Re Chambers - [2021] WASC 196

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT :   FULL BENCH
CITATION:   RE CHAMBERS; EX PARTE CHAMBERS [2021] WASC 196
CORAM:   QUINLAN CJ
ARCHER J
HILL J

HEARD:   22 JUNE 2021
DELIVERED          :   22 JUNE 2021
FILE NO/S:   EXP 4 of 2020
MATTER:   Application for admission as a legal practitioner by PAUL FRANCIS CHAMBERS
and
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 2007 (WA)
EX PARTE

PAUL FRANCIS CHAMBERS
Applicant

Catchwords:

Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 2007 (WA) – Application for admission as legal practitioner – Applicant admitted as legal practitioner in New Zealand – Applicant practised as barrister – Equivalency of occupations – Whether New Zealand practising certificate is required – Whether fit and proper person

Legislation:

Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (NZ)
Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth)
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 (Cth)
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 2007 (WA)

Result:

Application granted

Category: A

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	In Person
Amicus Curiae	:	J Ley SC

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	In Person
Amicus Curiae	:	Legal Practice Board of Western Australia

Cases referred to in decision:

Little v New Zealand Law Society [2021] NZHC 929
Re Tkacz; Ex parte Tkacz [2006] WASC 315; (2006) 206 FLR 171
Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis [2019] HCA 22; (2019) 93 ALJR 869

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 22 June 2021 and has been edited from the transcript.)

Introduction

On 21 April 2020, the applicant, Mr Paul Chambers, filed an application for admission as a legal practitioner of this Court pursuant to the Trans‑Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 (Cth) (the Act), as adopted by the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 2007 (WA).[1]
[1] Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 2007 (WA), s 4.
The application, as originally filed, was defective, in that it did not wholly comply with the Consolidated Practice Directions in relation to applications for admission under the Act.[2] Those defects included the absence of a certificate from the New Zealand Law Society in the form required by Practice Direction 10.1.3, in addition to a number of formal defects. Mr Chambers was requested to amend the application to comply with the Practice Directions.
[2] Consolidated Practice Directions, Practice Direction 10.1.3.
Mr Chambers filed an amended application, together with a supporting affidavit, on 14 September 2020.
As there were a number of legal issues potentially arising in relation to the application, the application was listed for directions on 5 October 2020. Mr Chambers appeared in person. At the Court's invitation, counsel for the Legal Practice Board (Board) Mr J Ley SC, appeared as amicus curiae.
At the directions hearing, Quinlan CJ raised an issue concerning the proper construction of the Act and in particular whether Mr Chambers required a current practising certificate in New Zealand in order to be admitted as a legal practitioner in this Court under the Act. The Chief Justice also enquired about the status of any complaints against Mr Chambers. It became clear that there was further information that needed to be filed regarding these matters.
Both Mr Chambers and the Board provided additional submissions and affidavit material concerning the application.
It now falls to be determined whether the Court should grant Mr Chambers' application for admission under the Act.
We turn first to the relevant provisions of the Act.

