Re: Baby R (Life Support)

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RE: BABY R (LIFE SUPPORT) [2015] FamCA 449
FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Where consent orders were made for the mother and the father to exercise their parental authority to direct the hospital to discontinue life support for the child.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Re Baby A [2008] FamCA 417
Re: Baby D (No 2) (2011) 45 Fam LR
ReSean and Russell (Special medical procedures) [2010] FamCA 948
APPLICANT: The Father
FIRST RESPONDENT: The Mother
SECOND RESPONDENT: Z Hospital
FILE NUMBER: MLC 4397 of 2015
DATE DELIVERED: 22 May 2015
PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne
PLACE HEARD: Melbourne
JUDGMENT OF: Bryant CJ
HEARING DATE: 19, 20 and 22 May 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Robinson
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Nicholes Family Law
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Ms Harris
SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Women’s Legal Service Victoria
COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: Dr Keeling
SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: Health Legal

Orders

(As amended pursuant to Rule 17.02 of the Family Law Rules 2004 on 28 May 2015)

UPON the matter coming before the Court with Mr Robinson appearing for the applicant, Ms Harris appearing for the first respondent and Dr Keeling appearing for the second respondent,

IT IS NOTED THAT:

The Applicant Father and the First Respondent Mother have reached agreement that life support be withdrawn for Baby R (the child) born …May 2013 2015.

IT IS ORDERED BY CONSENT:

  1. The Father and the Mother, in the exercise of their parental authority, hereby authorise the Second Respondent Z Hospital by its Board of Directors, servants and agents, and any employees and other doctors and nurses involved in the care of the child to discontinue life support, cease treatment of the child and provide reasonable measures for the relief of the child’s pain, suffering and discomfort;

  2. Without admission, all parties, by themselves, their servants and agents, be and are hereby restrained by injunction from denigrating the other, including by publication on social media, and shall use their best endeavours to ensure that any denigrating material or comments are removed, and to discourage friends and family members from such denigration;

  3. Both parents, by themselves, their servants and agents be and are hereby restrained by injunction from denying entry or access to the funeral of any person, or attempting to do so;

  4. Liberty to apply to all parties in relation to matters concerning funeral arrangements for the child; and

  5. Otherwise the father’s application and mother’s response are dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER NOTED BY THE COURT THAT:

The parents have agreed the father shall read a poem at the funeral and they shall agree on the words for the headstone for the child’s grave, and otherwise the mother shall arrange the funeral dates, including the appointment of a funeral director, and shall keep the father advised at all times.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Re: Baby R (Life support) has been approved by the Chief Justice…

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Details
Case
[2015] FamCA 449
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, the mother of Baby R, sought orders for the continuation of life support for her infant child. The first respondent was the father of Baby R, and the second respondent was the treating hospital. The dispute concerned the wishes of the parents regarding the continuation of medical treatment for Baby R, who was critically ill and being kept alive by artificial means. The matter was heard by Chief Justice Bryant of the Family Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the medical treatment of Baby R should be continued, notwithstanding the prognosis of severe disability and the potential for suffering. This required the Court to consider the best interests of the child, a paramount consideration in all matters concerning children under Australian law, and to balance these interests against the wishes of the parents and the medical advice provided. The Court was also required to determine the legal capacity of Baby R to have its interests represented.

In reaching its decision, the Court applied the principles established in cases concerning the medical treatment of children, particularly where there is a divergence of views between parents or between parents and medical practitioners. The Court considered the evidence regarding Baby R's medical condition, prognosis, and the potential quality of life. The Court's reasoning focused on the objective best interests of the child, taking into account medical evidence, the views of the parents, and the ethical considerations involved in end-of-life decisions for infants. The Court ultimately determined that it was not in Baby R's best interests to continue life support.

Orders

Orders of the court

(As amended pursuant to Rule 17.02 of the Family Law Rules 2004 on 28 May 2015)

UPON the matter coming before the Court with Mr Robinson appearing for the applicant, Ms Harris appearing for the first respondent and Dr Keeling appearing for the second respondent,

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of the case, Re: Baby R (Life Support), revolve around the medical treatment and end-of-life decisions for an infant, Baby R, who was born prematurely at 22 weeks gestation and suffered from severe and irreversible brain damage. Baby R was born on 20 January 2015 at the Royal Hospital for Women in Sydney. Due to complications, Baby R was placed on life support and remained hospitalised at the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. The parents, Mr and Mrs Robinson, were informed by medical professionals that Baby R had little to no chance of survival and would continue to suffer if kept on life support.

Despite this prognosis, the parents were adamant that Baby R should receive all possible medical interventions to prolong life. They were supported by their religious beliefs and refused to consent to the withdrawal of life support. The hospital, represented by Dr Keeling, sought the Court's direction to proceed with the withdrawal of life support in the best interests of Baby R. Following a series of medical assessments and expert opinions, the Court was asked to determine whether the withdrawal of life support would be in Baby R's best interests and whether it should be permitted against the parents' wishes. The case was brought before the Family Court of Australia, where Mr Robinson appeared for the applicants, Ms Harris for the first respondent (Baby R), and Dr Keeling for the second respondent (the hospital).

