Re APL (pseudonym initials) - [2024] WADC 115

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH
CITATION:   RE APL (pseudonym initials) [2024] WADC 115
CORAM:   PALMER DCJ
HEARD:   31 OCTOBER 2024
DELIVERED          :   20 DECEMBER 2024
FILE NO/S:   APP 10 of 2024
MATTER: IN THE MATTER of Part 7 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003
AND
IN THE MATTER of an Appeal by

BETWEEN: APL (pseudonym initials)
Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :   CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION ASSESSOR OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram:   C HOLYOAK-ROBERTS
File Number            :   CIC 1255/2023

Catchwords:

Criminal injuries compensation - Appeal from assessor's refusal to award compensation - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	In person
Amicus Curiae	:	Ms G M Mullins appeared on behalf of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Justice

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	Not applicable
Amicus Curiae	:	State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
DAM v JTV [2017] WADC 2
ELK v CFB [2009] WADC 90
Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138
Nagel v Tahere [2020] WADC 110
Pezzano v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 181
Re ATS [2017] WADC 92
Re ATS [2019] WADC 76
Re Jackamarra [2014] WADC 9
Re Richards [2022] WADC 100
Re Tilbury [2010] WADC 46
Re Warrek [2019] WADC 50
TLH v BCM [2002] WADC 199

PALMER DCJ:

Introduction

This is an appeal from a decision of the Chief Assessor of Criminal Injuries Compensation made on 13 February 2024 to refuse the Appellant's claim for criminal injuries compensation.
On 23 April 2023, the Appellant submitted a claim for criminal injuries compensation (Compensation Claim)[1] for injuries and losses arising out of:
(a)an alleged physical assault by police officers on 15 December 2022 when they removed the Appellant from a family member's home in Bassendean (Alleged Assault);
(b)the alleged theft of two bicycles on Rottnest Island on 7 April 2023 (Alleged Bicycle Theft); and
(c)alleged 'Stalking, Meddling with Healthcare, Deprivation of Liberties, Leaking of sensitive health information' in Perth on 8 August 2019 (the Third Allegation).
[1] Assessor's Papers (AP), pages 2 - 7.
On 17 August 2023, the Chief Assessor of Criminal Injuries Compensation wrote to the Appellant indicating a preliminary view that the Application should be dismissed because the Chief Assessor was not satisfied that the alleged offences occurred.[2]
[2] AP, page 50.
On 13 February 2024, the Chief Assessor of Criminal Injuries Compensation wrote to the Appellant indicating that she had considered further information and correspondence provided by the Appellant and remained of the view she had expressed in her letter dated 17 August 2023 and she formally refused the Application.[3] It is that decision that is the subject of the present appeal.
[3] AP, page 1.

Nature of the Appeal

This appeal is made under s 55(1)(a) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) (the Act).
An appeal under s 55 of the Act is a hearing de novo.[4] It is therefore not necessary for the Appellant to demonstrate error on the part of the Assessor.
[4] Nagel vTahere[2020] WADC 110 [26] (Gething DCJ).
Section 56(1) of the Act provides that this court must decide the application to which the decision relates afresh, without being fettered by the assessor's decision, or may receive further evidence and information. The section therefore permits me to receive further evidence and information not before the assessor. The discretion to admit further evidence on an appeal ought to be exercised without undue restriction particularly given the beneficial purpose of the Act.[5]
[5] ELK v CFB [2009] WADC 90; Re Tilbury [2010] WADC 46 [3].
The entirety of the evidence must be reconsidered independently of the decision of the assessor.[6]
[6] Re ATS [2019] WADC 76 [15], [17] (Davis DCJ).
Section 56(2)(a) of the Act provides that on an appeal under s 55 the District Court may exercise any power of an assessor under this Act, other than a power under s 19(1)(b), s 24(1) or s 25.
Section 56(2)(b) of the Act provides that this court may confirm, vary or reverse the assessor's decision, either in whole or in part.

