RC and LP and AC - [2006] WASAT 370

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT: GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA)

CITATION: RC and LP and AC [2006] WASAT 370

MEMBER: MS D DEAN (MEMBER)
MR J MANSVELD (MEMBER)
DR G HAMILTON (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)

HEARD: 9 MAY 2006
12 JUNE 2006
9 OCTOBER 2006

DELIVERED : 18 DECEMBER 2006

FILE NO/S: GAA 590 of 2006

BETWEEN: RC and LP
Applicants
AND
AC
Represented Person

Catchwords:

Application for administration - Capacity to make reasonable decisions - Family conflict - Enduring power of attorney revoked - Need for an administrator - Public Trustee appointed administrator

Legislation:

Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4(2), s 64(1), s 70, s 107, s 108(1)(a)

Result:

The Public Trustee appointed plenary administrator for a period of 5 years
The enduring power of attorney executed 21 April 2006 is revoked

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicants: G Papamihail
Represented Person : Self-represented

Solicitors:

Applicants: George Papamihail Barristers & Solicitors
Represented Person : Self-represented

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal’s decision

The applicants, RC and LP, son and daughter of AC, sought the appointment of an administrator for their father, AC, because of concerns that he had recently changed his will leaving the family home to his other son, KC, and daughter‑in‑law, NC. This would effectively leave AC's disabled daughter with little or no funds for her future care. In the past, AC's wills had always made significant provision for his disabled daughter.
A further concern was the fact that AC had recently revoked an enduring power of attorney in which he appointed RC and KC as donees. AC subsequently executed an enduring power of attorney appointing KC as sole donee. KC had been operating the enduring power of attorney and making decisions which the applicants believed were not in their father's best interests. The applicants said that the enduring power of attorney was not workable because of the level of conflict and lack of communication between them and their brother, KC, who, they said, did not include them in any of the major financial decisions in respect of their father, AC.
The matter was heard over three hearings, being adjourned the second time to allow additional clarifying information about AC's capacity to be sought. At the third hearing, and with the benefit of capacity reports from two geriatricians, it was agreed by all parties that AC did not have the capacity to make reasonable judgments about matters relating to his estate.
Evidence was provided at the hearings that AC had a history of overspending his Centrelink income by approximately $150 per fortnight. KC, who by his own account had been managing his father's financial affairs for some years, had not put in place any strategies to manage this problem. The siblings decided to take out a reverse mortgage on the family home to repay AC's debts and to ensure that he had adequate funds to last him several years. Within a relatively short time these funds were exhausted. The Tribunal found that the expenditure of these funds had not been managed in a manner consistent with AC's best interests.
Before the Tribunal reconvened for the third hearing, without consultation with the other siblings or the Tribunal, who had requested and been given an assurance by KC that he would not use the enduring power of attorney for anything other than minor day to day financial transactions, KC increased the reverse mortgage to pay further debts he said had been incurred by AC.
The Tribunal found that the enduring power of attorney was not operating in AC's best interests and, given that he was not able to make reasonable judgments for himself that he was in need of an administrator of his estate. There was no one suitable to act in this role other than the Public Trustee. The Tribunal revoked the enduring power of attorney and appointed the Public Trustee administrator of AC's estate.

Background

AC is an 88 year old widower who lives alone in the family home. He has two sons, RC and KC, and two daughters, LP and PC. PC has a disability and lives in supported accommodation with ongoing support from her father, siblings and extended family.
On 28 March 2006, the applicants, RC and LP, filed an application with the State Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) for the appointment of an administrator for their father, AC.
The stated reasons for the application were to protect their father's major asset, the family home, and the financial needs of their disabled sister, PC. The concerns were based on the fact that their father, AC, had recently executed several wills and most recently changed his will in favour of his son, KC, and daughter‑in‑law, NC, leaving them the family home and leaving no provision for the care of AC's disabled daughter, PC.

