Re Barnard and Australian Postal Corporation

[2008] AATA 507

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2008] AATA 507

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No 2007/5568

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE  DIVISION		)
Re		PATRICIA BARNARD

Applicant

And AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Mr S Penglis, Senior Member

Date13 June 2008

PlacePerth

Decision Pursuant to s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

......(sgd) Mr S Penglis.....

Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

Compensation – applicant slipped and fell on the steps exterior to the building in which she works – whether injuries sustained at her place of work – proper meaning of “place of work” for the purpose of s 6(1)(5) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1988..

LEGISLATION

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1988 (Cth), s 4, s 6(1)(b), s 6 (1A), s 6(1C),

CASES

Muir and Australian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1992] AATA 196

Comcare Australia (Defence) v O’Dea [1997] 150 ALR 318

REASONS FOR DECISION

13 June 2008 Mr S Penglis, Senior Member       

INTRODUCTION

1.The applicant is an employee of the respondent.

2.      On 8 August 2007, at approximately 1.10pm, having finished worked for the day, the applicant exited from the building in which she worked, walked across an area exterior to the building and then descended some steps leading down to the footpath.  As the applicant was descending the steps, she fell.

3.      The applicant sustained injuries from her fall for which she lodged a claim for rehabilitation and compensation.

4.      The respondent made a primary determination (dated 12 September 2007) denying liability for the claim for compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the Act). The basis of the primary decision was that the applicant’s claim for compensation is excluded by the application of s 6 (1C) of the Act, namely that at the time the injury was sustained, the applicant was travelling between her usual place of work and her residence.

5.      The applicant sought a review of the primary determination.  That review was dated 5 November 2007 and affirmed the primary determination.

6.      The review dated 5 November 2007 is the reviewable decision the subject of this application to the Tribunal.

7.      It was common cause that:-

· if the applicant’s fall occurred at her “place of work” within the meaning of s 6 (1)(b) of the Act, she is entitled to compensation under the Act;

· if the applicant’s fall occurred whilst she was travelling between her “place of work” and her residence, she is not entitled to compensation by reason of s 6(1C) of the Act.

ISSUE

8. The issue for determination in this matter is whether the applicant suffered injury “in the course of …. her employment” and, in particular, whether it was an injury sustained by the applicant “while the employee was at the employee’s place of work, including during an ordinary recess, for the purposes of that employment”, within the meaning of s 6(1) (b) of the Act.

THE ACT

9. Section 6 (1) of the Act relevantly provides as follows:

“Without limiting the circumstances in which an injury to an employee may be treated as having arisen out of, or in the course, his or her employment, an injury shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as having so risen if it was sustained

(a)       ….

(b)       while the employee was at the employee’s place of work, including during an ordinary recess, for the purposes of that employment; or.

(c)       …;

(d)while the employee was, at the direction or request of the Commonwealth or a licensee, travelling for the purpose of that employment”.

10. Section 6 (1C) of the Act provides as follows:

“For the purposes of paragraph 1(d), travel between the employee’s residence and the employee’s usual place of work is taken not to be at the direction or request of the Commonwealth or a licensee.”

11. It is thus immediately apparent that the Act provides for compensation for injuries sustained whilst an employee is at the employee’s “place of work … for the purposes of the employment”, but not for injuries sustained whilst the employee is travelling between the employee’s place of work and the employee’s place of residence.

12.     Prior to the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation and Other Legislation Amendment Act of 2007 (the Amendment Act), s 6(1) of the Act provided for compensation for injury not only sustained at an employee’s place of work, but also whilst travelling between an employee’s place of work and place of residence.

13. It is thus evident that the Amendment Act has significantly altered, by limitation, an employee’s entitlement to compensation under the Act.

14.     The matter presently for determination is the extent to which the entitlement to compensation has been limited.

15. There are other provisions of the Act which may be relevant to this matter. By s 4 of the Act, “place of work” is defined, in relation to an employee, to include

“… any place at which the employee is required to attend for the purpose of carrying out the duties of his or her employment”.

16. Section 6 (1A) of the Act provides as follows:

“For the purposes of this section

(a)a journey from a place of residence is taken to start at the boundary of the land where the place of residence is situated; or

(b)a journey to such a place of residence is taken to end at that boundary.”

APPLICANT’S EVIDENCE

17.     The applicant’s statement of evidence was as follows:

“1.       I was born on 27 November 1960.

