Re Athans; Ex parte Athans

Re: PETA ATHANS
Ex Parte ARTEMIS ATHANS
No. B3171 of 1990
FED No. 243
Bankruptcy
29 FCR 302

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION
Hill J.(1)

CATCHWORDS

Bankruptcy - judgment including interest to be subsequently calculated - interest amount subsequently determined but excluded from bankruptcy notice - statutory interest included in notice wrongly calculated - whether understatement objectively capable of misleading debtor as to requirements for compliance - whether bankruptcy notice based on final judgment or order - judicial discretion to extend time for compliance when appeal against final judgment pending - general discretion to set aside bankruptcy notice discussed.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth): ss. 40(1)(g), 40(3), 306

HEARING

SYDNEY

#DATE 9:5:1991

Counsel and Solicitors R.I. Goodridge instructed by
for Applicant/Debtor: White Keely and Co.

Counsel and Solicitors D.J. Russell instructed by
for Respondent/Creditor: Messrs Papanicolaou and Co.

ORDER

Upon an undertaking given by the applicant to prosecute with due diligence the appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against the orders of Bryson J including, if so advised, the seeking of leave to appeal therefrom:

(1) Time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice be extended to 9 August 1991.

(2) The application in so far as it seeks to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground that it understates the debt owed to the petitioning creditor be dismissed.

(3) The application in so far as it seeks to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground that the judgment given on 24 August 1990 was not a final order or judgment be dismissed.

(4) The application be adjourned until 9 August 1991.

(5) Each party be at liberty to restore the matter to the list on seven days' notice.

(6) There be no order as to costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

JUDGE1

The applicant, Mr Peta Athans, applies to the court to set aside a bankruptcy notice dated 10 October 1990. Alternatively he seeks an adjournment of the present proceedings, pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the judgment upon which the bankruptcy notice was based.

The bankruptcy notice was issued at the request of Mr Athans father, Artemis Athans, and the present proceedings form part of a protracted and it would seem bitter dispute between father and son.
The bankruptcy notice refers to a claim by the father "that the sum of $50,000 together with interest thereon at the rate of twenty one (21) percentum per annum from 24 August, 1990 to 31 August, 1990 and at the rate of nineteen (19) percentum per annum from 1 September, 1990 to 9 October, 1990 which amounts to $1,190.40, making a total of $51,190.40" is due by the debtor to his father under a final judgment obtained by the father in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 24 August 1990. It demands payment of the sum of $51,190.40 accordingly.
The dispute, which led to what is described in the bankruptcy notices as a final judgment, arose out of a venture in which the father and son were engaged over a number of years. Ultimately the son commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in its Equity Division for relief against his father and those proceedings were the subject of a compromise that was reached between the parties and resulted in terms of settlement being filed on 22 February 1990. Those terms of settlement, signed by both parties, provided for assets to be transferred from each party to the other. In addition, the terms of settlement provided that Mr Peta Athans was to pay to Mr Artemis Athans "on or before 2 August 1990" the sum of $50,000.
Clause 1.17 of the terms of settlement provided:

"If the said sum of $50,000 is paid on or before the said date, no interest shall be payable, but if the said sum or any part thereof is not so paid, interest shall run on the unpaid balance from the date hereof at the rate of interest charged from time to time by the National Australia Bank on overdraft accounts."

The terms of settlement contained releases between the parties.
Mr Peta Athans was of the view, he says, that the terms of settlement did not reflect the agreement reached between the parties through their barristers. Rather, he says, the real agreement was that he would if possible pay the sum of $50,000 in six months but if he did not pay within six months interest would then become payable. He says that he indicated that he had intended that in any circumstances the amount would be paid within twelve months.
Mr Peta Athans did not pay on or before 2 August 1990 the sum of $50,000, and as a result the father applied by notice of motion to the Supreme Court of New South Wales to enter judgment against the son in the sum of $54,360.26, that apparently being the amount including the $50,000 plus interest up to the time of filing the notice of motion. The notice of motion was opposed on a number of grounds including grounds going to estoppel by reference to oral statements alleged to have been made prior to executing the terms of settlement and/or rectification of the terms of settlement.
The matter came before Bryson J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales who directed the entry of judgment summarily. His Honour's orders, to take effect on 24 August 1990, the date on which they were pronounced, are in the following terms:

"Judgment -

1. That the cross-defendant pay to the cross-claimant the sum of $50,000 ... THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

4. An enquiry occur to ascertain the amount of interest to which the cross-claimant is entitled after 24 August, 1990. The enquiry to take place before Justice Bryson in private chambers and give Judgment for the cross-claimant for the amount of interest when certified."

