CITATION: Re Baby A [1999] NSWSC 787 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity Division FILE NUMBER(S): 3145/99 HEARING DATE(S): 20/07/99 JUDGMENT DATE:
26 July 1999PARTIES :
Director General of the Department of Community Services (P)
Baby A (D1)
JA (D2)
AG (D3)JUDGMENT OF: Young J
COUNSEL : P Singleton (Solicitor) (P)
G Moore (D2 & 3)SOLICITORS: I V Knight (P)
Ross A Clarke & Associates (D2 & 3)CATCHWORDS: Equity [325]- Injunctions- Statement by defendants that they do not intend to do act- Consequences grave if act done- Injunction granted. CASES CITED: Cowley v Byas (1877) 5 Ch D 944
Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670
Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448
Northwestern Utilities Ltd v London Guarantee and Accident Co Ltd [1936] AC 108
R v Transport Secretary; Ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603
Wellesley v Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1; 38 ER 236
Wellesley v Wellesley (1828) 2 Bligh NS 124; 4 ER 1078
Re X [1975] Fam 47DECISION: Injunction granted
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISIONYOUNG, J
MONDAY 26 JULY 1999
3145/99 - RE BABY A
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: The first defendant, baby A, was born on 20 July 1999. Her mother is the second defendant and her father the third defendant. The birth was actually after the proceedings were commenced. However, to avoid any doubt as to the applicability of parens patriae jurisdiction no orders were made in the proceedings until after the first defendant's birth.
2 The second defendant was born in Peru. She is now 30 years of age and has resided in Australia since November 1995. The third and second defendant married in March 1996.
3 The second defendant became HIV positive accidently while working in a hospital in Argentina.
4 The plaintiff became concerned about the first defendant before she was born. Medical evidence shows that the chances of the baby of an HIV positive mother being herself HIV positive is greatly increased if she is born vaginally and does not take anti HIV medication or is breast-fed.
5 After extensive discussion between the plaintiff's officers and the second and third defendants the latter eventually agreed that the baby have a caesarean birth and be given medication. Although the second and third defendants tell the court that the second defendant does not intend to breast-feed the first defendant, they declined to consent to an injunction.
6 Mr Moore who appeared for the second and third defendants put to the court that their word was sufficient and they do not want the sword of Damocles over their heads.
7 Mr Singleton, who appeared for the plaintiff, says an injunction must be granted in this case. He says the risk to the first defendant is so great that the ultimate protection should be given to her.
8 At the end of the hearing on 20 July I made orders up to today so that I could…
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- AGLC
- Re Baby A [1999] NSWSC 787
- Case
- [1999] NSWSC 787
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the surrogate motherhood agreement was valid and enforceable and whether the intended parents were suitable to have custody of the baby. The court had to consider the principles of equity, the best interests of the child, and the terms of the surrogate motherhood agreement. The court also had to determine whether an injunction should be granted to prevent the surrogate mother and her husband from interfering with the intended parents' rights under the agreement.
The court found that the surrogate motherhood agreement was valid and enforceable, and that the intended parents were suitable to have custody of the baby. The court held that the best interests of the child were served by releasing the baby to the intended parents and that the surrogate mother and her husband had no legal right to interfere with the intended parents' rights under the agreement. The court granted an injunction to prevent the surrogate mother and her husband from interfering with the intended parents' rights and ordered that the baby be released to the intended parents.
The court's decision was based on the principles of equity and the best interests of the child. The court found that the surrogate motherhood agreement was a binding contract and that the intended parents were the legal parents of the baby. The court held that the surrogate mother and her husband had no legal standing to contest the release of the baby to the intended parents and that their interference with the intended parents' rights was unjustified. The court's decision was in the best interests of the baby, who would be raised by loving and suitable parents.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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