Re Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union; Ex parte Adamson

No judgment structure available for this case.

Re: IN THE MATTER OF THE CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION ACT, 1904
And: IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ROBERT McCOLL ADAMSON FOR AN INQUIRY
INTO AN ELECTION FOR AN OFFICE IN THE AMALGAMATED METALS FOUNDRY AND
SHIPWRIGHTS UNION
N.S.W. No. 28 of 1984
Industrial Law
4 FCR 319
8 IR 410

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Gray J.(1)

CATCHWORDS

Industrial Law - registered organisations - inquiry into election - preliminary question - whether reasonable ground for the application exists - whether subpoenas proper - whether facts relied on constitute an irregularity - misleading of voters.

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 s. 159., s. 118C., s. 4., s. 133 AA

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s. 25

Re Applications by O'Dowd and Sullivan for Inquiries into an Election in the Commonwealth Bank Officers' Association, Federal Court of Australia, Gray J., 4th September 1984, unreported

State of Victoria v. Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation (1982) 41 A.L.R. 71

Re Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union of Australia; ex parte Huxtable (1979) 40 F.L.R. 418

Re Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union; ex parte Wilson (1979) 28 A.L.R. 330

Re Penhallurick (1983) 51 A.L.R. 589

Re Federated Clerks Union of Australia, Re Callaghan (1984) 6 I.R. 258

Re Election for Office in Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (1973) 20 F.L.R. 407

Leveridge v. Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1977) 31 F.L.R. 385

Woodward v. Sarsons (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 733

Evans v. Crichton-Browne (1981) 147 C.L.R. 169

Consandine v. Strathfield Municipal Council (1981) 44 L.G.R.A. 435

Industrial Law - Arbitration (Commonwealth) - Organisations - Elections - Inquiry by court - Reasonable grounds - Irregularities - What constitutes - Misleading of voters - Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), s 4(1) (definition of "irregularity"), ss 159, 165(1).

HEADNOTE

Held: (1) The definition of "irregularity" contained in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), s 4(1) is not exhaustive.

Re Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union of Australia; Ex parte Huxtable (1979) 40 FLR 418; Re Rayner (1983) 5 IR 170; Re Penhallurick (1983) 5 IR 470; Re Federated Clerks Union of Australia; Re Callaghan (1984) 6 IR 258, followed.

Re Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union; Ex parte Wilson (1979) 28 ALR 330, dicta at 336, not followed.

(2) Where a court pursuant to s 165(1) of the Act has to determine whether any irregularity has occurred in or in connection with an election the court will have regard to the statutory definition of the word "irregularity" as well as its ordinary and natural meaning and the likely effect of the act or omission on the result of the election concerned.

Woodward v. Sarsons (1875) IR 10 CP 733 at 743; Bridge v. Bowen (1916) 21 CLR 582; Hay v. Australian Workers Union (1944) 53 CAR 108 at 125-126, considered.

(3) The misleading of potential voters by the publication of misleading propaganda may constitute an irregularity.

Re Penhallurick (1983) 5 IR 470 at 474-475, applied.

HEARING

1984, July 6, 16; October 23; November 2. #DATE 2:11:1984

MOTION

By notice of motion the applicant sought the dismissal of an application to inquire into an election for alleged irregularity within the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), s 165(1).

M F Moore, for the applicant.

J L Trew QC and J McCarthy, for the respondent.

J Ryan QC and J W Shaw, for the Organisation.

Cur adv vult

Solicitors for the applicant: Geoffrey Edwards & Co.

Solicitors for the respondent: T V Martin & Co.

Solicitors for the Organisation: Turner Freeman & Co.

BAG

ORDER

The application for the relief sought in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the notice of motion dated 17th September 1984 is dismissed.
The inquiry is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Orders accordingly

JUDGE1

Between 23rd January and 17th February 1984, a ballot was conducted for the election of one person to hold the office of National Organiser-Division 4, within the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union ("the Organisation"). The candidates were Robert McColl Adamson and Charles Karoly Bali. The election was conducted by an officer of the Australian Electoral Commission pursuant to a request made under s. 170 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 ("the Act"). Upon the declaration of the ballot, Mr. Bali was the successful candidate.

Before the result of the ballot was declared, Mr. Adamson filed with the Industrial Registrar a purported application pursuant to Part IX of the Act, for an inquiry into the election. The Industrial Registrar purported to refer that application to the Court on 27th February 1984. It became matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984 in the Court. Thereafter, various documents were filed, and various interlocutory steps were taken, upon the footing that an inquiry had been instituted, or was deemed to have been instituted, pursuant to s. 159(4)(a) of the Act.
In particular, subpoenas were issued, directed to Mr. Bali, and to one Ralph Benson Marsh, calling upon them to produce documents. Each of Mr. Bali and Mr. Marsh applied to the Court by notice of motion to set aside the subpoena directed to him, and to seek to have the purported inquiry terminated, on the basis that no reasonable ground existed for the application. Argument was heard on these matters, and the Court reserved its judgment.
It then came to the attention of the Court, and the parties, that the statutory declaration which accompanied that application to the Industrial Registrar had been made pursuant to the Oaths Act 1900, an Act of the Parliament of New South Wales. Doubt arose as to whether this was a sufficient compliance with the requirement of s. 159(2)(d) of the Act that an application "be accompanied by a statutory declaration". This doubt was subsequently confirmed by the decision in Re Applications by O'Dowd and Sullivan for Inquiries into an Election in the Commonwealth Bank Officers' Association, Federal Court of Australia, Gray J., 4th September 1984, unreported.
On 30th August 1984, a further application was lodged with the Industrial Registrar. It was referred to the Court by him on 5th September 1984, and forms the basis of the present inquiry. Counsel for Mr. Bali argued that this new application was lodged with the Industrial Registrar outside the relevant limitation period laid down by s. 159(5) of the Act. This argument was rejected in a judgment delivered on 5th October 1984.
New subpoenas have been issued and served on Mr. Bali and Mr. Marsh, bearing the number of the present matter. A notice of motion dated 17th September 1984 has been filed in the present matter. It seeks the determination of a preliminary question whether the facts relied on by the Applicant constitute an irregularity within the meaning of the Act, a determination that there is no reasonable ground for the application for an inquiry, and the setting aside of the subpoena directed to Mr. Bali.
On 23rd October 1984, after hearing the parties, I formally dismissed the purported application in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984, for reasons similar to those given in the O'Dowd and Sullivan case, referred to above. By consent of the parties, I made the following orders in the present matter, which are similar to those purportedly made in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984:

1. The Court determines that the following irregularities occurred in the election for the position of National Organiser-Division 4 in the Amalgamated Metals Foundry & Shipwrights Union, the results of which were declared on or about 1st March 1984:

(i) Four ballot papers in South Australia and two ballot papers in Western Australia were wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer on the basis that the number on the rear of the envelope addressed to the Returning Officer containing the ballot papers could not be read whereas the numbers could be read.

(ii) One completed ballot paper in New South Wales was wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer on the basis that it was returned to the Returning Officer in an envelope which contained another ballot paper which was unmarked.

(iii) Eight ballot papers in New South Wales, two ballot papers in Victoria, three ballot papers in Queensland and two ballot papers in Western Australia were wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer on the basis that a tick marked for one candidate a "2" marked for the other candidate did not evidence a preference for a candidate.

2. The Court notes that the parties agree that the irregularities set out in paragraph 1 of this Order did not nor were likely to affect the results of the election the subject of the present application.

On the same day, I dispensed with the need for Mr. Marsh to file a notice of motion, the position being that if the subpoena directed to Mr. Bali is to be set aside, it is apppropriate that the subpoena directed to Mr. Marsh should meet the same fate. By consent of the parties, I also directed that the documents filed in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984 be treated as if they had been filed in the present matter, and that the evidence and submissions on the notices of motion in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984 be treated as evidence and submissions on the notice of motion dated 17th September 1984 in the present matter.
In the Application, the Particulars of Alleged Irregularities are as follows:

"1. The conduct, including advertisements, on behalf of
a candidate in the election was misleading and misled
voters in the election and thereby caused them to alter
their votes, or refrain from voting, which change in
voting intention affected the result of the election.

2. A candidate in the election engaged in conduct
(including an act, ommission or other means) the effect
of which is and was to hinder or prevent the full
recording of votes by all persons entitled to vote and
the correct ascertainment or declaration of the rules of
the voting and/or which constituted an irregularity.

3. A candidate in the election, by the use of funds
and resources of persons external to the union engaged in
conduct the effect of which was and is to hinder or
prevent the full recording of votes by all persons
entitled to vote and the correct ascertainment or
declaration of the results of the voting and/or which
constituted an irregularity."
In the Application, reliance was placed upon three pamphlets allegedly distributed by or on behalf of Mr. Bali as part of his election campaign. In addition, reference was made to newspaper advertisements in mass circulation daily papers, supporting Mr. Bali. Copies of the pamphlets and one newspaper advertisement were annexed to the application. One pamphlet showed a photograph of Mr. Bali, together with Mr. Marsh and the Prime Minister, Mr. Hawke. It bore the words "Vote: FOR BALI - AND GENUINE LABOR LEADERSHIP" in large type. In smaller type were the words "Vote: Against Adamson - and Carmichael's Control". The pamphlet urged voters to vote now and showed a How to Vote card with a first preference for Mr. Bali. The second pamphlet contained no photograph; its text was largely directed to allegations that the Organization was led by communists, particularly Mr. Carmichael, the Assistant National Secretary. In the text appeared the following words:

"As a member of the A.M.F.S.U. Rank-and-File Committee, I have set out to give a lead to A.L.P. members and supporters in our Union to change the present Communist and pro-Communist leadership. It is time for a change."

