Re: Blake
[2025] FedCFamC1F 364
•2 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Re: Blake [2025] FedCFamC1F 364
File number(s): By Court order file number is suppressed Judgment of: HARTNETT J Date of judgment: 2 June 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Gender dysphoria – Where the respondent father did not engage with the proceedings at any stage – Where the diagnosis of gender dysphoria is supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer – Where the child seeking to undergo treatment (“the child”) is nearly 18 years of age – Where the child seeks a change of name – Where the Court accepts the diagnosis of gender dysphoria – Declaration that the child is Gillick competent to consent to stage 2 treatment for gender dysphoria – Orders made for a change of name. Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Federal Circuitand Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 1.11
Cases cited: Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112
Re: Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (“Marion’s Case”) (1992) 175 CLR 189
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 65 Date of hearing: 28 April 2025 Representation By Court order the names of legal practitioners are suppressed ORDERS
SUPPRESSED FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: THE MOTHER
Applicant
AND: THE FATHER
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
HARTNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 APRIL 2025 AMENDED 2 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.For all purposes the child JESSICA born 2007 shall be known henceforth as BLAKE.
2.Within 28 days, the Applicant mother (“the mother”) is authorised to apply to the relevant Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages to change the name of the child JESSICA born 2007 to BLAKE.
3.Pursuant to the relevant state legislation, the Registrar of Births, Death and Marriages, upon the application of the mother referred to in Order 2 hereof, is to do all acts and things to register the change of name of JESSICA born 2007 to BLAKE.
4.The Court declares that the child Blake is Gillick competent to consent to stage 2 treatment for Gender Dysphoria in Adolescents and Adults as classified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 2015 (Fifth Edition) DSM-5.
5.The proposed stage 2 treatment of the child, being the administration of testosterone in such dose, in such manner and with such frequency as defined by his treating medical practitioners, is authorised by Order of this Court.
6.Otherwise, all extant applications are dismissed and the matter removed from the list.
7.The name of the child, their family members and their occupations, their medical practitioners, their school, the court’s file number, the State or Territory of Australia in which these proceedings were initiated, the name of any lawyers in these proceedings and any other fact or matter that may identify the child shall not be published in any way, and only anonymised reasons for judgment and orders (with cover sheets excluding the registry, file number and lawyer’s names and details, as well as the parties’ real names) shall be released by the Court to non-parties without further contrary order of a judge, it being noted that each party shall be provided with copies of orders and any reasons for judgment with relevant details including the file number and lawyers’ names.
AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.These orders have been amended pursuant to rule 10.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Re: Blake has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HARTNETT J
PRELIMINARY
This proceeding commenced on 17 July 2024, upon the applicant mother (“the mother”) filing an Initiating Application for final parenting orders in respect of the child, Jessica, born 2007 (“the child”) who, by the time of the final hearing and for some considerable period prior, was known as Blake. I observe that the surname is the surname of the child’s father.
The orders which the mother sought in that Initiating Application were made by the Court on the hearing of the matter on 28 April 2025. The Court made a declaration as to the child’s Gillick competence.
The final hearing was conducted with appearances by the mother and Independent Children’s Lawyer. The mother was represented by her solicitor advocate. The Independent Children’s Lawyer was represented by counsel. The father failed to appear at the final hearing. He had throughout the proceeding failed to participate.
What follows are my reasons for the making of the final parenting orders on 28 April 2025 as sought by the mother, and as consented to and supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”).
MATERIAL RELIED UPON
The mother relied upon:
(1)her affidavits filed 18 February 2025 and 9 April 2025;
(2)Application for Final Orders filed 17 July 2024;
(3)Subpoena tender bundle; and
(4)Case Summary Document filed 24 April 2025.
The mother did not challenge, and indeed also relied upon, the expert evidence as placed before the Court by the ICL and as contained in the affidavit of Dr B filed 30 January 2025. Dr B has been the child’s treating psychiatrist since 2019.
The respondent father (“the father”) did not file any materials.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer relied upon:
(1)the affidavit of Dr B filed 30 January 2025; and
(2)Outline of Case filed 23 April 2025.
SOME RELEVANT FACTS
The mother and father, both parties to this proceeding, commenced their relationship in around 2000.