In due course the amount of interest was certified. The amount does not appear in evidence, presumably it was $4,360.26.
The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was based upon two substantial grounds: first, it was submitted that the calculation of interest in the bankruptcy notice was wrong in that the proper amount was greater than that set out in the bankruptcy notice, that the respondent had not sought to abandon the balance of his claim and that a debtor in the position of the applicant could, as a result, be misled. It was said to follow, this not being a formal defect, that the bankruptcy notice should be set aside. Second, it was submitted that the judgment for $50,000 referred to in the bankruptcy notice was not a final judgment or final order, but was merely interlocutory.
It was further submitted on behalf of the applicant, that he was solvent and that on discretionary grounds the bankruptcy notice should be set aside or alternatively the proceedings adjourned.
The figure for interest referred to in the bankruptcy notice was calculated without regard to an amount of interest for the day 24 August 1990, and when the calculation was made of interest for the period between 1 September 1990 and 9 October 1990, the number of days in this period was taken as 38 days, when in fact that period encompasses 39 days.
It is unnecessary to consider whether interest was payable on the first day of the period, namely 24 August 1990. The submission that it was depended upon the well known rule that judicial acts take effect from the very beginning of the day. Thus it was said that interest was payable in respect of that day. As to whether an interest calculation is to include the date of judgment see Re Serafino; Ex parte Classic Manufacturing Pty Ltd 86 ALR 283. It is unnecessary to consider the correctness of this argument since it seems quite clear that there are 39 days in the period from 1 September 1990 to 9 October 1990 and not 38. Hence, an additional amount of approximately $20 was understated.
The difficulty with the applicant's case is that the decision of the High Court in Kleinwort Benson Australia Limited v Crowl (1987-8) 165 CLR 71 stands as authority to the contrary. The facts in that case bore a remarkable similarity to those of the present case, albeit that the discrepancy was more extensive. In that case it was argued that a bankruptcy notice in somewhat similar form to the notice before the court which included a claim for interest was defective because it understated an amount of interest. In that case, as in this, the understatement was said to arise in two ways, one because the first day of interest was not included and second because in any event the interest was undercalculated, that is to say there was an understatement of the amount of interest in the bankruptcy notice by a number of days. The actual amount of understatement in Crowl's Case was in the order of $23,000 but so far as the matter of principle is concerned the quantum is irrelevant.
The full High Court by majority, Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Gaudron JJ., Deane J dissenting, overruled the full court of this court in holding that the bankruptcy notice should not be set aside. The court pointed out it had long been accepted that interest could be included in an amount claimed by a bankruptcy notice notwithstanding some difficulty in interest answering the description of a sum due to the petitioning creditor under the final judgment. A long line of authority clearly established that a bankruptcy notice is a nullity if it failed to meet a requirement made essential by the Act or if it could reasonably mislead a debtor as to what is necessary to comply with the notice. The court then said (at 80):

"If the amount specified in a bankruptcy notice is in fact due and payment is claimed in accordance with the judgment, the essential requirements of s.41(2)(a)(i) - the only requirements presently relevant - are met. Understatement of the amount due, whether it be an understatement of the judgment debt or of interest payable thereon, will thus constitute a defect which is substantive rather than formal only if the understatement is objectively capable of misleading the debtor as to what is necessary for compliance with the notice. It may be that, in a given case, understatement is capable of misleading the judgment debtor particularly if the notice is capable of producing uncertainty as to whether the debtor is required to pay the amount in fact due or the amount specified in the notice. In such a case uncertainty arises, not merely from the understatement, but from the understatement in the context of the particular bankruptcy notice. No such uncertainty arises if it is clear that payment of the amount specified in the notice will constitute compliance with the notice."