Chronology of major events leading to the application for administration

On 13 February 2003, AC executed an enduring power of attorney (EPA) appointing his two sons to act jointly and severally as donees.
A week later, as the result of a family discussion between his children, RC, KC and LP, it was decided to take out a reverse mortgage of $100 000 on the family home to supplement AC's Centrelink benefit and to pay outstanding debts.
At this time, AC was said to owe KC $40 000, made up of $25 000 for a car and $15 000 cash, which had been advanced in three lots of $5000. No receipts were provided for these expenses. After payment of the debt to KC and smaller debts to RC and LP, approximately $54 000 was left, which was assumed by the family to be adequate for AC's needs for a few years to come. It came as a surprise to LP and RC to find out some time later that most of this money had been spent. Included in the expenditure of this money was $19 000 which AC paid to finance an overseas trip for himself, his son, KC, and daughter‑in‑law, NC.
On 23 September 2005, AC was said to have been assessed by his general practitioner (GP) as not having testamentary capacity. No written evidence of this assessment was provided to the Tribunal.
On 22 February 2006, AC made a new will leaving the family home to KC and his wife, effectively leaving nothing to AC's other children, including his disabled daughter, PC, who had always been included in previous wills made by AC and his now deceased wife.
On becoming aware of the new will, RC and LP arranged for AC to be assessed on 24 February 2006 by his GP as to his testamentary capacity. The GP confirmed his earlier assessment that AC no longer has testamentary capacity and referred AC to a geriatrician for a second opinion.
On 21 April 2006, AC revoked the EPA appointing his sons, RC and KC, joint attorneys and executed a new document appointing his son, KC, sole attorney. This document was witnessed by two legal practitioners.

Information provided to the Tribunal prior to the hearings

Medical and other written submissions

The Tribunal had access to two reports from AC's GP, in the first of which, in April 2006, the GP assessed AC as not having the capacity to make reasonable decisions in respect of his estate or to execute an EPA. The GP referred AC to a geriatrician for a second opinion.
The Tribunal had access to two reports, one dated March 2006 and one dated May 2006 in which the geriatrician assessed AC as having a Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) score of 22 out of 30. The MMSE is a short screening test administered by a suitably qualified person to assess cognitive functioning. The geriatrician assessed AC as having testamentary capacity and the capacity to make reasonable judgments in respect of his estate.
In June 2006, the GP reported that AC had "improved" in his memory functioning and had the capacity to execute an EPA. The GP stated that he was "not sure" of AC's capacity to make reasonable decisions in respect of his estate.
Rather than clarifying the capacity question in relation to AC, these reports appear to contradict one another. Given the lack of clarity in the information provided in respect of AC's capacity, further reports were sought and provided for the subsequent hearings.
In reports provided to the Tribunal and dated August 2006, Dr F, and July 2006, Dr V, both neuropsychologists, assessed AC as not having the capacity to make reasonable decisions in respect of the management of his estate.
In a report to the Tribunal dated 3 October 2006, Dr D, a geriatrician, assessed AC as having mild dementia, probably Alzheimer's type and having a MMSE score of 17 out of 30. This represented a loss of 5 points since AC's assessment by another geriatrician in May 2006.
The Tribunal received three letters purportedly by AC prior to the hearings. One of these, dated 29 March 2006, was a handwritten letter in which AC informed the Tribunal that he was happy for "you" [the Tribunal] to take over management of his financial affairs because he is becoming "very forgetful and I need to make sure that my daughter [PC] is cared for financially".
Two further letters were received, both of which were purportedly typed and signed by AC. In a letter dated 26 April 2006, AC requested a copy of the application, stating that after perusal of this document he would provide the Tribunal with additional evidence in relation to the application. In a letter dated 2 May 2006, AC states that he has read the application and does not want the Public Trustee to take on the role of administrator, preferring his son KC to assist him in taking care of his financial affairs.
The Tribunal received submissions from several family members outlining the family history, the breakdown in family relationships and concerns about AC's finances.
RC, the donee of the EPA, provided the Tribunal with receipts, bank statements and other documents in relation to his operation of the EPA.