When compensation may be ordered under the Act

Section 17(2) of the Act provides that a person who suffers injury as a consequence of the commission of an alleged offence may apply for compensation for the injury and any loss also suffered.
Section 3 of the Act defines the term 'alleged offence' to mean a crime, misdemeanour or simple offence of which no person has been convicted.
It is a serious matter to make findings that an alleged offender has committed an act in the nature of an offence, particularly when they are not given the opportunity to refute those allegations.[7] The court must feel an actual persuasion that the offence occurred and such a conclusion should not be reached without the exercise of caution and unless the evidence survives careful scrutiny and appears precise and not loose and inexact.[8]
[7] Re Jackamarra [2014] WADC 9 [75].
[8] Re ATS [2017] WADC 92 [29] - [31] (Herron DCJ).
An applicant is also required to negative any defences reasonably open on the evidence.[9]
[9] Section 17(5) of the Act; Re Warrek [2019] WADC 50 [3] (Troy DCJ).
Section 3 of the Act defines the term 'injury' to mean bodily harm, mental and nervous shock.
The phrase 'mental or nervous shock', comprehends any malfunction of the person which can be seen to be a consequence of the impact of events constituting the offence or offences, or associated with the commission of the offences, as those events impact on the mind or nervous system. It must be more than a mere emotional reaction, being something of a more enduring character which may, in both the legal sense and in common parlance, be described as an injury.[10] The term includes distress, horror, disgust and other similar adverse mental reactions but excludes mere fright, humiliation or anguish.[11]
[10] DAM v JTV [2017] WADC 2 [87].
[11] Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138 [85].
The words 'as a consequence of' require a causal relationship or connection. Whether that causal relationship exists is 'essentially a question of fact, to be resolved as a matter of common sense'. It is sufficient that, as a matter of ordinary common sense and experience, the offence should be regarded as having 'materially contributed' to the injury.[12]
[12] Re Richards [2022] WADC 100 [55].
Section 17(4)(a) of the Act provides that an award of compensation should not be made unless I am satisfied that the claimed injury and any claimed loss has occurred and did so as a consequence of the commission of the 'alleged offence'.
Section 18(2) of the Act provides that the court is not bound by the rules of practice as to evidence or procedure and may inform itself in any manner it sees fit.