The pamphlet urged voters to vote for Mr. Bali. At its foot, in larger type appeared the words "AND RETURN THE A.M.F.S.U. TO GENUINE LABOR LEADERSHIP". The third pamphlet was quite a lengthy document. On its front was a large photograph of Mr. Bali shaking hands with Mr. Hawke. The next page was largely devoted to allegations about Mr. Adamson's record as a member of the Communist Party. It contained an exhortation to vote for Mr. Bali "FOR GENUINE LABOR LEADERSHIP"; these words appeared in large type. The third page was devoted to the history and qualities of Mr. Bali. It contained, in large type, the words "A RECORD OF GENUINE LABOR LEADERSHIP", and details of Mr. Bali's history within the Australian Labor Party. The fourth page bore three photographs, one of Mr. Marsh, one of Mr. Bali and one of Mr. Hawke. Most of the text was in the form of a message from Mr. Marsh in the following terms:

"Australia has a new Federal Labor Government under Bob Hawke. We also need genuine Labor union leaders who can work in harmony with the Government for economic recovery and job creation. The Communist influence in the leadership of the A.M.F.S.U. is responsible for the worst unemployment our members have ever faced. I believe that Bob Hawke can turn the tide, but only if we elect union leaders who will give him a fair go. This is why I strongly urge you to vote for Charlie Bali."

Underneath the quote were the words in large type 'VOTE FOR A LABOR UNION LEADER TO BACK A LABOR GOVERNMENT".

The newspaper advertisement contained the same photograph of Mr. Bali shaking hands with Mr. Hawke as did the third pamphlet. Underneath the photograph was the text:

"There are two candidates: Charlie Bali, a labor man with a long history of service to the A.L.P. and Bob Adamson, former Newcastle District President of the Communist Party and National Committeeman."

There followed, in larger type the words:

"IF YOU'RE A LABOR SUPPORTER YOU'LL VOTE FOR BALI".

With respect to these pamphlets and the advertisement, the following allegations were made in the Application:

"8. The effect of annexures "A", "B", "C" and "D" was to mislead voters, or intending voters, into the belief that Robert McColl Adamson, as part of the leadership of the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union was opposed to the election of the current Federal Government under the leadership of R J L Hawke.

9. The effect of the aforesaid annexures were also that Robert McColl Adamson, as part of the leadership of the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwright Union was opposed to the agreement between the Trade Union Movement and the Federal Government known as the "A.L.P./A.C.T.U. Accord".

10. The effect of the aforesaid annexures was that voters, or potential voters, were misled into thinking that the candidate whose candidature was supported in the aforesaid annexures was endorsed either officially or unofficially, by the Australian Labor Party and/or Mr. R J L Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia.

11. It is not true that any candidate whose candidature was supported by the abovementioned annexures was endorsed, either officially or unofficially, by the Australian Labor Party or by Mr. R J L Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia.

12. It is not true that Robert McColl Adamson and/or the leadership of the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union were opposed to the election of the incumbent Federal Government, nor is it true that they were opposed to the "A.L.P./A.C.T.U. Accord".

13. The effect of the annexures referred to above was that persons eligible to vote were misled and either voted contrary to their true intentions in the absence of such misleading material, or failed to register a vote because of the misleading material.

14. The funds necessary for the provision of advertisements and pamphlets on behalf of that person whose candidature was supported in annexures "A", "B", "C", and "D" was provided by persons or organisations outside the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union and who have a purpose inconsistent with bona fide trade unionism and the democratic control of organisations by their members. Such funding from bodies outlined is contrary to the objects of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 as amended and specifically Objects (e) and (f) of that Act, and is an irregularity in the elections."

The Application was in the same terms as that in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984. By letter dated 27th March 1984, the solicitors acting for Mr. Bali requested further and better particulars of the application in that earlier matter. So far as is relevant, this request was in the following terms:

"1. In respect of the alleged irregularities cited in the Application, is it alleged that there has been a breach of the Rules of the Organisation?

2. If the answer to 1. above is in the affirmative, specify the Rule or Rules which are alleged to have been breached.

3. If the answer to 1. above is in the affirmative, what facts and matters are relied upon in the Application and the Annexures thereto to support such an allegation?

4. To the extent that it is not particularised in the reply to paragraph 3. above, please specify what part of each Annexure is relied upon to support the allegation of a breach of the Rules of the Organisation.

5. In respect of the alleged irregularities cited in the Application, is it alleged that there has been any act, ommission or other means whereby the full and free recording of votes by all persons entitled to record votes, and by no other persons, or a correct ascertainment or declaration of the result of the voting is, or is attempted to be, hindered or prevented?

6. If the answer to 5. above is in the affirmative, what facts and matters are relied upon in the Application and Annexures thereto to support such allegations?

7. To the extent that it is not particularised in the reply to 6. above, please specify what part of each Annexure to the Application is relied upon to support the allegation of such irregularity.

8. Is it alleged that any other irregularity occurred in or in connection with the subject election other than the irregularities alleged in the Application?

9. If the answer to 8. above is in the affirmative, what is the nature of such further irregularities?

10. If the answer to 8. above is in the affirmative, please specify the facts and matters relied upon in the Application and Annexures to establish such irregularity.

11. To the extent that it is not particularised in the reply to the preceding paragraph, please specify what part of each Annexure is relied upon to support the allegation of such an irregularity."

By letter dated 30th March 1984, the solicitors acting for Mr. Adamson supplied the following particulars:

"1. No.

2. Not relevant.

3. Not relevant.

4. Not relevant.

5. Yes.

6. This request, on one view, seeks to confine the Applicant to facts and matters in the Application. The facts and matters presently known to the Applicant which support the allegations in the Application are as follows:-

(i) Mr. Bali distributed election material which was misleading and was likely to mislead members of the AMFSU voting in the election.

(ii) In particular, Mr. Bali or his agent caused to be posted to members of the AMFSU voting in the election two pamphlets which were misleading and was likely to mislead members of the AMFSU voting in the election.

(iii) Voters were induced by the advertisement into voting for Mr. Bali in the mistaken belief that Mr. Bob Hawke was supporting Mr. Bali.

(iv) Mr. Bali or his agent or agents spent in excess of an estimated ninety thousand dollars distributing the material referred to in (ii) above.

(v) Prior to the election the subject of this Application, the National Civic Council and/or the membership of that association or part of it have provided financial support for candidates in elections in the AMFSU.

(vi) The funds referred to in paragraph (iv) above or part of them were provided by the National Civic Council and/or the membership of that association or part of it.

7. It is not possible to isolate any part or parts of the annexures as they have to be read as a whole.

8. Yes.

9.

&

10. (i) The matters referred to in the Application are irregularities as defined in the Act in addition to being irregularities of the type referred to in that part of the definition commencing with the word "includes" and concluding with the word "hindered".

(ii) It is also alleged that the following irregularities occurred:

(a) Ballot papers on which a vote had already been recorded were received by the members of the AMFSU who were entitled to vote;

(b) More than one ballot paper were received by individual members of the AMFSU who were entitled to vote;

(c) The Returning Officer failed to conduct the election in accordance with the rules. In particular, he failed to comply with rule 7(f) (i) by using more than one private post box at a post office;

(d) Further, the Returning Officer failed to comply with rule 7(g) by failing to forward an envelope clearly addressed to the Returning Officer at the private post box.

11. In relation to 9. and 10.(i) see 7 above: otherwise not relevant."

On 27th April 1984, Mr. Adamson filed in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984 Points of Claim in the following terms:

"1. The Applicant is a member of the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union ("the A.M.F.S.U.").

2. Between 23rd January, 1984 and 17th February, 1984 a ballot was conducted for the election of a person to fill the position of National Organizer, Division 4.

3. The candidates in the election were the Applicant and Charles Bali.

4. During the course of the election, pamphlets were distributed by post to all or virtually all members of the A.M.F.S.U. eligible to vote.

5. The election pamphlets referred to in point 4 above were misleading in that:

(i) (a) They suggested Bali had the personal support or endorsement of Mr. Hawke;

(b) They suggested that Bali had the support of the A.L.P.;

(c) They suggested that Bali was an endorsed A.L.P. candidate; or

(d) They suggested Bali's political allegiances were to the A.L.P. and his policies were to be those of the A.L.P.;

(e) They suggested that a vote for Bali was a vote in support of the A.L.P.

WHEREAS:

(ii) (a) Bali did not have the personal support or endorsement of Mr. Hawke;

(b) Bali did not have the support of the A.L.P.;

(c) Bali was not an endorsed A.L.P. candidate;

(d) Bali's political allegiances were not to the A.L.P. and his policies were not to be those of the A.L.P.;

(e) Bali was a candidate supported by and whose campaign was substantially funded by the National Civic Council, its members and supporters, and that the objectives of that organization are contrary to the interests of the A.L.P.

