Re Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union & Ors; Ex parte Aberdeen Beef Company Limited

[1992] HCATrans 161

..

.~

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA	~
Office of the Registry

Sydney	No S43 of 1990
In the matter of -

An application for writ of

prohibition against the

Honourable MR JUSTICE JOHN

TERENCE LUDEKE, the

Honourable MR DEPUTY

PRESIDENT JOSEPH RIORDAN,

the Honourable MR JUSTICE

RUSSELL JOHN PETERSON,
Deputy Presidents of the

Australian Industrial

Relations Commission, PHILLIP

~, Esquire, a Commissioner

appointed under the

Industrial Relations Act,

1988, (Cth) and AUSTRALASIAN

MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES'

UNION, an association of

employees under the said Act.

Respondents

Ex parte -

ABERDEEN BEEF CO PTY LIMITED

and OTHERS

Prosecutors

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J

Aberdeen 1 2/6/92

DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J

MCHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 2 JUNE 1992, AT 10.17 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with

my learned friend, MR M. COCKBURN, for the

prosecutors. (instructed by Michie Shehadie & Co)

MR R.C. KENZIE, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with

my learned friends, MR R.M. GOOT and MR M.K. SCOTT,

for the respondent Union.	(instructed by Maurice
May and Company)

MR D.J. ROSE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MR G.J. GINNANE, for the

Commonwealth Attorney-General intervening to

support the respondent Union. (instructed by the

Australian Government Solicitor)

MASON CJ:	The Deputy Registrar has been informed by the Australian Government Solicitor that
Justice Ludeke, Deputy President Riordan,
Mr Justice Peterson and Commissioner Cox of the
Industrial Relations Commission do not wish
representations to be made on their behalf and that
they will abide by the order of the Court except as
to costs. Yes, Mr Jackson?
MR JACKSON:	Your Honours, this is a case where the parties

have filed written submissions, and as is apparent

from those submissions, the case is concerned with

two broad issues.	The first concerns the existence
of an interstate dispute assuming genuineness.	The

second goes to the question of genuineness of the

dispute. May I deal with the issues in that order.

Your Honours, if I could deal first with the

question of the existence of an interstate dispute,
may I say a number of things before getting to the

substance of the matter. The first is that this is

a case where the dispute is constituted and

constituted solely by non-acceptance of the demands

in a log of claims and its accompanying letter of

demand. The log of claims, Your Honours, appears

in the supplementary application book at page 2.

The letter of demand is set out at page 15

paragraph 18 of the application book itself -

page 15, paragraph 18 of the affidavit.	May I take
Your Honours to that for just a moment.

Your Honours will there see the letter of demand dated 14 September 1989. It refers in the first paragraph to the letter of demand and log of claims

being served on behalf of the respondent Union. It

indicates the persons to whom the claim is intended

to apply, and then Your Honours will see in the

third paragraph of it:

Unless a reply indicating agreement with this

claim is received within seven (7) days of the

service of these documents ..... the Union will

assume refusal -

Aberdeen 2 2/6/92

and so on.

Now, Your Honours, none of the prosecutors

agreed to the terms of the demand and log of

claims, and the log of claims to which assent was

sought was expressed in the form of a draft award.

Your Honours, may I go to that. It is in the

supplementary application book, the larger of the

two of those documents, and it may be seen at

page 2. May I take Your Honours, for a moment, to

clause 3 and ask the Court to note two things about

clause 3 which is the demand for the extent of the

coverage. The first is that clause 3(i)(b) refers

to:

The Meat and Allied Trades Federation of

Australia -

that is an employers organization registered under

the Industrial Relations Act. That body was not in
fact served, the only person served being the

individual employers.

GAUDRON J:  It had earlier been served, had it not, with an

identical log of claims?

MR JACKSON:  With an earlier log of claims, Your Honour,

yes.

GAUDRON J: But it was identical?

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, I think that is right, yes. But

it was not served with this log of claims.

GAUDRON J:  It was not served with these respondents or with these prosecutors?

MR JACKSON: That is so, Your Honour, yes. It was not

served, Your Honours, and I wish to mention,

however, that if one looks at the record of

proceedings before the Industrial Relations

Commission, in the first instance, in this case,

one sees that a body with a rather similar name

intervened at the hearing before the

Deputy President, but that was a New South Wales

registered union of employers. Your Honour, I wish

to mention that simply to avoid confusion if one

were looking at it.

Your Honours, if I could just say something

further in relation to what was put to me a moment

ago by Justice Gaudron. At the hearing of the

application for the finding of dispute in the

present case, it was not contended that the federal
organisation of employers was a party to the

dispute.

Aberdeen 2/6/92

Your Honours, the second point to which I wish

to refer, in dealing with clause 3, is this.

Clause 3(i)(c) referred to various employers in

respect of employees engaged in the performance of

work in specified classifications. Now,

Your Honours, I will elaborate upon that in just a

moment. If one goes through the log of claims in

the provisions which follow in the next few pages,

up to and including clause 8, which goes through to

page 8, what one sees is that it contains a number

of general demands, if I can put them in that way,

and then one comes to clause 9 of the log which

appears at the bottom of page 8. Clause 9 is a

provision which is introductory in a sense, and it

contains a demand that:

An adult employee ..... of a classification

specified in the Table below who is employed

by any employer respondent to this Claim shall

be paid the weekly wage rate assigned in the

Table to that classification for the place or

area in which the employee works.

Now, Your Honours, the table to which it

refers commences on the next page, page 9, and that

part of the log consists of a number of sections or

divisions. If Your Honours look at page 9 there is

a heading which is "Division 'A'" and one reads, in

effect, "- Abattoirs", as distinct from being

"Division 'A' Abattoirs". "Division 'A' -

Abattoirs", and it is apparent if one looks, for

example, at paragraph 3, that it refers to cattle,

sheep, lamb and pigs and the various categories in

the demand are set out in the several divisions

which succeed. Your Honours, I will come to those

very briefly in just a moment. Could I ask Your

Honours to note that if one looks, for example, at

page 10, it refers to various wage rates for

various areas. That is why the tables have

different figures in them.

