Rayne and Lazar-Shaw and Anor

[2015] FamCA 69

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RAYNE & LAZAR-SHAW AND ANOR [2015] FamCA 69

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – with whom the child lives – where the parents’ relationship was marked by significant violence – where post separation care arrangements for the child have varied significantly and included alternate week time with each parent – where the child has not spent any significant time with the father since mid-2013 – where the father accepts that the child should continue to live with the mother – whether time with the father is in the child’s best interests – time ordered

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 61DA, 64B, 65AA

APPLICANT: Ms Rayne

RESPONDENT: Mr Lazar-Shaw

INTERVENER: Ms Cotterill

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Legal Aid Queensland

FILE NUMBER: BRC 4795 of 2011

DATE DELIVERED: 13 February 2015

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Hogan J

HEARING DATE: 29 and 30 January 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Pendergast

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Andersons Solicitors

RESPONDENT: In Person

THE INTERVENER: In Person

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr George

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Legal Aid Queensland

Orders

IT IS ORDERED

1. All previous orders, other than the order made by consent on 29 January 2015, are discharged.

IT IS ORDERED ON A FINAL BASIS THAT

1. The child, M, born … 2010, live with the mother.

2. The mother have sole parental responsibility in respect of all major long term issues (as that expression is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (as amended)) for the child with such issues to include, but not be limited to:

   (a)       the child’s education;

   (b)       the child’s religious and cultural upbringing; and

   (c)       the child’s health.

3. Except in the event of an emergency involving the child, the mother is to consult with the father about decisions to be made in the exercise of her sole parental responsibility as follows:

   (a)the mother shall inform the father about the issue about which a decision needs to be made, the decision she would like to make in respect of such issue and the reasons for that proposed decision, in writing;

   (b)       the mother shall give the father fourteen (14) days to respond;

   (c)the mother shall consider the father’s views/response when coming to her decision;

   (d)the mother will inform the father of the final decision she has made with respect to that issue as soon as practicable thereafter.

4. The mother shall provide the father with no less than 28 days’ notice in writing of any intention to move the child’s residence to a place other than Town D, Queensland.

5. Each party has responsibility for the day to day care, welfare and development of the child while he is in his or her care.

6. The child shall spend time with the father at all times as may be agreed in writing between the parties and, failing agreement, as follows:

   (a)commencing Saturday, 21 February 2015 and until 3 April 2015: each Saturday from 9.00 am until 5.00 pm with the father or his agent to collect the child from McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the commencement of the time and return the child to the mother at McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the conclusion of time;

   (b)from Friday, 3 April 2015: each week from 9.00 am Saturday until noon Sunday with the father or his agent to collect the child from McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the commencement of the time and return the child to the mother at McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the conclusion of time;

   (c)from Friday, 24 April 2015: each alternate weekend from 9.00 am Saturday until 5.00 pm Sunday with the father or his agent to collect the child from McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the commencement of the time and return the child to the mother at McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the conclusion of time;

   (d)during the June/July 2015 school holiday period, the father’s alternate weekend time shall be increased such that it commences at 9.00 am Friday and concludes at 5.00 pm the following Sunday;

   (e)commencing Friday, 17 July 2015: each alternate weekend from 3.00 pm Friday until 5.00 pm Sunday;

   (f)during the September/October 2015 school holiday period, the father’s alternate weekend time shall be increased such that it commences at 3.00 pm Friday and concludes at 5.00 pm the following Tuesday;

   (g)during the December 2015/January 2016 school holiday period: on three (3) non-consecutive blocks of five (5) nights and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, such time shall occur:

   (i)from 9.00 am on 16 December 2015 to noon on 21 December 2015;

   (ii)from 9.00 am on 4 January 2016 to noon on 9 January 2016;

   (iii)from 9.00 am on 16 January 2016 to noon on 21 January 2016;

   (h)during the gazetted school holiday periods which occur at the end of Terms 1, 2 and 3 in 2016: for the first half of each gazetted school holiday period with such time to commence at 9.00 am on the Saturday immediately after school concludes for the Term and to conclude at 5.00 pm on the second Saturday after school concludes for the Term;

   (i)for the first, third and fifth week of the December 2016/January 2017 school holiday period and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing:

   (i)from 9.00 am on the Saturday immediately after school concludes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the second Saturday after school concludes for the Term; and

   (ii)from 9.00 am on the third Saturday after school concludes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the fourth Saturday after school concludes for the Term; and

   (iii)from 9.00 am on the fifth Saturday after school concludes that Term until 5.00 pm on the sixth Saturday after school concludes that Term;

   (j)commencing with the school holiday period at the conclusion of first Term in 2017 and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing:

   (i)for the second half of the school holiday periods in odd numbered years; and

   (ii)for the first half of the school holiday periods in even numbered years.

7. From the start of the December 2015/January 2016 gazetted school holiday period, the operation of Clause (7)(e) shall be suspended during any school holiday period and shall resume with weekend time commencing:

   (a)on the first weekend of school Term if the child has spent time with the father in the first half of the holiday period; or

   (b)on the second weekend of school Term if the child has spent time with the father in the second half of the holiday period.

