Re Bond, A Ex Parte Ramsay, R.E v Caboche, D.J. and anor
[1992] FCA 563
•11 JUNE 1992
Re: ALAN BOND
Ex parte: ROBERT EASTAUGH RAMSAY
And: DELORES JEAN CABOCHE and PETER NOMMEL GLEESON
No. N B1071 of 1991
FED No. 563
Bankruptcy
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION
Hill J.(1)
CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - interlocutory injunction - application by trustee in bankruptcy to enjoin trustees of superannuation trust fund from dealing with assets of fund - arguable issue whether bankrupt absolutely entitled prior to bankruptcy to assets of fund - balance of convenience - whether proposed transactions might deplete fund.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s. 30(1)
Re: Bayliss; Ex Parte: Official Trustee (1987) 15 FCR 167 at 169, applied
Jones v. Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, applied
HEARING
SYDNEY
#DATE 11:6:1992
Counsel and Solicitors for the applicant: M. Douglas with S.M.P. Reeves
instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jacques
Counsel and Solicitors for the respondent: A. Myers QC with D. Robinson
instructed by Neil Lawson and Co.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The First and Second Respondents, and whether by themselves,
their servants, delegates or agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained until further order, without the consent of the Applicant from:
(a) causing or permitting Mr Nigel Satterley or any other person to be appointed as a director of Rynhound Pty Limited ("Rynhound");
(b) causing or permitting Mr Satterley or any other person to acquire directly or indirectly any shares in the capital of Rynhound.
(c) making any further advances to Beachfront Enterprises Pty Limited ("Beachfront") or Kallara Pty Limited ("Kallara").
(d) renegotiating the terms upon which funds are presently advanced to Beachfront or Kallara.
(e) causing or permitting the memorandum or articles of association of Rynhound, Beachfront or Kallara from being amended so as to vary the rights attaching to the shares in any of those companies.
2. The First and Second Respondents and whether by themselves,
their servants, delegates or agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained until further order from:
(a) Making any investment of the Trust Funds of the Investors Retirement Fund ("The Fund"), except with the consent of the Applicant first had and obtained.
(b) Except with the consent of the Applicant first had and obtained dealing with any of the assets of the Fund otherwise than in the ordinary course of the day to day management of the assets of the Fund in their current form.
(c) Exercising any of the powers or discretions conferred upon them as Trustees of the Fund pursuant to the Trust Deed and Rules governing the Fund other than the powers contained in Clause 8(1)(c), (1)(e), and (1)(j) unless the Respondents have first given to the Applicant seven days notice in writing.
3. The parties have liberty to apply on 24 hours' notice.
4. Order two (2) above shall not prevent the Respondents from
indemnifying themselves out of the Trust fund for the proper legal costs of the present proceedings. For the purposes of this order, costs to be taken to be proper costs if the amount thereof has been agreed with the Applicant, or failing agreement have been taxed and allowed on an indemnity basis.
5. The Applicant join Mrs Bond, Mr Bond's children and any other
person whom the Applicant may be advised to join and for that purpose file and serve upon the First and Second Respondents on or before Monday 15 June 1992 an amended application.
6. The Applicant file and serve upon the First and Second
Respondents a statement of claim on or before Monday 15 June.
7. The Applicant notify any person made a Respondent in these
proceedings at the time of service, that the matter will be listed for mention on 29 June 1992. It will not be necessary that the First and Second Respondents attend on that day.
8. The First and Second Respondents file and serve their
defence on or before 29 June 1992 at 9.30am.
9. The parties presently before the Court file and serve on
each other an affidavit of documents on or before 6 July 1992.
10. Inspection of documents take place on or before 13 July 1992. 11. The Applicant file and serve all affidavits upon which he
proposes to rely in chief on or before 20 July 1992.
13. The First and Second Respondents file and serve all affidavits
upon which they propose to rely on or before 10 August 1992.