In the present case, as in Crowl, there could be no uncertainty as to what would constitute compliance with the notice. The notice required payment of a specific sum, namely $51,190.40, so that it could not be said that the notice was capable of misleading. Accordingly, the present notice cannot be said to be a nullity any more than the notice discussed in Crowl's Case was.
The second challenge to the bankruptcy notice is more difficult.
The first way the argument was put was that the order to pay the sum of $50,000 was not a final judgment or order, but merely interlocutory in that there still required the interest payable under cl.1.17 of the terms of settlement to be calculated and certified before a final order could be made. The second way in which the submission was put was that the judgment of 24 August 1990 was a final judgment in respect of the $50,000 and interest, and that to omit a reference to that interest which was part of the damages which Mr Athans senior was claiming (he not having renounced his claim to it) was capable of misleading or perplexing the debtor with the result that the bankruptcy notice is void and should be set aside.
Section 40(1)(g) makes it a prerequisite of a valid bankruptcy notice that it be based upon a final judgment or final order. There is no definition as such of the expressions final judgement or final order, the former having traditionally been enshrined into the bankruptcy legislation for at least one hundred years. However, ss.40(3)(b) and (d) provide as follows:

"(b) a judgment order that is enforceable as, or in the same manner as, a final judgment obtained and an action shall be deemed to be a final judgment so obtained in the proceedings in which, or in consequence of which the judgment or order was obtained shall be deemed to be the action in which it was obtained;

(d) A person who is for the time being entitled to enforce a final judgment or final order for the payment of money shall be deemed to be a creditor who has obtained a final judgment or final order."

A final judgment in the sense used here is: "a final judgment obtained in an action by which a previously existing liability of the defendant to the plaintiff is ascertained or established..." See Opie v Opie (1951) 84 CLR 362 at 372.

The test is not whether the judgment is such that execution can immediately issue upon it, rather as was said by Vaughan-Williams J in In Re G.J.; Ex parte G.J. (1905) 2 KB 678 at 680-81:

"...there must have been something amounting to a cause of action which has been dealt with on the basis of a cause of action, at any rate to this extent, that the debtor has had the opportunity of setting up a counter claim, set-off, or cross-demand."

It does not preclude a judgment being a final judgment, or for that matter an order being a final order, that it may be under appeal or be subject to an appeal, or for that matter that it may be set aside. Until set aside, whether on appeal or otherwise, it remains a final judgment: Re Hanby; Ex parte Flemington Central Spares Pty Ltd (1967) 10 FLR 378.
As the full High Court said in Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 57 ALJR 673 at 675, after referring to Opie v Opie:

"In other words it is a judgment which finally disposes of the rights of the parties; see Licul v Corney (1976) 50 ALJR 439 at 444."

The case of Licul v Corney to which the High Court referred, was a case in a different context. The question that arose in that case was whether there was an appeal to the High Court as of right or whether leave was required, that question depending upon whether the judgment in question was final or interlocutory. As Barwick C.J. said in that case (at 441-42):

"To be final for this purpose, (i.e. for the purposes of s.35(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1973) the order, in my opinion, must of its own force put an end to the action of (sic) proceeding between the parties ... the order of the Supreme Court was not a final order disposing of the action between the parties and settling their substantive rights."

In the same case, Gibbs J (at 444) in enunciating the rule which his Honour thought should be regarded as established in Australia since Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 for the drawing of a distinction between final and interlocutory judgments said that the test was:

"Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties?"