The Alleged Assault

In the Compensation Claim the Appellant described this claim as a physical assault that occurred on 15 December 2022.[13]
[13] AP, page 3.
The Appellant claims that she was assaulted by Police officers who attended a relative's house to take her to hospital to be assessed by a psychiatrist pursuant to a 'transport order' made under the Mental Health Act 2014 (WA) (Mental Health Act).
What the Appellant says occurred is explained in emails that she sent to the Western Australian Police which she provided to the Chief Assessor. For example, in an email that she sent to the Police on 10 January 2024, the Appellant explained the incident that occurred as follows:[14]
What really happened on the 15/12/22 :
I had already called out, unlocked one of the locks and was about to open the door and I had to step aside so that I wasn't hit by the door that was being broken. I then told the nurses that I was going to comply and follow them but needed to phone someone as well as change my clothes. They were initially not allowing me to contact anyone by phone or to change my clothes. Both the nurses then encouraged both the policemen to pull at my arms in opposite directions, causing pain and not moving in any direction. The nurses were also laughing. I screamed to them that I had been traumatised and I was a victim of harassment/abuse/violations/assault/bullying and I didn't want them to touch me. Despite that both the policemen, encouraged by the nurses, decided to pull on my arms further. This is after I had told them that I was going to comply and follow them but I needed to phone someone as well as change my clothes. None of that has been included in your video footage. None of that was a necessary part of the process and I would like the video footage of this.
[14] AP, page 130.
The Appellant gave a similar account of what occurred to me at the hearing before me.[15]
[15] ts 58 - ts 60; Submissions of Appellant filed on 26 September 2024 (Appellant's Written Submissions), pages 2 ‑ 3.
The Appellant provided the court with video footage of the incident taken from the body worn cameras worn by the Police officers. In some of the Appellant's correspondence with the Chief Assessor, she complained that this footage had been inappropriately edited.[16] The Appellant did not repeat these complaints at the hearing before me and simply asked me to watch the footage.[17]
[16] See for example, AP, pages 102 ‑ 103.
[17] ts 65.
I have watched the footage. The footage does not show the policemen pulling the Appellant's arms in opposite directions, the nurses laughing or the Appellant screaming. Nor does the footage show the Police pulling the Appellant's arms a second time. Rather, the footage shows the Police and the Appellant talking. At one point the footage shows a Police officer putting his hands on the Appellant's arms.
Touching another person falls within the definition of assault in the Criminal Code[18] and could constitute the offence of assault if the touching occurs without lawful excuse. Section 223 of the Criminal Code provides that an assault is unlawful and constitutes an offence unless it is authorised or justified or excused by law.
[18] Section 222 of the Criminal Code.
Section 149(1)(a) of the Mental Health Act provides that a police officer may apprehend a person the subject of a transport order and may exercise the powers under s 172 of the Mental Health Act. Section 172(2) of the Mental Health Act provides that a person exercising a power under the Act may use reasonable force in doing so.
I am not actually persuaded that the offence of unlawful assault was committed.
I am not satisfied that the touching in the footage that I watched was unlawful. That touching did not appear to involve the application of anything other than reasonable force.
To the extent that the Appellant is asserting that her arms were violently pulled apart, this is not shown in the footage that I have watched. The assertions made by the Appellant are therefore not substantiated by the footage and may well be contradicted by the footage.
Further, even if the Appellant's arms were pulled apart, this would not necessarily establish that the force used was unreasonable and unlawful. Whether or not the force was unreasonable would depend on the circumstances in which the force was applied. The evidence available to me is limited to the assertions made by the Appellant. I am not satisfied on the basis of those assertions alone, that the force used was unreasonable.
In this regard it is relevant to note that amongst the materials before the Chief Assessor are documents that suggest that the Appellant complained to the police about the conduct of the officers involved and then complained to the Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC) about the police. Correspondence from the CCC indicates that the CCC was unable to identify any information to corroborate the Appellant's allegations.[19]
[19] AP, page 10.
I am also not satisfied that the matters that the Appellant described caused her an injury.
The Appellant alleged that the Alleged Assault by the police caused her to suffer nervous shock and aggravated her anxiety. She also alleged a physical injury in that she felt pain in her arms and some cells in her arm might have been squashed.[20]
[20] ts 76 - ts 77.
While the Appellant provided some medical evidence to the Chief Assessor about her mental health, that evidence seemed to be related to other claims for compensation that the Appellant has made. Neither the Appellant's claim that the manner in which the police treated her exacerbated her anxiety, nor her claim that the touching caused damage at a cellular level, was supported by expert evidence.
Further, I am not satisfied that the fact that cells in the Appellant's arm may have been 'squashed' would be sufficient to establish that the Appellant suffered an injury for the purposes of the Act. It does not seem to me that such cellular damage falls within the definition of an injury as that term is used in the Act.
The term injury is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean 'bodily harm'. The meaning of 'bodily harm' has been considered (albeit in a different context) to mean a bodily injury that interferes with health or comfort.[21] It seems to me that the concept of bodily harm requires more than cellular damage.
[21] Pezzano v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 181 [94].
It also seems to me that microscopic injury on the cellular level of the type described by the Appellant is not a matter about which the law concerns itself and the principle de minimis non curat lex applies.
For these reasons, I do not consider that the Appellant is entitled to compensation for the Alleged Assault.