In 2007, a female child was born to the parties. The mother and father registered the child’s birth, naming her Jessica.
The child was born with a medical condition and, consequently, lost the sight in one eye as a young child.
The mother and father remained residing together until September or October of 2008 when they separated. Upon separation, the child remained living with the mother. At the time, the parties and child were living in Suburb C, State D.
Upon their separation, the mother and father agreed that the father would spend time with the child each Tuesday and every second weekend, but that arrangement was not pursued by the father, who saw the child between separation in 2008, and 2012, on only two occasions.
In 2012, the father had the child in his care for two nights when he was living at Suburb E in State D.
In around mid-2014, the mother moved with the child to Suburb F in State G.
In 2016, the mother had her first of two other children from a subsequent relationship, with the second child of that relationship being born in 2022. Both children reside with their mother and with the child the subject of this proceeding. In mid-2018, the mother and the then three children moved from Suburb F to Suburb H, and in 2019, the child spent a night with the father at Town J.
In mid-2018, the child commenced attending upon a psychologist to assist the child in dealing with the then stressors in the child’s life. The mother considered early intervention for the child as being necessary. The child has continued to engage with a psychologist since 2018.
In 2019, the child commenced to attend upon psychiatrist Dr B. The child has, in the intervening years, attended regularly upon Dr B.
In around 2020 and following a telehealth appointment between the child and the child’s psychologist, the psychologist informed the mother that the child was gender diverse and dealing with the issues that arose because of being gender diverse.
In 2020, the mother and the three children moved from Suburb H to Suburb K in the City L area. Following the mother’s move to Suburb K, the child spent approximately two separate overnight periods with the father.
In late 2020, the child spoke with the mother about the possibility of testosterone treatment.
In 2022, the mother informed the father that the child was transgender. The father did not accept that status. He blamed the mother for “letting the child be transgender”. The father said to the mother, “If you ever call her a boy again, I’ll block you.”
In around 2022, the child was diagnosed with PTSD, OCD, ADHD and anxiety. He was subsequently diagnosed, in 2024 by Dr B, as also having major depressive disorder.
In school term 3 of 2022, the child transferred from M School, Town N, to O School, Suburb P. When the child changed school, the child transitioned socially. The child used ‘he/him’ pronouns. He selected the name Blake. The child commenced to tape the child’s chest each Sunday evening, and to do so extremely tightly, leaving the tape on for the week. It was the mother’s evidence that, because of engaging in such activity, the child suffered repeated lacerations to the child’s skin. The child also commenced to wear a binder over the top of the tape to further assist in flattening the child’s chest. The lacerations to the child’s skin, as caused by the taping, compounded each time the child taped his chest. The child’s wounds became infected. The taping caused the child considerable pain. The child nearly fainted on several occasions due to the extent of the binding and taping.
In May 2023, Dr B and the child discussed the child’s gender identity and the child commenced to access Q Service in City R. Upon attending appointments at Q Service, the child engaged with an endocrinologist and a social work counsellor, with those attendances also being ongoing. The mother invited the father to attend appointments at Q Service to meet with the team’s clinical nurse consultant, a medical provider, and the child’s counsellor, but the father declined to participate.
The child had face-to-face contact with the father in late 2023 when the child attended the funeral of the paternal grandfather. The child stayed overnight with an uncle, but did not spend any meaningful time with the father.
In January 2024, the child had a device inserted to decrease menstruation.
In March 2024, at Q Service, Dr B and the child discussed the child’s “gender journey and how he came to realise who he is”.[1] Together, the psychiatrist and the child explored the child’s gender and appearance (with regards to his medical condition) to ascertain if the child was experiencing gender dysphoria or body dysmorphia. During this discussion, the child expressed distress around his chest, voice and menses. The child reported telling the mother that he was transgender in 2020 and that he socially transitioned in 2021.
[1] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.14.
In March 2024, the child was diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
In April 2024, the child began attending a youth group at Q Service each Thursday.
In May 2024, the child commenced to attend speech therapy at Q Service to assist the child in deepening the child’s voice. The child expressed a wish to proceed with stage 2 gender-affirming testosterone treatment.