6. Voters were likely to have been misled by the pamphlets and/or induced to vote for Bali by them.

7. The publication of the pamphlets was an irregularity as defined by the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 as amended.

8. Sufficient voters were or may have been misled and/or induced to vote for Bali that the result of the election may have been affected.

9. In the conduct of the ballot:

(i) Some eligible voters received more than one ballot paper.

(ii) Some eligible voters received a ballot paper already marked with a vote.

(iii) In the State of New South Wales, envelopes were sent to voters on which the post box return address was overstamped with another number so that some or all of such envelopes (with the enclosed ballot paper) were not or may not have been returned to the Returning Officer.

(iv) The Returning Officer wrongly rejected the votes of those voters where the identifying number on the return envelope was obliterated.

10. Each of (i) to (iv) in point 9 above, is an irregularity as defined by the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 as amended.

11. Having regard to the irregularities referred to in point 9 above and that similar irregularities may have occurred, the results of the election may have been affected.

12. The Applicant claims that:

(i) The Court declare that irregularities referred to above have occurred;

(ii) The Court declares the election void and Mr. Bali not elected."

Mr. Adamson also swore and filed in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984 an affidavit on 10th May 1984. Exhibited to that affidavit were copies of the same three pamphlets and the newspaper advertisement as were annexed to the application. The affidavit contained the following:

"3. From inquiries made by me of my supporters in various State branches of the Organisation I believe that the pamphlets were sent to all, or nearly all members of the Union in Australia and that each member was sent two pamphlets by separate mail during the conduct of the ballot in January and February 1984.

4. I estimate that with over 100 000 members in the Union the postage cost for the dissemination of the pamphlets would have been at least $60 000.00 with further costs for printing, paper and envelopes.

...

6. I believe that a campaign was conducted by, or on behalf of the other candidate, Charles Bali, which was likely to confuse the persons entitled to vote in the election as to the very nature of the election itself by creating an impression that the Australian Labor Party and the Labor Prime Minister of Australia were supporting and/or endorsing the candidature of Mr. Bali.

7. It is my belief, based on my experience in the trade union movement, that it is not the practice or policy of the Australian Labor Party to interfere in the conduct of trade union elections by selecting or endorsing candidates.

8. It is my further belief that the popularity of Mr. R.J. Hawke has been recently measured in polls as being at a record or near records level and that he would attract an even higher level of support and popularity in a section of the population such as the membership of the A.M.F.S.U.

9. It is my belief that a large number of voters unacqainted with either candidate in the election would cast their votes principally on the basis and in the mistaken belief that one candidate was supported by the Prime Minister and the Australian Labor Party just as in a Federal or State Government election they would vote for whichever person was the endorsed A.L.P. candidate.

10. In January 1984, during the course of the election I was informed by officers of the Organisation that inquiries had been made by them of office holders of the Australian Labor Party seeking information as to the attitude of the A.L.P. to the support by the A.L.P. of candidates in an election in the Organisation. I was informed by such officers that office holders of the A.L.P. have stated that the Party had not endorsed any candidates and was not supporting any candidate in the election..."

Annexed to the affidavit were telex messages and letters from various officials of the Australian Labor Party to the effect that that party did not endorse candidates in elections within trade unions, and disavowing any endorsement by the Australian Labor Party of Mr. Bali. The affidavit continued:

"11. I believe that the following resolution was passed at the 1963 A.L.P. conference in the following terms:-

"Conference believes that industrial legislation should provide for Trade Unions to properly determine their own internal policies in accordance with their rules and constitutions, and deplores interference in Trade Union activities by any Government, outside individuals or Organisations. Conference accordingly calls upon all Trade Unionists to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of another Trade Union." and that this resolution remains part of the policy of the Australian Labor Party.

12. I became aware of articles published in the press in January and February 1984 which referred to statements made from the office of the Prime Minister and which claimed that the Prime Minister did not support any candidate in the election and that the photographs of the Prime Minister and Mr. Bali used in the said election material were not taken in circumstances where the Prime Minister was aware that they were to be used in the said election pamphlets..."

Also annexed to the affidavit were several newspaper articles supporting the propositions put forward in the last-mentioned paragraph. The affidavit continued:

"13. In or about January 1984 I became aware that the election material disseminated for or on behalf of the candidate Mr. Bali had become a matter of debate within the Australian Council of Trade Unions. I am informed and verily believe that the Secretary of the A.C.T.U., Mr. Bill Kelty, was, as a consequence of that debate, delegated by the A.C.T.U. to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister..."

A letter from Mr. Kelty was annexed to the affidavit, stating the attitude of the Australian Council of Trade Unions to the use of the photographs by Mr. Bali. The affidavit continued:

"14. Prior to the election in January and February 1984 I had become aware that the National Civic Council may be involved in the Organisation through a group calling itself the "Reform Group".

15. I am aware that the candidate Bali styled himself as a member of the Reform Group and it is my belief that the campaign conducted on his behalf was financed in whole or in part by the National Civic Council or its supporters..."

A bundle of documents purporting to show the activities of the National Civic Council, its members and supporters, within trade unions, including the Organization was annexed to the affidavit. The affidavit continued:

"16. I say that to the best of my knowledge and belief the National Civic Council is a body proscribed by the Australian Labor Party. I believe that this proscription means that no person who is known to be a member of the National Civic Council may hold membership in the Australian Labor Party.

17. I say that to the best of my knowledge and belief voters in the election were sent election propaganda likely to mislead them, when casting their votes, into a mistaken belief that one of the candidates was endorsed or supported by the Prime Minister and the Australian Labor Party, that this conduct is likely to have affected the result of the election and that the extent of the deception achieved by the said conduct would be aggravated should the inquiry herein establish as a matter of fact that the funds used to perpetrate the deception upon voters were provided by members or supporters of a body proscribed by the Australian Labor Party itself."

The subpoena directed to Mr. Bali seeks production of the following documents:

"1. All letters or like documents or copies thereof from the Australian Labor Party or any Branch thereof or any officer or representative of the Australian Labor Party or any Branch thereof relating to your candidature in the election the subject of this application received by you before the close of the ballot in the election.

2. All letters, telexes or like documents or copies thereof to or from the National Civic Council, its officers or representatives:-

(i) which relate in whole or in part to the election the subject of this application;

(ii) those which relate in whole or in part to funds from which money was expended on the said election by you or on your behalf.

3. All books of account relating to the funds from which monies were expended on your campaign in the election for an office in the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union being National Organiser, held in early 1984.

4. In particular, all cheque books (including butts), ledger books, bank statements and like document recording or noting income received for and expenditure made on the said campaign.

5. All invoices, receipts and like documents relating to moneys expended on the said campaign.

6. All receipts or copies thereof or receipt butts relating to the receipt of money which became funds or part of funds from which money was expended on the said campaign.

7. All lists or like records listing or recording amounts being contributions of money and/or persons making contributions of money which became funds or part of funds from which money was expended on the said campaign.

8. All letters, telexes or like documents or copies thereof to or from the National Civic Council, its officers or representatives which:-

(i) relate in whole or in part to the said campaign;

(ii) without limiting the generality of the foregoing relate to the funds from which money was expended on the said campaign.

9. Any retained originals or copies of any leaflet, broadsheet, standard form letter or like document sent by you or on your behalf or at your request soliciting money which would have or may have become funds or part of funds from which money might have been expended on the said campaign.

10. Any list or like records prepared, received or retained by you or on your behalf for the purpose of listing or recording people to whom a leaflet or like document of the type referred to in paragraph 7. above would or could be sent."

The subpoena directed to Mr. Marsh seeks production of the following documents:

"1. All books of account relating to the funds from which moneys were expended on the campaign of Charles Bali in the election for an office in the Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union being National Organiser, held in early 1984.

2. In particular, all cheque books (including butts), ledger books, bank statements and like documents recording or noting income received for and expenditure made on the said campaign.

3. All invoices, receipts and like documents relating to moneys expended on the said campaign.

4. All receipts or copies thereof or receipt butts relating to the receipt of money which became funds or part of funds from which money was expended on the said campaign.

5. All lists or like records listing or recording amounts being contributions of money and/or persons making contributions of money which became funds or part of funds from which money was expended on the said campaign.

6. All letters, telexes or like documents or copies thereof to or from the National Civic Council, its officers or representatives which:-

(i) relate in whole or in part to the said campaign;

(ii) without limiting the generality of the foregoing relate to the funds from which money was expended on the said campaign.

7. Any retained originals or copies of any leaflet, broadsheet, standard form letter or like document sent by you or on your behalf or at your request soliciting money which would have or may have become funds or part of funds from which money might have been expended on the said campaign.

8. Any list or like records prepared, received or retained by you or on your behalf for the purpose of listing or recording people to whom a leaflet or like document of the type referred to in paragraph 7. above would or could be sent."