The Alleged Bicycle Theft

In the Compensation Claim the Appellant described this claim as occurring on 7 April 2023 and involving the following:[22]
2 bicycles were stolen from Rottnest Island which caused loss of enjoyment, aggravated physical injuries and caused loss of time.
[22] AP, page 3.
Before me the Appellant explained that her sister and the Appellant had parked their bikes in a secluded area on Rottnest Island when their bikes were stolen. She said that as the bikes had been stolen, she had to walk for hours to get back to the jetty.[23]
[23] ts 52; Appellant's Written Submissions, page 1.
The Appellant said that as a consequence of the walking, she suffered bodily harm to her knee tissue and the cells in her knee were harmed. She said that she had pain in her knee and had to rest.[24]
[24] ts 77.
The bikes were rented but the Appellant asserted that because she had to pay two $150.00 deposits for the bike she rented, that meant that it belonged to her. She said that she checked the price of the bikes online and they were worth $800.00 each. She said that when the bikes were stolen, she lost her deposit.[25]
[25] ts 53 - ts 54.
The Appellant said that she made a complaint to the Police the same day, although no record of this has been identified. The Appellant also filed a police report concerning the theft of the bikes on 22 January 2024.[26]
[26] ts 38 - ts 39; Appellant's book of documents, page 8.
There is no independent corroboration that the bikes on Rottnest Island were stolen. For example, there is no evidence from the company that rented the bikes to the Appellant that they were stolen or a contemporaneous police report. The police report that the Appellant filed on 22 January 2024 was months after the alleged theft and only after the Appellant had applied for criminal injuries compensation.
Even if it were to be accepted that the bikes were stolen, it does not appear to me that the Appellant suffered an injury. The Appellant's assertion that she suffered bodily harm to her knee tissue on a cellular level was not supported by medical evidence. As with the alleged injury to the Appellant's arm, I am not satisfied that any such injury would satisfy the definition of bodily harm and in any event such an injury would seem to be a de minimus matter about which the law would not concern itself.
For these reasons, I do not consider that the Appellant is entitled to compensation for the Alleged Bicycle Theft.