8. The operation of Clause (7)(e) of this Order is suspended for the weekend on which Mother’s Day occurs such that the child will remain in the mother’s care for that weekend.

9. In the event that the child would not otherwise be spending time with the father on the weekend on which Father’s Day occurs, the child shall spend time with the father from 3.00 pm Friday until 5.00 pm Sunday on that weekend, with the father to collect the child from McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the commencement of time and return the child to McDonald’s Restaurant Town D at the conclusion of time.

10. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, the child shall spend time with the father:

    (a)from 5.00 pm Christmas Eve until 9.00 am Boxing Day in odd numbered years;

    (b)from 9.00 am Boxing Day until 5.00 pm 28 December in even numbered years.

11. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, the child shall spend time with the mother:

    (a)from 5.00 pm Christmas Eve until 9.00 am Boxing Day in even numbered years;

    (b)from 9.00 am Boxing Day until 5.00 pm 28 December in odd numbered years.

12. The father shall have telephone communication with the child each Wednesday between the hours of 6:30 pm and 7.00 pm or at such other times as may be agreed in writing between the parents with:

    (a)the father to initiate the telephone call to a mobile telephone number to be provided to the father by the mother; and

    (b)the mother to ensure the child is available to receive the telephone call; and

    (c)the mother to ensure the mobile telephone is charged and in a mobile telephone reception area; and

    (d)the mother to ensure the telephone calls take place in private, are not interrupted and are not recorded.

13. In any school holiday period during which the child is spending holiday time with the father, the mother shall have telephone communication with the child each Wednesday between the hours of 6:30 pm and 7.00 pm or at such times as may be agreed in writing between the parents with:

    (a)the mother to initiate the telephone call to a mobile telephone number to be provided to the mother by the father; and

    (b)the father to ensure the child is available to receive the telephone call; and

    (c)the father to ensure the mobile telephone is charged and in a mobile telephone reception area; and

    (d)the father to ensure the telephone calls take place in private, are not interrupted and are not recorded.

14. Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing or specified in this Order, changeovers shall occur at McDonald’s Restaurant Town D.

15. Each parent is at liberty to arrange for an agent to attend at changeovers provided that the person who attends is a person known to the child.

16. By this Order, any day care, school, educational facility or extra-curricular activity provider attended by the child is hereby authorised to provide to each parent, at that parent’s request and cost, all information about the child’s educational progress and school related activities.

17. By this Order, any medical or other health professionals who treat the child are hereby authorised to provide to each parent, at that parent’s request and cost, all such information lawfully able to be provided about the child’s attendance and treatment.

18. Each party shall refrain from consuming illicit substances while the child is in their care and for the 24 hour period immediately prior to the child coming into their care.

19. Each party shall refrain from consuming alcohol to excess or being under the influence of alcohol at a level higher than that which would enable that parent to lawfully operate a motor vehicle while the child is in their care.

20. Within three (3) months of this Order, the Father enrol in and complete an Anger Management Program conducted by Lifeline or such similar organisation.

21. The Independent Children’s Lawyer is discharged.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

1. The mother has liberty to apply directly to the Associate to Justice Hogan, or such other Judge who may be available in her absence, for the urgent listing of any application for a recovery order in the event the father fails to return the child to her care as required by this order.

2. All outstanding applications are dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Rayne & Lazar-Shaw and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 4795 of 2011

Ms Rayne

Applicant

And

Mr Lazar-Shaw

Respondent

And

Ms Cotterill
Intervener

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. At the commencement of the proceedings, the mother and father notified the Court they agreed that their son, M (“the child”), born in 2010, should spend time with Ms Cotterill (the father’s step-grandmother) for one weekend each calendar month. Accordingly, an Order was made by consent that day and, with the parties’ agreement, Ms Cotterill played no further part in the proceedings.

2. The child, who started at kindergarten in the week before the trial, is his twenty-nine year old father’s only child. He is the only child of his parents’ tumultuous and often violent three-year relationship. His nearly twenty-eight year old mother has four other living children[1], aged between about 10½ years and 4 months of age. All of her children live primarily with her.

   [1]E (born in 2004), F ( born in 2007), G (born in 2012) and R (born in 2014).

3. The mother’s two oldest children spend time with their father, who has previously had issues with illicit drug use and been incarcerated on occasion. The child M’s father has a history involving illicit drug use and he has been incarcerated on at least two occasions. The father of the mother’s two youngest children committed suicide in September 2014. He too struggled with illicit drug use and had also previously been incarcerated. The material strongly supports the conclusion that domestic violence was a feature of the relationships between the mother and each of the father’s of her children.

4. The child M’s parents commenced their relationship in about 2008. They separated finally on about 21 March 2011, when the child was about 6 months of age. I accept that the child was left in his father’s care at this time and that the father and his grandmother cared for the child at her home in Suburb H in the Moreton Bay Region whilst the mother travelled to Town D in the Darling Downs. I also accept the paternal grandmother’s evidence to the effect that, when the mother left for Town D, she said she would return in two to three days but did not.