14. The matter stand over for further directions on 12 August 1992. 15. If any party shall default in complying with these
directions and that default shall continue for a period of three days, the party not in default, shall notify my Associate forthwith when the matter may be restored to the list, but without prejudice to the liberty given to the parties to apply.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
The applicant, Mr Ramsay, is the trustee of the estate of Mr Alan Bond, a bankrupt. He applies to the court for orders, under s.30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"), inter alia restraining the respondents, Ms Caboche and Mr Gleeson, from dealing with the assets of a trust fund known as the "Investors Retirement Fund" ("the Fund") or otherwise exercising any right, discretion or power conferred upon them as trustees of the Fund. It is not in dispute that the court has jurisdiction to grant such relief where it is considered necessary for the purpose of carrying out or giving effect to the Act in a particular case: s.30(1) of the Act and see Re Bayliss; Ex parte Official Trustee (1987) 15 FCR 167 at 169.
The Fund was constituted pursuant to the provisions of a Trust Deed and Rules dated 9 February 1990. The original trustees were Mrs Bond and Ms Caboche, the latter being at all relevant times Mr Bond's personal accountant. Mr Gleeson was appointed a trustee of the Fund in place of Mrs Bond by a Deed dated 19 July 1991. From what I was told from the bar table by counsel for the respondents, Mr Gleeson is presently assisting the receivers of Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd, a Bond company, with matters concerning the receivership and it is safe to infer that Mr Gleeson is a person with at least some knowledge of Mr Bond's affairs. Mr Gleeson's appointment as a trustee was effected by the exercise by Metals Exploration Ltd jointly with Mr Bond of a power to appoint trustees. The Deed whereby Mr Gleeson was appointed recited that Mr Bond was the only member of the Fund at that time. That continues to be the case today.
The Fund was established by Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd, then referred to in the Deed as the "principal employer" to provide benefits for each member of the Fund in the event of retirement and benefits to dependents of members in the event of the death of a member. Rule 9 of the Fund Rules provides in the event of retirement of a member from the employment of an "employer" that a lump sum benefit becomes payable to that member. The quantum of that benefit depends upon whether the member also retires from the workforce. Rule 14 similarly deals with lump sum benefits being paid to members in the event that they cease to be in the employment of an employer.
The expression "employer" is defined in the deed as meaning any one or more of:
"(a) the principal employer;
(b) any company which:
(i) in relation to the principal employer is an associated company; and
(ii) has applied to the trustees to become and has been accepted by the trustees as, a participating employer..."
The expression "associated company" means:
"a corporation deemed to be associated with the principal employer within the meaning of the Standards Act as amended from time to time and any Act in substitution therefor."
Clause 16 of the Deed deals with forfeited benefits. Prior to the amendment of the Fund Deed on 19 July 1991 sub-cls.2 and 3 of that clause provided as follows:
"(2) If a person to whom a benefit is or may be payable under this Deed and the Rules does or permits to be done any act or thing or some event happens whereby the whole or any part of that benefit may become payable to or vested in any other person then that benefit shall be forfeited to the Fund.
(3) If a person entitled to a benefit under this Deed or the Rules becomes bankrupt or insane or in the opinion of the trustees becomes incapable of managing his own affairs then that benefit shall immediately be forfeited to the Fund."
Forfeited benefits may under the terms of the Fund Deed and the Rules be dealt with, inter alia, for the benefit of dependents of a member. Having regard to the definition of "dependents" and the relevant time at which it becomes necessary to determine who is included in the class, Mrs Bond, now divorced from her husband, and the children of Mr Bond are dependents.
It appears that the Fund was established for the purpose of receiving amounts from the Bond Corporation Group Superannuation Fund, of which Mr Bond had been a member. This may have been a step taken in anticipation of Mr Bond ceasing to be employed by Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd. In the result there was transferred to the Fund from the Bond Corporation Group Superannuation Fund the sum of $2,359,238 which, together with an amount of $66,874 shown in the accounts of the Fund covering the period from 9 February 1990 to 31 March 1992 as "contributions", represent the corpus of the Fund to which income and profits have been added. As at 31 March 1992 the balance sheet of the Fund disclosed the net assets of the Fund as $2,712,152 made up as follows:
Cash at Bank 159,917 Debtors 211,352 Loans
- Rynhound Pty Ltd 1,305,722 - Tambar Pty Ltd 75,724 - Beachfront Enterprises 274,000 - Topsfield Pty Ltd 25,000 Investments
Bond Corporation Holdings 100,000 - Rynhound Pty Ltd 100,000 - Kallara Pty Ltd 1,050 Land held for resale 481,851 2,734,616 Creditors 22,464 Balance of Fund 2,712,152
On 31 August 1990, Mr Bond ceased to be an employee of Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd. He remained as a director of that company until 26 September 1990.
