Re Anita
[2014] NSWSC 1352
•02 October 2014
| Equity Division Supreme Court New South Wales |
| Case Name: | Re Anita |
| Medium Neutral Citation: | [2014] NSWSC 1352 |
| Hearing Date(s): | 11 July 2014 |
| Date of Orders: | 02 October 2014 |
| Date of Decision: | 02 October 2014 |
| Jurisdiction: | Equity Division |
| Before: | Robb J |
| Decision: | Set out in paragraph 76 |
| Catchwords: | PROCEDURE - joinder - application by Anita's mother to be joined as a party pursuant to r 6.24(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 - parens patriae jurisdiction - whether joinder in best interest of the young person - powers and discretion of court |
| Legislation Cited: | Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69C(2) |
| Cases Cited: | Director-General, Department of Community Services; Re Thomas [2009] NSWSC 2017 |
| Texts Cited: | |
| Category: | Consequential orders (other than Costs) |
| Parties: | Anita's mother (applicant) |
| Representation: | Counsel: P Braine (applicant) Solicitors: Leanne Wells Solicitor (applicant) |
| File Number(s): | 2013/255452 |
| Publication Restriction: | Reasons for judgment have been redacted with the agreement of the parties to protect the anonymity of certain persons |
JUDGMENT
On 22 August 2013 I made orders in the duty list in the exercise of the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, on the application of the Director-General of the Department of Family and Community Services and the Minister for Family and Community services, that, until further order, the Director-General have power to detain a 15-year-old girl, known for the purposes of these proceedings as Anita, at secure premises and to use reasonable force if necessary to so detain her. I also made a number of related and consequential orders.
The orders were made in exercise of the jurisdiction that has been considered in detail by Brereton J in Director-General, Department of Community Services; Re Thomas [2009] NSWSC 2017. As White J has observed in Re Bella [2013] NSWSC 1034 at [3], secure accommodation orders of this type are essentially protective in nature, and are made where they are required for the protection and welfare of the child or young person. In the present case Anita was a young person who was at serious risk of harm to herself, and the restriction of her liberty was justified for her own protection. At the time the original orders were made there was a very pressing need to preserve Anita from an immediate risk of serious self-harm.
By further applications made by the Secretary (as now named) and the Minister on 29 August 2013, 6 December 2013, 10 March 2014 and 27 June 2014 I continued the secure accommodation and related orders. The application will next come before the court on 10 October 2014 for review of the continuation of the orders.
By notice of motion filed on 12 May 2014 Anita's mother has applied for an order that she be joined as a party to the proceedings. In order to maintain the anonymity of the proceedings I will simply refer to the applicant as the mother.
One of the orders that I made on 22 August 2013 was that Anita be separately represented by an independent legal representative. The Legal Aid Commission has appointed a solicitor to represent Anita.
The independent legal representative supports the application by the mother to be joined as a party, and adopts her submissions.
The application by the mother to be joined as a party to the proceedings is opposed by the Secretary and the Minister.
At present the only parties to these proceedings are the Secretary and the Minister. Anita is not a party. At the time the proceedings were commenced the Director-General and the Minister did not join Anita's parents.
The Minister has parental responsibility for Anita until she turns 18 under orders made by the Children's Court on [Redacted].
The mother has applied to be joined under UCPR r 6.24(1), and she relies upon the reasoning of White J in Re Bella, in which his Honour made an order that former foster parents of Bella be made parties to the proceedings. The circumstances of Bella's case are similar to the present, and Bella is being cared for at the same secure accommodation facility as is Anita. One difference between the present case and Bella's case is that, in the latter, Bella's natural parents were joined as parties when the proceedings were commenced.
The mother relies upon the following observations made by White J:
[9] The application for joinder is brought pursuant to r 6.24 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. Rule 6.24(1) provides:
"6.24 Court may join party if joinder proper or necessary
(1) If the court considers that a person ought to have been joined as a party, or is a person whose joinder as a party is necessary to the determination of all matters in dispute in any proceedings, the court may order that the person be joined as a party."