5. Whilst the paternal grandmother thought that “months” had passed before the mother returned to collect the child, it seems to me to be more likely that the period of time within which he was left in his father’s care was considerably shorter than that. I arrive at this conclusion because the evidence establishes the parties agreed for the child to spend time with his father from 3 April 2011 (when the father collected him from the mother at Town D) until 7 April 2011 (when the mother collected him from the paternal grandmother).

6. I accept that, in mid-April 2011, the father asked the mother to allow the child to spend time with him on his (the father’s) birthday (two days later). The mother agreed on the proviso the time occur at the father’s aunt’s house. On   the day before the father’s birthday, the aunt collected the child from the mother. I accept that, on 22 April 2011, the father told the mother he did not intend to return the child to her care. On 22 April 2011, the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services received information, which it recorded as a notification, raising the issue of physical harm to the child. The mother contacted the Department on 8 May 2011 – some 16 days after the father had told her of his intention to retain the child – and filed an application on 6 June 2011 seeking a recovery order.

7. Whilst I accept the mother’s evidence to the effect that there were issues involved with her seeking the provision of Legal Aid funding to enable an application to be made, I consider it highly unlikely she would have failed to approach Police or the Court herself if she seriously believed the child was at a significant risk of harm in his father’s care at this time. Such a conclusion is, I think, supported by a consideration of the mother’s comments, in August 2011, to the Family Consultant who prepared the first Family Report.

8. On 20 June 2011, Federal Magistrate Howard (as his Honour then was) made a recovery Order requiring the child be returned to the mother on 21 June 2011. This was the first parenting Order made in relation to the child. The June 2011 Order provided that, if the parents failed to reach agreement at a Legal Aid conference organised for 28 June 2011, the child would commence living with each of them for equal amounts of time, via an alternate week parenting regime, commencing on 29 June 2011.

9. On 5 August 2011, the Department corresponded about its assessment of the notification recorded on 22 April 2011. It advised it had determined the allegations were “unsubstantiated” in relation to concerns for the child.  The Department informed that no evidence was found to indicate the child was significantly harmed or at risk of significant harm due to actions from his carer.

10. I do not accept that the alternate week parenting regime broke down shortly after the June 2011 Order was made. Rather, I consider the evidence establishes it is more likely than not that the parents implemented this regime – at least significantly and save for a period from February until March 2012 during which the father was incarcerated – until an Order was made on 15 May 2012.

11. In April 2012, the parties agreed to participate in random drug testing.  On 17 April 2012, the Independent Children’s Lawyer asked both of them to test – the mother did and returned a result that was clear. The father failed to comply with the request to test. 

12. The May 2012 Order was made in the father’s absence. It provided that the child live with the mother and spend supervised time with the father at the J Contact Centre. As well as effecting the obvious change to the child’s parenting arrangements, it required each parent to subject themselves to drug testing on random occasions as requested by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.[2] The father was required to complete an anger management course within three months and both parents were to complete a parenting course within six months. There is no evidence to suggest that the father completed an anger management course as ordered nor that either parent complied with the requirement to complete a parenting course within six months. In fact, whilst there is evidence that the father completed a P5 Parenting Course on 14 August 2013, there is no evidence to suggest that the mother has ever completed a parenting course.

    [2]          Who had been appointed by the June 2011 Order.

13. It is uncontroversial that, unfortunately for the child, he did not spend supervised time with the father following the May 2012 Order. I think it highly likely this happened because, given the previous alternate week care arrangement which had existed since the end of June 2011, the father was affronted by the suggestion that his time with the child be restricted in this way.

14. As a result of the father’s unwillingness to engage with the Contact Centre, the child did not spend time with his father until 21 August 2012. I think it more likely than not the mother agreed to the father’s request that the child spend unsupervised time with him because he told her this would enable a terminally ill relative to spend time with the child. I accept he told her he would return the child to her on 25 August 2012. Her decision to permit the child to be cared for by the father for a four day block of time[3] is inconsistent with any proposition that she thought the child would be at risk in the father’s care.

    [3]a period longer than the two day period the Family Consultant records her as having said was the agreed duration : paragraph 13, Family Report dated 25 March 2013. 

15. The father did not implement his promise to return the child but, instead, retained him in his care.

16. At a Directions hearing conducted by a Registrar on 28 August 2012, the father told the Court that, by consent, the child was with him for three to four weeks and he anticipated returning him to the mother in the next two weeks. It appears the mother’s solicitors said they would have to confirm her instructions about this.

17. On 10 September 2012, the Independent Children’s Lawyer requested both parties to undertake testing for the presence of illicit substances. Neither did.

18. On 16 October 2012, the mother’s solicitors told the Independent Children’s Lawyer that the child had not been returned to the mother’s care. This was confirmed in correspondence, dated 11 November 2012, in which the Independent Children’s Lawyer was also informed that the mother was seeking Legal Aid to enable an application for a recovery order to be made.