2.I am employed by the Respondent as a parcel officer working 25 hours a week. I commenced employment with the Respondent on 5 March 2003.

3.On 8 August 2007 at approximately 1.10 pm I sustained an injury in the circumstances described in a claim form later completed by me (T68).

4.At the time of the incident I had completed my rostered work duties and was in the course of descending steps outside my workplace when I fell from approximately half way down the steps to the bottom of the steps.

5.Although the incident report I completed indicated that I “missed last step” I did not in fact miss the last step as is set out in the claim form but fell from approximately half way down the staircase.

6.I lodged a claim for compensation which claim was denied.”

18.     Although cross-examined on her statement by Ms Giles, Counsel for the respondent, there was ultimately no submission made on behalf of the respondent that findings ought not be made in accordance with the applicant’s statement, either in whole or in part.

19.     I find no reason why I should not accept the applicant’s evidence. My observation of her was that she was an honest and reliable witness.

20.     I therefore make findings of fact in accordance with the applicant’s statement of evidence.

21.     In cross-examination the applicant was asked questions about the configuration of the ground floor of the building in which she worked and, particularly, the route she took to exit the building.  In this regard the applicant’s evidence may be summarised as follows:

·     the applicant left the room in which she worked through a security door, turned right and walked down a corridor;

·     at the end of the corridor, on her left, there was another security door through which she passed into the building’s entry foyer;

·     the applicant then moved to her right and exited the building through sliding doors;

·     she then walked across an area external to the building at the end of which there were steps leading down to the footpath;

·     the applicant started descending the steps and fell.

22.     As none of this evidence was in controversy, I make findings of fact accordingly.

23.     Pursuant to leave given to both parties at the conclusion of the hearing, by letter dated 23 May 2008 to the Tribunal, copied to the solicitors for the applicant, the solicitors for the respondent advised of the following distances in relation to the route taken by the applicant from the room in which she worked to the point at which she fell:

·     from the first security door to the second security door – 7.8 metres;

·     from the second security door to the sliding doors from which the applicant exited the building – 5.1 metres;

·     the distance of the external area between the sliding doors and the commencement of the steps down to the footpath – 14.4 metres;

·     the distance between the top of the steps and the bottom of the front step (i.e. ground level) – 2.45 metres.

24.     The covering letter stated that the measurements were jointly conducted by an employee of the respondent’s solicitors and an employee of the respondent.

25.     Leave was also given to the applicant to provide her own measurements if she did not agree with the measurements provided by the respondent.   The applicant did not do so.

26.     I therefore make findings of fact as to the various distances in accordance with the said letter.

27.     On behalf of the applicant there was tendered a copy of a “Staff Information Bulletin” issued by the respondent dated 6 August 2007 and headed “Safety Caution: Entering and Exiting 1 Cambridge Street”. It was in the following terms:

“Please can all staff exercise great care when entering or exiting the head office building at 1 Cambridge Street, West Leederville, particularly when it is raining.

With winter upon us, remember that it is likely to be wet and slippery more than usual outside our workplace.

If you are entering or exiting the premises on foot, it is strongly encouraged not to use the vehicle access driveway from Cambridge Street, particularly when it is raining.

Car park users needing to walk across the vehicle access driveway are asked to be cautious and not to run.  Even when hard paved surfaces have a rough finish, and the surface of the driveway is wet, it is less likely to provide grip.

Your safety is important to us and we ask that you take these few steps to prevent any injuries.”

THE RESPONDENT’S LEASED PREMISES

28.     The respondent leases office premises at 1 Cambridge Street, West Leederville, Western Australia.  A copy of the lease was received in evidence.

29.     Section 2 of the Lease relevantly provides as follows:

“The Landlord, being registered or entitled to be registered, as the proprietor of the Land described in Item 1 of the Reference Schedule HEREBY LEASES to the Tenant the Leased premises described in Item 2 of the Reference Schedule TOGETHER WITH:

2.1.1.The non-exclusive right for the Tenant and the Tenant’s employees, agents, contractors, invitees, licensees and sub-tenants in common with the Landlord and all others authorised by the Landlord (whether expressly or impliedly) to pass and re-pass over and across those parts of the Common Areas (if any) described in this Lease giving access to and egress from the Leased Premises;

2.1.2….

2.1.3….”