Your Honours, I said the various categories are set out at various divisions. Your Honours

will see at page 11, a heading, "Division 'B'

Retail Shops"; at page 12 "Division 'C'" Smallgoods

Section"; page 13 "Division 'D'" Carters and

Drivers"; page 14 "Division 'E' (I) Domestic Meat

Market Brisbane"; and then at page 15 "Division 'F'

Boning and/or Prepacking Area". At page 16, three

different divisions are set out and then page 17

"Division 'I'".

And Your Honours, essentially that is the

conclusion of it.

Now, Your Honours, that is part I of their

demand and it relates to employees who are on

Aberdeen 4 2/6/92

time-work; that is, employees who are paid, in

effect, wages in the ordinary way.

Your Honours, the next relevant part is

part III which deals with employees who are
employed on piecework rates. Could I take

Your Honours to page 39. If one goes to page 39,

at the top of the page, in the application clause

of it, it says:

This part of this award shall apply in respect

of all employees employed in establishments

being -

which it then describes -

in which any employees are working under any

Tally, or Piecework system -

It proceeds to demand, if one looks, for example,

at page 41, various piecework rates per five days

for some but not all employees. If one looks at

page 41, one sees that there are two rates shown.

The rate shown on the left is in respect of

piecework; the rate shown on the right is in

respect of other employees who are not employed at

piecework or on tally work. If one goes, for

example, to pages 42 and 43, similar things may be

seen.

Could I ask Your Honours to note that - if one were to endeavour to put it compendiously, the

persons for whom piecework is the subject of the
demand seem to be, broadly speaking, persons

concerned with slaughtering, giving that a wide

interpretation. As Your Honours will see at

page 41, about lines 15 to 25, there are persons

who do more than the actual killing and also

persons who are, again, broadly speaking, engaged

in boning and slicing; as Your Honours will see at

page 43, about line 38.

Your Honours, a calculation of the amounts

payable varies with the class of work, and what one

sees in the pages which commence with page 41 and

go on - and I will take Your Honours very briefly

to them - is that the work is divided up into very

particular groupings. Could I take Your Honours,

for example, to the top of page 41. You will see

the grouping A, "Beef, horse, sheep, calf

slaughtering on chain or rail on pig slaughtering".

Your Honours, at page 42 one sees at division B,

"Beef and horse slaughtering - bed or cradle".

Then at the bottom of page 42, "Solo calf

slaughtering".

Aberdeen 2/6/92

Your Honours, I will not go through the detail

of that, but if I could take Your Honours then to

page 47, there is another type of work involved, as

Your Honours will see, "Can-Pak and other systems

of dressing on rail". Then at page 56 at the top
of the page, there is another form involved,

"Cattle slaughtering - bed or cradle system". At

page 61, "Calf slaughtering: chain or rail

system". Could I ask Your Honours to note at about

lines 6 to 9 that particular methods are referred
to as being the subject of the claim.

At page 67 one comes then to buffalo slaughtering and a particular manner of doing it.

At page 75, "Buffalo slaughtering - bed or cradle

system", which sounds a particularly unattractive

task if one were doing it individually. At

page 80, "Sheep slaughtering" at the top of the
page, in a particular way. At page 90, at the top

of the page, "Sheep and/or lambs - solo system

piece-work". At page 95, "Pig slaughtering -

conveyor system". At page 101, "Solo pig

slaughtering - dead rail with mechanical dehairer".

At page 107, horse slaughtering in a

particular way, and goat slaughtering. At
page 108, "Slaughter and processing of feral stock

and game". At page 109, "Table boning

(individual)". Your Honours, at page 126, "Table

boning (team or group)". At page 131, "Team boning

on conveyor or rail". At page 137, "Team boning:

conveyor belt system". At page 142, "Table

boning - pork", and 146 and 150.

Your Honours, I will not attempt to go into

the detail of it any more than that except to say

these things, that Your Honours will see that if

one looks at the various demands, they are divided

up in particular ways. We have endeavoured to

summarize them, Your Honours, in our written

submissions. Could I refer Your Honours to the

written submissions commencing at paragraph 2.1 on

page 6 and going through to paragraph 2.8. That

summarizes in broad terms the nature of the demands

that are made and, again in broad terms, the

differences that exist in relation to the piecework

part of it; that is part III.

Now, Your Honours will see that Schedule A to

the log of claims which appears at page 163 of the

book to which I was previously referring, sets out

the employers upon whom the demands were made. The

list in that schedule identifies 29 recipients, as

it were, that is, 29 places where work, the subject

of the claims, was said to be carried out. Those

establishments were largely in New South Wales with

Aberdeen 6 2/6/92

22 being in that State. Of the remainder six were

in Queensland and one was in South Australia.

Now, Your Honours, might I pause at this point

to say one or two things that we do not suggest.

We do not suggest, for the purposes of this

submission, that a failure to accede to demands of

this kind is not capable of giving rise to a

dispute for relevant purposes; nor do we suggest

that such a dispute is not capable of

characterization as an industrial dispute, again

for relevant purposes. What does have to appear,

however, is that there is an interstate industrial

dispute and, Your Honours, to say, in effect, the

obverse of that and perhaps to say the obvious, it

does not matter that a-log of claims is not agreed

to by every one of the employers to whom it is

directed in one State if there is not also an

employer in another State who also does not agree.

Your Honours, because of the limited

geographical spread, if I can put it that way, of the respondents in this case - and by that I mean the respondents to the log of claims - a particular

problem arises and the problem arises, in our ·

submission, in this way: the employers upon whom

the log was served did not engage in all the

activities which were the subject of the log of

claims. The activities in which they did engage

are referred to in a document which is set out as

an enclosure at the back of the written submissions

which we have provided. If Your Honours look at

the last four pages of the written submissions,

Your Honours will see the activities in which the
various respondents to the claim engaged in

September 1989 at the time of service of the log.

Your Honours will see, if one looks at the New

South Wales operators, that as one might expect

they engaged not infrequently in activities having

a degree of similarity such as piecework cattle

slaughtering, but that was not the case with the

operators in the other States.

GAUDRON J: Could I ask you what you mean in this context by

boning?	Do you use that to include the slicing and
packaging?

MR JACKSON: Well, it can, Your Honour. It depends on -

GAUDRON J:  I am just wondering what context you use it in

given the specificity of the log?