19. On 11 December 2013, a Registrar made an order pursuant to s 91B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). On about 7 February 2013, the Department visited the father and child and, on 21 March 2013, advised that the child had been assessed as a child not in need of protection.

1. On 2 April 2013, a Registrar conducted another Directions hearing. The Order made that day contains a notation to the effect that the mother consider either filing a recovery order application or discontinuing the proceedings. This suggests to me that the Registrar had formed a view that nothing practical was happening in respect of the child’s ongoing retention by his father.

2. On 27 May 2013 - some nine months after the father retained the child, the mother filed an Application in a Case seeking a recovery order. On 25 July 2013, the Principal Registrar ordered, amongst other things, that the father return the child to the mother at Town D, failing which a recovery order would issue.

3. On 31 July 2013, the child was returned to his mother’s care in compliance with the Order.

4. I again accept that there may well have been issues associated with attempts to obtain Legal Aid funding to enable the mother’s solicitor to make an application for a recovery order. However, an explanation for the significant delay by the mother can also be found in her explanation[4] to the Family Consultant on 5 February 2013: namely, she had waited for ‘a time’ before telling her own legal representative she had provided the child to the father because she knew she should not have done so. This explanation is clearly more suggestive of a desire to avoid admonition from her lawyer than it is consistent with the proposition the mother was concerned the child was at risk whilst in his father’s care.

   [4]          Paragraph 21, Family Report dated 25 March 2013.

5. I also suspect, from the contents of entries in documents provided by the Police, that the mother was also engrossed in dealing with issues in her relationship with Mr K and in parenting her other children during this period.

6. I again consider it highly unlikely the mother would have failed to approach her legal representative, Police or the Court herself if she seriously believed the child was at a significant risk of harm in his father’s care at this time.

7. The father was arrested on 23 October 2013, charged with attempted armed robbery and remanded in custody.

8. The current operative Order was made by the Principal Registrar on 19 November 2013. It provides that the child live with the mother, she have sole parental responsibility for him and the father’s Application in a Case[5], by which he sought to spend time with the child, be relisted upon the father producing evidence of compliance with the requirement that he complete a post-separation parenting course, an anger management course, attend upon a psychiatrist for psychiatric assessment and obtain two consecutive clear supervised drug and alcohol tests in a six month period.

   [5]          Filed 24 September 2013.

9. The father was granted bail in March 2014. In mid-November 2014, he entered a plea of guilty and was dealt with as an accessory after the fact to attempted armed robbery.  He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.[6] As 142 days of pre-sentence custody were taken into account, he was granted immediate parole. 

   [6]          And two months for breaching an Order, with such sentences to be served concurrently.

10. The father had, in fact, completed a P5 Parenting Course on 14 August 2013. He had participated in anger management counselling (albeit by telephone) on 27 August, 5 September, 10 September and 11 October 2013. In July 2014, he was assessed by Dr L, a psychiatrist, who considers that there is no psychiatric reason why the child should not spend time with him. He has not obtained two consecutive clear drug tests: in fact, a test in December 2014 revealed the presence of marijuana.

What does the evidence establish about the child’s time with the father since separation?

1. The consequence of the evidence, as summarised briefly above, is that the child:

   a)was cared for by the father from 17 April 2011 until 21 June 2011; and

   b)was in the father’s care for no less than alternating weeks during the period from 29 June 2011 until 15 May 2012 (save for about a month in February/March 2012); and

   c)was in the father’s care from 21 August 2012 until 31 July 2013; and

   d)has, since 31 July 2013, only spent time with his father on about three to four occasions when the father has attended at his grandmother’s home whilst the child has been in her care.

2. The child has otherwise lived with his mother.

The proposals

1. The mother proposes the child live with her, she have sole parental responsibility for major long term issues relating to him and that he spend no time with the father. It is submitted this is in the child’s best interests because the father’s violent and erratic behaviour means he is a risk to the child and previous Orders for supervised time have not been implemented by the parties.

2. The father’s historic proposals[7] have consistently been either that the child live primarily with him or that he live with each parent in an equal time parenting regime. When spoken to on 18 December 2014 by Ms C, a Family Consultant who prepared the most recent Family Report[8], the father’s position traversed the range of possible parenting options (that is, from living with, to equal time with, to alternate weekend time): the reality is, I think, that he really wants whatever time with the child he can obtain from the Court.

   [7]          See Response filed 21 July 2011 and Application in a Case filed 24 September 2013.

   [8]          Dated 7 January 2015.

3. Whilst the father accepted during the course of the hearing that the parameters of the dispute between the parties had narrowed to a consideration of what  time, if any, the child should spend with him, I consider he continues with his desire that the child either live primarily with him or spend equal time with each parent. His determination not to pursue orders in such terms at trial was, I consider, more an acceptance of the reality of the situation in which he and the child find themselves than an abandonment of a wish to be fully involved in, and with, the child’s parenting into the future.