In accordance with the direction made by consent, I treat as filed in this matter the letter dated 27th March 1984, the letter dated 30th March 1984, the Points of Claim and the affidavit of Mr. Adamson dated 10th May 1984, to all of which I have referred. In the original argument before me in matter N.S.W. No. 7 of 1984, which was on 6th and 16th July 1984, Mr. Trew Q.C., with Mr. McCarthy, appeared for Mr. Bali to move the Court; Mr. Moore of Counsel appeared for Mr. Adamson, and Mr. Ryan Q.C. with Mr. Shaw appeared for the Organisation. I treat their submissions as having been made to the Court in the present matter.
I have set out as fully as is possible the material which was before the Court on the hearing of these motions. On a preliminary motion such as this, in which an attempt is made to bring about the end of a proceeding without the hearing of full evidence, it is important that a full examination be made of the applicant's allegations. At this stage, the question is whether those allegations, assuming them to be true, constitute an arguable case. The equivalent in an ordinary proceeding is a motion to strike out on the ground that no cause of action is shown. In substance, Mr. Trew conceded that if an arguable case exists, the inquiry must continue. He did, however, invite me to consider for myself the question whether persons voting or likely to vote in the election would actually have been likely to be misled by the pamphlets and the newspaper advertisements. I do not regard it as appropriate at this stage that I should reach any conclusion about this matter. Any finding that the Court ultimately makes as to whether voters were, or were likely to have been, misled may depend upon evidence from persons claiming to have been misled in fact. Without hearing any such evidence, or assessing its weight, the Court cannot and should not attempt to form any view as to the effect of the propaganda. Accordingly, for the purpose of dealing with the motions before the Court, I adopt the assumption that the material concerned was capable of misleading and likely to mislead persons voting or likely to vote in the election. The crucial question is whether it is arguable that such misleading amounted to an irregularity.

Fundamental to the submissions put by Mr. Trew on behalf of Mr. Bali is the proposition that the definition of the word "irregularity" in s. 4(1) of the Act is, despite its use of the word "includes", an exhaustive definition. Also raised is the question whether, whatever the extent of the definition of "irregularity" in the Act, the misleading of voters in an election within an organization can constitute an irregularity for the purposes of Part IX of the Act. In the course of argument, the question arose whether I should take steps to have these important issues determined by a Full Court. It was suggested that the authorities were in conflict as to the proper construction of the definition of "irregularity" and that there is a dearth of authority on whether the potential misleading of voters can amount to an irregularity.
These issues arise before me in two ways. In the first place, Mr. Bali's notice of motion dated 17th September 1984 seeks to terminate the inquiry, on the basis that no proper allegation of an irregularity is raised by reference to the allegedly misleading nature of Mr. Bali's election propaganda. The powers given to the Court by order 29 rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules and by s. 159(4)(b) of the Act are invoked. In the second place, Mr. Bali applies by way of notice of motion to set aside the subpoena directed to him upon the footing that the documents sought cannot be relevant to any issue properly before the Court.
It is clear that s. 118C of the Act would give me power to refer the whole of the inquiry to a Full Court. Despite the important nature of the issues raised, I am reluctant to take this step. If the inquiry does proceed beyond this stage, it may involve a lengthy trial of fact. Experience has shown that such a trial is more satisfactorily conducted before a single judge, rather than before a Full Court. In addition, it seems to me to be undesirable to tie up so much of the resources of the Court as would be needed to constitute a Full Court for what may be a long period. There does not seem to be any power in a Full Court to determine part only of a matter referred to it pursuant to s. 118C, and to remit the balance of the matter to a single judge of the Court for determination. Nor does there appear to be any power in a Full Court to commit to a single judge the duty of finding the facts necessary for the determination of a proceeding by the Full Court. Accordingly, I regard a reference of the inquiry pursuant to s. 118C of the Act as too cumbersome a procedure in the circumstances of this case.
The question then arises whether I should state a case on the particular issues for determination by a Full Court. The power of a single judge of this Court to state a case for determination by a Full Court is found in s. 25(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. Under that provision, a case may be stated or a question reserved "concerning a matter with respect to which an appeal would lie" from a single judge to a Full Court. By virtue of s. 118B(1)(a) of the Act, an appeal does not lie to a Full Court from a judgment or order of a single judge of this Court in proceedings under Part IX of the Act. This inquiry is, of course, conducted pursuant to Part IX. No power exists, therefore, for me to state a case or reserve a question for the Full Court in the inquiry.
It was then argued by Mr. Trew, in written submissions forwarded by him after the close of argument on 16th July 1984, that an application by notice of motion to set aside a subpoena is a separate matter or proceeding from the inquiry, and therefore it does not arise under Part IX of the Act. Mr. Trew pointed to the powers of the Court in relation to practice and procedure under s. 38 and the powers given to the judges to make rules under s. 59 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, as well as to the provisions of order 27 of the Federal Court Rules. Reference might also be made to the general power of the Court to grant orders and to direct the issue of writs in matters within its jurisdiction, given by s. 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. Order 27 rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules gives the Court express power "in any proceeding" to issue a subpoena. Order 27 rule 9 provides for the setting aside of a subpoena on motion by the person named in it, after notice of motion. Despite these provisions, there is some support for the view that the issue of a subpoena, and hence any motion to set it aside, is a separate "proceeding", within the definition of that word given by s. 4 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. By that definition, "proceeding" includes an incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connection with, a proceeding. The issue of a subpoena, particularly against a person who is not a party to any proceeding before the Court, might be said to be incidental to or in connection with the proceeding before the Court. A subpoena was, of course, originally a writ issued by a court, commanding the attendance before the court of a person to give evidence or to produce documents. See the passage from the judgment of Jordan C.J. in Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 S.R. (N.S.W.) 564, quoted and followed by Sheppard J. in Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 A.L.R. 21 at page 36. In view of the forms now prescribed in the schedule to the Federal Court Rules for subpoenas, it may be inappropriate to describe a subpoena issued out of this Court as a writ. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that the issue of a subpoena, especially against a stranger to the proceeding in connection with which it is issued, and any motion to set it aside, is a separate proceeding from that to which it is incidental or connected.
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the High Court of Australia in State of Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation (1982) 41 A.L.R. 71. In that case, an injunction had been granted by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, exercising its appellate jurisdiction, to restrain what was found by it to be a threatened contempt of the Court. One of the questions which arose before the High Court of Australia on appeal was whether any right of appeal was barred by s. 118B(2)(a) of the Act, which prevents any appeal to the High Court from an order of a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in a matter arising under, among other provisions, Part VIII of the Act. There was before the Federal Court of Australia, a proceeding under s. 143, which is found in Part VIII of the Act. It was in respect of this proceeding that the alleged contempt was threatened. The High Court held that the injunction was not an order in a matter arising under Part VIII of the Act. It is true that there is a difference in language between s. 118B(1)(a) and s. 118B(2)(a) of the Act; the former refers to "a judgment or order...in proceedings...", while the latter refers to "a judgment, order or sentence...in a matter arising...". However, various members of the Court expressed themselves in terms which suggest that there is a clear distinction to be drawn between orders of the Federal Court of Australia made in the exercise of powers given by the Act, and those given by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. See, for instance, the judgments of Gibbs C.J. at pages 77-78, Stephen J. at page 109, Mason J. at page 110, Aickin J. at page 135, Wilson J. at page 155 and Brennan J. at page 179.
If the motion to set aside the subpoena is a proceeding separate from the election inquiry, then an appeal will lie to the Full Court in respect of that motion, pursuant to s. 24(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, and it would be possible for me to state a case for determination by the Full Court pursuant to s. 25(6). It is, however, unnecessary for me to reach a conclusion on this point. I am of the view that, even if I have power to state a case, in the circumstances of this proceeding, I should not do so. In part, I have reached this conclusion as a result of my examination of the authorities on the question whether the definition of "irregularity" in s. 4(1) of the Act is exhaustive or not. Upon examination, those authorities seem to me to lead in one direction; they include the views of two members of a Full Court on the issue. My examination of the authorities is set out below. I have also been influenced by the probability that delay would result in the conduct of the inquiry if I were to state a case for the determination of any issue by a Full Court. Already, a significant time has elapsed since the election was completed and the completion of the inquiry may be a long way off. It is in the interests of all of the members of the Organization, the candidates themselves, and the public generally that the inquiry should be completed as soon as practicable. Accordingly, if I do have a discretion to state a case for determination by the Full Court, I decline to exercise that discretion by stating a case.
I therefore proceed to an examination of the issues raised by the motion of Mr. Bali. It is appropriate that I should set out the definition of "irregularity" as it appears in s. 4(1) of the Act:

""Irregularity", in relation to an election or ballot, includes a breach of the rules of an organization or of a branch of an organization, and any act, omission or other means whereby the full and free recording of votes by all persons entitled to record votes, and by no other persons, or a correct ascertainment or declaration of the results of the voting is, or is attempted to be, prevented or hindered;"

This definition applies except where otherwise clearly intended, but, as it was obviously inserted for the purposes of Part IX of the Act, it is unlikely that an intention to oust the statutory definition will be found in that Part. Mr. Trew's argument was that, notwithstanding the use of the word "includes" in the definition, the definition was itself exhaustive. He argued that the express definition contained all of the elements which could reasonably be imagined as giving rise to irregularities. I shall return to this argument after an examination of the authorities.