Relevantly thereafter Mr Bond was employed by two companies: Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd and Metals Exploration Ltd. The former company was ordered to be wound up on 5 July 1991 and on this date at the latest Mr Bond had ceased to be both an employee and director of that company. Mr Bond resigned as a director of Metals Exploration Ltd on 5 December 1991 having earlier ceased to be an employee of that company.
On 8 October 1990 there was executed what is referred to as a Deed of Succession between Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd, Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd and the then trustees of the Fund, Mrs Bond and Ms Caboche. Under that Deed, Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd was substituted as the "principal employer" for Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd. The recitals to this Deed confirm that Mr Bond had already ceased to be employed by Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd prior to the execution of the Deed of succession.
On 19 July 1991 a further deed of succession was executed having the effect of replacing Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd with Metals Exploration Ltd as the "principal employer" under the Fund Deed. The recitals to that Deed record that Mr Bond had ceased to be employed by Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd and had accepted employment with Metals Exploration Limited.
On the same day and by the Deed whereby Mr Gleeson became trustee, the Deed establishing the Fund was further amended. Relevantly, cl.16(2) was amended so that it now reads as follows:
"If a person to whom a benefit is or may be payable under this Deed and the Rules does or permits to be done any act or thing or some event happens including any act of bankruptcy whereby the whole or any part of that benefit may become payable to or vested in any other person, then that benefit shall be forfeited to the Fund."
Mr Bond committed an act of bankruptcy on 6 March 1992 when he failed to comply with a Bankruptcy Notice. The petition upon which he was made bankrupt was filed on 9 March 1992. These events, of course, are some time after Mr Bond ceased to be an employee of Metals Exploration Ltd.
On these facts the applicant claims that Mr Bond became absolutely entitled to the assets of the Fund when he ceased to be an employee of Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd on 31 August 1990. Alternatively, it is said that Mr Bond's benefit in the Fund vested absolutely in him at the latest upon his ceasing to be an employee or director of Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd on or before 5 July 1991 or of Metals Exploration Ltd on 5 December 1991.
The applicant further says that cl.16(2) of the Deed dealing with forfeited benefits should be read and construed so as not to apply to divest a benefit to which a member had become absolutely entitled.
Since his appointment as trustee of the estate on 14 April 1992, Mr Ramsay has been conducting investigations but these investigations have not yet revealed any evidence which would suggest that Mr Bond had committed an act of bankruptcy between the date of the amending Deed of 19 July 1991 and his ceasing to be an employee of Metals Exploration Ltd. Nor for that matter has any other act of bankruptcy thereafter been detected, save that which founded the petition of 9 March 1992.
As I understand the position of the respondents, they support a construction of cl.16 of the Deed to bring about a forfeiture of a member's benefit due to an act of bankruptcy in circumstances where clause 16 would otherwise apply, notwithstanding that the member's benefit had, under the terms of the Trust Deed, become payable to him. This would be provided, of course, that that benefit had not in fact been paid. On this view, notwithstanding that Mr Bond, on any view of the facts, became entitled to payment of a benefit, at the latest by 5 December 1991, any subsequent act of bankruptcy would operate to forfeit that benefit. If Mr Bond became entitled to payment of a benefit at an earlier date, viz, 28 August 1990 or 5 July 1991, the effect of the amendment of clause 16 was that an act of bankruptcy, at least after 19 July 1991, would work a forfeiture of his benefit.
There was a possibility, according to counsel for the respondents, that there may have been an act of bankruptcy prior to the act of bankruptcy upon which the petition against Mr Bond was founded which, as a result of the amendment to the Fund Deed of 19 July 1991, worked a forfeiture of Mr Bond's benefits with the consequence that his ex-wife and children would become prima facie entitled to benefits under the Fund.