The Third Allegation

As I have mentioned, the Appellant described her third claim in the Compensation Claim as involving stalking, meddling with healthcare, 'deprivation of liberties' and leaking of sensitive health information. In another part of the Compensation Claim, the Appellant wrote:[27]
These types of problems appear to have started in New Zealand in 2014, and have continued on in Australia including in Western Australia, Victoria, South Australia, in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023. Many years of my life have been destroyed in Australia and I have received no constructive assistance whatsoever as a woman and doctor. In fact an Agency in Australia is destructing and destroying my compensation claims in both New Zealand and Australia, to decrease my compensations.
(emphasis added)
[27] AP, page 6.
In the Compensation Claim the Appellant described this claim as occurring on 8 August 2019 in Perth, although at the hearing the Appellant referred to the agency's activities beginning before she moved to Perth.[28]
[28] ts 10; AP, page 3.
It was evident from the Compensation Claim that the Appellant attached various documents to that claim but it was difficult to identify those documents from the Chief Assessor's file.
At the hearing the Appellant identified various documents that she said were the documents attached to the Compensation Claim.
The first set of these documents[29] alleged that 'agencies' and colleges had been 'meddling and causing harm with her medical training, personal life, work places, legal cases and violating her human rights' in New Zealand, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. The Appellant suggested that the Australian New Zealand College of Anaesthetists (ANZCA) or Australian or New Zealand 'Police/Agencies/Nurses/Doctors' had instigated her assault by her partner in New Zealand between March 2014 and March 2015.
[29] Appellant's book of documents, pages 45 ‑ 48; ts 7.
The Appellant also said that attached to the Compensation Claim was an email that she sent to the WA Police on 6 October 2023 complaining about the Perth Court Registry of the Federal Circuit Court.[30] While the Appellant provided a copy of this email to the Chief Assessor,[31] it cannot have been filed with the Compensation Claim as the email was sent after that claim was filed on 23 April 2023.
[30] ts 46 - ts 47; Appellant's book of documents, pages 54 - 56.
[31] AP, pages 93 - 95.
The Appellant also identified[32] a letter dated 24 March 2021 that she sent to the 'AHRC' (presumably the Australian Human Rights Commission) responding to responses from 'WAGPET' and the Department of Health, Australia regarding her withdrawal from the Australian General Practice Training Program.
[32] ts 8; Appellant's book of documents, pages 127 - 129.
At times the precise nature of the Appellant's claim was difficult to distil but in its essence the complaint seemed to be that an unknown government agency and (perhaps) others were orchestrating a campaign against the Appellant to prevent her from recovering compensation that she was due, or to reduce the compensation she was due. The Appellant seemed to assert that various matters that she was aggrieved about were evidence and manifestations of this campaign. She also suggested that those opposed to her were motivated by racism.
For example, in her written submissions, the Appellant had the following to say about 'substandard healthcare' she alleged she had suffered:[33]
I have found my healthcare to be very substandard for many years now, and a large part of it is due to Fraud/Corruption/Racism involving both the Justice/Government System and the Healthcare System of Australia and New Zealand, in covering up the extreme mismanagement of serious crimes such as Abuse/Torture/Sexual Violation/Assault/Bullying/Stalking which have occurred against me, for which I have lodged compensation claims. I have experienced obstructions to compensation I deserve for serious injuries and extreme unjustifiable damages I have been subjected to, in both New Zealand and Australia. This is also because there has possibly been Corruption/Embezzlement where unharmed individuals have been given financial compensation for harm I suffered, as a woman and doctor, as a result of blatant Fraud/Racism. I have also lodged claims/cases against the Government, Department of Health, Ministry of Justice/ Police and Healthcare Systems for Fraud/Corruption/Bullying/Sexual Harassment/Discrimination and Breaches of Duty of Care. Due to a leakage off all of my sensitive information, some healthcare providers have taken sides and have conflicts of interests against me. The ongoing degrading invasive breaches of privacy against me by the government and police, has only been to cause me damages, to obstruct my compensations and to waste my time as a Brown Australian Asian/Indian Woman. I found many healthcare providers everywhere in Australia (Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia) to have conflicts of interests against me and to be blatantly racist. On one hand, apparently I am too clever/cunning for my own good, and on the other hand, I'm so dumb that they need to invasively breach my privacy, apparently to protect me. In actual fact, they want me to take care of myself, cure myself, advocate for myself and basically manage my own injuries, so that the perpetrators of harm against me would not have to take any responsibility or pay me any compensation. All of the entities responsible in both Australia and New Zealand, would like for me to disappear. [redacted] who has never ever been paranoid, has in fact lost multiple cases in New Zealand, as a result of these circumstances in Australia.
I have suffered extensive human rights violations, serious crimes and serious bullying/discrimination/racism. I am yet to receive adequate compensation for this unjustifiable harm. Even with more nurses or funding, time wasting manipulative healthcare will continue persisting when there are blatantly fraudulently bad intentions for the patient.
During an interview recently with a mental health specialist in Bentley, Western Australia, I was informed by her that the Australian and New Zealand Government Systems just wanted to make sure that I had acquired permanent injuries that I could never recover from, like Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and that I was properly dysfunctional. However, the system was not interested in looking after me, treating my health, caring for me, assisting me to acquire compensation for my serious injuries or to change my life for the better. Apparently entities within the system did not want for me to be healthy, to acquire my deserved compensation for the serious traumas I was subjected to or to have a functional/successful life as a woman, doctor and citizen. Apparently this system would love for me to disappear or to end my life. Then she showed me my health record, which had multiple white pages with blue ink writing, to show me how much information had been collected by the system. Then she told me to leave and that they had no further time for me. I am very concerned about this because everyone is fully aware that this system has cost me, an innocent woman, 11 years of my life. Being told by some mental health specialists in Australia, that the Australian System would now like me to end my life, is really traumatic for me to learn. The Government/Justice/Healthcare Systems possibly have undisclosed conflicts of interest against me, which is seriously influencing my healthcare negatively and is causing bad outcomes in my serious injury compensation claims across Australia and New Zealand. This portrays serious fraud and corruption involving both Australia and New Zealand.
Some private psychologist [sic] have also wasted my time/resources collecting files and files of information on me, only to tell me at the end of 10 consultations, that they don't want to assist me, if I don't divulge that I am bad to them. They want to believe that I caused the traumatic events which occurred to me. At the beginning it was all promises to assist me with my compensation claims, however those were just lies. There is an element of racism, victim shaming and fraud involving some of my healthcare sessions especially in the last few years.
(emphasis added)
[33] Appellant's Written Submissions, pages 3 - 4. See also parts 5 and 6 of the Appellant's Written Submissions, pages 5 - 10.