[10] There is no matter that can truly be said to be a matter in dispute in these proceedings. These proceedings are not adversarial. In deciding whether the applicant's joinder is necessary regard must be had to the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised. The parens patriae jurisdiction is to be exercised for the benefit and welfare of the young person.
[11] There is no doubt that the question whether or not the secure accommodation orders should be continued, amended or discharged can be determined whether or not the applicants are joined as parties to the proceedings. However, as that determination has to be made with a view only to Bella's welfare, it seems to me that if it appears that the applicants are likely to be able to provide evidence or submissions that would permit a better, because more informed, determination of those matters, then their joinder is necessary within the meaning of the rule.
12The independent legal representative supported the mother's application to be joined by relying upon the principle that is applied in the family law jurisdiction that, so long as the best interests of the child are not contrary to joinder, any other person concerned with the care, welfare or development of the child can be party to proceedings concerning parenting orders: s 69C(2) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The independent legal representative relied upon the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court in Re C and D [1998] Fam CA 98 concerning the right of children under this section to have contact with persons other than their parents who are significant persons in their lives, unless it would be contrary to the best interests of the child to have contact with any such persons.
The Secretary and the Minister, on the other hand, in submitting that the mother did not have any right to be joined to the proceedings, relied upon the decision of the High Court of Australia in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 at [131] - [132] and News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League (1996) 64 FCR 410 at 523-5. The thrust of the submission was that a non-party is only a necessary party to proceedings, who ought to be joined, where the court is invited to make, or proposes to make, orders directly affecting the rights or liabilities of the non-party.
I propose to follow White J in relation to the circumstances in which persons may be joined as parties to parens patriae proceedings, but I would add that in my view the court has very wide powers in such proceedings as to the persons from which the court will receive assistance concerning the orders that should be made in the exercise of the jurisdiction, the limitations that should be placed on the role of such persons, and the information that should be provided to them.
In Re Bella, White J made an order that the foster parents be joined as parties, because he found that the applicants should be in a position to provide assistance, and it was likely to be in Bella's best interests for them to be joined as parties ([20]), but his Honour noted (at [25]) that, if the applicants (or the natural parents) did not provide assistance, or caused disruption, or for any other reason their continued joinder as parties was not in Bella's interests, then they would be removed as parties. His Honour also noted that the foster parents could only provide assistance to the court if at least some information in relation to Bella's progress was provided to them (at [29]). His Honour accepted that some information should be kept confidential, if that was the view of the Minister, who had parental responsibility for Bella and/or Bella herself. White J gave as examples confidential doctor's reports, reports from counsellors, psychologists and the like.
I accept that the family law rules relied upon by the independent legal representative provide some useful guidance, particularly in respect of their acceptance that, ultimately, it is what is in the best interests of the child that is determinative. However, the family law rules could only be relevant by analogy, and in, my view, the parens patriae jurisdiction itself is a source of procedural power as to how the court should conduct proceedings in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
In my view the principles laid down by the High Court in the John Alexander's Club's case are of little assistance in the present context, as they concern proceedings where the orders that the court is invited to make would affect the rights or liabilities of non-parties. As White J observed in Re Bella at [10], in proceedings in exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction involving the protection of children and young persons, there are no matters truly in dispute, and the proceedings are not adversarial, and I would add that the orders do not affect the rights or liabilities of any party, except the child or young person concerned.
It is not entirely clear what the purpose of formally joining non-parties as parties to proceedings in the parens patriae jurisdiction might be, except perhaps for the purpose of giving them a right of appeal. No orders will be made that will bind them in any legal sense. On the other hand, in my view, just as the court has power to order that an independent legal representative be appointed for the child or young person, the court should have power to make orders that permit any persons who might be able to assist the court in exercising the jurisdiction to do so, without formally being made parties, and to make consequential orders that regulate the manner in which such persons may participate in the proceedings, including in relation to the information that they should be given for that purpose.