If the test to be applied for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is the same test as may be used to distinguish between interlocutory and final judgments, then it would seem clear having regard to the decision of the High Court in Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1984) 54 ALR 767 that the present judgment, so far as it left open the computation of interest, was interlocutory having regard to the legal rather than the practical effect of the judgment. In Computer Edge it was held, where the Federal Court had given judgment on the substantive issue of infringement, that there remained outstanding an issue of damages yet to be pursued and that the judgment on liability was not a final judgment. Their Honours (at 768) cited with approval in support of this conclusion the following passage from the judgment of Dixon C.J. in John Grant and Sons Ltd v Trocadero Building and Investment Co Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 1 at 35:

"The judgment of the Supreme Court did not determine the action, for the demurrers did not affect pleas to or replications in relation to all counts of the declaration. The judgment was, therefore, interlocutory, and this appeal did not lie without leave."

In the proceedings whereby summary judgment was entered, Mr Athans senior was seeking damages for breach of contract. Those damages comprised two elements, the first the sum of $50,000 and the second the interest component. It was clearly one cause of action for which only one amount in damages could be awarded. From a practical point of view, the order clearly enough established that part of the ultimate amount to be awarded was $50,000. But that did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties so far as the father's claim was concerned. The final quantum of damages could only be determined when interest was calculated.
Although I share the doubts expressed in Clyne's Case at first instance by Lockhart J as to whether the context of the meaning of final judgment in a jurisdictional sense is necessarily the same as the context in which the words are used in the Bankruptcy Act, the citation by the full High Court in Clyne's Case of the jurisdictional cases suggests that their Honours did not perceive a relevant difference.
In the present case, however, any such distinction is of no moment. Clearly the order of Bryson J was an order. As a judgment for the payment of money, it could be enforced under the provisions of Part 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. That manner of enforcement would be the same manner of enforcement as was available had the order been in fact not interlocutory. Accordingly, having regard to the provisions of s.40(3)(b) of the Act, the judgment must be deemed to be a final judgment.
It follows therefore that the first limb of the submission must fail.
The second leg of the argument is, however, more difficult. Accepting that the order of Bryson J was a final order or final judgment, the question arises whether it was a final judgment for the payment of $50,000 or a final judgment for payment of a greater sum than that, a component of which had not yet been quantified.
It was submitted for the applicant, prompted by comments from the bench, that the judgment of Bryson J could be seen to be the source of the obligation to pay the additional component of interest. This proposition can be tested by considering whether, assuming a certificate finally taken out as to the quantum of interest pursuant to para.4 of the judgment, that certificate would be a final order.
In Wilmot v Buckley (1984) 56 ALR 589, a question arose as to whether a certificate of taxation after an order for costs had been made was itself a final judgment. Beaumont J, referring to Re Cartwright; Ex parte Cartwright v Barker (1975) 1 WLR 573 was of the view that it was not. His Honour's view was that once costs were taxed and certified, it became part of the record of the proceedings to be read together with the judgment or decree. However, the certificate of taxation itself did not constitute the entry of a new judgment.