The starting point of any review of what the Court has said about the definition of "irregularity" is inevitably the judgment of Northrop J. in Re Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union of Australia; ex parte Huxtable (1979) 40 FLR 418. In that case, His Honour was required to deal with claims by two persons that they had refrained from nominating for office after receiving advice from the returning officer conducting elections within the Tasmanian Branch of the Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees Union of Australia to the effect that they were not eligible to stand. The issue arose whether this advice, which was incorrect, constituted an irregularity. At page 424, His Honour said:

"The issue remaining to be decided on the preliminary issue is whether the facts assumed for the purposes of submission are capable of constituting an irregularity within the meaning of that word when used in s. 165 of the Act. The word "irregularity" is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (23rd ed. 1972 reprint) as "the quality or state of being irregular; something that is irregular". In the same dictionary, the word "irregular" is defined in relation to things as "not in conformity with rule or principle, contrary to rule; disorderly in action or conduct, anomalous, abnormal."

His Honour then set out the statutory definition and continued (at page 425):

"This provision does not give a definitive meaning to the word "irregular" but extends the meaning, if necessary, to include specific matters. In the present case, the facts assumed for the purpose of submission on the preliminary issue cannot constitute an irregularity within the statutory extended meaning of that word. There has been no breach of the rules of the union or its Tasmanian branch. There has been no act or omission whereby the full and free recording of votes by all persons entitled to record votes, and by no other persons, or a correct ascertainment or declaration of the results of voting is, or is attempted to be, prevented or hindered."

Mr. Trew relied upon this paragraph to argue that, although Northrop J. had said that the statutory definition gave an extended meaning to the word "irregularity" His Honour had resorted to the statutory meaning to determine whether an irregularity had occurred. It is clear, however, that His Honour was looking only at the statutory meaning in this paragraph. In the very next paragraph, His Honour went on to look at the effect of a possible broader meaning of the word "irregularity", in the following terms:

"In the present case, on a finding of facts most favourable to them, the applicants, relying on advice given by the returning officer and which in the result was wrong, did not nominate for any of the offices for which the elections were to be held. In support of his submission, counsel for the applicants submitted that the word "irregularity" should be construed as meaning "any action that has the clear effect of depriving a person of his right to nominate for an office in an election". Even if this meaning is adopted it cannot be said that the advice given by the returning officer via the agency of the branch secretary, deprived the applicants or any of them or any member of the Tasmanian branch of the union of his right to nominate for an office."

As this passage shows, what Northrop J. said about the nature of the statutory definition of "irregularity" may properly be said to have formed part of the reasoning which led to His Honour's decision in that case.

The next case in point of time was Re Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union; ex parte Wilson (1979) 28 ALR 330, decided by Sheppard J. almost eight months after Huxtable, but apparently without the benefit of the citation of Huxtable. Wilson was relied on by Mr. Trew as authority for the proposition that the statutory definition of "irregularity" is exhaustive. At page 336, Sheppard J., after quoting the statutory definition, said:

"The definition, by reason of the use of the word "includes", may not be an exhaustive one, but it is difficult to think of any other type of irregularity that would not be within the definition. The words "any act, omission or other means" are very wide, notwithstanding they are qualified by the words that follow them. No submission was made based on the fact that the definition was an inclusive one and I put that matter aside."

His Honour found that a breach of the Rules had occurred. It is proper, therefore, to regard the comments on the nature of the definition as not essential to His Honour's reasoning. It is also clear from what His Honour said that he did not have the benefit of full argument on the point. Possible situations, which may amount to irregularities without falling within the terms of the statutory definition do not seem to have been drawn to his Honour's attention. Some examples of such situations are given below.

In Re Rayner (1983) 5 IR 170 at page 171, Northrop J. referred to and adhered to what he had said in Huxtable, in the context of determining that the Court has jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into an election conducted under purported rules which have not been certified by the Industrial Registrar in accordance with s. 139(4) of the Act. Because such an election cannot be regarded as having been conducted in breach of any rules, in the sense of enforceable rules, His Honour's remarks may be regarded as essential to his conclusion.
In Re Penhallurick (1983) 51 ALR 589 at page 596, Fitzgerald J. referred to Huxtable and Rayner, as well as to Re Application by Bath for an Inquiry into Elections in the Federated Clerks' Union of Australia, Taxation Officers' Branch (1982) 1 IR 217 and Re Application by Hibbert for an Inquiry into an Election in the Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (unreported, Evatt J., 28th June 1983), in the context of a discussion of another controversy arising out of Wilson, namely the question whether the reference in the statutory definition of "irregularity" to the full and free recording of votes and the correct ascertainment or declaration of the results qualifies so much of the definition as relates to a breach of the rules, as well as the other elements of the definition. His Honour said:

"In part at least, the solution seems to me to be found in a recognition that, as was pointed out in Huxtable's case, the definition of "irregularity" in the Act is not exhaustive but expansive (F.L.R. at 425). Thus, any breach of the rules will be an irregularity, as will be any act, omission or other step which prevents or hinders the full and free recording of votes by all persons entitled to record votes or the correct ascertainment or declaration of the results of the voting. But conduct which may not meet either description may also be an irregularity."

This passage might be said to be part of the reasoning leading to His Honour's conclusion that a breach of the rules of an organization is an irregularity, without regard to its effect on the recording of votes or the ascertainment or declaration of the result.

The most recent case is the decision of the Full Court in Re Federated Clerks Union of Aust.; Re Callaghan (1984) 6 IR 258. In that case, at page 9 of the joint judgment of Northrop and Lockhart JJ., their Honours said that the statutory definition of "irregularity" is not in a definitive form. Their Honours also quoted with approval the passage from the judgment of Northrop J. in Huxtable which contained His Honour's reference to dictionary definitions. It might be said that the comments of Northrop and Lockhart J.J. in Callaghan were not essential to their Honours' reasoning in that case, but those comments are nevertheless of high authority. Nothing said by the third member of the Full Court, Kirby J., detracts in any way from those comments.
That completes an examination of the manner in which this Court has dealt with the question whether the statutory definition of "irregularity" is exhaustive or extensive. There is one earlier decision of the Commonwealth Industrial Court to which reference should be made. In Jutte v Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1967) 10 F.L.R. 195 at page 199, Dunphy J. said "The definition of "irregularity" in s. 4 is not intended to be completely comprehensive."
It will be seen that the authorities lean heavily in favour of the proposition that an irregularity for the purposes of the Act is not limited to the matters appearing in the definition in s. 4(1). The only authority which runs counter to this proposition is the statement of Sheppard J. in Wilson. As I have said, this was a passing statement, not crucial to His Honour's reasoning, and without the benefit of a consideration of the decision of Northrop J. in Huxtable. In my view, I should follow the weight of authority and hold that the statutory definition is not exhaustive.
In addition, there are grounds for regarding this conclusion as correct in principle. It is not difficult to think of instances not clearly covered by the terms of the statutory definition, which could nevertheless be regarded as irregularities in an election.
It is possible to imagine matters which might occur in the process of lodging a nomination, or in the process of acceptance or non-acceptance of a nomination by a returning officer, which could amount to irregularities. These matters may not involve any breach of the rules of the organization concerned. They might be said to be divorced from the process of recording of votes or the correct ascertainment or declaration of the results of voting. The reference to both of these elements seems to assume that there are candidates for and against whom votes can be recorded, and amongst whom a result can be ascertained. If, for instance, without breach of the rules, a returning officer failed to make available any reasonable facility for the receipt of nominations, so that persons who desired to be candidates were prevented from nominating, it would be reasonable to suggest that there was an irregularity in the conduct of the election, although it was not one concerned with the process of recording votes or ascertaining the results of the voting. An example of this kind of irregularity is provided by the decision of Joske J. in Re Election for Office in Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (1973) 20 FLR 407. In that case, the rules of the relevant organization contained no provision as to the period of time which should elapse between the calling of nominations and the closing of nominations. There was evidence of a past practice as to the length of such time, but the practice was departed from in the particular case. Joske J. held that an irregularity had occurred. At page 410, His Honour said:

"It was contended on behalf of the intervener that there was no irregularity in the election since there was no breach of the organizations's rules, they being entirely silent as to notification of calling for nominations of candidates for election and as to the period to be allowed for putting in nominations after notification. Irregularities in the course of conducting an election may occur whether or not the rules of an organization have been broken. Where the rules are silent on a matter, irregularities can easily occur, for example where there is no provision in the rules for the submission of nominations. It is clear from s. 165 of the Act that the court, if it considers an irregularity has occurred with regard to the submission of nominations, may deal with the matter by its order. This contention, therefore, fails.

It was also contended that the evidence of what was usual in the organization was irrelevant and not evidence. However, while there is no rule or form prescribed by the rules of the organization which sets out the time for receipt of nominations nevertheless, as the case of Friend v. Barnes ((1969) 15 FLR 184) shows, the calling for and receiving of nominations are integral parts of an election under the Act. Elections cannot be carried out if such steps be omitted. Once the duty of conducting an election devolves upon a person under s. 170 all the steps involved in the concept of conducting that election must be taken by him. How then is he, in the absence of guidance from rules, to determine the length of time which should elapse between the date of calling for nominations and the date upon which receipt of nominations close? There seems to be only one answer as to this, and that is he must fix a reasonable time. How does he ascertain what is a reasonable time? This may well vary with the circumstances of each union and its members.

...The evidence shows the long-established practice of the organization was to allow seven or eight weeks for the submission of nominations and that the practice was continuing. The evidence objected to, in my opinion, was not irrelevant and was properly admitted."