In the present case the mother simply applied to be joined as a party, without making any specific reference to the basis upon which she would be joined, and her entitlement once joined. Ordinarily, once a non-party is joined to proceedings, the new party would be entitled automatically to be served with all of the evidence that any other party proposes to tender, subject to any specific order to the contrary. In the course of argument I asked counsel for the mother to inform me what the mother proposed to do, if joined as a party, and what information the mother expected to receive. Counsel was not able, on the basis of his instructions, to provide a clear response to that question, although he did embrace the observations of White J whereby the court could make orders that limited the information that the Secretary and the Minister would be required to provide to the mother.
In the course of submissions I informed counsel for the mother that I regarded the issue of joinder per se as being relatively insignificant compared with the issue of exactly what would happen in relation to the continuation of the proceedings if the mother were joined, and what effect that would have on the care regime that the Secretary has in place for Anita. I will explain more fully below why I think that is so critical an issue in the present case.
I gave the mother's counsel an opportunity to consider the position and to provide a further written submission to inform the court in more specific terms as to the orders that the mother asks the court to make. Counsel provided an additional submission, which set out the following alternative orders:
(i) Join the mother to the proceedings but qualify her participation by articulating the form which such participation may take
(a) that she is entitled to be present in court whether or not the court is closed;
(b) that she is entitled to address the court regarding any concerns she may have about the child's welfare, and may do so with the assistance of a legal practitioner;
(c) that she is entitled to read the monthly [Redacted] reports subject to copies of such reports being retained by her legal representative;
(d) that she may receive psychiatric and counsellors reports, subject to the counsellor's agreement that the release of the report would not be harmful to Anita.
(ii) Adjourn the joinder application part-heard for further consideration but make an interim order defining the mother's participation in accordance with paragraph (i) (a) to (d).
(iii) Join the mother without restriction but maintain the court as a closed court in the future so that there is maintained a suppression of the information of what transpires in court.
As I understand the mother's overall submissions, her preference is for orders (iii), (i) and (ii) in descending order.
Ordinarily, it would be undesirable to approach this application with undue complication, and the natural course would be, if I was satisfied that the mother could provide assistance to the court, to make orders similar to those made by White J in Re Bella. At the end of the day, it is probably unlikely to matter whether or not the mother is formally made a party to the proceedings, or alternatively given some limited right to participate in the proceedings. The court will have to grapple with the issue of what information should be provided to her, and if it happens that, contrary to expectations, the mother's involvement becomes disruptive, or otherwise unhelpful, then appropriate orders could be made at that time.
I should therefore make clear why I think that this application has special features, which require great care to be taken about the orders that should be made to govern the involvement of the mother in the proceedings.
First, however, I should outline the position taken by the mother, on the one hand, and the Secretary and the Minister on the other.
As expressed in her supplementary written submissions, the mother's position is that there is benefit to Anita in her mother being well informed about her daughter's progress in [Redacted], so that when Anita is transitioned out of the care of the Minister, she is actively engaged in that process. The mother is the person most likely to support her daughter through her life after the Minister is no longer seized with parental responsibility. The mother submits that her application presents minimal risk to Anita, as all of the mother's contact with Anita is supervised completely at the discretion of the Minister; such contact to date by way of face-to-face and telephone contact has not been destabilising of Anita; the Department is able to control what information is provided to Anita concerning her mother's participation in the proceedings; and the court is able to dictate what information is given to Anita concerning her mother's participation, with the assistance of the independent legal representative. There is no evidence that the mother's application to be joined has been destabilising of Anita.
One reason given by the mother as to why it is preferable that she be joined as a party at this stage, is that if her joinder application is deferred for any reason, she may not have legal representation when the issue is reconsidered. The mother has been given a grant of legal aid for the purposes of the present application. I asked her counsel whether the grant of legal aid would cover the mother's future involvement in the hearing, if an order was made joining her as a party. As I indicated to counsel, I asked the question because the issue of whether the mother would be, or would not be, represented in the future might be relevant to my consideration of the usefulness of her joinder, and the circumstances in which it should be ordered. Counsel advised me that it was unclear whether the mother would receive legal aid for her continuing participation in the proceedings.