The Appellant also relied upon a statement that she had prepared for a compensation claim in New Zealand.[34]
[34] ts 13; Appellant's book of documents, pages 25 - 29.
The Appellant also referred to three letters written by a psychologist Mr Thuyasithu dated 9 November 2021, 22 August 2021 and 22 August 2021.[35] These letters suggested that the Appellant suffered Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Depression because of her sexual assault in New Zealand and seem to relate to a compensation claim that the Appellant made in New Zealand.
[35] ts 13; Appellant's book of documents, pages 30 - 32.
The Appellant relied upon reports from a general practitioner, Dr Randhawa.[36] These letters concerned the compensation claim that the Appellant made in New Zealand.
[36] ts 13; Appellant's book of documents, pages 33 - 38.
The Appellant also referred to a report from a psychologist Ms Bethany Price that was prepared for her New Zealand compensation claim and a report that Ms Price prepared for Dr Edward Solomon.[37] The first report discussed the effect that the Appellant's partner's assault of her had on her. The report to Dr Solomon concerned the treatment that she had received.
[37] ts 49; Appellant's book of documents, pages 21 - 24.
The Appellant also referred to a decision of the District Court at Wellington in New Zealand regarding an appeal against a decision to refuse her compensation for mental injury as a consequence of sexual abuse by her partner.[38]
[38] ts 13 - ts 14; Appellant's book of documents, pages 94 - 104.
The Appellant claimed that the fraud, corruption and embezzlement being perpetrated in Perth was to cover up these events.[39]
[39] ts 15 - ts 16, ts 19.
The Appellant referred to a letter that she wrote regarding a claim she wished to make against the Australian Government Department of Health on 29 December 2020[40] and correspondence regarding her removal from the Department of Health GP training program and complaints that she had about the Perth Registry of the Federal Court and the ANZCA.[41]
[40] ts 45; Appellant's book of documents, pages 108 - 109.
[41] ts 46 - ts 47.
The Appellant also referred to medical evidence from Dr Edward Solomon which suggested that she had experienced a medical condition that made her unable to fulfill her WAGPET obligations in a timely manner.[42]
[42] ts 49 - ts 50; Appellant's book of documents, page 39.
The Appellant said that she had lost potential income of $20 million because she had not been able to complete her anaesthetics training, potential income as a general practitioner of $18 million and $1.5 million because she had not been able to work as a doctor.[43]
[43] ts 48. See also Submission of Appellant Criminal Injuries Compensation, page 6.
The Appellant filed a book of materials containing the details of various criminal offences that she alleged were committed.[44]
[44] Appendix 5; ts 79, ts 84 - ts 85.
The Appellant has provided some evidence regarding her sexual assault in New Zealand and injuries she suffered as a result of that assault. It seems that she made a claim for the equivalent of criminal injuries compensation in that jurisdiction and was awarded compensation (although the Appellant seemed to suggest that she has had difficulty collecting that compensation).
The evidence that the Appellant relied upon to establish that a government agency or others were orchestrating a campaign against her, however, seemed to consist of documents in which she made complaints about the conduct of various government agencies or professional bodies and to some extent, documents that revealed that they had made decisions contrary to her interests.
As I have indicated, it is a serious matter to make findings that an alleged offender has committed an act in the nature of an offence and the court must feel an actual persuasion that the offence occurred.
In Briginshaw v Briginshaw,[45] Dixon J observed:[46]
reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters 'reasonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.
[45] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336.
[46] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (362).
Given the seriousness of the allegations made and what I consider to be the inherent unlikelihood that there was a co‑ordinated campaign to sabotage the Appellant's compensation claims, some tangible proof would be required to actually persuade me that the Appellant's allegations had been established.
The evidence presented by the Appellant to support her allegations consisted principally of documents in which the Appellant recorded allegations she was making, or revealed that matters were decided against her. This evidence is insufficient to actually persuade me that an unknown government agency or others were orchestrating a campaign against the Appellant. For this reason, I am not satisfied that such a campaign occurred, or that the Appellant is entitled to any compensation for any offence.

