IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF VICTORIA No VN 238 of 1996
Re: COLIN MICHAEL JAMES CAMILLERI
Judgment Debtor
Ex Parte: MICHAEL MAGUIRE
Judgment Creditor
Coram: Olney J
Place: Melbourne
Date: 8 May 1996
MINUTE OF ORDERS
The Court is not satisfied that the judgment debtor has such a set-off, counter-claim or cross demand as is referred to in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and orders that:
The judgment debtor pay the judgment creditor's costs of this proceeding.
In the event that a sequestration order is made against the estate of the judgment debtor based on an act of bankruptcy committed by him as a result of his failure to comply with the demand contained in the bankruptcy notice herein, the costs referred to in paragraph 1 of this order be deemed to be costs in the administration of the bankruptcy.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in rule 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF VICTORIA No VN 238 of 1996
Re: COLIN MICHAEL JAMES CAMILLERI
Judgment Debtor
Ex Parte: MICHAEL MAGUIRE
Judgment Creditor
Coram: Olney J
Place: Melbourne
Date: 8 May 1996
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE PROCEEDING
On 22 November 1991 the judgment debtor and another issued proceedings in the Magistrates' Court at Melbourne in which they claimed damages against 5 defendants including the judgment creditor. On 21 December 1992, after a 2 day hearing, the Magistrate upheld a submission made on behalf of the judgment creditor that there was no case for him to answer and dismissed the claim against him. At the same time the judgment debtor was ordered to pay the judgment creditor $2,306 for costs.
On 12 February 1996 the judgment creditor caused to be issued a bankruptcy notice which required the judgment debtor within 14 days of service to make one of the responses required pursuant to the prescribed form of notice. The demand in the bankruptcy notice relates to the order for costs made on 21 December 1992. The notice was served on 25 February 1996. On 12 March 1996 the judgment debtor filed an affidavit pursuant to s 41 (7) of the Bankruptcy Act in which he asserted that he had a set-off against the judgment creditor in the sum of $200,000 which he could not set up in the proceeding in which the judgment debt was obtained. (By reason of the intervention of a weekend followed by a public holiday the affidavit was filed within the period required by s 41(7)).
Although the judgment debtor has specifically referred to a set-off in his affidavit, I understand his claim to be a reference to a "set-off, counter-claim or cross demand" as those terms are used in s 40(1)(g) and s 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. The term "set-off" in its conventional meaning is obviously inappropriate in the present context.
The question of whether the Court is satisfied that the…
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- Case
- [1996] FCA 328
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the nature of the claim Mr. Camilleri made against Mr. Maguire, which was a part of a larger proceeding in the County Court of Victoria, where Mr. Camilleri and his wife claimed damages against three defendants, including Mr. Maguire. The claim was based on alleged misrepresentations made by Mr. Maguire during negotiations for a share purchase agreement. The Court found that Mr. Camilleri's claim was a joint claim against multiple defendants, and could not be set up as a set-off, counter-claim, or cross-demand against Mr. Maguire alone. The Court also noted that the claim could not have been set up in the original proceeding where the judgment debt was obtained, as Mr. Maguire had not made a claim against Mr. Camilleri in that proceeding.
Based on its findings, the Court concluded that Mr. Camilleri did not have a set-off, counter-claim, or cross-demand of the nature referred to in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. Consequently, the Court ordered Mr. Camilleri to pay Mr. Maguire's costs of the proceeding. In the event of a sequestration order being made against Mr. Camilleri's estate based on his failure to comply with the demand in the bankruptcy notice, the costs would be deemed to be costs in the administration of the bankruptcy.
Background
Background to the litigation
On 17 April 1996, the matter came before the Federal Court of Australia, General Division, Bankruptcy District of Victoria, where judgment was reserved. The court was required to determine whether Colin Michael James Camilleri had a set-off, counter-claim, or cross demand of the nature referred to in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The case was heard on 17 April 1996, and judgment was delivered on 8 May 1996.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the Court satisfied that the judgment debtor has such a set-off, counter-claim, or cross demand as is referred to in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966?
2. Could the cross-claim be set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained?
3. Is the claim against Michael Maguire a joint claim with other defendants, and if so, what are the implications for the cross-demand?
Held
1. The Court is not satisfied that the judgment debtor has such a set-off, counter-claim, or cross demand as is referred to in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The Court ordered the judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor's costs of this proceeding.
2. The cross-claim could not have been set up in the proceeding in which the judgment debt was obtained.
3. The claim against Michael Maguire is a joint claim with other defendants, and this has implications for the cross-demand, which is insufficient to satisfy s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether the judgment debtor had a set-off, counter-claim, or cross demand as referenced in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The judgment debtor claimed a $200,000 set-off against the judgment creditor, alleging misrepresentations made during negotiations for a share purchase agreement. However, the court determined that the judgment debtor's claim was not a personal claim against the judgment creditor but rather a joint claim against multiple defendants, including the judgment creditor.
The court noted that the cross demand could not have been set up in the proceeding where the judgment was obtained, as the judgment creditor made no claim in that proceeding against which the judgment debtor could set up the cross demand. The relevant proceeding for the purposes of s 40(1)(g) was the judgment creditor's application for a costs order against the judgment debtor following the dismissal of the claim. This aligns with the decision in Chesson v Smith and related cases.
Additionally, the court considered the implications of the judgment debtor's claim being a joint claim with other defendants, as established in re Brown and re Wedd; Ex parte Parker. These cases established that a judgment creditor should not be compelled to hold their hand while their debtor prosecutes a claim against them and someone else. The court found that the principle in re Brown applied and was fatal to the judgment debtor's case.
The court concluded that the judgment debtor did not have a set-off, counter-claim, or cross demand of the nature referred to in s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, and therefore ordered the judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor's costs of the proceeding. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a cross-claim against a judgment creditor cannot be set up if the claim is a joint claim with other defendants, and the debtor cannot satisfy s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act under such circumstances.