The Secretary and the Minister gave eight reasons for opposing the mother being joined as a party to the proceedings, which are found in par 80 of the affidavit of Catherine Keady affirmed 9 July 2014. Ms Keady has been acting Manager Client Services for Community Services since 10 February 2014, and has had overall case management responsibility for Anita since that time.
The reasons are:
(a)Before Anita came into care, there were serious concerns about the care provided to her by her mother and her father and the Children's Court accepted that there was no realistic possibility of Anita being restored to their care;
(b)Community Services will not consider placing Anita with the mother and father when she leaves [Redacted];
(c)The mother continues to deny that the father has sexually assaulted Anita. JIRT and community Services believe Anita's allegations to be true;
(d)The mother has not had Anita in her care since [Redacted]. She is not able to determine whether or not it is in Anita's best interests for Anita's placement at [Redacted] to be maintained;
(e)The mother's joiner to these proceedings will divert attention and resources away from the therapeutic work being done with Anita and is likely to make the proceedings far more adversarial. From my involvement with the [Redacted] program, I am aware that this has occurred in Bella's matter in the Supreme Court, in which former foster carers have been joined. Furthermore, if the mother is joined, it could impact on the level of detail in submissions and/or evidence for the Secretary in future review hearings.
(f)The mother's joinder to these proceedings has the potential to impact negatively on Anita's progress in the [Redacted] program. Anita has indicated a great desire to please her mother. If Anita becomes aware that extensive information about her progress is being shared with her mother, and consequently with her father, I feel strongly that it would influence what she says to her counsellor and carers
(g)The mother and father are very close, and remain in a relationship. I believe that any information given to the mother will be passed on to the father. In light of Anita's allegations, I do not believe this would be in Anita's best interests.
(h)If Anita does not feel comfortable discussing issues fully with the professionals engaged to support her, then those professionals will have great difficulty in resolving her historical relationship issues with her family. I believe it is critically important to resolve those issues, in order to address Anita's serious self-harm behaviours and ensure her long-term safety.
The strength of these reasons must be considered in the context that Anita was [Redacted], and she will attain the age of 18 on the same date in [Redacted]. Anita will remain within the parental responsibility of the Minister for a further [Redacted]. It seems to be accepted by the Secretary and the Minister that Anita's strongest personal relationship is with her mother. While the future cannot be predicted, it is highly likely that, after Anita turns 18, she will seek to reinstate her relationship with her mother, and it is very likely that her mother will become a major influence in her life.
The reality is that Community Services has some [Redacted] to alleviate as many of the deep and serious problems that confront Anita as can possibly be achieved in that time, but thereafter Anita will ultimately have to make her own way in the world. That proposition is subject to transitional arrangements that may be available to assist Anita when she leaves [Redacted], but it is at least true that the present legal regime, which imposes involuntary confinement on Anita, will cease. It is obviously desirable that, to the fullest extent possible, the next [Redacted] months be used as a transition period that may put Anita's mother in the best position possible to provide continuing care and assistance to Anita after her 18th birthday.
For the purpose of determining the present application, Community Services' eight reasons differ in strength.
Reason (a) may be true to some extent, although the evidence before the court does not establish clearly the extent to which the care provided to Anita by her mother, in particular, was deficient. It appeared to me from the evidence, and the way the mother gave oral evidence, that she genuinely loves Anita and wishes to care for her. The mother wishes Anita to return home, so that she can live with her mother and sister. Any concern about the adequacy of the mother's care of Anita before the date of the Children's Court order must be tempered by the reality that the mother is highly likely to continue her relationship with Anita when the latter turns 18. I infer that the deficiencies in care that Anita may have received before parental responsibility was given to the Minister flow principally from the conduct of her father.
I accept reason (b) as a fact, but the effect of Community Services' decision will be relatively short lived.
Reason (c) is of a higher order of significance than most of the other reasons, and I will consider it more fully below.