The parties and their credit

1. On the assumption that the father does not commit another criminal offence which leads to the revocation of his parole, he will remain subject to it until the end of 2015. His driver’s licence is, at present, suspended until May 2015.

2. I think it clear that the father has provided, at best, sanitised accounts of his previous behaviour. He has also, I think, positively understated or misstated events when asked questions about them: for example, he told Ms C that no conviction had been ordered in relation to his recent plea of guilty to a criminal offence[9] in circumstances where the evidence establishes the contrary.

   [9]          Paragraph 38, Family Report dated 7 January 2015.

3. He has, I think, been quite prepared to tell authorities, such as the Corrective Services Department, whatever information he thinks will be beneficial to him. Despite this and apart from the issue of whether he told his parole officer about the illicit substance revealed by the test, I accept his explanation for the contents of Exhibit 5. I also note the mother has not advanced that misuse of alcohol is a feature of the father’s functioning and that the paternal grandmother, whose evidence about this issue I accept, said that he was ‘not much of a drinker.’

4. The father’s drug screen collected on 4 December 2014 reveals the presence of marijuana.  The test was not scheduled but was supervised. Whilst the father accurately declared the prescription medication he was taking before being tested - the drugs he told his parole officer he had taken were, in fact, revealed by analysis - Exhibit 8 does not record that he told his parole officer about his use of marijuana.

5. Given that the very purpose of the test was to monitor for the presence of an illicit substance, I struggle to accept that the father’s parole officer would not have recorded his (the father’s) admission about taking the same. I similarly struggle to accept the entirety of the father’s explanation for the presence of marijuana in the sample he provided. I think it more likely than not that he placed himself into a situation where he foolishly decided to consume marijuana.

6. I also suspect that a plausible explanation for the father’s failure to disclose his marijuana use to his parole officer before testing may be that he – wrongly – thought the test would not detect the presence of marijuana. The falsity of this belief has been clearly established. The father should now have no doubt whatsoever that any use by him of illicit substances will be detected via the  testing undertaken as a condition of his parole.

7. I further suspect that, given he returned a positive test on the first occasion he was required to test after his release from prison, the father can expect an increased level of scrutiny. This view is strengthened by his own evidence – which I accept – that his parole officer made it clear to him that this positive result is the only occasion on which his failure to comply with a condition of parole will be excused.

8. I can only hope these matters will deter the father from putting himself in a future situation where he makes another stupid decision. Whether the father returns to prison as a consequence of breaching the conditions of his parole is, obviously, entirely within his control.

9. The father has also, I think, provided conflicting evidence about the frequency of the testing for illicit substances required of him as a condition of his parole because, despite asserting he is tested on a fortnightly basis, the evidence establishes he has only been tested once - in December 2014 - since his release from jail in November 2014.

10. He continues, I think, to understate the extent of the domestic violence during his relationship with the mother and, I suspect, in his relationships since then.

11. Having had the opportunity to observe the father during the course of the trial, I have no difficulty in accepting that he struggled to follow direction when Ms C wished to engage with him about matters in respect of which he did not wish to engage. It is, I think, in one sense understandable that the father expressed a reluctance to discuss the details of his criminal history (including the history of domestic violence) because he was under the impression Ms C would have read all of the material and he did not wish to “retell” those details. However, it is also a clear demonstration of his inability to manage his own behaviour and act in the manner most likely to assist him to persuade Ms C and the Court of the benefits of his proposal for the child: in this sense, to use a colloquial phrase, the father is his own “worst enemy”.

12. In a manner not dissimilar to that of the father, the mother has also, on occasion, provided inaccurate information: for example, she told Ms C during her interview in December 2014 that:

    a)The child lived with her after separation until she agreed for him to spend a weekend at the paternal grandmother’s after which the father did not return him until a recovery Order was made, whereas during her interview on 30 August 2011 (for the preparation of the Family Report dated 6 October 2011) she said she had left the child with the father for several days while she returned to Town D from where she told the father the relationship was over[10]; and

    b)she had no criminal history other than driving offences and as the aggrieved party to a Domestic Violence Order (whilst in her relationship with the father)[11] in circumstances where her criminal history reveals conviction for possession of dangerous drugs, receiving tainted property[12] and committing public nuisance.

    [10]         Paragraph 49, Family Report dated 6 October 2011.

    [11]         Paragraph 26, Family Report dated 7 January 2015.

    [12]         Page 10, Bundle 2, Exhibit 2.

13. She also denied to Dr L, when interviewed by him in July 2014, that she had ever been charged with any drug related offences.[13] As noted, the contents of her criminal history belie this assertion.

    [13]Page 22 of 39, affidavit of Dr L filed 21 August 2014

14. For the reasons outlined above, I have determined that it is necessary to approach both parties’ evidence with a significant degree of circumspection.

Principles

1. In these proceedings for a parenting order[14] in relation to the child, I may, subject to the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility[15] and Division 6 of Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), make such parenting order as I think proper.[16] I must have regard to the Objects of Part VII of the Act and the principles which underpin those Objects.[17] In deciding whether to make a parenting order, I must regard the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration.[18]

   [14] s 64B Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

   [15]         s 61DA of the Act

   [16]         s 65D of the Act.