Although costs may stand in a different position to interest, costs not being part of the initial cause of action of the parties but the result of the litigation itself, I think it can be said, that in the facts of the present case, once the interest was calculated and certified, that certificate formed part of the record of the proceedings to be read with the judgment given by Bryson J. No other judgment or order was necessary. It would follow on that reasoning that the judgment of Bryson J constitutes a final judgment not only for the sum of $50,000 but also for the interest ultimately certified.
This conclusion, however, poses a dilemma for the respondent. If the judgment of Bryson J on 24 August 1990 is a final judgment as I think it is, and makes final orders, the judgments and orders are for the payment not only of $50,000 but also of an amount to be certified. The total amount (upon which interest under the Supreme Court Act will thereafter be calculated) is a figure substantially greater than $50,000.
It is clear from the decision of the High Court in Crowl that not every understatement of a judgment debt operates to invalidate a bankruptcy notice. In a case where the amount specified in the bankruptcy notice is in fact due (and that is obviously the case here) the understatement will only constitute a substantive defect if it is objectively capable of misleading the debtor as to what is necessary for compliance with the notice: Crowl's Case (supra).
While it is true that judgment was given for $50,000 plus an additional amount for interest, later certified to be $4,360.26, and that the bankruptcy notice claimed payment only of $50,000 (excluding interest on the amount of the judgment) there is objectively no room for the debtor here to be mislead as to what is necessary for compliance with the notice. The notice requires payment of $51,190.40. In so doing it is unambiguous. The sum of $50,000 which forms most of the $51,190.40 was a sum the debtor was ordered to pay by Bryson J and it was owing by the debtor. The balance, interest after the date of the order was also demanded and was owing. It seems to me to follow from Crowl's Case that the defect was not such as to render the notice void and that the amount of the understatement may be dealt with as a formal defect or irregularity occasioning no substantial injustice to the debtor; see s.306 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
I would accordingly not set aside the bankruptcy notice on these grounds.
The final submission of the applicant went to discretionary matters. The evidence established that a notice of appeal was filed and served on 17 September 1990. The proceedings in the Court of Appeal were instituted as an appeal, although it would seem from Computer Edge (supra) that leave to appeal would be required. It seems that the appeal book has not yet been prepared nor has the appeal been set down for hearing. I say nothing as to the merits of the appeal, save that the issue as to whether summary judgment should be given if evidence was before Bryson J, which might found an estoppel, is an arguable one. Much may depend upon what the evidence before Bryson J was.
The applicant gave evidence showing that he was "solvent". According to his evidence, which was not challenged, he was (as a result of the settlement with his father) the beneficial owner of the whole of the issued share capital of Tim Unity Holdings Pty Ltd which company had assets of $1,509,000 and liabilities of $452,275. The company had gross income of $5,000 per week. There is no indication of what outgoings, if any, were required to be met out of this income. The company owed the applicant $140,000. He had, in addition to the shares and the loan account, a small savings account of $54 and no liabilities other than to his father but no present personal income. He said that he was able to pay his debts as and when they fall due including the judgment debt to the respondent. His ability to pay the judgment debt to his father arises from the obtaining of a loan approval from his bankers to cover the amount. He said that he could pay the amount at any time.
The applicant was cross-examined. The cross-examination was largely directed at the assertion made by the applicant that the original terms of settlement did not reflect the true agreement between the parties. In this context reference was made to a letter dated 1 August 1990 written by the applicant's solicitors in which it was stated that:

"When our client entered into the Terms of Settlement he naturally had every intention of paying the sum referred to in Term 1.16 on or before 2 August 1990."