In relation to reason (d), it is factually true that the mother has not had care of Anita since [Redacted]. I also accept that the mother is not able to determine in any definitive way whether or not it is in Anita's best interests for Anita's placement at [Redacted] to be maintained. It does not follow from the truth of those propositions, however, that the mother could not have anything useful to say to the court on the subject, or that they are reasons in themselves to entirely exclude the mother from having any opportunity to influence the court in relation to the continuation of the orders.
Reason (e) has three separate components. The first is that the mother's joinder will divert attention and resources away from the therapeutic work being done with Anita. This is a practical reason, but I accept it is important. It is also suggested that the proceedings are likely to become far more adversarial. I accept that is a possibility, and it would be undesirable if it occurred. I would expect the parties to act responsibly in Anita's interest to avoid an adversarial approach. I accept that there could well be circumstances where the mother may be moved to adopt an adversarial approach in the perceived best interests of her daughter. At the end of the day this is an issue to be managed by the court, and the court can exercise its authority to minimise the consequences of any tendency to treat the proceedings in an adversarial manner. The third reason involves a suggestion that Community Services may find it hard to avoid tempering the candour and comprehensiveness of reports to the court, if it is likely that the reports will be provided to the mother. As I understand it, this reason does not spring from any general disinclination on the part of Community Services to provide information to the mother, but rather is primarily associated with reason (c). The concern is that the provision of certain forms of information to the mother, in circumstances where Anita may come to learn that information she gives to case workers and consultants of Community Services may not remain absolutely confidential, may have a dire effect on the prospects of success of a number of crucial aspects of the steps that have been put in train to assist Anita.
Reason (f) is a further important aspect of the third of the reasons advanced as part of the reason (e).
Community Services' belief, as expressed in reason (g), that the mother continues to have a relationship with Anita's father, reinforces the concern that flows from the provision of information to the mother, because of the likelihood that the mother will pass that information on to the father.
Reason (h) is in a sense the culmination of the preceding reasons, as Community Services believes that any steps which interfere with the confidence that Anita is able to develop with the professionals engaged to support her, whereby she does not feel comfortable discussing issues fully with them, is likely to undermine the attempts that are being made to resolve the issues that have led to Anita's serious self-harm behaviours, and to ensure her long-term safety.
It is to be noticed that Community Services' reasons generally do not suggest unsatisfactory consequences of the mother having a right to participate in the proceedings per se, but relate to supposed unsatisfactory consequences of the mother being given the information necessary to make her participation in the proceedings effective. In saying that I do not dismiss out of hand potentially disadvantageous consequences of the distraction of attention and resources from the need to care for Anita, although inconveniences of that nature should be capable of management with the assistance of the court, and any such disadvantages must be balanced against potential advantages that may flow from the mother having an appropriate level of involvement in the proceedings.
As I see it the real problem arises out of the need to manage the information that is provided to the mother.
This problem must be viewed in light of the fact that one of the strategies adopted by Community Services for the well-being of Anita has been to reintroduce contact between Anita and her mother and sister, Anita's maternal grandmother and her partner, as well as other relatives. This contact has occurred in person and by telephone on a regular basis, closely supervised by Community Services. On the evidence Anita has had telephone contact with her mother on 23 occasions since 4 September 2013, and 11 times with her sister [Redacted] as well.
Furthermore, Community Services provides information privately to the mother on a regular basis. There was an issue in the proceedings as to whether Community Services has provided insufficient information. Community Services' evidence was to the effect that Anita's case worker has had 25 telephone conversations with Anita's mother since 30 December 2013 (with file notes of the conversations being put in evidence). Additionally, on 30 May 2014, the mother had a telephone conference with Anita's treating psychiatrist. It is understandable that the mother might not be satisfied with the amount and regularity of the information being given to her, but it is not feasible to enter upon a consideration, on the basis of the existing evidence, as to whether or not Community Services is providing an adequate level of information to the mother. On the basis of the objective evidence that is available, it seems clear that Community Services has attempted to provide the mother important information on a regular basis.