The Act

The relevant provisions of the Act are found in pt 3 (Occupations), beginning at s 15.
Section 16 of the Act provides:
(1)The Trans-Tasman mutual recognition principle is that, subject to this Part, a person who is registered in New Zealand for an occupation is, by virtue of this Act, entitled after notifying the local registration authority of an Australian jurisdiction for the equivalent occupation:
(a)to be registered in the jurisdiction for the equivalent occupation; and
(b)pending such registration, to carry on the equivalent occupation in the jurisdiction.
(2) However, the Trans-Tasman mutual recognition principle is subject to the exception that it does not affect the operation of laws that regulate the manner of carrying on an occupation in an Australian jurisdiction, so long as those laws:
(a)apply equally to all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation under the law of the jurisdiction; and
(b)are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation.
The definition of 'registration', in s 4 of the Act
includes the licensing, approval, admission, certification (including by way of practising certificates), or any other form of authorisation, of a person required by or under legislation for carrying on an occupation.
Sections 17(2) and (3) of the Act provide:
(2)This Part extends to an occupation carried on by an individual, where the individual is subject to more than one system of registration or more than one local registration authority in a participating jurisdiction, and accordingly this Part applies in relation to each such system of registration and each such authority.
(3)Without limiting subsection (2), an example of such an occupation is that of a legal practitioner, which involves both the admission as a legal practitioner by a court and the issue of a practising certificate by another body.
Section 18(1) of the Act provides that
[a] person who is registered in New Zealand for an occupation may lodge a written notice with the local registration authority of an Australian jurisdiction for the equivalent occupation, seeking registration for the equivalent occupation in accordance with the Trans‑Tasman mutual recognition principle.
Sections 18(2) and (3) go on to identify the matters that must be included in the notice.
Section 19 provides for an 'entitlement' to registration upon the lodgement of a notice under s 18. That section provides:
19Entitlement to registration and continued registration
(1)A person who lodges a notice under section 18 with a local registration authority of an Australian jurisdiction is entitled to be registered in the equivalent occupation, as if the law of the jurisdiction that deals with registration expressly provided that registration in New Zealand is a sufficient ground of entitlement to registration.
(2)The local registration authority may grant registration on that ground and may grant renewals of such registration.
(3) Once a person is registered on that ground, the entitlement to registration continues, whether or not registration (including any renewal of registration) ceases in New Zealand.
(4) Continuance of registration is otherwise subject to the laws of the jurisdiction, to the extent to which those laws:
(a)apply equally to all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation under the law of the jurisdiction; and
(b)are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or experience relating to fitness to carry on the occupation.
Sections 20 and 21 of the Act deal with action that needs to be taken after lodgement of a notice and postponement of registration. Refusal of registration is dealt with in s 22(1) of the Act, which provides:
(1)A local registration authority may refuse the grant of registration, if:
(a)any of the statements or information in the notice as required by section 18 are materially false or misleading; or
(b)any document or information as required by section 18(3) has not been provided or is materially false or misleading; or
(c)the authority decides that the occupation in which registration is sought is not an equivalent occupation and equivalence cannot be achieved by the imposition of conditions.