The child, throughout this process, also wished to legally change his birth name to Blake. The maternal grandfather always went by a nickname within the family and was an important and respected member of the mother’s family. The child wished his middle name to be that of his grandfather and his surname to be that of his mother.
It was the mother’s evidence that the child had a very good attendance at school in 2023 and a perfect attendance at school in 2024. She observed a very positive change in the child’s attitude toward school once the child socially transitioned and was able to present to his peers in a way that affirmed the child’s gender.
In February 2025, the child met with his endocrinologist Dr S at Q Service. Dr S spoke to the child and the mother about testosterone treatment; what it could provide to the child; and when the child would be able to receive this treatment if approved by the Court.
On 15 February 2025, the child had a telephone conversation with his father. It was a positive conversation in the same vein as an earlier conversation around Christmas 2024, when the pair had earlier spoken. The child was particularly happy that the father used the ‘he’ pronoun when talking with the child.
In late March 2025, and following an exchange of messages between the father and the child, with the father essentially refusing to provide his consent to Blake receiving testosterone treatment, the child reacted by saying to the mother:
The only way [the father] is going to realise is when he’s burying me. The only way to show [the father] is to bury me. I’ll show him.
And further:
I can’t stay here for you anymore. It’s cruel that you’re asking me to do this. I’ve stayed here for too long for you.
Given the above, the mother took the child to T Hospital, seeking support for him. The child was given a sedative at the hospital and more tablets to take home with him. On the following day, the child’s behaviour was such that the mother called an ambulance, and the child was transported to U Hospital in accordance with the relevant mental health legislation. The mother remained bedside with the child for several hours, leaving at around 1.00 am. The child was subsequently assessed and admitted to a Mental Health Unit for around 36 hours.
The child was directed to continue, upon discharge, to be supported by Q Service rather than engaging with CAMHS. The child subsequently returned to school in April 2025 and continued his attendance at school until the time of the hearing on 28 April 2025.
At trial, it was the mother’s estimation that the child had spent no more than 10 occasions in the care of the father since the child was born. In that same time, there had been no regular phone or video chat communication between the father and the child.
EVIDENCE
Statements of fact in these reasons are findings of fact on the balance of probabilities unless the context indicates otherwise.[2]
[2] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140.
Dr B
The affidavit of Dr B annexed two reports, the first being dated on 20 March 2024, and the second on 16 December 2024. The second report was produced upon a letter of instruction provided by the Independent Children’s Lawyer. Within the scope of the second report, it was requested of Dr B that she address the relevant diagnoses associated with the undergoing of stage 2 hormone treatment; provide an opinion as to whether the child could provide informed consent; and otherwise set out a summary of the conclusions as reached by her.
In the second report, Dr B noted discussing with the child and the mother in March 2024, the risks of testosterone administration in natal females which included polycythaemia, weight gain, acne, balding, sleep apnoea, elevated liver enzymes, hyperlipidaemia, destabilisation of certain psychiatric disorders, cardiovascular disease, hypertension, type 2 diabetes, loss of bone density, genital atrophy, liver disease, and tumours. Dr B noted that the child indicated in March 2024, and again in December 2024, that the child understood the treatment and the impact of treatment; the reversible and irreversible effects; and the potential impact on fertility. The child had seen a paediatric endocrinologist to discuss such risks in further detail.
Dr B described her report of 16 December 2024 as a comprehensive statement validating the phase 2 treatment, being the application of masculinising hormones for Blake in treatment of gender dysphoria.
Dr B identified in her second report that:
All clinicians that have provided and continue to provide care for [Blake] since 2023 have agreed that he meets the criteria for Gender Dysphoria (currently DSM-V-TR).[3]
[3] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.22.
Dr B further stated that Blake:
...also meets criteria for the World Health Organization’s definition of Gender Incongruence in ICD-11.[4]
[4] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.22.
Dr B considered that if the procedure were not carried out, the child’s health and emotional wellbeing would almost certainly deteriorate:
His mental and physical health is dependent on his perception of himself as male.[5]
[5] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.15.
In both the first and second reports, Dr B identified that Blake had been “persistent, insistent and consistent” in his gender identity being male.