These considerations reinforce the view that I have reached that the critical issue is the management of the provision of information to the mother, so as to control what is done with the information, and in particular Anita's understanding of what is done with the information.
In order to avoid these reasons for decision becoming unduly lengthy, it will be appropriate that I go directly to the heart of the problem.
The original secure accommodation orders were made because Anita had displayed extremely alarming risk taking, and challenging behaviours, that are summarised in par 33 of Ms Keady's affidavit, which included threats of, and increasingly serious attempts at, suicide.
As I understand it, it is the view of Community Services and its professional consultants that Anita's propensity to engage in serious self-harm behaviours has arisen out of historical relationship issues with her family.
The primary, but not the only, issue is Anita's belief that her father committed an act of sexual assault against her. The evidence does not disclose the precise nature of the alleged act.
The evidence suggests, albeit in an unspecific way, that the mother may have been responsible for some domestic violence and threats. (During the 12-month period to 28 November 2012 there were 37 risk of significant harm reports to Community Services about Anita).
The allegations made by Anita concerning sexual assault by her father have been the subject of an investigation by the Joint Investigation Response Team (JIRT). JIRT is an initiative between the NSW Police Service, Community Services and health professionals, and investigates serious allegations relating to children.
Following the investigation a decision has been made not to lay any charges against the father, on the ground that there is inadequate corroboration.
JIRT has nonetheless recommended to Community Services that Anita not have contact with her father, on the basis that he poses a risk of sexual harm to her.
Accordingly, Community Services will not permit contact between Anita and her father while Anita is at [Redacted], and Community Services will only provide limited information to the father concerning Anita.
The mother believes, as she repeated in evidence in cross-examination, that Anita's claim concerning her being sexually assaulted by her father is totally false.
The mother is at present not living with the father, who is living at premises owned by the couple some 3 hours driving distance from where the mother presently lives with [Redacted]. The mother and father are not separated in any formal or absolute way. The father visits the home where the mother and [Redacted] live frequently for access to [Redacted]. On occasions when Community Services has telephoned the mother at home, the telephone has been answered by the father. On another occasion when Community Services attempted to call the father on a number given to them by the mother, the mother answered. It is not necessary to make any precise finding about the nature of the continuing relationship between Anita's mother and father. I accept the evidence given by the mother, for whatever its significance might be, but I do not accept that the mother and father have no relationship at all. It is clearly possible that they may have a rapprochement in the future. Importantly, given in particular the mother's belief that the father did not assault Anita, I find that there is a serious risk that any sensitive information that Community Services may be obliged to provide to the mother might be divulged to the father. In fairness to the mother, I am inclined to believe that she might find it very difficult in some circumstances to decline to provide information to the father.
The significance of the likelihood that the mother would divulge information to the father is exacerbated by the fact that the mother has, and will continue to have, face-to-face and telephone contact with Anita. While that contact is supervised and controlled by Community Services, as the evidence discloses, it is not physically possible entirely to control the ability of Anita and her mother to speak together without the supervision of Community Services. The significance of this circumstance is enlivened by the fact that Anita has generally informed Community Services that she does not want to see her father, but Anita has appeared to change her stance after meetings with her mother. Anita has written letters to her father that reflect these apparent changes of position.
The intensity of the difficulty faced by Community Services in facilitating meetings between Anita and her mother, and other relatives, is illustrated by the fact that the increase in contact coincided with a new and troubling form of self-harm by Anita in March of this year.
I accept the view expressed by Ms Keady in her reason (h) (which has been reinforced by other information provided to me by Community Services at the time of earlier applications to extend the secure accommodation orders) that if there is to be any hope of successfully addressing Anita's serious self-harm behaviours, and ensuring her long-term safety, it will be necessary for Community Services, and its professional consultants, to help her to resolve her historical relationship issues with her family.
As I have noted, the most serious, but not the only issue, is Anita's belief that she was sexually assaulted by her father.