Information provided at the hearings

This matter was heard over three hearings, the first two being heard by a single member and the third by a three member Tribunal. The first two hearings were adjourned for further investigation of AC's capacity to make reasonable decisions for himself and for KC to provided documentation in respect of his use of the EPA executed by AC on 21 April 2006.
RC, the son of AC and one of the applicants in this matter, provided the hearing with the following background to the application. In July 2004, AC, in consultation with his three children, made a new will which, as in the past, made significant provision for PC, his disabled daughter.
Prior to making this will, on 13 February 2003 AC had executed an EPA appointing his two sons, RC and KC, jointly and severally as his attorneys.
As the result of a family meeting in November 2005, RC and LP became concerned about what they believed was inappropriate manipulation of AC by their brother KC, whom they believe persuaded AC to change his will and leave the family home to KC and his wife to the exclusion of the other siblings and in particular PC, who had been protected in the previous wills of both her father and her mother.
On 22 February 2006, KC arranged for AC to draw up a new will leaving the family home to KC and his wife and, after payment of all debts, the residue to be left equally to the other children. This effectively left PC with little or no funds for her future support.
On 24 February 2006, RC and LP had AC assessed by his GP for his capacity to make his own decisions. This, stated RC, confirmed an earlier assessment in September 2005 by his GP that AC did not have testamentary capacity.
RC informed the Tribunal that around this time there appear to have been several wills executed and signed by AC and facilitated by KC, allegedly to counter any other will which might have been executed and signed in the meantime.
It was clear from discussion during the hearings that AC was confused about what he had signed and whom he had appointed as either beneficiaries of his will or attorney in relation to the most recent EPA. Further, when questioned about these and other matters, AC looked to his children for the answers to the questions. AC frequently responded to questions from the Tribunal with "I don't remember" and when asked if he remembered reading the application, which he had referred to in his letter to the Tribunal dated 2 May 2006, KC responded on AC's behalf saying "You came in here dad", to which AC replied "I came in here?" AC's confusion was evident on other occasions during the hearings when he asked the same questions several times of both the Tribunal members and his children.
LP explained to the Tribunal that it had always been the express wish of AC and his wife that their disabled daughter PC is cared for financially and to this end had made their wills accordingly. LP expressed concern that now that AC was vulnerable and suggestible he had changed his will, leaving PC without the financial security so carefully protected by her parents in the past. Previous wills executed by AC had provided for PC and this had always been the intention of AC and his wife when alive.
LP referred to what she said was the less than responsible manner in which KC had managed her father's affairs under the EPA, evidenced she said by the fact that the Meals on Wheels account had reached $500 before being paid. KC contested this, saying that his father had been responsible for paying this account in cash on a weekly basis. KC said that when it came to his attention that the account had not been paid he arranged to pay it. LP said that Silver Chain, the provider of the service, had informed her that KC had been paying the accounts but had fallen behind in payments.
KC explained to the Tribunal that in 1997 he purchased and paid $27 000 for a car for AC. After the death of AC's wife in January 1999, when AC ran low on cash, KC topped up AC's money supply to a total of approximately $15 000. During this same period, RC had loaned AC $5000 and LP had provided $1000 because AC was spending approximately $150 per fortnight more than his pension.
As a result of this overspending, in February 2003 the siblings decided that AC should take out a reverse mortgage on his house. The plan was for the siblings to be repaid the money they had loaned AC and for him to have some capital to draw on to support his lifestyle.
In May 2003, AC, KC and his wife NC, attended an overseas conference which was paid for out of AC's funds. KC informed the Tribunal that around that time he "took over running [AC's] affairs". According to KC, prior to that overseas trip, AC managed his own financial affairs. LP contradicted this, saying that as far back as 1999 when their mother died, AC was having difficulty managing his finances. This was consistent with KC's previous evidence that he had provided financial support for AC after his wife's death.