Application of the Act to the legal profession in Western Australia

The Act clearly applies to the occupation of a legal practitioner. Indeed, as is apparent from s 17(3) of the Act, the occupation of a legal practitioner is the only occupation specifically referred to, in terms, in the Act itself.
Relevantly, there are two important matters that arise in relation to the application of the Act as it applies to registration as a legal practitioner.
The first is to recognise that there are two systems of registration applicable to the legal profession in Western Australia under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA): admission to the legal profession, and the grant of practising certificates. The effect of s 17(2) of the Act is that a New Zealand legal practitioner wishing to practise in Western Australia must comply with each system of registration.
That is, as s 17(3) expressly recognises, in order for a person registered as a legal practitioner in New Zealand to practice in Western Australia that person must both be admitted as a legal practitioner and must have a practising certificate. The local registration authority in relation to admission is, of course, this Court.[3] The local registration authority in relation to the grant of local practising certificates is the Board.[4]
[3] Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 26.
[4] Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 37. We leave aside, for the purposes of these reasons, the possibility that an Australian lawyer might also practise with an interstate practising certificate.
The application made by Mr Chambers in the present case only relates to the first system of registration. In the event that he is admitted to the legal profession in accordance with the Act, Mr Chambers would nevertheless require a local practising certificate before he could engage in legal practice in Western Australia. We note, for completeness, that the operation of the Act in this way reflects the manner in which the equivalent provisions have been held to operate in New Zealand (most recently in Little v New Zealand Law Society).[5]
[5] Little v New Zealand Law Society [2021] NZHC 929.
The second matter that arises, insofar as admission by this Court is concerned, is whether, on the assumption that the provisions of the Act have been complied with, the Court retains a residual discretion to refuse to admit a person to the legal profession on the basis that the applicant is not a fit and proper person. The apparently unqualified 'entitlement' to registration in s 19(1) of the Act, would suggest that, subject to the power to refuse registration in s 22(1), as a matter of statutory construction, there is no such residual discretion.
The existence, or otherwise, of such a discretion was the subject of this Court's decision in Re Tkacz.[6] That case concerned, relevantly, identical provisions in the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth), which makes the same provision in relation to the various States of Australia, as the Act makes in relation to New Zealand.
[6] Re Tkacz; Ex parteTkacz [2006] WASC 315; (2006) 206 FLR 171 (Re Tkacz).
The Court in ReTkacz concluded that[7]
the established and long recognised power of the Court to determine whether a person should be admitted to its Roll, irrespective of whether or not they possess the requisite educational qualifications and experience, is unaffected by the mutual recognition legislation.
[7] ReTkacz [69] (Martin CJ, Murray & Templeman JJ).
In so concluding the Court relied upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the supervision of practitioners and on the provision in the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 equivalent to s 16(2) of the Act (namely s 17(2) of the Mutual Recognition Act 1992). The Court said:[8]
So, the language of s 17(2) of the MRA (Cth) is replicated in s 20(4) of that Act, relating to continuance of registration. The long-standing capacity of the superior courts to determine that only the persons with the requisite personal qualities of character be admitted to, or remain on, the Roll would not easily fit within the description of 'some qualification or experience'. Accordingly, that capacity of the superior courts, including the Supreme Court of Western Australia, remains unaffected by the mutual recognition legislation.
[8] ReTkacz [66] (Martin CJ, Murray & Templeman JJ).
The correctness of the Court's decision in ReTkacz has been doubted. In Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis,[9] Gageler J said:[10]
To the extent that Re Tkacz might be understood to have decided either that s 17(2) of the MRA renders a State law requiring that a legal practitioner be of good character applicable to registration under s 20(2) of the MRA or that the discretion conferred on a local registration authority by s 20(2) of the MRA extends to allowing a local registration authority to refuse registration of a person who has been admitted to practice as a legal practitioner in another State and who has given notice under s 19 of the MRA on the basis of its own assessment that the person is not of good character, it will be apparent from what I have written that I consider that case to have been wrongly decided.
To the extent that Re Tkacz held that a State Supreme Court is a local registration authority for the purpose of the MRA and to the extent that it might be taken to have held that the inherent jurisdiction of a State Supreme Court is unaffected by the MRA, I would reserve my consideration of its correctness for a case in which the correctness of each of those holdings squarely arose and was fully argued. Examination of the correctness of the first of those holdings would require consideration of whether a State Supreme Court fits the description of a 'person' or 'authority' within the MRA definition of a local registration authority and of the weight to be attached in answering that question to the general provision that is made in the MRA for review of a decision of a local registration authority by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Examination of the correctness of the second of the holdings would require consideration of the potential for operation in a proceeding in the inherent jurisdiction of a State Supreme Court of the prescription in s 44(1) of the MRA that the mutual recognition principle and the provisions of the MRA 'may be taken into consideration in proceedings of any kind' and of the import of that prescription.
[9] Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis [2019] HCA 22; (2019) 93 ALJR 869 (Andriotis).
[10] Andriotis [94] - [95] (Gageler J).
The other members of the Court in Andriotis who referred to Re Tkacz also reserved their views as to the correctness of the conclusion in that case that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is unaffected by the Mutual Recognition Act 1992.[11]
[11] Andriotis [150] (Nettle & Gordon JJ); see also at [47] (Kiefel CJ, Bell & Keane JJ).
There is certainly, in our view, a significant tension between the legislative purpose revealed by the Act as a whole and the broader conclusion in Re Tkacz that an applicant for admission under the Act stands in no different position than an applicant ab initio under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).
As the correctness of the decision in Re Tkacz was not the subject of submissions before this Court, and has not been overruled, we will proceed upon the basis that there may exist a residual discretion to refuse admission for an applicant under the Act. Nevertheless, in our view, any residual discretion would fall to be applied having regard to the general principle reflected in the Act that the local authority will respect the assessment of qualifications, experience and fitness of the authority in New Zealand.[12] It is a fundamental feature of the Act, and the Mutual Recognition Act 1992, that local authorities will not, at least in the ordinary course, go behind the registration of a person in another participating jurisdiction.
[12] See, by parity of reasoning, Andriotis [163] (Edelman J).
We turn then to Mr Chambers' application.