The process by which Anita may be assisted to resolve these issues is a matter for the expertise of Community Services and its consultants, which has not been put before the court in any detail in the evidence. It is sufficient that it be noted that it is apparently essential that the consultants be able to develop a bond of trust with Anita, and the development of that bond requires the most precise and rigid management of Anita's belief as to what she can candidly say to the consultants, which will not be passed on to her parents.
I accept the evidence that I have been given concerning the importance of the development of this bond, and my general concern about Anita's well-being is so great, that I would be loath to take any significant risk that might jeopardise Anita developing the necessary confidence in the consultants, and Community Services itself. In my view it is incumbent upon the court to be risk averse, and to err on the side of caution in taking any step that may interfere with the judgment of the professionals who are involved in the attempt to assist Anita to resolve the difficulties.
Ms Keady gave evidence that Community Services' plan for the support of Anita has four consecutive phases. In summary, phase 1 is the introductory phase. This involves significant oversight and observation of the young person in order to gather information to best understand their needs. Phase 2 attempts to solidify the young person's program and begins decreasing, on occasion, their supervision. Their engagement with the therapeutic team is increased and they attempt to set goals that are reviewed every three months. Phase 3 then sees the young person more involved in community-based activities, for example schooling or vocational activities. Family contact is often increased in this phase. Phase 4 involves identifying their post [Redacted] options and focuses on safe community access and transition out of the program.
Anita at present is in phase 2. It would seem probable that, if Anita's position improves so that she enters phase 3, she should be less at risk, and, subject to appropriate controls, more robust and able to accommodate more serious emotional difficulties than she is able to do at the moment.
All of these considerations have led me to the view that I should not treat the present application simply as an all or nothing application by the mother to be made a party to the proceedings. I should look at the mother's application as a matter to be managed over the next [Redacted] months, until Anita reaches the age of 18.
I propose to make orders that will permit the mother to take part in the regular hearings that occur from time to time for the purpose of reviewing the secure accommodation and related orders, but to do so on a carefully calibrated basis.
Outside that regime, Anita's mother should be able to file a notice of motion in the proceedings, if she wishes to make any particular application in relation to the circumstances of Anita. As I have said above, a notable feature of the present application is that it is only an application to be joined as a party, and is not an application for any particular relief concerning Anita's circumstances. I appreciate that the mother might not be able to afford legal representation, but I will if necessary attempt to assist the mother if she has to make any application in person.
I take the view that the very fact that the mother is Anita's mother gives her a significant claim to the court's consideration when it comes to affording her an opportunity to influence the exercise by the court of its parens patriae jurisdiction in relation to Anita. That is so notwithstanding that the Minister has parental responsibility for Anita. It is so notwithstanding that some conduct on the part of the mother may have contributed to the Children's Court's determination to make the parental responsibility order. It arises out of the fact that the evidence shows that Anita continues to love her mother, and to look to her for immediate and long-term emotional support. It is reinforced by the fact that it is quite possible that in [Redacted] months Anita will need to rely heavily on her mother.
At this stage, however, I do not propose to make an order that the mother be joined as a party. I do not think it is appropriate that the mother be entitled to the evidence that Community Services proposes to provide to the court, save for categories of information that are expressly excluded from that obligation by orders made by the court.
I propose to start simply, and take the matter on a step-by-step basis.
I will make an order that the mother have a right to appear at all future hearings in these proceedings, whether by herself or by her legal representatives. That will be so whether or not the proceedings will be held in closed court (as it is obvious that the mother should not be excluded from court on such applications). I will remain open to applications by the Secretary and the Minister that particular categories of information not be disclosed to the mother by anything that is said or done during court hearings.
At any hearing at which the mother appears I will allow her, or her legal representative, to address the court within reasonable bounds as to any matter that she wishes to put to the court, in particular but not confined to the result of any of her contacts with Anita, or information that she has been provided from time to time by Community Services.
At future hearings I will hear any application by the mother to increase or otherwise change the nature of her involvement in these proceedings. I will permit such applications to be made informally, on the basis that, if Community Services is given inadequate notice of any application, it is likely that an adjournment will be necessary to enable the application properly to be determined.