KC outlined for the Tribunal the extremely important role his wife, NC, had played in the life of his disabled sister PC after the death of their mother in 1999. KC said that it was as a result of his wife's efforts that PC's disability was diagnosed and appropriate accommodation and services were put in place for her.
KC said that his father had decided to change his will and leave the house to him and his wife in return for the support his wife had provided for the disabled daughter, PC. At the same time that he changed his will in favour of his son, KC, and daughter‑in‑law, NC, AC revoked his previous EPA and signed a new one appointing KC his sole attorney.
LP explained that there are tensions within the family and that her father, in his efforts to keep everyone happy, vacillates from one decision to another as evidenced by the several recent wills he has executed and the change of EPA. During the hearings the Tribunal witnessed this when AC at various times informed the Tribunal that he wanted KC to manage his money and other times he wanted the "government" appointed to manage his money.
KC informed the Tribunal that in November 2003 he transferred $16 000 from AC's account into his own account to prevent AC from spending his money frivolously and giving it away, which he was prone to do. KC used the money to pay necessary bills as they were incurred. He provided the Tribunal with a list of the bills he had paid from 15 April 2004. He said that the bills amounted to $18 548, leaving AC owing KC $2548. KC said that he was using his own funds to pay the more recent bills, leading to the $2000 debt currently owed him by AC.
KC gave an undertaking at the completion of the first hearing that he would not operate the EPA, other than to pay essential accounts for AC, until the completion of the proceedings before the Tribunal.
The applicants and KC were each represented by counsel at the third hearing.
Before the hearing reconvened for the third time, the Tribunal received written notification from KC's counsel stating that KC had increased the reverse mortgage on AC's family home by a further $100 000. Counsel explained that it was necessary for KC to do this to pay AC's outstanding accounts, including the telephone account, which was at risk of being disconnected if not paid. In addition, there was a major sewage problem requiring attention. Other outstanding accounts were from the solicitors, who drew up the most recent EPA and the will, plus general house maintenance including blinds for the windows. None of these issues had been discussed with the other siblings.
At the hearing, counsel for RC and LP argued that at the time KC increased the reverse mortgage by $100 000, allegedly to pay outstanding accounts and maintenance, there was at least $2500 of AC's money still in KC's bank account. This would have gone some way toward payment of the outstanding accounts before the matter came back to the Tribunal for the resumed hearing.
LP informed the Tribunal that she had been concerned for some time about the lack of care provided for her father, the unpaid accounts such as Meals on Wheels, the unpaid council and water rates, and the fact that AC was eligible for a pensioner rebate on these rates but no application had been made for this to occur. She said that she had asked KC to pay these accounts to no avail and these outstanding accounts had only been paid since the application for administration had been made.
LP alleged that under KC's management her father's accounts were not paid, he incurred bank penalties because of overdrawn accounts and KC "vetoed" suggestions made by LP and RC in respect of their father's care.
At the third hearing, and after receipt of the reports from Dr V and Dr F, it was agreed by all parties that AC no longer has the capacity to make reasonable decisions in respect of his estate and that he requires an administrator to manage his estate for him.
KC proposed that he continue in the role of managing AC's estate, a role he has exercised for some years. RC and LP proposed that the Public Trustee take on the role as in their view an appointment within the family would be likely to further compound and complicate the already conflictual relationships within the family.
There was lengthy discussion and allegations with regard to the level of support provided to AC by his three children. The very high number of telephone calls AC makes to KC was an indication, according to KC, of the level of support AC requires and receives from KC.
LP informed the Tribunal that she rings her father every morning, has him to her house for dinner each week, "drops in constantly" and accompanies him to church three times a week.
RC confirmed that he also has regular telephone and face to face contact with his father.
In respect of the $16 000 KC transferred from AC's account to his own, although questions were asked by counsel for RC and LP about the validity of the transactions by KC in relation to AC's accounts, it was pointed out by the Tribunal that there is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that AC did not have the capacity from 2004 through to early 2006 to instruct and oversee KC in his operations on behalf of AC at that time.