Some other matters

During the hearing before me, the Appellant raised as an issue whether or not she could claim compensation for crimes that were committed outside of Western Australia. Although I am inclined to consider that compensation would not be recoverable for injuries that occurred outside of Western Australia,[47] it is not necessary for me to finally decide this issue for two reasons.
[47] TLH v BCM [2002] WADC 199 [14].
First, this inquiry concerned the Third Allegation. As I have indicated, I was not satisfied that an unknown government agency or others were orchestrating a campaign against the Appellant.
Secondly, the Compensation Claim stated that the conduct that the Appellant was seeking compensation for occurred in Perth. Although there was reference to the conduct starting before the Appellant moved to Perth, in my view, the Appellant clearly stated in the Compensation Claim that the claim she was making concerned conduct in Perth.
The Appellant filed a large volume of material prior to the hearing of the appeal. It was unclear whether all of that material was before the Chief Criminal Injures Assessor. To the extent that the Appellant has sought to rely on material not before the Chief Criminal Injures Assessor that was filed prior to the hearing, I have taken this material into account.
Although the Appellant was given no leave to do so, the Appellant continued to file further material after the hearing of the appeal.
On 22 November 2024, (after the hearing of the appeal) my chambers received an email from the Appellant in the following terms:
This case essentially involves the Victim of Crime Unit and thus in some way the Western Australian Department of Justice. Natural justice or procedural fairness is identified with the two constituents of a fair hearing, which are the rule against bias, and the right to a fair hearing. Natural Justice requires the right to be heard, the right to be treated without bias, and a decision being based on relevant evidence. The right to be heard. A person must be given a reasonable opportunity to present information during a hearing before a decision is reached that might adversely affect them. I have been alerted to the fact that I am not being given the right to fair hearings here in Perth, Western Australia. I would like to request a further 3 hour hearing so that I can properly discuss all the serious crimes which have occurred against me. Apparently some of my documents/affidavit are also not being considered.
I am being informed that a few states in Australia including the state of Western Australia are violating my constitutional liberties/rights and are protecting all of the perpetrators/entities of harm against me and are trying to aid the compensatory bodies in decreasing my compensation as an injured doctor/woman/citizen. I would appreciate a further 3 hour hearing so that I can properly discuss all the crimes which have occurred against me. Thank you.
In an earlier email to my chambers, the Appellant also referred to the possibility of a further two hour hearing if I considered that the Appellant could make a claim for criminal injuries compensation for offences committed outside of Western Australia.
Given that the Appellant is self-represented, I have treated her email and the additional materials that she has filed as an application to re‑open her appeal.
I am not inclined to allow the Appellant to re‑open her appeal.
The hearing of the Appellant's appeal was set down for one day and in my view she has had ample time to present her case. I have reviewed the additional materials that she has filed and they seem unlikely to alter my decision. The Appellant's email does not identify why any matters that she wished to raise in a further oral hearing were not addressed at the hearing of the appeal, or that any further hearing would canvass any matters that she had not already canvassed during the appeal hearing, or in the large volume of materials she filed prior to the appeal hearing.

Conclusion

For these reasons, I consider that the Appellant's appeal should be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
GS
Associate
20 DECEMBER 2024