The application in the present case

The evidence before the Court reveals that Mr Chambers was admitted as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand on 7 February 1997.
The Certificate of Standing provided by the New Zealand Law Society in relation to Mr Chambers on 23 March 2020 provided
[Mr Chambers] is not currently suspended from practice and has not been struck off the roll. There are no professional misconduct charges pending at this time. [Mr Chambers] is of good standing as a barrister.
Insofar as admission is concerned, therefore, Mr Chambers is 'registered in New Zealand' as an admitted barrister and solicitor. Subject to s 22 of the Act, and any residual discretion of the Court, he is prima facie entitled to registration (i.e. admission) in this State.
It is apparent from the material before the Court however, that Mr Chambers encountered a number of difficulties in his practice as a barrister in New Zealand in 2019 and 2020. Those difficulties resulted in a number of complaints in relation to Mr Chambers. They also resulted in a certain degree of acrimony between Mr Chambers and the New Zealand Law Society.
Before turning to s 22 of the Act, and any residual discretion of the Court, it is appropriate to briefly summarise the history as it is revealed by the evidence.

Factual background

When Mr Chambers initially applied for admission on 21 April 2020, he held a current New Zealand Practising Certificate as a barrister. That practising certificate has now expired and was not renewed.
Mr Chambers declared, at that time, that he was not the subject of any disciplinary proceedings but that he was subject to two preliminary investigations. That declaration was consistent with the Certificate of Standing provided by the New Zealand Law Society on 23 March 2020. The Certificate of Standing also revealed that Mr Chambers had been the subject of disciplinary action by the New Zealand Law and Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal on 16 May 2006 and 19 January 2009 respectively.
Following the request for further information, and the directions hearing on 5 October 2020, respectively, Mr Chambers filed two further affidavits dated 14 September 2020 and 19 October 2020.
Those affidavits reveal the following.
In the course of a significant criminal trial in February 2019, Mr Chambers suffered the onset of acute symptoms of a mental health condition. It is not necessary to set out the precise nature of Mr Chambers' condition or its cause. Mr Chambers obtained a report dated 13 May 2020 from Dr Chris Brampton, psychiatrist, to the effect that, from early 2019, he has suffered from severe symptoms from his condition, which symptoms affected his work capacity. The report in particular states that Mr Chambers' 'symptoms are relatively severe however they have already settled considerably compared with early 2019'. Mr Chambers has deposed, in his affidavit filed 14 September 2020, that his prognosis was for a return to full work capacity in approximately 12 to 18 months (from that date).
At the hearing of the application, Mr Chambers provided a recent report from his treating practitioner to the effect that the practitioner had been treating Mr Chambers for over 12 months and that 'further assistance will be required for some time'. It is therefore apparent that Mr Chambers' recovery still has a way to go.
The further affidavits also revealed additional complaints that had been received by the New Zealand Law Society since the expiry of his practising certificate. Correspondence from the New Zealand Law Society to the Board confirmed that to be the case. Mr Chambers gives an account of his understanding of those matters, insofar as he is able.
It is apparent from Mr Chambers' affidavits that, following the onset of his symptoms in February 2019, the relationship between him and the New Zealand authorities began to fray. Mr Chambers deposes to feeling mistreated by the New Zealand Law Society. While it is not appropriate to enter into the merits of his grievance against the New Zealand authorities, it does provide some context.