It was conceded by senior counsel for the respondents that there is an arguable issue to be tried as to whether Mr Bond's benefit in the Fund had by the date of his bankruptcy vested in him so that it became part of the property of his estate distributable among his creditors. The matter was accordingly not debated before me. I content myself with saying that on the facts before me the Trustee appears to have a powerful argument. It should be said, of course, that the present proceedings are interlocutory and that the relevant facts may ultimately turn out to be quite different than they presently appear.
The need for interlocutory relief as a matter of urgency arose out of two transactions into which the trustee proposes to enter. The first concerns Rynhound Pty Ltd ("Rynhound"); the second Beachfront Enterprises Pty Ltd, ("Beachfront"). I shall outline each of these transactions so far as the evidence before me enables this to be done. The evidence emanates from answers given by Ms Caboche in an examination under s.81 of the Act held last week. No evidence was adduced by the respondents.
The Rynhound TransactionRynhound was a company initially owned as to 50% by the trustees of the Fund and as to 50% by a Mr Mellor. Its substantial asset is a development property presently let out in its undeveloped state. The shares initially held by Mr Mellor were issued partly paid to one cent. The shares held by the trustees are fully paid. It seems that a call was made on the partly paid shares which Mr Mellor was unable to meet. In the result, the shares have apparently been forfeited. It is now proposed that these shares be reissued to a Mr Satterly, who is apparently a real estate agent. He is to pay for them $1,000 and to become a director of Rynhound. According to Ms Caboche's evidence, Mr Satterly is a good person to have on board and was "instrumental in developing the development concept".
Mr Satterly will make his profit from the development of seven up-market townhouses which, according to Ms Caboche, will be valued at around $700,000 to $800,000. After paying up moneys unpaid on the shares, Mr Satterly would become entitled to one half of the profits. The evidence is silent as to how the development is to be financed.
Presently the trustees have advanced approximately $1.3 million to Rynhound on the security of the undeveloped real estate, which, it is said by Ms Caboche, is presently valued at approximately $1.6 million.
The situation therefore, at the present time, is that the trustees own 100% of the shares in Rynhound and in addition have advanced that company $1.3 million. Accepting the valuation for present purposes, the trustees have an equity in Rynhound Pty Ltd of $300,000. The issue of shares to Mr Satterly for $1,000, albeit it party paid, will dilute that equity to some extent. It may also make it more difficult for the applicant to dispose of the land, in the event that he wished so to do, by virtue of his controlling only half of the shares in Rynhound.
It would seem at the moment that the respondents are receiving interest on the loan to Rynhound, although the rate of interest is not clear. While the respondents own all of the issued share capital of Rynhound this is probably irrelevant. It would become more significant if one half of that company were owned by a third party.
Ms Caboche, in her examination, indicated that it was her opinion that if the real estate were now sold the whole of the indebtedness of Rynhound would be recovered.
The Beachfront Enterprise TransactionBeachfront is a company which operates a cafe known as the Blue Duck Cafe at Cottesloe Beach near Perth. There was some vagueness in the responses of Ms Caboche in the public examination about this transaction. I would form the impression from reading her answers that she does not have a full grasp of the proposed details of this transaction. As I understand the position, the present directors of Beachfront are a Mr Kim Gambol and a Mr Max Gambol (apparently at arm's length from Mr Bond) who are directly or indirectly also shareholders. A restructuring is presently proceeding the result of which will be that the trustees of the Fund will own one half of the shares in Beachfront through an intermediary company, Kallara Pty Ltd. At the present time the trustees have advanced to Beachfront the sum of $310,000. Of this amount $35,000 has been advanced since Mr Bond became bankrupt. Part of the restructuring arrangement now contemplated is that the present advance, which is unsecured but repayable on demand, become secured but repayable over a term of six to seven years, the interest increasing from a present 12 percentum to 14 percentum.
The effect is that an asset which would be immediately realisable as a loan repayable on demand will become a term loan, which may or may not be realisable depending upon the ability to find a purchaser for it. That in turn would no doubt depend upon the financial status of the borrower and the value of the security.