Mr. Trew endeavoured to argue that this decision should properly be seen as one involving a breach of the rules of the relevant organization. His contention was that, the rules being silent as to the process of nomination, it was necessary to imply into them a term that a reasonable time would be allowed for the lodging of nominations. Without going to the question of the possible difficulties which might lie in attempting to imply such a term into a set of rules which contained no provision as to the process of nomination, it is sufficient to say that Joske J. did not deal with the case in any way on the basis put forward by Mr. Trew.

In some cases, it is necessary for the court to consider the effect of s. 140(1) of the Act in the context of an election inquiry. A nomination may have been rejected on the basis that the person the subject of it failed to comply with some condition laid down in the rules for the acceptance of nominations. That person may then contend that, at the date when his nomination was rejected, the rule laying down the condition was in contravention of s. 140(1). In such a case, if the rule is found to have contravened, there will be held to be an irregularity. This was the very situation which occurred in Leveridge v Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1977) 31 F.L.R. 385. In that case, in dealing with one of the election inquiries which were before the Full Court, Smithers J. at pages 420-1 said:

"Accordingly, if rr. 5 (c) (ii) and 36 (b) were invalid on 4th March, 1977, Mr. Webster was entitled to nominate and the action of the returning officer in rejecting them was taken in error, although of course understandably so. There can be no doubt that such erroneous action would be an irregularity in a step in each election. Although such action may not be one of the items of conduct specified in the definition of "irregularity" in s. 4 of the Act as being included in the relevant meaning of that expression, it was an action inconsistent with the provisions of the rules as they really were. As such, it was an irregularity within the natural meaning of that word in the relevant context."

At page 425, Evatt J. said:

"Being of the opinion that the part of r. 5 (c) (ii) and the part of r. 36 (b) (in so far as they relate to the positions of division delegate to branch conference and branch delegates to national council referred to in r. 36 (a) (i) and 36 (a) (iii) referred to in my judgment in V 4 of 1977 contravene s. 140 (1) of the Act, and being satisfied on the evidence that such contraventions occurred on and immediately before 4th March, 1977, the date on which nominations for election to the said positions closed, I am of the opinion that irregularities within the meaning of s. 165 of the Act occurred in a step in the subject election. Such irregularities were the rejection by the returning officer of the applicants' nominations for election to the said positions on the basis that the applicants had not at the date of the closing of nominations been financial members of the federation for a period of two years immediately preceding that date as apparently then required by branch rr. 5 (c) (ii), 36 (a) (i) and 36 (a)

(iii)."

J.B. Sweeney J. agreed generally with the reasons for judgment of both Smithers and Evatt J.J. Mr. Trew also argued that this situation could be seen as a breach of the rules. It is true that, if the rule which is found to have been in contravention of s. 140(1) is treated as having been void, and therefore as not having existed at the relevant time, the failure to accept a nomination in such a situation might be said to be in breach of the rules. This was certainly not the view expressly taken by the Court in Leveridge, and is too narrow a view. It is possible to envisage situations in which, once a rule is held to have contravened s. 140(1), there are no other relevant rules of the organization concerned to which reference may be had. If that were to occur, it would be strange if the Court were obliged to find that no irregularity existed.

Since the definition of "irregularity" was inserted into s. 4(1) of the Act, by Act No. 28 of 1949, the Parliament has made provision in s. 133AA(2) for regulations to govern the conduct of certain elections in organizations, where the rules of an organization do not provide for a secret postal ballot. These regulations are found in Part VAA of the Concilation and Arbitration Regulations. They contain provisions governing the process of receiving nominations, as well as the processes of recording votes and ascertainment of the results of voting. Naturally, when it inserted the definition of "irregularity", the Parliament cannot be taken to have contemplated these particular regulations. Nevertheless, it would be a strange result if a breach of those regulations which did not involve a breach of the rules of an organization, or any part of the process of recording votes or ascertaining the results of voting, was to be held not to constitute an irregularity. The court should not lean towards a construction of the definition which would exclude such a breach of the regulations from the field which can be covered by an inquiry under Part IX of the Act.
Some assistance in the construction of the definition of "irregularity" is to be derived from a comparison of that definition with others which existed in s. 4 of the Act at the time when Act No. 28 of 1949, which inserted the definition of "irregularity", was passed. Such an examination discloses that some definitions used the word "means", some used the word "includes", and some used "means...and includes...". It must be borne in mind that the Act is not and has not been a model of consistent drafting; it has been amended frequently throughout its history. Nevertheless, use by various persons who drafted amendments of these three methods of definition provides some support for the proposition that, in the case of "irregularity", the word "includes" was chosen deliberately to indicate that the definition which followed was not intended to be exhaustive.
Further assistance is to be derived from the context in which the word "irregularity" is used in Part IX of the Act. As was pointed out by Mr. Moore in argument, the duty of the Court under s. 165(1) of the Act is to inquire into and determine whether any irregularity has occurred "in or in connection with" an election. This is some indication that the Court is required to take a broad view. The powers of the Court under s. 165(3) are extensive. Reference might also be made to s. 170A, which gives a returning officer conducting an election under s. 165A or s. 170 power to take action and give directions to ensure that no irregularities occur "in or in connection with" the election. Again, it is obvious that these powers are intended to be broad. So far as the Court is concerned, its power to make orders is confined by s. 165(4) to a situation in which the result of the election may be or may have been affected by irregularities which the Court has found to exist or to have existed. This provision is at the same time broadening and limiting. It is an indication that the field of potential irregularities is very wide; the Court's inquiry may range over a large area, but it may only alter the course of or overturn the result of an election where there is a likelihood of an unwarranted effect on the result. At the same time, s. 165(4) is an indication that an irregularity is to be regarded as an occurrence or non-occurrence which is in some way connected with the result of an election; the concept of an irregularity, and the concept of its effect on the result of an election, are difficult to divorce. The intention of the legislation seems to be that the Court should have few fetters on its power to inquire into matters where the possibility exists that an election will be or has been improperly interfered with, but that the Court should only have power to make orders in relation to such an election where the result may be, or may have been affected.
For these reasons, I hold that the definition of "irregularity" in s. 4(1) of the Act is not exhaustive.
Upon the footing that the statutory definition is not exhaustive, Mr. Trew put two arguments as to the meaning of "irregularity". To begin with, he directed attention to the various definitions of "irregular" in the Oxford English Dictionary. One of these is said to be an ecclesiastical definition, chiefly in use in relation to the Roman Catholic Church. It is in the following terms:

"Not in conformity with the rule of the Church or of some ecclesiastical order; disqualified for ordination, or for exercise of clerical functions."

Mr. Trew submitted that this use of the word "irregular" in connection with church law, was closer to the use of the expression in the Act than some other senses of the word "irregular" given in the dictionary. The conclusion Mr. Trew sought to draw from this argument was that the meaning of "irregularity" in the Act was limited to any matter contrary to law. The particular definition on which Mr. Trew relied appears in the Oxford English Dictionary under the heading "Technical Senses". The last cited use of the word in this sense in the Oxford English Dictionary was in 1885. It is unlikely that a person drafting statutory provisions using the term "irregularity" in 1949, and inserting a partial definition of the term, would have refrained from defining it exhaustively if the intention had been to restrict the matters the court could look at to those which were contrary to law. There is nothing in the provisions of Part IX of the Act, or in the context of the Act as a whole, to suggest that regard was had to a special, technical meaning of the word "irregular", rather than to the more common meanings referred to by Northrop J. in Huxtable. In my view, no ground exists for confining the meaning of "irregularity" in the manner suggested.

Mr. Trew's second contingency argument was that, if the statutory definition of "irregularity" is not exhaustive, the word is only intended to import what has been described as the "common law of elections". Reliance was placed on a well known passage in Woodward v Sarsons (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 733 at page 743, followed by the High Court in Bridge v Bowen (1916) 21 C.L.R. 582. The passage is in the following terms:

"...we are of opinion that the true statement is that an election is to be declared void by the common law applicable to parliamentary elections, if it was so conducted that the tribunal which is asked to avoid it is satisfied, as matter of fact, either that there was no real electing at all, or that the election was not really conducted under the subsisting election laws. As to the first, the tribunal should be so satisfied, i.e., that there was no real electing by the constituency at all, if it were proved to its satisfaction that the constituency had not in fact had a fair and free opportunity of electing the candidate which the majority might prefer. This would certainly be so, if a majority of the electors were proved to have been prevented from recording their votes effectively according to their own preference, by general corruption or general intimidation or by being prevented from voting by want of the machinery necessary for so voting, as, by polling stations being demolished, or not opened, or by other of the means of voting according to law not being supplied or supplied with such errors as to render the voting by means of them void, or by fraudulent counting of votes or false declaration of numbers by a returning officer, or by other such acts or mishaps. And we think the same result should follow if, by reason of any such or similar mishaps, the tribunal, without being able to say that a majority had been prevented, should be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority of the electors may have been prevented from electing the candidate they preferred. but, if the tribunal should only be satisfied that certain of such mishaps had occurred, but should not be satisfied either that a majority had been, or that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority might have been, prevented from electing the candidate they preferred, then we think that the existence of such mishaps would not entitle the tribunal to declare the election void by the common law of Parliament."

