RC v The Salvation Army (Western Australia) Property Trust

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

RC  APPLICANT

AND

THE SALVATION ARMY (WESTERN AUSTRALIA)


PROPERTY TRUST  RESPONDENT

RC v The Salvation Army (Western Australia) Property Trust

[2024] HCA 43

Date of Hearing: 7 & 8 May 2024

Date of Judgment: 13 November 2024

P7/2023

ORDER

1.Special leave to appeal granted.

2.Appeal allowed with costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

3.Set aside orders 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 17 February 2023 and, in their place, order that:

(a)The appeal be allowed.

(b)The orders of the District Court of Western Australia made on 1 December 2021 be set aside and, in their place, order that:

(i)the defendant's application of 25 May 2021 that the plaintiff's action be permanently stayed be dismissed; and

(ii)the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the application forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed.

(c)The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia

Representation

M D Cuerden SC with T J Hammond SC and L D Coci for the applicant (instructed by Bradley Bayly Legal)

D F Villa SC with R Young SC and H C Cooper for the respondent (instructed by Mills Oakley)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GAGELER CJ, GORDON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ.   On 15 November 2018, the applicant ("RC") commenced an action against the respondent ("the Salvation Army") in the District Court of Western Australia claiming damages for sexual abuse. He alleged that a Lieutenant Frank Swift had abused him between August 1959 and April 1960,[1] when RC was 12 and 13 years old and in the care of the Nedlands Boys' Home ("the Home"). The Home was owned and operated by the Salvation Army. Lt Swift was a Salvation Army Officer at the Home.

    [1]The Statement of Claim alleges that RC was placed in the Home for a period of approximately eight months in 1957, when he was aged 12. That cannot be correct as RC turned 12 in 1959.

  2. The Salvation Army applied for a permanent stay of the proceedings on the basis that it could not meaningfully defend the proceedings. The primary judge granted the permanent stay. RC's appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia was dismissed.

  3. RC's application for special leave to appeal to this Court was heard immediately following the appeal in Willmot v Queensland.[2] In this matter, and in Willmot, the Court was required to consider the intersection between the principles relating to a permanent stay and a provision that lifted the time-bar on commencing proceedings for a claim for child sexual abuse.

  4. In this case, s 6A(2) of the Limitation Act

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Details
Case
[2024] HCA 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning an application by the respondent, The Salvation Army (Western Australia) Property Trust, for a permanent stay of proceedings brought by the appellant, RC. RC alleged sexual abuse by a Salvation Army officer during his placement at the Nedlands Boys' Home in 1959 and 1960. The Salvation Army sought the stay on the grounds that the significant passage of time since the alleged events, the deaths of the alleged perpetrator and other potential witnesses, and the absence of documentary evidence rendered a fair trial impossible, constituting an abuse of process.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the continuation of RC's proceedings against the Salvation Army would constitute an abuse of process, justifying a permanent stay. This required the Court to determine if the prejudice allegedly suffered by the Salvation Army due to the delay was so profound as to make a fair trial impossible, notwithstanding the absence of a limitation period for child sexual abuse actions under section 6A of the *Limitation Act 2005* (WA). The Court also considered the onus of proof on the party seeking the stay.

The High Court reasoned that the Salvation Army had failed to discharge its heavy onus of proving that a fair trial was not possible. While acknowledging the difficulties presented by the passage of time, the Court found that the Salvation Army possessed sufficient information to make a meaningful response to RC's allegations. The Court emphasised that cases where a party can do little more than deny the main allegation are routinely tried, and a trial judge exercises care in such circumstances. The Court concluded that the Salvation Army had not demonstrated that the trial of the joined issues would be unfair, and therefore, the proceedings should not be permanently stayed.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia. The Court ordered that the Salvation Army's application for a permanent stay be dismissed and that the proceedings proceed to trial. The Salvation Army was ordered to pay RC's costs of the application and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Special leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal allowed with costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

3. Set aside orders 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 17 February 2023 and, in their place, order that:

(a) The appeal be allowed.

(b) The orders of the District Court of Western Australia made on 1 December 2021 be set aside and, in their place, order that:

(i) the defendant's application of 25 May 2021 that the plaintiff's action be permanently stayed be dismissed; and

(ii) the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the application forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed.