30.     Item 2 of the Reference Schedule describes the “Leased Premises” as follows:

“The whole of the office areas constructed on the Land described in Item 1, and known as 1 Cambridge Street, West Leederville, Western Australia and (subject to measurement) being:

(a)       Ground Floor of approximately 475 square metres;

(b)       1^st Floor of approximately 1,239 square metres;

(c)       2^nd Floor of approximately 1,222 square metres; and

(d)       3^rd Floor of approximately 1,222 square metres.

The final floor areas are subject to measurement in accordance with the Property Council of Australia Pty Ltd method of measurement for office premises at the cost of the Landlord.”

31.     Section 1.1 of the Lease defines “Common Areas” to mean “all parts of the Land other than the office premises on each of the ground, first, second and third floors leased to the Tenant by this Lease”.

32.     It is important to note that Item 2 of the Reference Schedule describes the leased premises as “the whole of the office areas constructed on the Land”.  It was common cause that the applicant fell outside the “office areas constructed on the Land”.  Accordingly, it was further common cause that the applicant fell on part of the “Common Areas” as defined in the Lease in respect of which, by Section 2.1.1 of the Lease, the respondent, with others, had a non-exclusive right for itself and its employees (etc) to pass and re-pass over and across giving access to and egress from the Leased Premises.

APPLICANT’S CONTENTION

33.     The applicant’s contention was that, although she had completed her duties for the day and was on her way home, the steps where the applicant sustained her injury were part of her “place of work” as they formed part of the improvements on the land on which the building in which she worked was constructed, and the applicant was there as a consequence of her employment. 

34. Mr Prast, Counsel for the applicant, sought to draw support for this contention from s 6(1A) of the Act. Although there is not a similar section in the Act providing that a journey from a place of work is taken to start at the boundary of the land where the place of work is situated or to commence at that boundary, it was submitted that it would be inconsistent for the definition of “place of work”, and thus the delineation of where a journey from the employee’s place of work commences, to be defined conceptually in a different way.

35.     The applicant’s position was succinctly set out in a letter from the applicant’s solicitors to the respondent’s solicitors prior to commencement of the hearing (a copy of which was provided to the Tribunal) in the following terms:

“In paragraph 2.15 of your Facts and Contentions you set out your definition of the leased premises.  The Applicant’s position is that the lease provides that the landlord leases the area you have described together with “the non-exclusive right for the tenant and the tenant’s employees, agents, contractors, invitees, licensees and sub-tenants in common with the landlord and all other authorised by the landlord to pass and re-pass across those paths of the common areas described in this lease giving access to an egress from the leased premises” (T Documents, page 383).

The common areas are defined to mean all that part of the land other then the office premises on each of the ground, first, second and third floors leased by the tenant (T Documents, page 378).

It is the case that on that construction the applicant contends that the premises include the area at which the Applicant sustained injury.

So there is no doubt we refer you to clause 2 of the lease which provides ‘the Landlord being registered and entitled to be registered as proprietor of land described in item 1 of the reference schedule hereby leases to the tenant the leased premised described in item 2 of the reference schedule together with 2.1.1 the non-exclusive right for the tenant and the tenant’s employees, agents, contractors, invitees, licensees and sub-tenants in common with the landlord and all others authorised by the landlord (whether expressly or implied) to pass and re-pass over and across those paths of the common areas described in this lease giving access to an egress from the leased premises.’

It is clearly the case pursuant to the lease that the employer was responsible for the payment of all outgoings in respect of the entire premises.  In those circumstances the Applicant had not in fact left her place of work.” 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

36. The respondent relied upon both the second reading speech to the Amendment Act and the Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment Act in support of its contention that s 6(1)(b) of the Act ought be construed narrowly as it was the legislative intent to remove claims for non work-related journeys and to limit the entitlement to compensation to areas in respect of which the employer has control over the activities of the employee.

37.     It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the term chosen by Parliament, namely “place of work,” was very specific and narrow in its application.  It was submitted that it did not refer to the address where the employee worked or even the building in which the employee worked, but rather the area occupied by the employer in which the employee worked.

38.     It was therefore the respondent’s contention that, as regards the applicant, “place of work” meant the area leased by the respondent from which it conducted its business, in respect of which it had rights of quiet enjoyment and in which its employees worked.

39.     The respondent relied upon, amongst others, the following statements made in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment Act:

·“The principal amendments will … remove claims for non work-related journeys and recess breaks where the employer has no control over the activities of the employee”.