For example, in early in 2020, in response to an investigation initiated by Auckland Standards Committee 2 in relation his conduct of an appeal in the High Court of New Zealand, Mr Chambers sent a memorandum to each of the courts in New Zealand containing criticisms of the courts, the New Zealand Law Society and the profession generally. One of the complaints was a complaint in relation to Mr Chambers' failure to appear at a hearing in the High Court of New Zealand in November 2019.
The ultimate outcome of that complaint is instructive. On 23 October 2020 the Legal Complaints Review Officer reversed a finding of unsatisfactory conduct against Mr Chambers. In the course of his decision the Review Officer said:
[16]In the memorandum [referred to in [44] above], Mr Chambers advised that, as a result of the memorandum addressed to all courts in New Zealand, he had been ordered by the Court of Appeal to 'obtain a psychiatric report detailing his fitness or otherwise to appear as defence counsel' in the appeal in which he was acting as the appellants' counsel.
[17]He advised that he had 'attended a pre‑scheduled appointment with psychiatrist Dr Chris Brampton, who advises that a report requested by ACC as to counsel's formal diagnosis requires at least 3 more sessions' and that the report would be available in the first week of May 2020.
[18]Dr Bampton's report is dated 13 May 2020.
[19]The own motion investigation came before the Committee at its meeting on 9 April 2020. The Committee issued its determination on 8 May 2020, which was the Friday of the first full week in May. It is clear then, that the Committee did not have Dr Bampton's report before it when reaching its decision.
[20]Mr Chambers has lodged an application for review of the Committee's determination, which also contains critical and derogatory comments about the Committee and its members, building on the previous comments to the Committee … He refers also to breaches of the Human Rights Act 1993.
[21]Mr Chambers provided Dr Bampton's report to this Office on 15 June 2020. He advised that the report was confidential to him and contains sensitive information. He does not wish it to be provided to the Standards Committee or any arm of the New Zealand Law Society.
[22]Having read the report, I have no hesitation in upholding Mr Chambers' request for confidentiality, and acknowledge the courage that would have been required by Mr Chambers to provide a copy to this Office.
[23]In usual circumstances, where fresh information is produced on review, it is the practice of this Office to return the matter to the Standards Committee to reconsider its determination. That cannot be done in this instance, and in any event, I would not wish to prolong finalisation of this matter.
[24]Dr Bampton's report is 25 pages in length and makes for devastating reading. Although Mr Chambers does not have a current practising certificate, and is residing in Australia, if the New Zealand Law Society has the ability to provide any form of support to Mr Chambers, it is my hope that such support would be forthcoming.
[25]Due to the confidentiality of the report, I cannot make reference to any of the matters referred to by Dr Bampton. However, the report fully explains Mr Chambers' somewhat confrontational responses to the Courts, the Judiciary, the New Zealand Law Society, and the Standards Committee. I have no hesitation in reversing the determination of the Standards Committee.
We turn now to s 22 of the Act.