(c) The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below, this appeal should be allowed, and orders made as proposed in the joint judgment of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ. The parties, the facts, the claims, and the Salvation Army's onus of proof The parties and the facts The parties and the facts are set out comprehensively in the joint judgment. It suffices here to provide only a broad outline. The respondent, the Salvation Army, although described as a trust, is the trustees, a statutory body corporate,[21] which carried out the Western Australian operations and activities of the former Southern Territory of the Salvation Army ("the Salvation Army Southern Territory") which was an unincorporated association operating in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Tasmania. On 1 January 2019, the Salvation Army Southern Territory was amalgamated with another Salvation Army entity to form the Salvation Army Australia Territory.[21]The Salvation Army (Western Australia) Property Trust Act 1931 (WA), s 3. For most of the relevant period between August 1959 and April 1960, RC was a 12-year-old child in the care of the Salvation Army at the Nedlands Boys' Home ("the Home"), which the Salvation Army owned and operated. During that time, RC alleges that he was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions by Lt Swift, who was an officer of the Salvation Army appointed to the Home between January 1959 and September 1962. The final of those alleged sexual assaults, being anally raped by Lt Swift, occurred some weeks before the end of RC's placement at the Home. RC claims that he reported that rape, and an earlier assault, to Major Watson, who ignored RC. RC was born on 24 March 1947. In 1960 the limitation period for a claim founded on the tort of negligence was six years,[22] and the limitation period for a tortious claim founded on battery was four years,[23] from the age of majority, which at that time was 21.[24] That would have meant that RC's claim founded on the tort of negligence would have been subject to a limitation defence after 24 March 1974 or alternatively, if the lowering of the age of majority to 18 applied retrospectively to his cause of action, after 31 October 1972, with the passage of the Age of Majority Act 1972 (WA).[25] RC's claim founded on the Salvation Army's vicarious liability for "Swift's intentional tort", to the extent this claim is founded on the tort of battery (which, for the reasons below, is not clear on the face of RC's statement of claim[26]), would have expired on 24 March 1972. [22]Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 38(1)(c)(vi).[23]Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 38(1)(b).[24]Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 40. [25]See Age of Majority Act 1972 (WA), s 6(2), Sch ("Limitation Act, 1935-1954"). But see also, s 5(8).[26]See below at [50].RC's pleaded claims The Salvation Army was notified of RC's legal claims on 13 July 2018 and the action brought against the Salvation Army in November 2018. His claims were described by the primary judge as being for negligence, breach of statutory duty under the Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA), and vicarious liability for "[Lt] Swift's intentional tort". There is some confusion in these claims. The first is particularised as a breach of a non-delegable duty "to exercise reasonable care for the safety of [RC]." But a non-delegable duty is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is exercised. It is not sufficient that a defendant took reasonable care.[27] The third is described as a claim for vicarious liability for "[Lt] Swift's intentional tort". It is not entirely clear whether the expression "vicarious liability" is used (inaccurately) to describe a liability based on attribution of Lt Swift's actions to the Salvation Army or (accurately) to describe liability based on attribution of Lt Swift's liability. It may be that the label is used to describe a non-delegable duty to ensure that care is taken, albeit in circumstances of intentional wrongdoing.[28][27]Bird v DP (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 41 at [36] and the authorities cited.[28]See CCIG Investments Pty Ltd v Schokman (2023) 97 ALJR 551 at 569-570 [80]-[81]; 410 ALR 479 at 501; Bird v DP (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 41 at [42].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