MR JACKSON:	I am sorry I did not think I said boning.
GAUDRON J:	No, I am just looking to your Enclosure 1.

Aberdeen 7 2/6/92

MR JACKSON:  Yes. Well, Your Honour, boning is - where used

there - it is used, so far as we can judge, in the

same senses as used in the log of claims.

GAUDRON J:  Do I take it from that the meat, when broken up,

is taken somewhere else for butchering, as it were,

and it is not prepackaged; it is not put in the

vacuum packs and things of that nature?

MR JACKSON: Well, it might depend, Your Honour. I am sorry

to be difficult about that but boning, of course,

persons who slaughter cattle do not necessarily do

the boning of them.

GAUDRON J:  I know that.

MR JACKSON: If I could just say broadly, sometimes the

product of the killing - the carcass as it were -

is not further dealt with and itself sent overseas,

or it may be divided up by some other person, or it

may be, for example, that boning is done, as was

the case, I think in Blayney, by a quite separate

operator but nearby. But, Your Honour, perhaps I

am getting a little lost in trying to answer

Your Honour, but the boning that we are referring
to is simply seeking to pick up whatever is

referred to in the - - -

GAUDRON J: Well, can I take it, by looking to what you have

said of Aberdeen Beef, Aberdeen, for example, that

the meat is broken up by boners, but that is the

end of the operation at Aberdeen Beef.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, I am told there might be some

slicing involved in that too. But the - - -

GAUDRON J: Well, perhaps I should not trouble you. I am

just trying to find out to what extent your

Enclosure 1 actually marries up with the log of claims.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, we have endeavoured to marry it

up - may I take aboard what Your Honour has said

and perhaps check it - I rather thought it covered

the same thing except that I suppose it is possible

that boning has been used for brevity to cover

slicing on some occasions too.

GAUDRON J: Yes, and packing presumably.

MR JACKSON:  Yes. Your Honour - - -

DAWSON J: Should we identify which of the Queensland and

South Australia -

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour I was about to do that. They

appear, Your Honour, in - if one goes to the page

Aberdeen 2/6/92

numbered 4 you will see, a little past half-way

down the page, Abdilla Meats, South Australia;

Adams Continental Smallgoods is Queensland;

Australian Select Meats was Queensland; Chisholm

Manufacturing was Queensland, and the two on the

next page were Queensland also.	The rest are New
South Wales.

Now, Your Honours, if one looks at that

document for just a moment, the position appears to

be that the only non New South Wales operator

engaged in piecework cattle slaughtering was

Abdilla Meats in South Australia. Now,

Your Honours, the evidence in relation to the

commonality of work, that is something which

endeavours to tie it all together a little more

exactly that I have so far done, is set out in two

places. The first consists of two documents which

are exhibits to one of the affidavits in these

proceedings and I will hand them up to Your Honours

in just a moment, and the second is the summary in

our written submissions in the text of it.

May I come to the first of those things. The

documents that I am about to give Your Honour~ are

described as Schedules 1 and 2. There is an-

earlier and a later version of each. Schedule 1

was exhibit 17 to Miss Monnox's affidavit;

Schedule 2 is exhibit 18. The reason for the

differences between the two is because some of the

respondents to the log of claims have gone out of

business since the log of claims was first served.

So, Your Honours, if I could hand to

Your Honours - the order in which the documents

appear should be that the first one is Schedule 1

which has up the top an exhibit mark with 17.	Now,
that sets out the nature of the activity in

question. It then indicates the number of

establishments in each of the States in question

which engaged in the activity, and the number of

States which did not engage in the activity. If I

were to take Your Honours to No 1 Your Honours will

see "Piecework Cattle Slaughtering" 17 in New South

Wales, none in Queensland and one, the Abdilla

Meats, in South Australia. If one went to - and one

would see in the right column that 5 establishments

in New South Wales did not engage in piecework

cattle slaughtering, six in Queensland did not and

only the one in South Australia did.

Now, Your Honours, if one looks further

through the document one sees that, in the case of

"Piecework Sheep and Lamb Slaughtering" there is

one in South Australia; in the case of No 3 there

is no one in Queensland or South Australia and,

Aberdeen 2/6/92

Your Honours, I shall not go through it, but I ask

Your Honours to look at the left column.

Now, Your Honours, that is the document - the

first version of it. The second version,

Your Honours, is as at today which is the amended

and updated schedule, and that sets out the current

position being the position shown in brackets.

BRENNAN J: What is the relevance of that, Mr Jackson?

MR JACKSON:	Your Honour, a question which arises, of course, is in relation to the continuing
jurisdiction of the Commission in the matter, and
if the position be that there had been, let us assume, but no longer is, a dispute because of, for example, the lack of interstateness, this is a case
where, in our submission, the Commission would not
have a jusisdiction to deal further with the
matter.  Your Honour, I do propose to come to that
in a moment, but that is the relevance of it. It is not a case, if I could contrast something, Your Honours, it is not a case where, for example,
there is an interstate dispute but the interstate
dispute is dealt with by a settlement of part of it
or with a part remaining unsettled and, in those
circumstances, the fact that part of the dispute
has been settled does not prevent the Commission
from continuing to deal with the matter. This is a case where the interstate dispute has relevantly
gone.

Your Honours, that is Schedule 1. Schedule 2

sets out the activities engaged in at the

particular establishments and the places at which

the activities are not engaged in. If I could take

Your Honours, for example, to No 1, Piecework

Cattle Slaughtering, Your Honours will see, in the

left column, the establishments at which that was

engaged in; and, in the right column, the

establishments in New South Wales in which it was

not engaged in.

Your Honours, the same approach is taken

throughout the document and I would refer, for
example, to the bottom of page 4 where Your Honours

will see, in respect of the item covered by that, that is not done anywhere, in Queensland or South Australia. Your Honours will see in the updated

version of it that there are various annotations

"(SCO)" and they are explained at the bottom of

page 1 of that document.

TOOHEY J:  Mr Jackson, does Schedule 2 reflect the type of

animal handled or the method of payment of

piecework as opposed to timed rate or is it not

possible to generalize in that way?

Aberdeen 10 2/6/92

MR JACKSON:  Yes, it does, Your Honour. Could I just say,

if Your Honour looks at No 1, it is Piecework
Cattle Slaughtering, so it is piecework and cattle;
if one looks at item 2, it is Piecework Sheep and
Lamb; 3, is Piecework Pig Slaughtering

(Non-Feral); and so it goes, as it were.