Counsel highlighted the fact that previously all decisions such as execution of the EPA and taking out a reverse mortgage had been family decisions in consultation with AC and all his children. More recently, such decisions had been made by KC and AC without involvement of the other children.
KC acknowledged that his relationship with his siblings had broken down to the point that he would find it difficult to communicate and consult with them about decisions which might need to be made if he continues to manage his father's estate.

Relevant legislation

The principles to be observed by the Tribunal when making determinations in relation to applications are set out in s 4(2) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (the Act).
These principles are:
"(2)(a) The primary concern of the State Administrative Tribunal shall be the best interests of any represented person, or of a person in respect of whom an application is made.
(b)Every person shall be presumed to be capable of ‑
(i)looking after his own health and safety;
(ii)making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person;
(iii)managing his own affairs; and
(iv)making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his estate,
until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the State Administrative Tribunal.
(c)A guardianship or administration order shall not be made if the needs of the person in respect of whom an application for such an order is made could, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, be met by other means less restrictive of the person's freedom of decision and action.
(d)A plenary guardian shall not be appointed under section 43(1) if the appointment of a limited guardian under that section would be sufficient, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, to meet the needs of the person in respect of whom the application is made.
(e)An order appointing a limited guardian or an administrator for a person shall be in terms that, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, impose the least restrictions possible in the circumstances on the person's freedom of decision and action.
(f)In considering any matter relating to a represented person or a person in respect of whom an application is made the State Administrative Tribunal shall, as far as possible, seek to ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned as expressed, in whatever manner, at the time, or as gathered from the person's previous actions."
Section 64(1) of the Act empowers the Tribunal to appoint an administrator provided it has satisfied itself that the person:
"(a)is unable, by reason of mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of his estate; and
(b)is in need of an administrator of his estate."
Section 70 of the Act provides for the best interests of the represented person.
"(1)An administrator shall act according to his opinion of the best interests of the represented person.
(2)Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), an administrator acts in the best interests of a represented person if he acts as far as possible ‑
(a)as an advocate for the represented person in relation to the estate;
(b)in such a way as to encourage the represented person to live in the general community and participate as much as possible in the life of the community;
(c)in such a way as to encourage and assist the represented person to become capable of caring for himself and of making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person;
(d)in such a way as to protect the represented person from financial neglect, abuse or exploitation;
(e)in consultation with the represented person, taking into account, as far as possible, the wishes of that person as expressed, in whatever manner, or as gathered from the person's previous actions;
(f)in the manner that is least restrictive of the rights, while consistent with the proper protection, of the represented person;
(g)in such a way as to maintain any supportive relationships the represented person has; and
(h)in such a way as to maintain the represented person's familiar cultural, linguistic and religious environment."
The Act sets out the obligations of donees who accept appointment under an enduring power of attorney. The manner in which the donee has executed those obligations guides the Tribunal in its decision as to whether the EPA can operate as a less restrictive alternative to the making of an administration order for that person.
Specifically s 107 provides:
"(1)The donee of an enduring power of attorney ‑
(a)shall exercise his powers as attorney with reasonable diligence to protect the interests of the donor and, if he fails to do so, he is liable to the donor for any loss occasioned by the failure;
(b)shall keep and preserve accurate records and accounts of all dealings and transactions made under the power;
(c)subject to section 109(2), may not renounce a power during any period of legal incapacity of the donor; and
(d)shall, if the donee becomes bankrupt, report that bankruptcy to the State Administrative Tribunal.
Penalty applicable to paragraph (b): $2 000."
When the continued operation of an EPA would be inconsistent with the functions of an administrator, s 108(1)(a) of the Act enables the Tribunal to revoke or vary the EPA to remove any inconsistency in operation.

Findings and reasons

The Tribunal gave significant weight to the evidence of LP who appeared genuine in her concerns for her father's welfare. She convincingly described her observations of her father who she said was confused but still trying to do the best by his family, particularly his disabled daughter whom he wished to provide for financially both now and in the future.
LP explained that when it was pointed out to AC by herself or her brother, RC, that the new will he had executed in favour of his son, KC, and daughter‑in‑law, NC, did not provide for his disabled daughter as he intended, he became upset and wished to right things but did not know how to do so.
The Tribunal was not convinced by KC's evidence that he has historically provided the bulk of the support required by AC. It was clear from the evidence provided at the hearing and in written submissions provided prior to the hearings that RC and LP have also provided significant support to AC by taking him to church, to doctor's appointments, into their homes and maintaining regular contact by telephone and, in LP's case, by regular visits to his home. The Tribunal is satisfied that all three children provide significant support to AC.

Capacity

Much of the medical evidence provided to the Tribunal by the GP and the geriatrician was conflicting in respect of AC's capacity. Consequently further medical reports were sought.
The assessments referred to by RC, in which the GP assessed AC in September 2005 and February 2006 as not having testamentary capacity, were not provided to the Tribunal and therefore could not be taken as evidence that AC did not have the capacity to direct KC in the way he wished his funds to be managed at that time.
The Tribunal finds the conflicting reports from the GP provided to the Tribunal to be unconvincing and, similarly, the reports from the geriatrician are also given little weight by the Tribunal as they refer only to testamentary capacity and are of limited use to the Tribunal in its decision as to AC's capacity to make reasonable judgments in respect of his estate.
The Tribunal finds the more recent assessments provided by Dr V and Dr F, that AC does not have the capacity to make reasonable judgments in respect of managing his financial affairs, convincing and compelling and accepts this as evidence that AC no longer has capacity. After receipt of and discussion about the above reports, it was agreed by all parties at the third hearing that AC, by reason of a mental disability, is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his estate.