·“It is estimated that the amendments to the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act) would produce a reduced call on Comcare’s premium pool of around $20 million per annum.  Reducing the call on the premium pool may have a beneficial effect on Worker’s Compensation under the Comcare Scheme.”

·“The amendments to the treatment of a journey claims (some recess break claims) are estimated to produce savings of $15 million per annum to Comcare’s premium pool.”

·“The Government’s primary objective with the worker’s compensation scheme established under the SRC Act, is to minimise the human and financial costs of work-related injury and disease while at the same time providing appropriate compensation support for employees injured or made ill through employment.  In this context the Government is seeking to strike a balance between the obligations for employers covered by the scheme to employees injured or made ill through work and the need to ensure that the costs of the scheme are maintained at a reasonable level”.

·“In relation to journeys between the place of residence and the place of work, the Productivity Commission enquiry found that the cost of journey claims can be significant and influence the affordability of workers compensation.  He found that while journeys to and from work are an inevitable part of meeting the employment commitments, the mode and the nature of the journey and the location of the worker’s residence relative to work, are not in most circumstances matters over which the employer exercises any control.

·In these circumstances, the extension of worker’s compensation coverage to both “journey claims” does not fit well the obligations imposed on employers by the Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 …..

·When an employee is undertaking a journey other than a purely work-related journey, for all practical purposes the employer has no control over the circumstances of the journey or the employee’s behaviour.  It is inappropriate that employer could be liable for injury sustained by an employee during these journeys notwithstanding that the employer fully complies with all occupational health and safety requirements at the employee’s work place”.

40.     The respondent relied upon the whole of the second reading speech, but particularly the following;

“the fundamental common–sense principal underlying the Productivity Commission’s recommendations was of course, that employers should only be held liable for conduct which they are in a position to control”.

41.     With leave of the Tribunal, after the hearing of the matter, the solicitors for the respondent provided to the Tribunal, with a copy to the solicitors for the applicant, a letter indicating additional paragraphs of the explanatory memorandum on which the respondent relied, as well as identifying pages 182 to 187 of the Productivity Commission Report on National Workers Compensation and Occupations Health and Safety Frameworks 2004 upon which the respondent relied.  I have had regard to that material, but do not consider it necessary to detail any of it in these reasons for decision.

THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS AS TO THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACT

42. Neither party referred to or relied upon any previous decisions in support of their respective contentions. I was informed that, so far as Counsel were aware, this was the first matter to consider such issues in regard to the Act subsequent to the Amending Act.

43. Notwithstanding, I consider assistance can be obtained from certain decisions relating to the Act pre-dating the inclusion of s 6 (1A) into the Act. In particular, there are two decisions, one of this Tribunal and one of the Federal Court of Australia, that I consider to be particularly instructive.

44.     The first (in time) is the decision of this Tribunal in Muir and Australian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1992] AATA 196 in which the Tribunal undertook a detailed analysis of various decisions concerning whether or not an injury had occurred at the worker’s “place of residence” (and did so in the absence of the provision such as s 6(1A) of the Act).

45.     The review concluded that:

·     it was not possible to formulate any general test as to when a person could be said to be travelling between their place of work and place of residence;

·     in particular, identification of a “place of residence” by reference to the boundary of the property on which the residence is constructed was not supported by the majority of the authorities.

·     each case depends upon its own facts;

·     it is essential to consider each element of the relevant legislative provision.

46.     Comcare Australia (Defence) v O’Dea [1997] 150 ALR 318 is a decision of Northrop J, of the Federal Court of Australia (on appeal from this Tribunal). (For the sake of completeness I note that the decision was ultimately overturned by the Full Federal Court of Australia, but on an unrelated point).

47.     The following passage of His Honour’s decision is particularly relevant:

“…

In any event the use of the word “place” in either of the expressions “place of work” or “place of residence” connotes defined area, normally the whole area of the workplace or residence or, to put the matter in another way, the area for which the owner or legal occupier of the area has control.