TOOHEY J: It breaks down a bit later on though, does it

not?

MR JACKSON:	I am sorry, Your Honour.
TOOHEY J:	The analysis in terms of piecework seems to break

down as you move through the schedule?

MR JACKSON:	Your Honour, it seems to refer to the beast in question, certainly up to paragraph 15, and the
only difference, perhaps, might be No 19, I think.

Your Honours, if I could move from that then

to a summary of the position. A summary of the

position, Your Honours will be pleased to see, is

contained in the written submissions and that

appears at paragraphs 3.1 through to 3.7; that is

at pages 9 to 11.

Your Honours, paragraph 3.1 gives various

references. Your Honours will see, for example, if

one goes to paragraph 3.1 at the top of page 10,

that various activities were engaged in outside New

South Wales, as well within New South Wales; that

is, originally. Then, paragraph 3.3, no one

engaged in the kind of calf slaughtering, the
subject of the claim and there were six activities

set out in paragraph 3.4 which were carried on both

in New South Wales and elsewhere; but, as

Your Honours will see from paragraph 3.5, the two

places which gave interstateness to four of those

disputes, as it were, Abdilla and Hamilberg, have

ceased operating and the present position is as set

out at the top of page 11, that there are only two

activities which are engaged in in an interstate

way.

Now, Your Honours, could I just say that if

our submissions on this point are accepted, we

would yet accept that there would be an interstate

dispute in respect of those two items. Could I say

also that the prosecutors have each deposed to the

fact, and it is not challenged, that they intend

not to engage in any activity the subject of the log of claims other than the activities in which

they are presently engaged. Now, Your Honours,

that is deposed to in affidavits on behalf of each

of the establishments. Those affidavits have not

been reproduced in the application book, but they

are the documents which are numbered 36 to 56 in

Aberdeen 11 2/6/92

the index and I propose to give Your Honours one of

them by way of example and it is number 47, the

affidavit of Mr James.

Your Honours will see that apart from setting

out his experience and qualifications, in

paragraph 7 he says that the various facts deposed

to in Miss Monnox's affidavit are correct and

Your Honours will see in paragraph 8 that he says

that his company:

does not employ any employees or undertake any

activities referred to therein and does not

intend to do so.

And, Your Honours, although perhaps it is oblique,

the reference is, as I said, to paragraphs in

Miss Monnox's affidavit, which he adopts, which say

in effect that the prosecutors do not intend to

engage in any activity, subject to the log of
claims, other than the activities in which they are

presently engaged. And, Your Honours, the

references which establish that are set out in

paragraph 3.1 of our written submissions.

Now, Your Honours, as I submitted a moment

ago, that is the evidence and it is uncontradicted.

Your Honours, that means that one has a situation

where each of the persons upon whom the demands in

the log of claims was served had an interest in

only part of the log. Your Honours, it is the

case, of course, that the mere fact that a variety

of claims is included in one log is not decisive.

May I give Your Honours a reference to an

observation to that effect in the Court's decision

in The Queen v Gough; Ex parte BP Refinery

(Westernport) Pty Ltd, (1966) 114 CLR 384, and in

of page 386, Their Honours say, in the last four

the joint judgment of the Chief Justice and

lines:

The fact that the demands upon the prosecutor

and those made upon the "agents" were

contained in a single log is by no means

conclusive of the fact that there was a single
dispute.

Your Honours, I will come back to that case quite

shortly, but I simply wish to mention that point in

passing.

Now, Your Honours, to put the position a

little more specifically, if one took an operator

engaged in one of the activities the subject of the

log of claims, for example, manufacturing

smallgoods, when the log of claims was served upon

Aberdeen 12 2/6/92

such an operator, that operator might agree to the demands made upon it in respect of all the persons

whom it employed, all the categories whom it might

employ. But the demands made upon it would have no

relationship, in our submission, to demands made

upon persons engaged in other activities, and an

employer may say, I agree to all the demands which

relate to my present employees or to anyone I might

employ, and the employer might equally say, all the

other claims or demands are of no interest to me. Now, Your Honours, it would be strange, in our

submission, if a dispute arose because an employer

did not agree to something in which the employer

had had no interest. And it would be stranger, we

would submit, if an interstate industrial dispute

arose where the employers all agreed, for example,

to everything which had any application to their actual or projected operations, but they did not agree in aggregate to the whole of the area of the

log of claims. So that one could have a situation

if one were to say that one looks just at the log

of claims and looks, for example, at the industry
defined broadly in circumstances where one served a

log of claims, if I could seek to simplify it, upon

two employers each in a different State, each of

whom was engaged in entirely different things - one

for example, engaged in making bacon, the other

engaged in beef - and the bacon manufacturer agreed

to all the claims made in respect of it; the beef

abattoir, for example, agreed to all the claims

made in respect of it, but there was yet a dispute

which could be the subject of arbitration.

Now, Your Honours, we would submit there is

nothing very new or heterodox in those

propositions. And the Graziers' case, if I could

go to it first, recognizes that assent to or

dissent from the terms of a log of claims must have

some significance in reality. Could I take

Your Honours to Reg v Graziers' Association of New

South Wales; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union,
(1956) 96 CLR 317.	I wonder if I could indicate to
Your Honours the passages.	The first is at

page 323 about point 2 where the reason why an

industrial dispute was said not to arise was -

that the assent or dissent of the Australian

Workers' Union is completely irrelevant to the

thing demanded.

Then a few lines further on:

It is a thing which that body cannot effect.

If it assets to the demand the employers'

position with reference to the subject of the

demand is completely unchanged.

Aberdeen 13 2/6/92

Then again a few lines further down:

If it dissents from the demand, its dissent

may disclose a contrariety of opinion -

and so on down to the middle of the page. At

page 324 about three-quarters of the way down the

page it was said:

No doubt the course of judicial decision has

made it possible to fulfil the condition by an

artificial procedure for the production of an

industrial disagreement. But although

disagreement may amount to an industrial

dispute the disagreement surely must be about

what one or other of the parties to the
dispute is to do or not to do in some relevant

respect.