Need

As set out in the legislation, the appointment of an administrator requires the Tribunal to find there is a need for an order and that the needs of the person cannot be met by any means less restrictive of the person's freedom of decision and action than the making of an order.
In this case there is an EPA, which has been operated by AC's son, KC, and, if working in AC's best interests, could operate as a less restrictive alternative to the making of an order.
Neither RC nor LP proposed themselves as administrators, leaving only KC who, as donee of the EPA, can continue to manage AC's finances if no administration order is made.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the EPA has been operating in AC's best interests. The attorney has made decisions without consultation with other family members which have significantly depleted AC's funds. This has resulted in AC's house being mortgaged for several hundred thousand dollars to support his excessive spending and to pay overdue accounts and maintenance on the family home.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the reasons provided by KC for the transfer of $16 000 from AC's account to his own account indicate that the transaction was in the best interests of AC. There are other ways, including opening an interest bearing account in AC's name, to curb his spending and to ensure that money is available to pay outstanding accounts. An account in AC's name would also protect his interests if KC became incapacitated and was no longer able to manage AC's money.
The Tribunal did not receive a satisfactory explanation as to why KC did not follow through with the plan agreed with his siblings after the decision to take out the reverse mortgage to "drip feed" funds to AC to curb his spending. For reasons not clear to the Tribunal, KC chose not to put this strategy in place.
The Tribunal finds that, given the fact that under the new will the family home is left to KC and his wife, when acting as donee of the EPA or if appointed administrator, KC could find himself in a conflict of interest. If AC moves into supported residential accommodation, a decision may be required to raise money to pay an accommodation bond. If this occurs, decisions will need to be made as to whether the family home should be sold, mortgaged or funds raised in some other way to pay the bond. A decision of this type could also influence the choice of future accommodation for AC, in that accommodation which attracts a smaller bond may appear more attractive if it allows for the house to be kept rather than sold.

Wishes of the represented person

The Tribunal is required as far as possible to take into account the wishes of the person whom the application concerns. In this case, the Tribunal had reference to AC's correspondence to the Tribunal, his wills, the EPAs in which he nominated RC and KC, and later KC alone, as donees, as well as information provided by AC at the hearings.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the two typewritten letters received from AC are his work alone. It was clear from his evidence at the hearing and from medical reports that AC has significant memory problems and has no memory of writing these letters. The Tribunal therefore gives little weight to the ideas expressed in these letters.
It is clear from the variation in views provided by AC that he is no longer able to clearly express a consistent wish as to how he would like his estate to be managed. It is therefore for the Tribunal to make a decision based on AC's best interests as to how this should occur. In making this decision, the Tribunal is guided by the earlier EPA and previous wills executed by AC as an indication of his wishes in respect of management his estate.

Best interests of the represented person

Evidence before the Tribunal indicates that, historically, decisions in this family have been made in consultation with all family members. In more recent times, KC has been making decisions in isolation and without consultation with other family members, leading to a breakdown in family relationships and to significant erosion of AC's estate.
The Tribunal finds that, as the result of the conflict that has arisen between the children of AC, the appointment of an administrator within the family would likely compound this conflict and contribute to a further deterioration of family relationships.
The Tribunal finds that it is in AC's best interests to revoke the EPA and to appoint an administrator independent of the family in the hope that this will reduce some of the stresses which have contributed to the conflict between the siblings. It is in AC's best interests to have a harmonious, functional family.
The appointment of an external administrator will give all family members the opportunity to have input into significant decisions.

Decision

The Tribunal considered all the evidence available prior to and at the hearings and is satisfied that AC is a person for whom an order can be made. Further, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is in AC's best interests that an administration order be made.

Orders

The Tribunal made the following orders:
1)The Public Trustee is appointed plenary administrator of the estate of the represented person.
2)This order is to be reviewed by 9 October 2011.
3)The enduring power of attorney, dated 21 April 2006, by which the represented person appointed KC to be his attorney, be revoked.

I certify that this and the preceding [87] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MS D DEAN, MEMBER