In the present case, it is noted that the expression “place of work” is defined in s 4 of the Comcare Act in an inclusive form and includes any place at which the employee is required to attend for the purpose of carrying out the duties of his or her employment.  The meaning of the expression “place of work” in s 6 of the Comcare Act is such as to make the result in a given case depend largely upon matters of fact and degree: cf Gummow J, as referred to above.  In the context of travelling between a place of residence and place of work, in general understanding of the expressions, what is connoted are the boundaries of the place of residence and the place of work

… In normal understanding the place of work is the place at which the employee attends for work as an employee.  It is not to be limited to the office or particular workshop where the employee performs duties” (p325/6)

48. Turning then to the contentions advanced on behalf of the applicant and the respondent as to the proper construction of the Act, I reject both of them in so far as they both purport to be the proper construction of s 6(1) of universal application.

49. Moreover, as for the applicant’s contention, I find nothing in the words used in s 6(1)(b) of the Act (either read in isolation or against the background of all other relevant sections of the Act) to support the contention that, as a matter of general application, the “place of work” is to be defined by reference to the boundaries of the title of the property on which the person works. Indeed, I consider that to be inconsistent with the approach previously taken by the majority of courts as to the meaning of the words “place of residence” in the Act prior to the introduction of s 6(1A) of the Act.

50. I also reject the submission that the existence of s 6(1A), expressly relating only to “place of residence” (and not “place of work”), suggests a legislative intent in regard to the determination of both the “place of work” and “place of residence” for the purpose of the Act. If there was such an intention, it was and remains open to Parliament to include such a provision in the Act. It has not done so. Indeed, if anything, the fact that s 6(1A) is in the Act and relates solely to “place of residence” (and not “place of work”) might be said to support the view that it is not Parliament’s intention that “place of work” is to be so defined. Either way, I do not find s 6(1A) to be of assistance in determining the definition of “place of work” and its application to the facts of this matter.

51.     Turning then to the respondent’s contention, it is clear from both the Explanatory Memorandum to, and the second reading speech of,  the Amending Act, as well as the passage from O’Dea to which I have referred, that the issue of the place over which the employer has control is relevant to the determination of an employees “place of work”. 

52. Whilst I therefore consider it to be a relevant matter to determine whether injury was sustained in an area owned by or leased to the employer, the fact that an injury has not occurred on such an area is not in my view determinative of a finding that an injury did not occur at a “place of work” within the meaning of s 6(1) (b) of the Act. By way of example, situations where an injury may occur on the common areas of a building which I consider to be well capable of being held to constitute part of the “place of work” include an injury sustained:

·in a lift or stairwell between two floors of a building where the employer has offices on both floors;

·on the way to or from a toilet located on a floor occupied by the employer, but where the toilet is actually on the common property.

53. Moreover, if “control” was to be the determinative consideration, it was open to the Parliament to include in the Act a definition of “place of work” in which “control” was said to be a determinative factor. It has not done so.

54.     In addition, there would seem no reason to limit the notion of “control “  to legal control so that notions of practical “control” may well have a role to play.  That is not an issue that I need determine in this matter.

RESULT

55.     I consider it neither possible nor appropriate for me to seek to determine a definition of universal application for the phrase under consideration as it is not capable of universal definition and each case must be determined on its own circumstances.

56. The matter for determination is whether the applicant, having completed her work for the day, having left the building in which she worked and having done so for the purpose of going home, and having fallen on steps some 14.4 metres from the building (albeit still on the land upon which the building was constructed) thereby suffered injury at her “place of work” within the meaning of s 6(1) (b) of the Act.

57. I consider it of relevance that, on the evidence, the respondent leases all of the office space within the building in which the applicant worked. ( I note that provided to the Tribunal prior to the hearing, but not tendered in evidence, was a copy of a sub-lease of certain portions of the Leased premises, namely level 1. I note for the sake of completeness that, even if the sub - lease had been admitted into evidence, the fact that the office space within the building was in fact occupied as to 3 floors by the respondent and as to 1 floor by a sub – tenant of the respondent, would not have altered the analysis or conclusions contained herein.) In such a situation I consider there is much to be said for the proposition that the whole of the interior of the building in which the applicant worked could properly be described for the purposes of s 6(1)(1b) of the Act as being the applicant’s “place of work”, irrespective of the fact that the applicant only worked in one particular part of the area leased by the respondent, and irrespective of the fact that not all areas within the building form part of the “Leased Premises”. The position might be otherwise if the facts were that the respondent was only 1 of many organisations occupying the office space within the building.

58. In the same way, if the respondent leased only part of the office space within the building and other tenants occupied the balance of the office space within the building, I would have little hesitation in concluding that, as soon as the applicant had exited the building, if she had not already done so for the purpose of the Act, she left her “place of work” at that point.