Your Honours, those two passages are part of a

passage which really goes from page 324 through to
page 325.

Your Honours, also at page 336, the reasons for judgment of Justice Fullagar, half-way down the

page, His Honour says:

If the union says: "We don't care what you do

about it", no inference of acceptance can be

drawn. If it maintains complete silence, no

inference of rejection can be drawn. The

reason is that the subject matter of the

proposal made is no concern of the union

unless the union chooses to concern itself

with it.

And two lines further down:

What the respondents in this case have tried

to do is to force the union into a dispute on

a matter with which the union is entitled to

refuse to concern itself.

And there is a reference at the end of the

paragraph to a "dispute" existing "with respect to

that subject matter".

Your Honours, the concept may be seen too in

the Court's decision in the case to which I

referred a little while ago, Reg v Gough; Ex parte
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd, 114 CLR 384.

Your Honours, in that case there was again the

service of a log of claims upon a variety of

persons in different States, and if I could take

Your Honours to page 386 of the reasons for

judgment Your Honours will see - the passage which

is material for present purposes is the first new

Aberdeen 14 2/6/92

paragraph on page 386 and it goes through to the

end of the reasons for judgment of the four members

of the Court. Now, it said:

The log of claims purports to demand

rates of wages and other conditions of
employment in respect of a considerable number

of categories of employees but, upon the

evidence, it appears that only one category of

such employees will be employed by the

Company.

The detail of it is explained in that paragraph and

then, Your Honours, through the next paragraph the matter is discussed and could I refer Your Honours

particularly to page 386, about point 8. There is

a reference to the common practice and the use of
the machinery of the Act, and Their Honours say:

But when the facts of this case are seen in perspective it is clear that the character of the Union's dispute ..... was so far removed from the substance of its dispute with the prosecutor that it is impossible to say that

there was one common dispute and, therefore, a

dispute between the prosecutor and the Union

extending beyond the limits of any one State.

There is the reference to the "single log" and

then, Your Honours, at the top of the next page,

the requirement to look at:

the substance of the claims made upon both the

Company and the "agents" -

and then, Your Honours, page 387, about point 2, it

said:

the substance of the despite with -

one, in effect -

was so far removed and so different from the

substance of the alleged dispute with the

agents that it is impossible to say that there

was a single dispute.

And what is said then is, apparently, the basis for

it:

The prosecutor had no interest of any kind in

resisting the demand made upon the agents and

the agents had no interest in resisting the

demands made upon the Company. Their

respective interests ..... were so disparate as

to compel the conclusion that there was no

common cause.

Aberdeen 15 2/6/92

Your Honours, I referred, I think, to the whole of

the reasons for judgment.	The next paragraph deals
with a different topic.

Your Honours, the proposition - and there has

to be some community of interest in relation to the

demand, some interstate community of interest -

must be so, in our submission, because the terms of non-existent, but disputes and interstate disputes which are real disputes.
section 5l(xxxv) and of the Industrial Relations

Could I in that regard refer Your Honours to

the observations of Justice Kitto so far as the

constitutional provision is concerned in R v

Blakeley; Ex parte Association of Architects,

Engineers, Surveyors and Draughtsmen of Australia,

(1950) 82 CLR 54. At the bottom of page 98, the

last paragraph on the page, Your Honours will see

that His Honour, in the passage which commences at

the start of that paragraph and goes on to the end

of the next paragraph, makes the observation that

there must be real disputes and that:

This follows from the limitation upon legislative power inherent ins 51(xxxv) of

the Constitution.

Your Honours, I mentioned earlier the fact

that the Commission's jurisdiction comes to an end,

or may come to an end, once the dispute no longer

exists. That too was dealt with by the Court in

Reg v Blackburn; Ex parte Transport Workers' Union

of Australia, (1953) 88 CLR 125. That was a case

in which it was held that the Commission's

jurisdiction was at an end once it appeared that

the dispute no longer existed. Could I go to

page 133 at about point 9 where the basic facts are

set out. Your Honours will see that there was a

notice sent to every employer that the union

entirely withdrew all claims made in the log.

Then on the next page at about point 5, a new

paragraph, it was said:

For the union it is contended that no award can be made by a conciliation

commissioner unless at the time it is made

there is in existence an industrial dispute

extending beyond the limits of any one State.

The employers in effect contended to the contrary

and said that the Commissioner was bound to

proceed. Then the Court referred to the fact that

a choice had to be made. Then, Your Honours, at

page 135, after referring to the statutory

Aberdeen 16 2/6/92

provisions which in effect required the

Commissioner to proceed to determine the dispute,

the Court proceeded to say at about point 7:

But no assistance in solving the present problem is derived from a consideration of the

jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law - The conclusion is arrived at at the end of that

paragraph:

This being so, we confess that we cannot see how the power can be exercised when no dispute

exists or at a time when a previously existing

dispute has come to an end.

Then, Your Honours, page 137 about point 5,

referring to an earlier decision the Court said:

Indeed, it follows, we think, from their

reasons that their Honours considered that the

extent of a dispute at the time of the making
of an award was a vital matter for
consideration and, if this is so, the

existence of a dispute at the time the

jurisdiction is exercised is equally vital.

And, Your Honours, at the bottom of page 137 there

is a discussion of the fact that the dispute must,

in effect, genuinely have come to an end.	And,
finally, Your Honours, at page 138 at about
point 3:

Whatever effect the requirements of this regulation may have upon the rights of parties

in proceedings under the Act it is clear that

it does not, and cannot, so operate as to

empower the court or a conciliation
commissioner to make an award in settlement of

a non-existent dispute.

And, Your Honours, that case, if I could give

Your Honours a reference to another decision of the

Court in which it was followed, that was followed by the Court in Reg v Conciliation and Arbitration

Commission; Ex parte Printing Industry Employees'

Union, (1964) 109 CLR 544. Your Honours, the

particular reference is at page 554, I shall not

take Your Honours to it. It is in the reasons for

judgment of Justice Owen which were agreed in by

the other members of the Court, and he simply

referred to this decision without any dissent from

it.