This passage was also quoted by O'Mara J. in Hay v Australian Workers Union (1944) 53 C.A.R. 108 at pages 125-6. In that case, His Honour was faced with the difficult task of resolving complaints about misconduct in an election, before the Act contained any of the provisions which are now found in Part IX. Mr. Trew contended that, if it did not intend to restrict the meaning of "irregularity" by defining that word, the Parliament intended to do no more than import the "common law of elections" into the area of elections in organizations. By reference to the authorities to which I have referred, and to an extract from Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, Mr. Trew sought to say that the concentration of the common law of Parliament was on breaches of the law, and that, accordingly, an irregularity for the purposes of the Act, outside the statutory definition, was restricted to a breach of the law.

There are two difficulties with this proposition. In the first place, it is not clear from Woodward v Sarsons, and the cases in which it has been followed, to what extent the courts would go in saying that there has been "no real electing at all". No court has endeavoured exhaustively to define such a situation, much less to confine it to breaches of the law. Indeed, breaches of the law are referred to as a separate category from that which involves the absence of any real electing.
An aspect which is perhaps more important arises from an examination of the terms of the Act as they relate to elections, and a comparison of the provisions of the Act with those of other legislation relating to elections. It is quite common to find very detailed provisions governing the conduct of parliamentary elections. See, for instance, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, especially Part XVII, which deals with electoral offences. By contrast, in Part IX of the Act, there are few specific provisions governing the conduct of elections in organizations. In addition, there are the provisions in Part VAA of the Regulations, which only apply in the absence of a provision for a secret postal ballot in the rules of an organization; see s. 133AA(2) of the Act. The intention of the legislature in enacting Part IX appears to have been to leave it to the court to decide what are irregularities, subject to the overriding restriction found in s. 165(4). The ingenuity of persons who seek to manipulate the results of elections is great. For the Parliament to seek to meet every possible means of improper manipulation of an election in advance would be an impossible task. To attempt to proscribe specifically every kind of irregularity would require frequent amendment of the legislation, always lagging behind the possible inventiveness of those who seek to corrupt the democratic process. To restrict the meaning of "irregularity" to the matters to which the Parliament has made specific reference in creating offences would, in my view, be far too narrow. In my view, the court is not intended to be hampered by the restricted nature of the offences which are created in s. 171 of the Act. It is intended that the court should be free to determine whether a particular Act or omission is an irregularity, having regard to the statutory definition of that word, its ordinary and natural meaning, and the likely effect of the act or ommission on the result of the election concerned.
For the purposes of the inquiry with which the Court is presently concerned, the crucial question is whether, in the context of the Act, the word "irregularity" in its ordinary and natural meaning includes the making to persons entitled to vote in the election concerned of statements which are likely to mislead or deceive those persons or some of them. I have already referred to the passage in the decision of Fitzgerald J. in Re Penhallurick, in which His Honour held that conduct falling outside the statutory definition of "irregularity" may be an irregularity for the purposes of the Act. Immediately following the passage which I have quoted above, His Honour said:

"For example, it seems to me that it may well be that conduct which misleads voters and thereby causes them to alter their votes, but not to refrain from voting may not properly be described as conduct which prevents or hinders the full and free recording of votes; cf Evans v Creichton-Browne (1981) 33 A.L.R. 609; 55 A.L.J.R. 287 at 288. However, it does not seem to me to be open to doubt that such conduct might well constitute an irregularity and might well justify the court declaring an election void if, having regard to the likelihood of other similar irregularities, the irregularity in question may have affected the result of the election."

Faced with a statement like that, it seems to me to be extremely difficult for the Court to hold that no reasonable ground exists for the application for an inquiry, within the meaning of s. 159(4)(b), or to hold that the documents sought in the subpoenas directed to Mr. Bali and Mr. Marsh could not reasonably be relevant to an issue which is likely to arise in the inquiry.

It is not at all impossible to imagine situations in which the misleading of potential voters could have an effect on the result of an election. A wrongful claim to be the present holder of the office for which the election is being conducted, in a situation in which the actual incumbent does not seek re-election, might have a significant effect on the minds of many voters. So might the impersonation of a candidate for the purpose of presenting his or her policies in an absurd or extremely unattractive manner. The widespread claim that voters should not waste their votes on a particular candidate because he or she had died or withdrawn since the close of nominations, if untruthful, could also affect significantly the numbers voting for that candidate. These are, perhaps, stark examples, but they do indicate that there is force in the observations of Fitzgerald J. in Re Penhallurick to the effect that the misleading of potential voters may constitute an irregularity.
This is not to say that every piece of possibly misleading information given to voters or potential voters will be enough to persuade the Court to declare void an election. It is well known that election propaganda, in organizations as elsewhere, is commonly expressed in extreme language. Candidates and their supporters go to great lengths to denigrate their opponents, and to put themselves forward as superior, both generally and in specific respects. Promises are made in general terms, often in situations where any real ability to perform them will be unlikely. Clearly, it is not the intention of Part IX of the Act that the Court should be forced to try the truth of every claim made in an election, or every insult projected by one side against the other, much less the genuineness of promises made as to performance after the election. Apart from anything else, the familar nature of election propaganda leads to the conclusion that electors generally are well equipped to withstand its excesses and to discriminate amongst candidates despite its presence. In most cases, it will be unlikely that the Court would hold that a statement by or on behalf of one candidate, alleged to have misled voters, would be such as to have affected the result of an election. It must be recognised, however, that the possibility exists that the Court would hold that a sufficient number of voters may have been induced to change their voting intentions by some misleading statement or statements and that the result of an election might have been affected.
A large part of Mr. Trew's argument was devoted to an examination of a number of cases decided under different legislation, for the purpose of establishing the existence of a distinction between the process of recording or casting a vote on the one hand, and the process of deciding for whom to vote on the other. This argument was based, in part, upon the proposition that the statutory definition of "irregularity" is exhaustive. I have already rejected that argument. In the alternative, however, Mr. Trew drew attention to the various ways in which the Applicant's claim has been put, for the purpose of showing that each of those ways depends upon the statutory definition itself, and that at no time has the Applicant endeavoured to allege irregularities in terms other than those of the statutory definition. I have set out above, in full, each of the documents in which the Applicant has formulated his claim. It is unnecessary for me to go to the precise terms of those documents, for the purpose of determining whether the Applicant has or has not restricted himself to the terms of the statutory definition. It is well established that, in carrying out its duty under s. 165(1) of the Act, to "inquire into and determine the question whether any irregularity has occurred in or in connection with the election", the Court is not limited by the specific irregularities alleged by the Applicant. See Re Elections for Offices in Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (1963) 5 F.L.R. 260 at page 265, Jutte v Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1967) 10 FLR 195 at pages 201-2, Re Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union; ex parte Wilson (1979) 28 ALR 330 at page 333, and Re Applications by Bragg and Ors. for Inquiries into Elections in the Australasian Society of Engineers, South Australian Branch (Federal Court of Australia, Gray J., 21st August 1984, unreported at page 14). Irrespective of the manner in which the Applicant alleges irregularities have arisen, it is open to the Court, and indeed the Court is obliged, to determine whether irregularities have occurred. There is, therefore, no real need to examine the alleged distinction between the process of recording a vote and the process of deciding for which candidate to vote.
In any event, if that distinction were examined, extreme care must be taken in the use of the authorities relied upon. The most significant of those authorities was the decision of the High Court of Australia in Evans v Crichton-Browne (1981) 147 C.L.R. 169. In that case, the High Court rejected the proposition that advertisements which portrayed the policies of the Australian Labor Party in a misleading fashion amounted to a contravention of s. 161(e) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. At pages 204-205, the Court said:

"If the words of s. 161 (e) are considered alone, and given their natural meaning, they do not have the effect for which the petitioners contend. The words forbid the printing, publishing or distributing of the electoral advertisements and other documents of the kind mentioned in the paragraph only if they contain any untrue or incorrect statement which is intended or likely to mislead or improperly interfere with any elector in the manner to which the paragraph refers, i.e. "in or in relation to the casting of his vote". The phrase "cast a vote" has a well defined meaning - "to deposit (a voting paper or ticket); to give (a vote)" (Oxford English Dictionary); "to deposit (a ballot) formally or officially; give a vote" (Websters International Dictionary). It does not include "to decide for whom to vote". The use of this phrase in s. 161 (e) suggests that the Parliament is concerned with misleading or incorrect statements which are intended or likely to affect an elector when he seeks to record and give effect to the judgment which he has formed as to the candidate for whom he intends to vote, rather than with statements which might affect the formation of that judgment. Certainly par. (d) of s 161 is concerned only with a particular instance of a misleading or incorrect statement of that kind, namely a statement contained in a document representing, or apparently intended to represent, a ballot-paper. For example, a document in the form of a ballot-paper, which contained directions that a ballot-paper must be marked in a manner different from that provided by the Act, or in a manner that would favour a particular candidate, would, if the other conditions were satisfied, fall within the prohibition of s. 161 (d). It seems reasonable to conclude that s. 161 (e) was intended to deal with misleading or incorrect statements of a similar kind, even though not contained in a representation of a ballot-paper. For example, a statement contained in a newspaper advertisement that a ballot-paper should be marked in a way that would not conform to the requirements of the Act and which would render the vote invalid might mislead or improperly interfere with an elector in the casting of his vote. The same might be true of a statement that a person who wished to support a particular party should vote for a particular candidate, when that candidate in fact belonged to a rival party. An erroneous statement as to the hours or place of polling which had the result that an elector (perhaps in a remote country district) failed to get to a polling booth in time to vote would have misled that elector in relating to the casting of his vote, although it would not have misled him in casting his vote, since in the case imagined no vote was cast. The insertion of the proviso to s. 161 at the same time as pars (d) and (e) confirms the construction suggested.