Section 22 of the Act

Section 22(1)(a) and (b) both confer a discretion to refuse a grant of registration where the statements, information or documents provided by an applicant are 'materially false or misleading'.
We are satisfied that there is nothing in Mr Chambers' application that could be characterised as 'materially false or misleading'. The helpful submissions filed by the Board, as amicus curiae, did not suggest otherwise. The Board did, however, refer to the fact that Mr Chambers did not disclose that he had previously been the subject of disciplinary proceedings in 2006 and 2009 (see [37] above). As the Board submitted, any lack of candour in that regard would be a matter relevant to the residual discretion.
In relation to s 22(1)(c), we are satisfied that the occupation in which Mr Chambers seeks registration ('local lawyer') is an equivalent occupation to that which he is registered in New Zealand ('barrister and solicitor').
In that regard, the submissions of the Board raised two potential issues.
The first was whether the absence of current New Zealand practising certificate prevents his registration as an admitted lawyer in Western Australia. The second was whether Mr Chambers' occupation 'as a barrister' in New Zealand was equivalent to that of an 'unrestricted legal practitioner in Western Australia'.
The issues may be addressed together.
First, we do not consider that the absence of a current practising certificate in New Zealand prevents admission in Western Australia. To so conclude would be to confuse the two separate systems of registration in relation to legal practitioners that exist in both New Zealand and Western Australia. The only system of registration, the subject of the application before the Court, is that relating to admission. If Mr Chambers meets the registration requirement of that system (i.e. admission in New Zealand) that is the relevant registration for admission in Western Australia.
That does not mean, as we have noted above, that admission in Western Australia would entitle Mr Chambers to commence practice as a lawyer in Western Australia. On the contrary, the clear effect of s 17(2) of the Act is that Mr Chambers would require a local practising certificate. As Mr Chambers does not have a New Zealand practising certificate, there could be no 'mutual recognition' of such a certificate. Mr Chambers would be required to comply with the relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) in relation to practising certificates.
Whether Mr Chambers would be able to satisfy the Board that the grant of a practising certificate is appropriate, and on what conditions (if any), is a different question to whether his admission in New Zealand is equivalent to admission in Western Australia.
This leads to another point in relation to the issues identified by the Board. The 'equivalence' in relation to the issue before the Court is not as between 'a barrister in New Zealand' and an 'unrestricted legal practitioner in Western Australia'. It is an equivalence of the occupations in each jurisdiction that is the subject of admission.
In that regard, in both New Zealand and Western Australia admission is to the legal profession generally. In New Zealand a person is admitted by the High Court 'as a barrister and solicitor' (and no person may be admitted as a barrister or solicitor only).[13] That is the nature of Mr Chambers' admission (i.e. 'as a barrister and solicitor').[14] Likewise, in this State, persons are admitted to the legal profession as 'lawyers' (although, in the past the nomenclature 'barrister and solicitor' has also been used). Significantly, both forms of admission are general in nature.
[13] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (NZ), s 48.
[14] See [31] above.
Registration at the level of the mode of practice (either as 'barrister' or 'barrister and solicitor') in both New Zealand and Western Australia is regulated at the level of practising certificates. As we have said above, that is not an issue before this Court.
For these reasons, we are satisfied that the occupation in which Mr Chambers seeks registration is an equivalent occupation to that which he is registered in New Zealand. No discretion under s 22(1)(c) of the Act arises in relation to admission.
It remains only to consider the residual discretion.

Residual discretion

Mr Chambers is admitted as a barrister and solicitor in New Zealand and has not been struck off the roll. While there have been a number of complaints raised in relation to his practice in recent years, on the information provided by the New Zealand Law Society we are of the view that none are of a nature that suggest that there is any real prospect that they will result in removal from the roll of barristers and solicitors in New Zealand, particularly in light of the evidence as to his medical condition.
Prima facie, his status as an admitted barrister and solicitor in New Zealand means that he is a 'fit and proper' person for admission in Western Australia. As we have noted above, the Act assumes that to be the case.
The evidence in relation to Mr Chambers' health supports the conclusion that he is not, at present, medically fit to undertake practice as a barrister or solicitor. It may be the case, therefore, that he would not be a fit and proper person for the grant of a local practising certificate.
The issue as to whether a person is fit and proper for admission, however, is not concerned with transitory or temporary medical conditions that may prevent a person from properly fulfilling the duties and functions of a lawyer. That issue is concerned with more enduring matters of fitness of character and integrity.
Clearly Mr Chambers has experienced a number of serious difficulties in his life in recent years that have adversely affected his capacity to undertake his duties as a lawyer. Those difficulties also appear, regrettably, to have resulted in complaints in relation to his conduct that appear out of character, given his history of practice. When seen in the light of his health problems, however, those complaints do not point to a more fundamental or enduring problem with his character, such as to render him unfit for admission. Similarly, we do not regard the deficiencies in his application to this Court, which might otherwise have suggested a lack of candour on his part, as rendering him unfit for admission.
In our view, it is appropriate that Mr Chambers be admitted to the legal profession in this State in light of the prima facie entitlement conferred by the Act. We have reached that conclusion on the basis that we are satisfied that the matters that give rise to concern as to his immediate capacity to fulfil the duties of a legal practitioner in this State can, and should, be properly addressed by the Board in determining whether Mr Chambers is a fit and proper person to be granted a practising certificate and, if so, whether conditions should be imposed on such a certificate (either as to supervision, restriction or monitoring of his health). In making that determination the Board will be able to take into account any up to date medical information and the outcome of any complaints in New Zealand.
Mr Chambers should be admitted to the legal profession of this State.

I certify that the preceding paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
AK
Principal Associate to the Honourable Chief Justice Quinlan
22 JUNE 2021