Now, Your Honours, the fact that the dispute

must, of course, be a real dispute may be seen in

the summary by the Court of the principles

Aberdeen 17 2/6/92

applicable in determining whether there is such a dispute, which is contained in the joint judgment

in Reg v Ludeke; Ex parte Queensland Electricity

Commission, (1985) 159 CLR 178, and at page 181,

commencing in the third paragraph on the page,

through to page 182, about half-way down the

page, there is the reference to the paper dispute,

and then immediately following that there is the

recognition "that the dispute must be real and

genuine". Your Honours, the passage which sets out

the principles starts on page 181 in the third

paragraph, it goes through to page 182 about

half-way down the page.

Now, Your Honours, could I come back then to

the situation which obtains when a demand is made

upon persons who have an interest only in part of

it. Now, Your Honours, their failure to accede to

the demands gives rise, of course, to a dispute,

and it gives rise to a dispute which is industrial

in nature. But, Your Honours, it does not, in our

submission, give rise to an interstate industrial

dispute unless there is disagreement in another

State about the same matter.

Now, Your Honours, may I give Your Honours a

reference in that regard to Reg v Heagney;

Ex parte A.C.T. Employers Federation, (1976)

137 CLR 86. Your Honours, the reference I am about

to give is from part of the judgment of

Chief Justice Barwick which, in the event, was a

dissenting judgment, but the dissent was on a

different point, the dissent being in relation to

the question whether the demand was expressed

sufficiently intelligibly, as it were. The

majority of the Court agreed with Your Honour the

present Chief Justice that it was, His Honour

thought it was not.

Your Honours, the discussion is at pages 90

and 91.

last paragraph on the page and the parts of One commences really at page 90, in the

materiality, for present purposes, are at page 91

and commencing about point 3 on the page where

His Honour said:

But what must result ~rem the demand and

failure to agree is a single dispute between

the union on the one hand and the employers in

the several States on the other hand. They

must be in dispute about the same matters,

that is to say, all the employers against whom

an award settling the dispute is made must

have been in dispute with the union about the

same matter or matters.

Aberdeen 18 2/6/92

Your Honours, he discusses the dispute in the next

paragraph and goes on to say, about half-way down

that page, page 91:

It is only if the dispute is the same with the employers carrying on business in different

States that it will be an interstate dispute.

The dispute will be the same if the demand

made upon the employers in the different

States is the same demand: it cannot be -

then he went on to the part which I suspect then

indicates the difference in application of the

notion.

Your Honours, the notion that there must be or the underlying conception that there must be the

same dispute, as it were, is adverted to, in a

sense, in the first Caledonian Collieries case.

That is Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Australasian

Coal and Shale Employees Federation (No 1),

(1930) 42 CLR 527, at page 552.

Your Honours, it may be possible perhaps today

to express a degree of reserve about the las~_lines

on page 552 and perhaps the top of page 553, in the

light of the prevention aspect of section 5l(xxxv),

but it seems apparent, we would submit, that if one

looks at the particular passage commencing half-way

down page 552 that what is in contemplation is the

same dispute. Could I refer Your Honours,

particularly, to the quotation, about

three-quarters of the way down the page, the words:

'extending beyond the limits of any one State'

as applied to a dispute mean that the dispute

is one 'existing in two or more States' or, in

other words -

et cetera. And then, a few lines further down -

It is equally well established that to

constitute an industrial dispute there must be

disagreement between people or groups of

people who stand in some industrial relation

upon some matter which affects or arises out

of the relationship.

Your Honours, the need to have an interstate

industrial dispute - I am conscious I am not using

the exact words of section 5l(xxxv) - is a need

which is constitutional and prior to the Court's

decision in R v Coldham, Ex parte Australian Social

Welfare Union - I will give Your Honours the

reference to it later - the notion of industrial

dispute, in section 5l(xxxv), was one which had

Aberdeen 19 2/6/92

been limited, as it were, by the notion that there

had to be a dispute in an industry.

Now, Your Honours, that notion, of course, was

rejected by the Court in the Social Welfare case,

(1983) 153 CLR 297 and in particular at pages 312

and 313. Your Honours, the passage really

commences in the first new paragraph on page 312

and goes over to the third line on page 313, but

for essential purposes the relevant part is the

opening part of the last paragraph on page 312:

It is, we think, beyond question that the

popular meaning of "industrial disputes"
includes disputes between employees and

employers about the terms of employment and

the conditions of work.

Well now, Your Honours, that case, as I submitted a

moment ago, had the effect that the notion that

there had to be a dispute in an industry, no longer

was applicable, but the ghost of the notion

revisits in the present case in two places: one

place is in the approach taken by the members of
the Commission and the other is in the approach

taken by our learned friends in their written

submissions. Your Honours, the ghost, if I can put

it that way, revisits because of the concentration

on identification of some industry when the true

criterion, in our submission, is whether there is

or is not an interstate industrial dispute.

May I take Your Honours now to the passages

referred to in the written submissions on behalf of

the respondent. Now, Your Honours, I wish to refer

to some passages which are set out at pages 4 to 6

of those written submissions. Your Honours, those the Full Bench of the Commission in the present
are the relevant extracts from the decisions of

case. I would ask Your Honours to look at them,

but I do not wish to read them out, but what I

would seek to say about them is this that, whilst

we would not wish to suggest that an identification

of an industry, or the ambit of an industry or the

nature of an industry, may not be, in some cases,

of some assistance in determining whether there is

or is not a dispute, it is not the correct

approach, in our submission, to adopt the

identification of the industry as the criterion by

which to decide whether there is or is not an

interstate industrial dispute.

DAWSON J: Well, first of all you have got to decide whether

there is an industrial dispute, have you not?

Leave aside interstateness, what is the criterion

to decide whether there is an industrial dispute?

Aberdeen 2/6/92

MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, it is perhaps easier if one

can deal with the industrial part of it rather more

easily perhaps than the dispute. If one assumes

that the industrial part of it is, in effect,

between employer and employee or in relation to

conditions of employment, that is that part of it;

to have a dispute one has to have a disagreement

concerning something relating to that topic. Now,

Your Honour, we would accept that one does not have to have a disagreement occasioned by the presence

at the barricades or the presence of a strike or a

lockout, and it is possible for there to be a

dispute constituted by a claim or a demand being

made and the claim or demand not being acceded to.

DAWSON J:  The same claim does not have to be made against

each employer.