It would appear that Ms Caboche in assenting to each of these transactions has been guided by advice from Mr Bond. The closeness of Mr Bond to the transactions in question may perhaps be reflected in the fact that on 15 May 1992, the respondents delegated to Ms Caboche and Mr John Bond, who, I assume, is one of Mr Bond's children, certain powers to invest and generally to do all such things as the Delegate may consider necessary or expedient for the management, administration and preservation of the Fund. The circumstances of this delegation could not be explored in evidence. However, it was conceded by counsel for the applicant that it was not suggested that the respondents, in proposing the two transactions discussed or in implementing them, were acting improperly. If that proposition required any qualification it was solely that the only evidence was that Ms Caboche had consulted Mr Bond in respect of the transactions in question.
The present proceedings were commenced before me ex parte, although as it happens junior counsel for the respondents was present and was of assistance during the course of that hearing. As a result, undertakings were given by the respondents not to deal with the Fund assets until 5.00pm on 10 June 1992. That undertaking was extended until 5.00pm today. Although the respondents had the opportunity in the meantime to adduce evidence pointing to the advantage of the two transactions to the beneficiaries, the manner in which the transactions were to be implemented and the urgency or otherwise of the transactions proceeding, they did not do so. The inference that there is no particular urgency about either transaction, which can be drawn from Ms Caboche's replies in her examination, may in the absence of evidence from the respondents be more confidently drawn: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.
Since it is conceded that there is an arguable issue to be tried, I turn to consider the balance of convenience. If no interlocutory relief be granted and it should turn out that the assets of the superannuation fund were properly to be regarded as assets of the bankrupt estate, each of the two transactions could have some impact on the ability of the applicant to realise the assets in question. The Beachfront transaction could well delay the applicant recovering moneys from the respondents for the benefit of the bankrupt estate should it turn out that the applicant is entitled to the Fund assets. The Rynhound transaction would marginally deplete the Fund's equity in a development project and convert a 100% interest into a 50% interest, thereby affecting its marketability.
On the other hand, there has not been shown in evidence or suggested to be any detriment to the respondents at all in an injunction restraining them entering into these transactions so as to preserve the status quo pending a hearing.
The parties are in agreement that a final hearing of the matter could be arranged for a time within two or three months. This is a matter which I take into account in deciding to grant to the applicant interim relief. However I note that this time estimate could ultimately prove to be an under-estimate having regard to the need to join other parties in the proceedings. In this regard I am in agreement with counsel for the respondent that it is appropriate that there be joined all persons who potentially might benefit from the fund in the event that Mr Bond's interest has been forfeited so that they too will be bound by the ultimate outcome. In practical terms that means the joinder of Mrs Bond and Mr Bond's children. Whether Mr Bond should also be a party is a matter which the applicant should consider.
It appears that one or more of Mrs Bond or her children may be presently overseas. On the other hand counsel for the respondents advises that on his instructions there would be no difficulty in serving any of Mrs Bond or her children.
In these circumstances it seems to me the decision is relatively simple. The balance of convenience is in preserving the status quo pending an ultimate hearing which can proceed without undue delay. The applicant has, of course, agreed to give the usual undertaking as to damages and it was established in cross-examination that in so doing he is indemnified by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and Tricontinental.
Accordingly, having regard to the relatively short time in which injunctive relief will need to be granted, the fact that there appears no urgency on the part of the trustees to enter into the relevant transactions and having regard to the concession of the respondents that the applicant has an arguable case, it seems to be appropriate that some injunctive relief be granted.
I should mention that in his evidence to the court, more in the way of submission than as evidence of fact, Mr Ramsay indicated that he had a general concern that the trustees of the Fund might deal with assets and particular concerns that the arrangements with Mr Satterly could operate to the prejudice of the estate and affect the Trustee's ability to realise the assets of the Fund should he be held to be entitled to them. Mr Ramsay had a similar fear in respect of the restructuring of Beachfront Enterprises Pty Ltd. Against this concern must however be weighed the fact that to date no suggestion has been made that these transactions were entered into for any improper purpose or for other than commercial reasons.