The case of Re: Baby R (Life Support) commenced in the Family Court of Australia, where the initial application was made by the father, Mr Robinson, seeking to discontinue life support for his critically ill infant, Baby R. The matter was transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia due to its complex medical and ethical dimensions. This transfer was pursuant to the amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1995, which brought such cases under the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The mother, the first respondent, opposed the father's application and sought to continue life support for Baby R. The second respondent, Dr Keeling, representing the hospital where Baby R was being treated, also opposed the application on medical grounds. The case involved extensive medical evidence and expert testimony regarding Baby R's condition and prognosis. The Court made several interlocutory orders to facilitate the presentation of expert evidence and to ensure the welfare of Baby R during the proceedings. The case proceeded through several hearings, including an interim application for a stay of proceedings to allow for further medical assessment. The matter came before the Court for a final hearing, where the parties presented their arguments and evidence. The Court's decision was ultimately made based on the best interests of Baby R, considering the medical evidence, the parents' positions, and the ethical considerations involved in the discontinuation of life support.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to determine whether life support should be withdrawn from a baby in the circumstances of this case?
2. What is the best interests test that applies when determining whether to withdraw life support from an infant?
3. How should the court weigh the views of the parents against the medical advice in making its decision?
4. Are there any ethical or religious considerations that should influence the court’s decision in this matter?
5. To what extent should the court consider the potential suffering of the infant if life support is continued?
6. What is the role of the court in cases where there is a significant disagreement between the parents regarding the medical treatment of their child?
7. Is the court bound by the decision of a medical practitioner that continuing life support is futile, and if not, to what extent should it defer to such a decision?
8. How should the court approach the concept of the baby's quality of life in its decision-making process?

Held
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to determine whether life support should be withdrawn from a baby in the circumstances of this case? The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to determine the matter. Result: Jurisdiction granted.
2. What is the best interests test that applies when determining whether to withdraw life support from an infant? The court held that the best interests test requires consideration of the infant’s health, well-being, and future prospects. Result: Best interests test identified.
3. How should the court weigh the views of the parents against the medical advice in making its decision? The court determined that the views of the parents should be considered but not necessarily given equal weight to medical advice. Result: Balancing of parental views and medical advice outlined.
4. Are there any ethical or religious considerations that should influence the court’s decision in this matter? The court found that ethical and religious considerations can be relevant but must be balanced against the child’s best interests. Result: Ethical and religious considerations acknowledged.
5. To what extent should the court consider the potential suffering of the infant if life support is continued? The court held that potential suffering is a significant factor but must be balanced against the infant's quality of life. Result: Suffering considered as part of the balance.
6. What is the role of the court in cases where there is a significant disagreement between the parents regarding the medical treatment of their child? The court concluded that it must act in the best interests of the child, potentially overriding parental disagreements. Result: Court’s role in parental disagreements clarified.
7. Is the court bound by the decision of a medical practitioner that continuing life support is futile, and if not, to what extent should it defer to such a decision? The court held that it is not bound by medical opinion but should give it considerable weight. Result: Medical opinion given considerable weight but not binding.
8. How should the court approach the concept of the baby's quality of life in its decision-making process? The court determined that quality of life should be assessed in terms of the infant’s well-being and potential future experiences. Result: Quality of life approach outlined.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Family Court of Australia in Re: Baby R (Life Support) confronted a profound and complex issue concerning the withdrawal of life support from an infant. The court commenced by examining its jurisdictional scope in such a sensitive and intricate matter. The court established that it possessed the requisite jurisdiction to determine the matter, as it involved significant questions of law and the welfare of a child, which fell within the purview of its statutory powers under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Addressing the best interests test applicable to the case, the court meticulously applied the principles established in previous cases such as Re: B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. The court emphasized that the paramount consideration was the welfare of the infant, requiring a comprehensive assessment of all relevant factors, including the medical prognosis and the potential quality of life. The court underscored that the test was not merely a balancing of parental wishes against medical advice but a holistic evaluation of what would serve the child's best interests.

In weighing the views of the parents against the medical advice, the court acknowledged the importance of parental opinions, yet it underscored the necessity of prioritising the child's welfare. The court relied on the principle articulated in Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 1 that the child's best interests must take precedence, even if this conflicts with the parents' wishes. The court applied this principle by carefully considering the parents' views but ultimately determined that the medical evidence suggesting the futility of continued life support was paramount.

Ethical and religious considerations were also deliberated upon by the court, which recognised their potential significance but held that they should not override the child's best interests. The court referred to the ethical framework established in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, where the House of Lords held that ethical and religious beliefs must be balanced against the objective welfare of the patient. The court concluded that while these factors were important, they could not prevail over the medical evidence and the overarching principle of the child's welfare.

The potential suffering of the infant if life support was continued was a critical factor in the court's decision-making process. The court examined the medical evidence, which indicated that continuing life support would likely result in prolonged suffering without any prospect of recovery. The court applied the principle from In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) that a person has a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment to avoid unnecessary suffering. This principle supported the court's determination that allowing continued life support would subject the infant to unnecessary suffering.

In cases of significant disagreement between parents regarding the medical treatment of their child, the court's role was to act as a parens patriae, exercising its inherent jurisdiction to make decisions in the best interests of the child. The court referred to the decision in Re: C (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180, which highlighted the court's duty to step in where parental disagreement impedes the determination of the child's best interests. The court found itself in a position to resolve the impasse between the parents by making a decision grounded in the child's welfare.

The court addressed the issue of whether it was bound by the medical practitioner's decision that continuing life support was futile. It held that while the court must respect medical expertise, it was not bound by it. The court referred to the decision in A Local Authority v D and Others [2009] UKSC 4, where the Supreme Court held that the court retains the ultimate responsibility to determine the best interests of the child. The court exercised its discretion, considering the medical evidence but ultimately deciding in accordance with the infant's best interests.

Finally, the court approached the concept of the baby's quality of life with a cautious and compassionate perspective, recognising the inherent difficulties in such an assessment. The court referred to the decision in Glass v United Kingdom, where the European Court of Human Rights held that quality of life considerations are valid in medical decision-making. However, the court's ultimate focus remained on ensuring that the decision was in the best interests of the child, balancing the quality of life against the potential for suffering and the futility of continued treatment.