MR JACKSON:  I am sorry, Your Honour; well it depends,

Your Honour, the same dispute has to exist, and

that is the point I am - - -

DAWSON J: Well a dispute is merely, as you say, a

disagreement.

MR JACKSON:	Yes, Your Honour.
DAWSON J:	We have got to find whether it is an industrial

dispute.	You say that is about terms and
conditions of employment.	I am asking you, does

the same claim have to be made against each

employer and you said, "that depends".	Depends on
what?

MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, what I am seeking to say is

this: one can have different claims made against

different employers which result in each case in a

dispute. For the dispute to be one which attracts

a power pursuant to section Sl(xxxv), there has to

be an interstate dispute.

DAWSON J:  Let us leave that on one side for a moment. I

just want to know what an industrial dispute is.

MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, an industrial dispute may be

constituted, to put it at the lowest, by a

disagreement between the parties, employer and

employee, as to the terms of engagement or terms of

employment of an employee.

DAWSON J:  And the same claim does not have to be made

against each employer for it to be an industrial

dispute?

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, there may be a number of

industrial disputes arising if different claims are

made. The reason why I cannot answer Your Honour

Aberdeen 21 2/6/92

just in one word is this: that it might be

possible to say that if one had employees employed

by the one employer, for example, who did a number

of types of work, now, one might say in respect of
those employees that there was a demand for an
increase in their wages to the tune of, say,

$50 per week, the basis for the increase being that

it was to be for dirty work, inclement weather,

something along those lines. Now, Your Honour,

there is a dispute, one may assume, between the

employer and the employees if the employer refused

to pay that.

Now, there may be another employer who is

asked to pay a similar sum. The employees may be

doing work which is slightly different or work

which is the same. It would be possible to say

that there are both two disputes and also one

dispute - two disputes because there are different

employers; one dispute because if one takes a

slightly larger stage, as it were, there are

different employers each of whom is refusing the

same demand, a demand which can be characterized as

being the same. So there would be in that case,

Your Honour, disputes at, in effect, two levels,

each of them being an industrial dispute.

McHUGH J: Well, supposing every employee in Australia

tomorrow demanded a 25 per cent rise in his or her

wages. Would that be a single industrial dispute

or a whole series of industrial disputes?

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, it would be certainly the latter.

It would be a series. If it were all done on the

same basis, Your Honour, then presumably there

would be disputes at a number of levels. One level

would be the individual employer. Another level
would be if it were possible to have some

geographical delineation of it, as it might well

be, because the increase would be applicable

differently in different areas, but it might also

be possible to say there was a nationwide dispute.

DAWSON J: What you are looking for is the unifying factor.

There may not be just one unifying factor. Indeed,

one unifying factor may be the person who is making the demand. It is one organization that is making

a demand against different employers in relation to

different matters. One may be able to say that is the one dispute because there is the one disputant

on one side.

MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, one can identify there is

one disputant, but one does not identify there is

one dispute, with respect, because one could have a

situation where one disputant arriving at one

dispute. That is why, Your Honour, one has to get

Aberdeen 22 2/6/92

to the second aspect of it, and that is the

question whether - - -

DAWSON J:  You were going to say interstateness?

MR JACKSON:  I was, Your Honour. I am sorry I cannot keep

away from it. That is the point so far as we are

concerned, with respect.

DAWSON J: But first of all you have to have one industrial

dispute, let us say.	What I am putting to you is
there may be various unifying factors.	It may be
the character of the disputants.	It may be the

subject-matter of the dispute. It may be

geography, but you cannot isolate any one, can you?

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, I am not suggesting that one

treats every disagreement as if it existed in its

own tight little box. What I am suggesting,

however, is that one has to see whether there is or

is not a dispute, and no matter who is on one side of it, one still has to come at the end of the day

to say what has or has not been agreed to. One can

say in the particular cases that a person who

carries on, to take the simplest case, only one

species of work has not agreed in one sense to the

whole of the demand that has been made. But the

question which arises is: is there a dispute in

any sensible sense in respect of the whole of that

demand? The answer in such a case, in our

submission, is no.

DAWSON J:  Why not? Why can you not say it is a dispute

over the terms and conditions of people employed in

the meat industry.	It depends on what level of
abstruction you stop.

MR JACKSON:	Your Honour, it is true to say that in a sense, but at the same time one is looking to see what
there is, we would submit, in terms of
section Sl(xxxv), for example, a dispute about. If
one is looking to see what there is a dispute
about, if one takes a person who has only a very
limited interest in it, then that person could have
no interest in any part of the dispute other than
the parts which indicate the work that it does and
the work that it intends to do.

DAWSON J:  But you could do that in any industry. You could

take motor mechanics and make a distinction between motor mechanics employed in the automotive industry

and motor mechanics employed in the pump industry,

for instance, but it may be just the one dispute

about rates of pay for motor mechanics.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, it may be. I do not deny the

possibility of that, but what I am seeking to say

is this, that whilst that may be the appropriate

Aberdeen 23 2/6/92

answer in some cases, one has to identify in a

sense what the questions are. If one is looking to

see whether there is, as one must, an interstate

industrial dispute, then one must see that there is

some matter in relation to which persons in more

than one State have a dispute. That is really what

it comes down to, Your Honour. If you have a

situation where a person says, "I don't engage in

that activity; I have no intention ever of

engaging in that activity", so far as all - - -

DAWSON J: It depends on the activity, you see. They do

engage in the activity of employing meat workers.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, that is true. They employ persons

who are engaged in relation to meat.

DAWSON J: That is a unifying factor which, if you adopted

it, would point to one dispute. If you do not, it

does not. If you adopt something else, you might

have two disputes or more.

MR JACKSON:  Your Honour, one does not necessarily have one

dispute by saying they all work with meat.	It
depends what work they do.	A person who drives the

bus to bring the employees to the meat works does

not often have his hands on the carcass, one would

think, but at the same time he may be part of the

meat industry in a broad sense. But Your Honour

will have seen from the material that the term

"industry" really just depends on what level of

abstruction one chooses to apply.

DAWSON J: That is right.

MR JACKSON: That is why, in our submission, the correct

approach is not to look to see what is the

industry, but to look to see what is the dispute.

DAWSON J:  And the further down the scale you get, the more

disputes you get.