59.     The matter is less clear, however, where, as here, the applicant’s employer is either the principal or sole tenant of the office space within the building.

60.     I consider the most beneficial construction of the words “place of work” available to the applicant on the facts of this matter does not extend beyond the building in which the applicant worked.  This is particularly so given that there is no evidence of any work being performed by any employee of the respondent, let alone the applicant, occurring, either expressly or by necessary implication, on the land but outside the building.  A different conclusion may have been reached if the facts in this regard were otherwise.

61.     Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent leased the whole of the office areas within the building and was either the principal or sole tenant,  I find that the applicant was no longer at her “place of work” once she had left the building in which she worked as:

·     no part of the “Leased Premises” extended beyond the interior of the building;

·     areas external to the building formed part of the “Common Area” in respect of which the applicant’s and respondent’s were only entitled, by licence, to cross for the purpose of access to and egress from the leased premises;

·     there was no evidence that any work was undertaken by any employee of the respondent (let alone the applicant) on the land on which the building was constructed other than within the building;

62. I note on the evidence that, after she exited the building, the applicant walked some 14.5 metres before she fell and sustained her injury. Whether the distance was over 14.5 metres or only a few centimetres outside the building is not to my mind of any moment in determining whether or not the injury had occurred at the applicant’s “place of work”. The distance travelled and where the injury was sustained (ie steps to the footpath) do, however, seem to reinforce the proposition that the area where the applicant sustained her injury was not an area which the applicant or, on the evidence, any other person employed by the respondent worked, either expressly or by necessary implication. I find that neither the fact that, under the lease, the respondent reimbursed the lessor in respect of all outgoings in relation to the common areas (including the steps) is, if not entirely relevant, of little relevance in determining whether or not the place where the applicant fell comprised part of her “place of work” within the meaning of the Act.

63. I also consider the fact that the respondent issued a “staff information bulletin” urging its staff to exercise great care when entering or exiting the building does not warrant, either alone or in conjunction with other matters, a contrary finding. The fact that an employer takes the commendable step of issuing a cautionary note to staff about a potential danger of which it is aware is of little assistance in determining an employees “place of work” within the meaning of the Act. It would be a surprising result if an employer, seized of a potential and proximate danger which might effect its employees, determined whether or not to warn them of the same (as distinct from remedying the danger itself) by reference to whether or not the danger existed at the “place of work” within the meaning of the Act.

64.     Indeed, if anything, the staff information bulletin merely serves to reinforce the conclusion I have reached: it is a plain English communication from the respondent to its employees in which the respondent refers to the danger “outside our workplace”. Having said that, I wish to make it clear that I have not have not had regard to that expression in reaching the conclusion I have reached.

Conclusion

65.     Without deciding whether or not she had left her “place of work” at an earlier point, I find that, on the facts of this case, the most generous construction to the applicant of her “place of work” was the building in which she worked.  As her injury was not suffered in the building, it is therefore not necessary for me to determine whether, on the facts of the case, the applicant had left her “place of work” at some prior point (as urged on behalf of the respondent).

66. In reaching this conclusion, I have had careful regard to the fact that the Act is beneficial legislation which, in applying the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, should be interpreted so as to give the fullest relief which its language shall allow, see for example, the decision of this Tribunal in Miller [72] and the cases referred to therein.

67.     In my view, however, on the facts of this matter, to give the words “place of work” an operation broader than that which I have applied, would be to give them an artificial interpretation which does not accord with modern life.

68. I therefore find that when the applicant left the building, she was no longer at her “place of work”. She therefore was not at her “place of work” when she fell: she was not then at a “place at which (the applicant was) required to attend for the purpose of carrying out the duties of (her) employer”. It follows that when she fell the applicant was travelling between her “place of work” and her place of residence and thus, by dint of s 6(1)(C) of the Act, her injury is not one compensable under the Act.

69.     The reviewable decision is thus to be affirmed.

I certify that the 69 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr S Penglis, Senior Member.

Signed: ..(sgd) T Freeman.....
              Associate

Dates of Hearing  15 May 2008
Date of Decision  13 June 2008
Counsel for the Applicant         Mr C Prast
Solicitor for the Applicant          Slater & Gordon
Counsel for the Respondent     Ms P Giles
Solicitor for the Respondent    Sparke Helmore