It was submitted by Mr. Masterman, who appeared for the petitioner in case No. 148, that the casting of a vote cannot be limited to the physical act of putting the ballot-paper in the ballot-box, and that it embraces the mental decision accompanying the act - the making of the choice by the elector of the candidate in whose favour he will mark the paper. However, the words used in the section are not apt to refer to the mental process of decision or choice which precedes the formal expression of that opinion or choice by the casting of a vote. To say, "I have cast my vote for X" does not mean the same as, "I have made up my mind to vote for X". It is only to the act of formal expression that the words in question in s. 161 (e) naturally refer."

Mr. Trew sought to argue that the phrase "recording of votes" in the statutory definition of "irregularity" is the equivalent of "the casting of his vote" in s. 161(e) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, and that, accordingly, any information which may mislead a voter in an election within an organization in coming to a decision as to the candidate for whom he or she will vote cannot be an irregularity. Even assuming the statutory definition to be applicable, there are difficulties about this view.

The process of casting a vote in a parliamentary election or local government election is broader than the simple act of inserting the ballot-paper into the ballot box. It comprehends the filling out of the ballot-paper in such a way as to express the true choice of the voter as between the candidates. This follows from some of the examples given by the High Court of Australia in Evans v Crichton-Browne in the passage which I have quoted. It also follows from certain other cases. In Bray v Walsh (1977) 15 S.A.S.R. 293, Mitchell J. held that a How to Vote Card using the name of a particular party, but directing the voter to express his or her preferences in a manner different from that urged by the party concerned was likely to mislead an elector who wished to vote for that party in the casting of his or her vote. In Consandine v Strathfield Municipal Council (1981) 44 L.G.R.A. 435, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a How to Vote Card of a candidate who had been expelled from the Australian Labor Party, which could have led to the conclusion that he was still a member of that party, amounted to misleading or improper interference with electors in relation to the casting of their votes. At page 441, Street C.J. said:

"An elector coming into the polling booth with the intention of casting a vote for, say, Mr. O'Donnell, or any one of the other four Australian Labor Party candidates numbered three to six in the appellant's "how to vote" card, knowing for certain that the candidate of his choice was a member of the Australian Labor Party, could well have concluded from the appellant's "how to vote" card that the seven persons listed in the righthand column were all Australian Labor Party candidates. It is by no means fanciful to conclude that a substantial number of individual electors would not have been aware of the political alliances of all twentyfour candidates. It is by no means fanciful to conclude that a substantial number of individual electors might have known one or more of the five Australian Labor Party candidates but have been ignorant of the appellant's comparatively recent estrangement from that party. It is by no means fanciful to conclude that a substantial number of individual electors falling within the category described in the preceding sentence, recognizing the name of their favoured Australian Labor Party candidate or candidates in the favoured positions number two to six on the appellant's how to vote card, would have assumed that the seven names in that column which the appellant had identified as a group were at least associated together in the pursuit of Australian Labor Party policies if not actually officially candidates sponsored by that party. This would amount to a misleading or an improper interference with such electors in relation to the casting of their votes. It was likely to influence directly the actual numbering of the squares. The recommendation put forward by the appellant was in terms aimed at the manner in which the squares would be numbered, that is to say at the manner in which the vote would be cast. It was misleading in that it conveyed an impression of affinity in policy and association in political identity as between the appellant and the other six persons where no such affinity or identity existed. Electors could thereby have been misled in relation to the casting of their votes."

The process of casting a vote in a parliamentary or local government election is, generally, by attendance at a polling booth, the filling out of the ballot-paper and the insertion of it into a ballot box. In an election within an organization, the process of recording a vote is generally different. In most cases, the Act now requires that elections within organizations be by secret postal ballot. This requires that a voter fills out a ballot-paper received by him or her in the post, places it in an envelope addressed to the returning officer, and posts it. Whereas a parliamentary or government election will take place in the course of one day, a secret postal ballot within an organization often continues for several weeks. An elector attending at a polling booth may expect to receive How to Vote Cards on behalf of the various candidates from their supporters in the vicinity of the polling booth. A voter within an organization may expect to receive How to Vote cards, and other election material, in the mail, by distribution at his place of work, or in the form of advertisements in various newspapers and other publications. This process may take some considerable time. It seems to me that, if anything, a broader view should be taken of the process of recording votes in an election within an organization than might be taken of the process of casting votes in a parliamentary or local government election.

If a How to Vote card of the kind dealt with in Bray v. Walsh or Consandine is to be regarded as misleading or interfering with voters in or in relation to the casting of their votes, then a document with a similar effect in an election within an organization must be regarded as an act whereby the full and free recording of votes is hindered, and therefore as an irregularity within the statutory definition. Thus, to mislead a person who has decided to vote for a particular group, faction or political interest that, by filling out a ballot-paper in a particular way he will be voting for that group, faction or political interest, may be an irregularity within the statutory definition.
In the present case, it is argued on behalf of the Applicant, that the material published in support of Mr. Bali tends to suggest that his candidature in the election is endorsed or supported by the Australian Labor Party and the Prime Minister. On an examination of the material, I regard it as arguable that it would have this effect. Whether, on a final analysis, it will be held that the material did have this effect will depend upon the whole of the evidence received by the Court in the conduct of the inquiry, and upon the outcome of full argument as to the effect of that evidence. At the present time, it seems to me to be appropriate that I should do no more than to hold that the proposition put forward on behalf of the Applicant is arguable.
Upon the analysis which I have undertaken, it seems clear that to mislead electors in the way in which Mr. Bali's propaganda arguably did could amount to an irregularity. If, as I have held, the statutory definition of "irregularity" is not exhaustive, and misleading of voters can amount to an irregularity, it seems to me that this is the sort of misleading which might come within the concept of something which may affect the result in an illegitimate way. Not only is it alleged that Mr. Bali falsely claimed to have the support or backing of the Australian Labor Party, it is also alleged that in fact he was supported, and his campaign was funded, by the National Civic Council, a body alleged to be proscribed the Australian Labor Party. If those allegations turn out to be correct, it is possible that voters in the election who had made a decision to record their votes in favour of candidates representing what might be described as an Australian Labor Party position or viewpoint could have been misled into recording their votes for someone who represented a viewpoint proscribed by the Australian Labor Party.
Even if the statutory definition of "irregularity" is exhaustive, it is arguable that the full and free recording of votes was hindered by Mr. Bali's election campaign, when viewed in the light of the allegations made.
Mr. Trew drew my attention to certain provisions of English statute law dealing with elections, and to some English decisions on them. The effect of these decision was to explore the distinction between a personal reflection or defamatory comment about a candidate and a legitimate criticism of the policies of that candidate. Because of the view which I have taken as to the meaning of "irregularity", there is nothing to be gained from an examination of these cases.
On the view which I have taken, it is impossible for me to hold that there is no reasonable ground for the application for an inquiry in the present case. Section 159(4)(b) does not, therefore, apply. I propose to give directions as to the continuing conduct of the inquiry.
I also propose to dismiss the motion by Mr. Bali to set aside the subpoena directed to him. It follows that the subpoena directed to Mr. Marsh will stand also. Because of the way in which the Applicant puts his case, and the nature of the irregularities alleged, the terms of these subpoenas are not so broad as to require me to set them aside, in whole or in part. It was argued by Mr. Trew that documents which might tend to show the sources of funds used by or on behalf of Mr. Bali in the conduct of his election campaign were irrelevant to any issue which could arise. This argument overlooked the fact that the Applicant alleges as part of his case that Mr. Bali made false claims about his endorsement or backing by the Australian Labor Party, whereas he was funded by the National Civic Council, a body allegedly proscribed by the Australian Labor Party. It is plain that the documents sought with respect to funding are capable of going to that issue. In all the circumstances, the subpoenas should stand.
I therefore propose to dismiss the application for the relief sought in so much of Mr. Bali's notice of motion dated 17th September 1984 as seeks to terminate the inquiry and set aside the subpoena directed to Mr. Bali, and to adjourn the inquiry to a date to be fixed, for the return of subpoenas, and for the giving of any further directions which may be necessary before the hearing.

Actions

Download as PDF Download as Word Document

Citations

In the matter of an application by Adamson, Robert McColl for an inquiry into an election for an office in the Amalgamated Metals Foundry & Shipwrights Union [1984] FCA 380 (4 FCR 319; 8 IR 410)

Most Recent Citation

Mitchell v The Owners [2018] ACAT 86

Cases Citing This Decision

1

Mitchell v The Owners [2018] ACAT 86

Cases Cited

5

Statutory Material Cited

0

Re Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees' Union of Australia; Ex parte Huxtable [1979] FCA 36

Stoelwinder v Southern Health [2001] FCA 115

Bridge v Bowen [1916] HCA 38

[1984] FCA 380

02 NOVEMBER 1984