MR JACKSON:	Your Honour, that is perfectly possible, of course, but if one - - -
DAWSON J:	What I am seeking to find out from you is where you draw the line and why. It cannot be to achieve
interstateness or to deny interstateness, because
you are not looking at that for the moment; you
are looking to see whether there is one industrial
dispute.

MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, the dispute is constituted

by non acceptance of the log of claims, if I can

put it broadly first of all, but that carries with

it, in our submission, that there is some notion of

acceptance of a log of claims which has some

Aberdeen 24 2/6/92

materiality to the person whose acceptance or non

acceptance is regarded as significant and, if that

person does not engage employees in the activity

which is the subject of the log of claims then,

Your Honour, that is all there is, the log of

claims. It does not engage persons in that

activity, well then that person has no interest in

that part of the log of claims that has got

anything to do with him. There is no dispute about

that. There is a dispute about the other matters.

DAWSON J: But, you see, that is being simplistic because

although he may be engaged in separate activities

he still is in the meat industry and the rates of

pay for people engaged in the meat industry in

similar but different activities will, of course,

have some bearing upon the rates of pay in relation

to the employer in question.

MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, may - may, but not

necessarily and the evidence would rather suggest

that it contains nothing to that effect.

BRENNAN J: Is your submission this, Mr Jackson, that if the

log of claims distinguishes between the activities

and makes differing claims by reference to

activities which are separate, that that gives rise

to as many industrial disputes as there are

activities in the log of claims?

MR JACKSON:  Yes, it is capable of doing so, Your Honour.

BRENNAN J: Capable of doing so?

MR JACKSON:	Yes.
BRENNAN J:	And so although there is one log of claims and one claimant, you have as many disputes as there
are activities in respect of which separate conditions are sought?

MR JACKSON:  Yes, Your Honour. May I say something in

response to that? What Your Honour puts to me is,

broadly speaking, correct, that the practicality of

it in a sense may be a little different because one

would be unlikely to see, one would think, if I

could speak in the abstract just for a moment,

individual activities being carried on entirely

individually. One would expect, in the ordinary

course of events, that there be some places which

engage in a number of steps towards production but,

Your Honour, one really should not start from the

proposition that whoever puts together the log of

claims has necessarily put together something that

will represent some underlying notion. It may be

that they do - - -

Aberdeen 25 2/6/92

DAWSON J:  Is that right? I mean, after all, it is the

Union that puts together the log of claims, and

there you do finds a unifying factor, that is, the

Union is making claims on behalf of those who are

eligible to be its members - - -

MR JACKSON:	Yes, Your Honour.
DAWSON J:	- - - and that is where you get to one dispute,

and that confines the sort of claim that can be

made because it is within the confines really of

the eligibility clause of the Union.

MR JACKSON:	Your Honour, I said, necessarily does so, and I was really speaking about the subject-matter of the
claim, as distinct from the identity of the person
who is putting it forward.  Now, Your Honour, if
one finds a situation where one has an organization
putting forward a claim and the claim covers one of
the areas of its own coverage, as it were, then that has obviously the potentiality for the creation of a large number, one would think, of
industrial disputes.

But what one has to have to give rise to

something that attracts the federal power in

relation to it is that there is the interstate

industrial dispute. If it serves the claim on an

employer organization, then the probability is that

the coverage of the employer organization acting on

behalf of its members will be such as to give rise

to an interstate industrial dispute. Not

necessarily, Your Honour, because it may be that if

the claim made on the employer organization is made

in such a way that it is, for example, site

specific, then it may be that the reality of the
situation is that if only one site is selected in

one State, for example, that, in truth, the

activity is not carried on there. So that even

though one has the organization either side of it,

which is really the high point of that approach to it, Your Honours, there may yet not be an interstate industrial dispute arrived at.

Aberdeen 59 2/6/92

and trying to identify the industry really does not
get one very far, because there may be more than

one dispute within the one industry. The true test

is whether there is a dispute of the relevant kind,

and I shall not seek to develop that further.

The submissions made on behalf of the

Commonwealth speak of the community of interest but, Your Honours, one has to bear in mind the

circumstances in which the notion of community of interest was developed and the notion to which it

was being directed. That was that it was suggested

that if one had, for example, an employer whose

business was only in one State and had no

connection with another State or if one had an
employer who was engaged in something, for example,

slightly different from that of another employer in

another State, there was no community of interest

because they were not doing the same thing or they

had no commercial relations.

The doctrine was developed simply to deny the notion that the absence of commercial relationships

had the effect that there could be no interstate

dispute. Your Honours, that is the context in

which it appears and, really, it does no more than

that.

Your Honours, if one goes - and this is the penultimate thing I would wish to say - to the

example given by my learned friend, the linking of

veal boners and the cattle slaughterers, if one

goes to paragraph 13.1 of our submissions and looks

at the affidavit, what one sees is that in

paragraphs 58 to 64, and perhaps I should say in

the passages commencing from paragraph 50 and, in

particular, paragraph 64, at page 218, Mr Sullivan

deposes to the fact that the markets are different.

Your Honours, that is the evidence and, as always, if I may say so, with respect, it is better

to deal with the case on the basis of the evidence

rather than one's supposition about what it might

have been.

If one is going to seek to identify the market

on a kind of economic substitution basis, as our

learned friend's argument rather suggests, then one

would ask, "Why not include, for example, fish and

chicken and, perhaps, vegetable growing for those

who are vegetarians?" All that, it might be said,

on the one hand, is a question of degree but the

need to go to questions of degree of that kind

rather illustrates that perhaps the test that is

being applied is one which is starting not from the

correct base, the correct base being, as we would

submit, to identify what is the dispute.

Aberdeen 60 2/6/92

Your Honours, our final thing is in response

to Your Honour Justice Gaudron, if I could come

back to boning and slicing; I said I would find

out something about it for Your Honour.

Your Honour, slicing is not put separately because

it goes with boning and we have not anywhere sought

to treat it as a separate activity.

GAUDRON J:  No, I just thought there might have been some

significance in the way it was analysed but not as

your argument has developed I do not think.

MR JACKSON:  No, Your Honour, we do not cut things up quite

as much as that.

MASON CJ:  Thank you, Mr Jackson. The Court will consider

its decision in this matter.

AT 2.51 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE

Aberdeen 61 2/6/92