It was said, however, that the applicant was unable to pay the amount for reasons that were set out in a draft affidavit. The draft affidavit which was tendered in evidence by the solicitors for the respondents (it was not ever sworn by the applicant) claimed that the applicant believed that he was in a position to honour all the terms of the agreement and set out an explanation as to why this had been impossible.
The letter and draft affidavit are not necessarily inconsistent with the applicant's claim, but I do not think there is a great deal of point in exploring a matter more relevant to the Court of Appeal proceedings than to the matter before me.
More importantly, the cross-examination made it clear that not only had the applicant not in fact yet paid the amount owing to his father under the judgment but that he had apparently only made an offer to pay the amount owing plus interest under the Supreme Court Act less the cost of the bankruptcy proceedings.
I accept the evidence of the applicant that he has a substantial surplus of assets over liabilities. I accept his evidence also that he has the ability by means of borrowing to pay the amount referred to in the bankruptcy notice. Despite cross-examination seeking to suggest a lack of bona fides in respect of the appeal to the Court of Appeal, I am not of the view that the appeal proceedings have not been instituted bona fide or are not being prosecuted with due diligence. It is certainly true that it appears to have taken a long time for the appeal books to be printed. The evidence merely establishes that the applicant is waiting for advice from the Court of Appeal as to the printing of those books. No attempt has been made to adduce in evidence before me circumstances which would suggest that there has been a lack of due diligence.
The commission of an act of bankruptcy is a serious matter. From that point on the assets of the debtor are affected contingently. The person of the debtor becomes susceptible to a change in status and the acts of the debtor become potentially attended with penal consequences. The issue of a bankruptcy notice by a Registrar is not a mere step in a process of debt collection. In these circumstances, where an appeal is pending against the judgment debt and the appeal is not frivolous, the court will not be quick to allow the situation to arise where an act of bankruptcy has been committed. I have considered carefully the circumstances of this case. It has not been suggested that the appeal to the Court of Appeal is frivolous, and in these circumstances I would extend the time for compliance with it for a reasonable time to permit the appeal to the Court of Appeal to be decided.
If I understood counsel for the applicant correctly, he also submitted that I could and should set aside the bankruptcy notice on discretionary grounds having regard to the evidence that the applicant has an excess of assets over liabilities.
The bankruptcy notice was regular in form subject to the matters on which attention has already been focussed. While the use of a bankruptcy notice to enforce payment in a dispute between father and son is regrettable, it cannot be said that the act of the father in causing there to be issued a bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process which would permit the court to set it aside. The mere fact that the debtor is solvent is not a ground for the court to set aside a bankruptcy notice. The Act gives no general discretion to the court to set aside bankruptcy notices valid in form which are not an abuse of the process and I know of no case where a bankruptcy notice has in such circumstances been set aside. The Act permits the issue of a bankruptcy notice and if valid in form prescribes the consequences to the bankrupt of non-compliance. The court's jurisdiction to set aside a defective notice stems from s.30 of the Act but it is not a general discretionary jurisdiction. In this sense, it differs from, for example, the jurisdiction to make a sequestration order under s.52(1) which is expressly discretionary.
Where a debtor is solvent, notwithstanding that an act of bankruptcy has been committed, the court may in the exercise of discretion refuse to proceed to make a sequestration order: Re Sarina; Ex parte Wollondilly Shire Council (1980) 32 ALR 596 and see Trajon v Hindmarsh (1987) 82 ALR 255. If the applicant's appeal be ultimately unsuccessful and, an act of bankruptcy having been committed, a petition be presented against him then the court will consider at that time whether a sequestration order ought to be made having regard inter alia to the applicant's financial situation. That time has not yet come.
It was submitted for the father that I should only be prepared to extend the time for compliance if the applicant paid to the father the sum of $50,000 at least. Initially I was attracted to this course, especially as whatever the outcome of the appeal there is no doubt that the $50,000 is owing by the son to his father. However, on reflection I do not consider it an appropriate course. The issue of a bankruptcy notice is not, as such, the issue of a debt collection process. The bankruptcy notice must be based on a final judgment and if it is, failure to comply with it will bring about the Commission of an act of bankruptcy upon which all creditors, not merely the party causing the bankruptcy notice to issue, can found a petition.
If the judgment be set aside, no act of bankruptcy will, if the notice has been extended until judgment in the appeal is determined, have been committed. Thus, the creditor would then have to obtain judgment before issuing a further bankruptcy notice. To order the applicant to pay $50,000 to his father is more an act of debt collection rather than relevant to the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the court.
I would accordingly, subject to the giving of an undertaking by the son, extend the time for the compliance with the bankruptcy notice until a day three months from the date of the judgment. If the appeal has not then been heard and decided the applicant should move the court for a further extension of time. Although the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice was extended up to 5 March 1991, no application was then made (no doubt through inadvertence) for a further extension. However, it has been held by the full court of this court in Streimar v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211 that s.41(6A) conferred jurisdiction upon the court to extend time in a case where the requirements of that sub-section were met, notwithstanding that the time for compliance with the notice had expired. The present is clearly an appropriate case for the exercise of that power.
The undertaking required to be given will be that Mr Athans will both prosecute the appeal to the Court of Appeal and if so advised, seek leave to appeal the decision of Bryson J, with due diligence.
The orders I propose to make are as follows:
Upon the applicant undertaking to prosecute with due diligence the appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against the orders of Bryson J including, if so advised, the seeking of leave to appeal therefrom:

(1) I extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice dated 10 October 1990 to 9 August 1991.

(2) I dismiss the application so far as it seeks to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground that it understates the debt owed to the petitioning creditor and on the ground that the judgment given on 24 August 1990 was not a final order or final judgment.

(3) I adjourn the application until 9 August 1991 before me.

(4) Each party shall be at liberty to restore the matter to the list on seven days' notice.

As both parties have been partially successful, I make no order as to costs.

[1991] FCA 243

09 MAY 1991