The question of the scope of the relief to be granted in the event that I should accede to the applicant's application was argued before me. A draft of the orders sought as framed by senior counsel for the applicant would have restrained the respondents from exercising any power conferred upon them as trustees without the consent of the applicant. Such broad relief was not, so it was submitted by counsel for the respondent, appropriate. The trust deed confers upon the Trustees of the Fund these powers and in the absence of a suggestion of bad faith on their part, the trustees should remain free, so it was submitted, to exercise them.
There is substance in the respondents' submissions. Indeed, some of the powers conferred upon the Trustees, eg to effect insurance, and pay taxes (if that be a power, rather than a statutory duty) could not conceivably operate to the detriment of the applicant. Others perhaps could, such as the power to grant options over the trust property. After consideration of these submissions, it seems to me that the order I should make should be framed so as to enjoin the respondents from exercising any power of investment or dealing with the trust assets, without the consent of the applicant. I would further restrain the respondents from exercising any other power conferred upon them, other than certain administrative powers which I will enumerate, without first giving seven days' written notice of their intention so to do to the Trustee. It seems to me that this would give adequate protection to the applicant, while leaving administrative matters to the discretion of the Trustee.
Accordingly I would make the following orders and directions for the future conduct of the matter:
1. Order that the First and Second Respondents, and whether by
themselves, their servants, delegates or agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained until further order, without the consent of the Applicant from:
(a) causing or permitting Mr Nigel Satterley or any other person to be appointed as a director of Rynhound Pty Limited ("Rynhound");
(b) causing or permitting Mr Satterley or any other person to acquire directly or indirectly any shares in the capital of Rynhound.
(c) making any further advances to Beachfront Enterprises Pty Limited ("Beachfront") or Kallara Pty Limited ("Kallara").
(d) renegotiating the terms upon which funds are presently advanced to Beachfront or Kallara.
(e) causing or permitting the memorandum or articles of association of Rynhound, Beachfront or Kallara from being amended so as to vary the rights attaching to the shares in any of those companies.
2. Order that the First and Second Respondents and whether by
themselves, their servants, delegates or agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained until further order from :
(a) Making any investment of the Trust Funds of the Investors Retirement Fund ("The Fund"), except with the consent of the Applicant first had and obtained.
(b) Except with the consent of the Applicant first had and obtained dealing with any of the assets of the Fund otherwise than in the ordinary course of the day to day management of the assets of the Fund in their current form.
(c) Exercising any of the powers or discretions conferred upon them as Trustees of the Fund pursuant to the Trust Deed and Rules governing the Fund other than the powers contained in Clause 8(1)(c), (1)(e), and (1)(j) unless the Respondents have first given to the Applicant seven days notice in writing.
3. The parties will have liberty to apply on 24 hours notice.
4. Order two shall not prevent the Respondents from indemnifying
themselves out of the Trust fund for the proper legal costs of the present proceedings. For the purposes of this order, costs will be taken to be proper costs if the amount thereof has been agreed with the Applicant, or failing agreement have been taxed and allowed on an indemnity basis.
5. I direct that the Applicant join Mrs Bond, Mr Bond's
children and any other person whom the Applicant may be advised to join and for that purpose file and serve upon the First and Second Respondents on or before Monday 15 June an amended application.
6. I direct the Applicant to file and serve upon the First and Second
Respondents a statement of claim on or before Monday 15 June.
7. I direct that the Applicant notify any person made a
Respondent in these proceedings at the time of service, that the matter will be listed for mention on 29 June 1992. It will not be necessary that the First and Second Respondents attend on that day.
8. I direct the First and Second Respondents to file and serve
their defence on or before 29 June 1992 at 9.30am.
9. I direct the parties presently before me to file and serve
on each other an affidavit of documents on or before 6 July 1992.
10. I direct that inspection of documents take place on or
before 13 July 1992.
11. The Applicant shall file and serve all affidavits upon which
he proposes to rely in chief on or before 20 July 1992.
13. The First and Second Respondents shall file and serve all
affidavits upon which they propose to rely on or before 10 August 1992.
14. The matter shall stand over for further directions on 12
August 1992.
15. If any party shall default in complying with these
directions and that default shall continue for a period of three days, the party not in default, shall notify my Associate forthwith when the matter may be restored to the list, but without prejudice to the liberty given to the parties to apply.
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