indeed, had no recollection of the actual events in question.

1. Because of the presence, which is undisputed, of intentional intoxication, the court must consider whether the defendant was of unsound mind bearing in mind the definition in Schedule 2 of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) (“the Act”).

1. The evidence of Dr Neillie was that alcohol, resulting in intentional intoxication, was a contributing factor to the severity of the mental illness suffered by the defendant at the relevant time and was a contributing factor to the deprivation of the defendant's capacity for control and capacity to know that what he did was wrong.

1. His opinion is that the contribution of intoxication in relation to the deprivation of capacity was such that, on the balance of probabilities, it cannot be said that those capacities were absent solely because of the mental condition of the defendant.  In expressing his conclusion, Dr Neillie observed that since the alleged offences the defendant's mental condition has improved and that a relevant factor in that improvement has been the defendant's absence from substance use, in particular alcohol.

1. Professor James was of the view that the defendant's psychotic state was itself sufficient to have deprived the defendant of the capacity to know that what was done was wrong.  Professor James further explained his opinion as stated in his report in terms of the psychosis being of sufficient severity to lead the defendant to the brink or threshold of deprivation and to amount to deprivation, but accepted that intoxication had some role in further exacerbating the deprivation.

1. I am grateful to the assisting psychiatrists for the views they have expressed in relation to the differences in the clinical evidence offered by the two psychiatrists who have given evidence.  Both assisting psychiatrists favour the views of Dr Neillie that in this case intentional intoxication was a factor in the deprivation of both the capacity to know that he ought not to do the acts and the capacity for control.  They also considered that the capacity to understand was affected by alcohol and cannot be said to have solely resulted from the psychosis.

1. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was of unsound mind as defined in Schedule 2 to the Act. I find that the defendant was at the relevant time not of unsound mind. The evidence is all to the effect that the defendant is fit for trial and in those circumstances the proceedings are to continue according to law.

1. I direct that a copy of the transcript of my reasons and copies of the medical reports be made available to the District Court and to the defendant's legal representatives for use in the proceedings.