RC's pleaded case and the Salvation Army's defence to that claim that has just been summarised is the case the Salvation Army sought to permanently stay. It is by a close analysis of the pleadings at the date of the hearing of the stay application that the factual and legal issues in dispute between the parties are identified. A stay application is not a trial. It is the disputed issues, revealed by that analysis of the pleadings, that are considered in determining whether there can be a fair trial of the issues joined between the parties. The evidence adduced by the parties on the stay application must be relevant to that question.[7] [7]Willmot [2024] HCA 42 at [31]-[32].Evidence filed on application for stay Annexed to an affidavit filed by the Salvation Army in support of its application for a stay was a 73-page statement given to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse ("the Royal Commission") by Commissioner Tidd, Territorial Commander Australia Southern Territory of The Salvation Army,[8] dated 17 September 2015. That statement addressed the way in which the Southern Territory of The Salvation Army ("TSAS") had conducted boys' homes in Eden Park in South Australia, Box Hill and Bayswater in Victoria, and the Home in Nedlands in Western Australia. Commissioner Tidd recorded that, having come to Australia and assumed the role of Territorial Commander in 2013, he had acquainted himself with the fact that "a large number of former residents of homes run by TSAS had suffered severe sexual, physical and emotional abuse while residents at these homes". That evidence was admitted without restriction before the primary judge.[8]Commissioner Tidd defined the Southern Territory to cover Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Tasmania. The respondent was part of the Southern Territory of The Salvation Army. The statement was divided into four sections: (I) Institutional Structure; (II) Relationship between TSAS and the South Australian, Victorian and Western Australian Governments; (III) Response to Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse at TSAS Institutions (including the Home); and (IV) Criminal Investigations and Proceedings. It set out, in detail, an historical analysis of each of these topics, as well as a summary of the position of TSAS in 2015, when the statement was provided to the Royal Commission. Under the third heading – Response to Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse at TSAS Institutions – Commissioner Tidd records the conclusions he reached about the way in which TSAS had conducted the Home as well as boys' homes in Eden Park, Box Hill, and Bayswater. That is, before the Royal Commission in 2015, the Salvation Army considered that it was able to form conclusions about what it had done and not done to protect children and what it had done and not done in response to complaints of abuse. It is not appropriate or necessary to set out each of the conclusions reached by Commissioner Tidd. In considering the Salvation Army's application for a stay, it is sufficient to refer to the fact that Commissioner Tidd states that "it seems clear that there were care leavers [children in the care of a home operated by TSAS] who told officers or other staff that they were being abused at TSAS homes. It seems that in most cases nothing was done about these allegations" and that "[m]ost ... claims of abuse have arisen in more recent times, after the homes have all been closed". No less significantly, Commissioner Tidd records that he "agree[s] entirely with the conclusion" of a Mr Walker that TSAS "failed to adequately explore and investigate claims of abuse and it failed to appropriately respond to such claims". Commissioner Tidd then states that "[i]t is nothing short of tragic that these poor children's pleas for help went unanswered. There are so many lives that could have been so different had the pleas for help been answered."

Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GORDON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ EDELMAN J
The Salvation Army contends that in the end a trial will be a contest where RC makes allegations that the Salvation Army says it can do no more than deny. That contention is an incomplete description of the Salvation Army's position as it has sufficient information to make a meaningful response to RC's allegations. In any event, as explained in Willmot,[17] cases where a party can do no more than deny the main allegation are tried in the criminal courts every day. In such cases, a trial judge ordinarily exercises care before accepting uncorroborated evidence of this kind, and the required level of impairment is that the trial would be unfair, even if the trial judge heeds the Longman warnings.[18] In all the circumstances, the Salvation Army has not discharged its heavy onus to obtain a stay because it has not identified that the trial of the joined issues would be unfair.[17][2024] HCA 42 at [29].[18]Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 91, citing Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 31-32, 42-44, 56‑57, 71-72.Conclusion and orders The Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that there could be no fair trial of these proceedings. The Salvation Army's application for a permanent stay of the proceedings should have been dismissed and the proceedings should proceed to trial. For those reasons, special leave to appeal is granted and the appeal is allowed. The Salvation Army is to pay RC's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. Orders 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia of 17 February 2023 should be set aside and, in their place, order that: 1. The appeal be allowed.2.The orders of the District Court of Western Australia of 1 December 2021 be set aside and, in their place, order that:(a)the defendant's application of 25 May 2021 that the plaintiff's action be permanently stayed be dismissed;(b)the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the application forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed.3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed. Introduction This application for special leave to appeal was heard by a Full Court as though it were an appeal. Special leave should be granted as the application raised the same questions of principle concerning abuse of process, with different perspectives offered by counsel, as were raised in the appeal heard immediately beforehand, Willmot v Queensland.[19] The decision in Willmot v Queensland[20] has now reaffirmed the well-established principles concerning abuse of process and confirmed that those principles continue to apply to cases such as the present where s 6A(2) of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) removes any limitation period for bringing particular actions. [19][2024] HCA 42.[20][2024] HCA 42. In the application of the established principles of abuse of process following a substantial lapse of time in bringing a claim, the question in this proceeding is resolved by proper consideration of the onus of proof. The respondent ("the Salvation Army") failed to discharge its onus of proving that it suffered such prejudice, arising from the substantial period of time between the events alleged by the applicant, RC, and the claims commenced by the writ filed by RC in 2018, that a fair trial of RC's claims was not possible. The onus of proof includes a causal requirement that the Salvation Army establish that, due to the lapse in time, there was a loss of opportunities that would have been pursued or evidence that would have been led with such potential benefit (since the actual effect will be unknown) to its defence that any trial would be unfair.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAGELER CJ, GORDON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ, EDELMAN J