   [17]         s 60B of the Act

   [18]         s 60CA and s 65AA of the Act

2. I accept that there is benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with both of his parents. Ms C’s evidence, based on observations in December 2014, that he appeared comfortable in the care of each parent and that he appeared to experience his time with his father positively provides a clear basis for such a conclusion.

3. Whilst Counsel for the mother submitted, in essence, that removing from the child the opportunity to spend time with his father was in his best interests because it would shield him from the consequences of his father’s influence, it cannot be forgotten that his mother’s lifestyle and history involve:

   a)a previous period - albeit short - of illicit drug use; and

   b)previous conviction for possession of dangerous drugs; and

   c)repeated involvement in intimate relationships in which violence has featured; and

   d)a relatively significant degree of relationship instability, given that her children are the issue of intimate relationships with three different partners.

4. The real issue, it seems to me, is whether the child will be at an unacceptable risk of harm from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence if he spends time with the father.

5. The first Family Report, dated 6 October 2011, contains no record of the mother asserting that the father directly physically harmed the child or her other children. In fact, it records her report he had been very good to her children when their relationship first commenced.[19] She also said that:

   a)she had no objection to the child spending significant or substantial time with the father as long as she knew where he was[20] and that she knew the father loved and cared for the child[21]; and

   b)because of the father’s drug use and unstable living arrangements, the child should live with her and spend alternate weekends with the father but, if the regime of equal time parenting was maintained, it might be better for the child that it occur in two week blocks rather than alternate weeks so that he could settle[22] – an assertion which is, I think, inconsistent with a genuine concern that the father represented a direct risk to the child.

   [19]         Paragraph 42, Family Report dated 6 October 2011.

   [20]         Paragraph 18, Family Report dated 6 October 2011.

   [21]         Paragraph 21, Family Report dated 6 October 2011.

   [22]         Paragraph 17, Family Report dated 6 October 2011.

6. The second Family Report, dated 25 March 2013,[23] similarly contains no record of the mother asserting that the father had previously physically harmed either the child M or her other children.

   [23]         Prepared after an interview with the mother on 5 February 2013.

7. However:

   a)the mother told Dr L in July 2014 that the father used to hit the children all the time; and

   b)when she spoke with Ms C in December 2014, the mother reported the children had been exposed to violence and, at times, had been direct targets of the father’s violent behaviour.[24]

   [24]         Paragraph 29, Family Report dated 7 January 2015.

8. The assertions that the father hit the children and that they were direct targets of his violent behaviour are not supported by the contents of the extensive police records before me. The police had significant involvement with the parties during their relationship - in response to notifications about incidents of domestic violence during which both parties were physically violent to the other. Whilst the complaints do reveal two occasions on which the father directed behaviour toward the mother whilst a child was in her arms, none of the records of those events contain a complaint that the father hit the children all the time or directly targeted them.

9. Additionally, the mother herself recounted that the father did not react toward her oldest daughter when that child kicked him in the genitals during an altercation between the adults.[25]

   [25]         Paragraph 47, Family Report dated 6 October 2011

10. Quite properly, Ms Pendergast conceded there is no evidence before the Court to indicate that the child was neglected or physically abused in any way whilst in his father’s care. She also submitted that no significant weight should be placed on the father’s use of physical discipline - which is limited to the occasional smack on the bottom with an open hand.

11. Given the child’s age, the father’s absence from his life since mid-July 2013 and his associated lack of opportunity to behave towards the child as a reading of his comments to Ms C might suggest, I am not persuaded that these comments could sensibly be relied on as a basis for concluding that the father has inappropriately physically interacted with the child.

12. Given the father’s impulsivity and difficulty in containing his emotions, Ms C expressed understandable concern that he may unintentionally harm the child as the child ages and “pushes his parent’s buttons”. Whilst this is certainly a risk, I note that there is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that the child suffered harm of any sort during the not insignificant periods of time he has previously been in his father’s care.

13. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the child will be at an unacceptable risk of direct physical harm if he spends unsupervised time with his father in the future.

14. Given the evidence about each of the child’s parents’ involvement in intimate relationships which have featured domestic violence, there is I think a risk that he may be exposed to this in either of their households in the future. I am not persuaded that the risk to the child of exposure to domestic violence in the mother’s household is less than the risk to the child of exposure to the same in the father’s household.

15. Clearly, both parties would benefit from counselling to assist them to address their respective vulnerabilities: the mother, to help her learn to avoid forming relationships with partners who struggle to regulate their behaviour and to express their emotions in an acceptable manner; and the father, to help him learn to regulate his behaviour, to express his emotions in an acceptable manner and to refrain from perpetuating a cycle of domestic violence. Both parties have, I consider, been reluctant and/or oppositional to taking steps to address these vulnerabilities to date, although I accept the father’s evidence that he has found some anger management techniques helpful. Whilst it has probably been said to the father on many previous occasions, he would be well advised to continue to use the techniques he spoke of – and any others – to manage his behaviour otherwise it is highly likely his future will be littered with incidents which may, one day, result in him being deprived of the privilege of involvement in the child’s life.