The evidence of Dr B as to Blake having a diagnosis of gender dysphoria was unchallenged evidence, and the Court accepts such a diagnosis.
Gillick competency
The legal principles pronounced in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, which were confirmed by the High Court in Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (“Marion’s Case”) (1992) 175 CLR 189, are as follows:
A child is capable of giving informed consent when he or she achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what treatment is proposed.
In her first report, Dr B identified that:
[Blake] demonstrated capacity to give informed consent.[6]
[6] Annexure “D” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.32.
In her second report, Dr B identified that Blake has:
...done reading on the treatments and has had multiple discussions with professionals around the effects (reversible and irreversible) and side effects of this treatment. He has accessed other treatment options, namely social transition, chest binding, menstrual management.[7]
[7] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.18.
In her second report, Dr B opined that:
The child, [Blake] is deemed capable of making an informed decision and that the child agrees to the procedure.[8]
[8] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.18.
Dr B noted the child was actively engaged at school and was excelling academically and that:
He wants to start testosterone as soon as he can in order to start university “as myself” (seen as a male and not be seen as only someone who is transgender).[9]
[9] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.19.
In addition to his discussions with his psychiatrist Dr B, Blake also, over a prolonged period, engaged in conversations about the proposed treatment with the endocrinologist to whom he was referred.
Blake’s mother, who has cared for him since birth, has been a steadfast support for the child throughout the many difficulties he has faced in his life. She agreed to him accessing gender‑affirming care. His father did not. His father has, however, failed to spend any meaningful time with him since his birth, and failed to participate in this proceeding or in any of the psychiatric and other appointments arranged for the child for assessment of the child’s overall mental health and gender identity.
The Court, on the unchallenged evidence before it, could declare that the child was Gillick competent.
CONCLUSION
As the mother sought orders for treatment of the child for gender dysphoria, the provisions of rule 1.11 of the Federal Circuitand Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”) applied to this proceeding. Those provisions were satisfied on the evidence before me.
The Court must have regard to the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration when determining whether to authorise stage 2 treatment. The Court should attribute significant weight to the views of the child in accordance with his or her age or maturity.[10]
[10] Re: Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344 at [45].
The child is 17 years of age. His expressed views, in the context of the history of the matter, are afforded significant weight by the Court. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the child is not of appropriate maturity.
The Court placed considerable weight on the unchallenged evidence of Dr B.
Dr B opined that it was in the best interests of Blake to have phase 2 treatment for gender dysphoria (masculinising treatment) and that such conclusion was evidenced by the child’s ongoing distress from gender dysphoria, the likely negative long-term impacts of non‑treatment, the non-existence of alternative treatment, the necessity of phase 2 treatment for his long-term health and wellbeing, and his agreement to (and in Dr B’s opinion, the child’s ability to make an informed decision regarding) phase 2 treatment.
Further, her unchallenged evidence was that:
It is the current clinical consensus across a range of providers that gender affirming care is the best practice treatment for Gender Dysphoria for young people (children and adolescents included).[11]
[11] Annexure “C” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.22.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer submitted that any further delay in the proceedings gave rise to a real risk to the child’s safety, having reviewed the evidence and met with the child.
I find that the child’s safety will best be promoted by orders authorising administration of masculinising testosterone as sought in the mother’s case and as supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer. Such orders are consistent with the developmental and psychological needs of the child, in the view of his treating psychiatrist and psychologist. The orders sought by the mother were consistent with the child’s expressed wishes to undertake stage 2 gender dysphoria treatment. Dr B considered the child’s views “considered and measured”.[12]
[12] Annexure “D” to the affidavit of Dr B filed 26 February 2025, p.28.
The proposed change of name, being a surname which mirrors that of the mother, and a middle name which is an adoption of the maternal grandfather’s name, better reflects the child’s gender identity, as it is now, than his registered name. The long-term effect of a change of name is likely to be supportive of the child’s ongoing mental health by allowing his registered name to align with his gender identity. It also is a change of name that further connects him to his mother who has been a source of affirmation and support to his gender identity.
Accordingly, the Court made orders as sought by the applicant mother and the ICL.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hartnett. Associate:
Dated: 2 June 2025
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