I am sensitive to the risk that I could impose unwarranted administrative burdens on Community Services by the form of any formal order that I might make concerning the provision of information about Anita to her mother to enable her to participate more fully in future applications, where that information is in addition to the information that Community Services provides to the mother from time to time by means of telephone calls from Anita's case worker, as well as other sources. I have reviewed the form of the detailed evidence that Community Services customarily provides to the court each time an application is made to extend the secure accommodation orders. I accept that it would not be in Anita's interests for many aspects of that evidence to be provided to the mother, particularly at this stage of Anita's progress. It would not be wise for the court arbitrarily to determine which parts of the evidence could safely be given to the mother. I do not think it is warranted that the court impose upon Community Services the burden of requiring its consultants to provide a justification for parts of the evidence not being provided to the mother, as a condition to Community Services' entitlement to withhold that evidence from the mother. I do not think that it is warranted unduly to increase the administrative burden on Community Services.
As I have already said, I propose to start conservatively and approach the involvement of the mother in these proceedings on a step-by-step basis, which may involve some trial and error. I will remain open to suggestions from the Secretary and the Minister, the independent legal representative, and the mother, as to adjustments that should be made to the approach that I will initially implement. I will attempt to deal with issues as informally as possible. It goes with out saying that I will expect everybody involved to approach the court's continuing role in the care for Anita on a positive, cooperative, and non-adversarial basis, which is guided at all stages by the concern that the only thing that is important is that Anita's interests are paramount.
I propose to make the following orders at this stage of the proceedings. As there is significant novelty in the proposed orders, I will hear from the Secretary and the Minister, Anita's independent legal representative, and the mother, when the matter is next before the court on 10 October 2014, if they wish to suggest any variations to the proposed orders, and will make appropriate orders at that time. The proposed orders are:
(1)I order that Anita's mother be given one month's notice by the Secretary of all future hearings before the court in this matter, unless shorter notice is made necessary by the need for some urgent application to be made.
(2)I order that the Secretary cause Community Services to provide brief information to Anita's mother at the time notice of future hearings is given, concerning the circumstances of Anita since the last date the proceedings were before the court.
(3)The information that Community Services is required to provide to Anita's mother shall be within the discretion of Community Services (or the Secretary or the Minister, as the case may be), and shall be brief (having regard to all other information that has been provided to Anita's mother during the period) and shall be prepared on the basis that it does not involve the application of undue administrative resources on the part of Community Services, or disclose any information that Community Services believes it is not in Anita's interests to disclose.
(4)The information that Community Services is required to provide to Anita's mother shall also be provided to the court at the same time as further evidence is delivered to the court in respect of the forthcoming hearing.
(5)The Secretary and the Minister are not required to serve on Anita's mother the evidence that will be provided to the court and served on Anita's independent legal representative.
(6)Anita's mother's notice of motion filed on 12 May 2014 is adjourned part heard, on the basis that it will be listed before the court at the time of all future hearings in the proceedings, until such time as the court makes orders in respect of the notice of motion, or dismisses it.
(7)I direct that no further hearing in respect of any relief claimed in Anita's mother's notice of motion will occur unless Anita's mother gives to the Secretary and the Minister, and Anita's independent legal representative, at least two weeks' notice of her intention to proceed upon the notice of motion at a particular hearing of these proceedings before the court.
(8)I reserve the costs of Anita's mother's notice of motion.
(9)I order that Anita's mother may attend court on any future hearing in these proceedings, both by herself and by her legal representative, and participate in those proceedings notwithstanding any order that the proceedings be conducted in closed court (unless a particular order is made by the court that Anita's mother not be present or participate in any aspect of the hearing), notwithstanding that Anita's mother has not for the time being been made a party to these proceedings.
(10)I give leave to the Secretary and the Minister, to Anita's independent legal representative, and to Anita's mother to apply to the court, including as to any variation of these orders and directions, on 7 days' notice.
(11)I order that these reasons for judgment not be published pending further order of the court, and will consider on 10 October 2014 whether or not that prohibition should be lifted.
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