16. I am confident in concluding that, if the child’s parents choose not to address these vulnerabilities, it is highly likely his future behaviour will reflect his exposure to domestic violence, uncontrolled expressions or outbursts of anger or frustration and a pattern of relationship instability. Both of them will be responsible for this.

1. Whilst the evidence establishes the father has the following history of misusing prescription and illicit drugs:

   a)in March 2003, he presented to the Town D Hospital after taking an overdose of 30-60 Panadol and two anti-depressants;  

   b)in August 2008, he presented to the Town D Hospital and disclosed possession of prescription medication from different varieties – staff recorded that he was a regular intravenous drug user;

   c)in November 2008, he was taken to hospital by Police after using drugs and alcohol, discharged himself the next morning against advice and was recorded as behaving aggressively;

   d)in August 2009, he was taken to hospital by the Queensland Ambulance Service having taken 22 diazepam and consumed a bottle of bourbon,

   there is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest a continuation of these behaviours more recently.

2. I take into account Ms C’s evidence and expressed concern about the father’s comment to her as recorded at paragraph 44 of her report. I accept entirely that it is her practice to take such comments seriously when they are made by parents engaged in litigation in this jurisdiction. However, I am not persuaded that the father’s comment amounts to a direct threat he will harm himself if not permitted to spend time with the child; rather, I consider it is a statement by an emotionally immature, impulsive and frustrated parent. After all, there is no evidence to suggest that, despite the extremely limited time the father has spent with the child in the last 18 months or so, he has in any way attempted self-harm.

3. Whilst I also accept that Ms C has expressed concerns about the degree of emotional consistency the father may be able to provide the child in the future, it cannot be forgotten that the best interests assessment does not require a parent to have perfect insight, emotional consistency or to be free of personal failings.

4. It is clear that the father has previously been involved in incidents of domestic violence which pre-dated his relationship with the mother.  Regard need only be had to documents relating to his presentation at the Town D Hospital in October 2003, having suffered a stab wound said to be inflicted by a then girlfriend.  He assaulted his grandfather and suffered injury himself during an event in October 2010. He has had difficulties interacting with police: for example, in April 2009 he made threats and struck out until he was subdued.  He has clearly struggled to manage his behaviour and has demonstrated a capacity to react violently when challenged. 

5. Similarly, there was domestic violence in the mother’s relationship with the father of her two oldest children.

6. The evidence clearly establishes there was a significant level of domestic violence in the parties’ relationship.  I accept that both parties inflicted physical injury upon the other.  I consider it highly likely that at least some of this occurred in the presence of the children.  There is no doubt that the mother has suffered injury at the hands of the father. She too inflicted physical injury to him by, for example, hitting him over the head with a saucepan.  On occasion[26], she instigated a physical confrontation between the parties by smashing a shot glass over the father’s head. On other occasions, the father was clearly the instigator of physical violence.  

   [26]         20 March 2010.

7. I accept that, at various times during their repeated altercations, the father bit the mother’s finger, assaulted her, grabbed her around the throat, ripped her shirt and smashed a car window.  I also accept that the mother smashed a shot glass over the father’s head, hit him in the face, kicked him in the genitals, smashed a chess board against his head and hit him across the back of his head with an ashtray. Both parties have slapped each other across the face. The mother punched and kicked the father whilst they were at the local aquatic centre.[27]

   [27]         in October 2010.

8. The extent of the violence in their relationship reached a crescendo in February 2011 when police observed the father to have a cut to his arm (which he said had been caused by the mother) and scratches across his back whilst the mother had bite marks and swelling to her left eye. This event seems to have precipitated the mother’s departure to Brisbane, after which she and the father reconciled and travelled interstate to avoid the Department’s jurisdiction. It is uncontroversial that they separated on their return to Queensland in March 2011.

9. The father’s issues with anger management and involvement in altercations did not end after his relationship with the mother ceased. For example, on Christmas Day 2011, he and his then partner were involved in an altercation which involved the child: his partner used a baseball bat to try and hit him whilst the child was in his arms and the child’s head was grazed. The father bit the finger and ear of his partner. Given the child’s age, police understandably concluded he had been at a significant risk of injury at this time.

10. Lest it be thought that the father’s household was the only one in which significant incidents of domestic violence were occurring at that time, records reveal that:

    a)on 24 December 2011, the mother (then pregnant) and her children had a male person (who I conclude is likely to have been Mr K) approach their car, swear and wave a tomahawk and then pursue them before punching the mother in the face: when police arrived she had a red, slightly inflamed eye but did not want to make a report to them; and

    b)on 26 January 2012, police attended at the mother’s household after a heated argument during which, according to the information provided by the mother’s oldest daughter, she (the mother) was punched in the face, body and head: whilst the mother told police there had only been a verbal argument and declined to provide a statement, police believed the account given by the ten year old witness.

11. During the course of her submissions, Ms Pendergast, for the mother, relied on the thrust of Ms C’s evidence – to the effect that there is a probability that, if the child is exposed to his father’s inconsistent emotional behaviour, oscillating mood and instability, he may “continue the legacy of his father and his behaviour” – as a basis for urging the Court to conclude it is in the child’s best interests that he have no time with his father.  Whilst there may be an  impact on the child’s emotional and behavioural functioning in the future consequent upon any time he may spend with the father, this is likely to be ameliorated if such time occurs only, for example, on alternate weekends and during holidays.

12. Additionally, it seems to me that there is also a possibility – and, perhaps, a probability – that, by continuing to live primarily in his mother’s household the child may, if the mother repeats what is an established pattern of forming relationships with domestically violent men who have struggled with illicit substance use and have experienced periods of incarceration, in the future continue the “legacy” of his mother’s modelled lifestyle choices.

13. The mother raises general concerns about the father’s capacity to parent or care for the child.  However, a record from a medical practitioner to whom the father took the child on 23 March 2012 records that his weight, height and head circumference were all within normal range, that he appeared to have good skin colour - no bruises were observed.  Additionally, as outlined above, the Department’s investigation in February 2013 - when the child was in his father’s care - resulted in the assessment that he was not a child in need of protection.  

14. Ms Pendergast also submitted that, if the child spent time with the father, there is a risk he will, once again, retain him and he will be separated from his mother and siblings and, consequently, suffer emotional harm. The submission by Counsel for the mother to the effect that the Court would be concerned about the father’s capacity and/or willingness to abide an order requiring him to return the child to the mother’s care is certainly justified on the evidence. 

15. It is clear the father failed to comply with the May 2012 order when he withheld the child and retained him in his care from August 2012 until July 2013. However, it is also clear he complied with the July 2013 order in returning the child to the mother. 

16. The father says he recognises that he was wrong to retain the child; he says he realises that it was not beneficial to the child to be separated from his mother and siblings for such a significant period of time. He also says the Court should not be concerned he will act in the future as he has in the past because he is currently subjected to parole conditions which require him to report on a regular basis. A failure to report will have the consequence that his parole is revoked and he will return to prison to serve no less than about 13 months imprisonment. The father says, and – albeit with some reservation – I accept he will not risk future imprisonment by failing to return the child to his mother.

17. Whilst he has a history of not returning the child to the mother, I accept that, at least for the next 13 months or so, the father is subject to the requirement that he report on a regular basis to a parole officer.  His failure to do so will inevitably result in his return to prison. This would, of course, impact significantly upon his ongoing relationship with the child. If such an event occurs, the father will be totally responsible for the severing of his opportunity to have an ongoing and meaningful relationship with the child.

18. I accept Ms C’s evidence that there is some benefit for the child in having the opportunity to have time independent of his siblings - with whom he lives in his mother’s household - because this will mean he does not have to compete with their varied and equally demanding needs and will have the opportunity to experience undivided parental attention from his father.[28]

    [28]         Paragraph 72, Family Report dated 7 January 2015.

19. There is every possibility that the child may initially be a little unsettled if he resumes spending time with his father and is required to transition between his parents’ households. However, given his previous experience of being cared for by his father and Ms C’s observations of their interactions, I am confident this is unlikely to be ongoing.

20. A resumption of time with the father will also provide the child with an increased opportunity to spend time with and get to know his extended paternal family without impacting upon his agreed time with Ms Cotterill in any way. Whilst time with his father will obviously mean a separation from his mother and siblings and a reduction in his interaction with them, the child will still have sufficient time with them to enable him to maintain and develop his relationship with all of them.

21. I accept Ms C’s evidence to the effect that, if the child was denied the opportunity to spend time with the father there is a potential for a future  adverse impact on his sense of self-worth and identity; he may also, erroneously, blame himself for the absence of his father from his life. Such a consequence would not be beneficial for him.

22. The father clearly demonstrated an inability to see things from the child’s perspective when he failed to ensure he spent time with his mother and siblings from late August 2012 until late July 2013. This demonstrates a lack of understanding of the likely impact on the child of being removed from his mother and siblings.

23. Whilst I understand the basis upon which Ms C is critical of the father’s behaviour in repeatedly seeking affection from the child during her observation - rather than permitting the child to approach him - I am not persuaded that his actions on this occasion demonstrate a fundamental lack of parenting capacity. I consider it highly likely the father was simply attempting to take the opportunity to interact with the child to the fullest extent possible in circumstances where their time together since mid-2013 has been extremely limited.

24. Whilst Counsel for the mother understandably focused on the father’s asserted lack of parenting capacity, it is important to place such criticisms in the context of the following matters, relevant to the mother’s parenting capacity:

    a)in October 2004, the Department substantiated a notification regarding neglect and emotional harm of the mother’s oldest daughter;  and

    b)in January 2005, the Department substantiated a risk of emotional and physical harm to the children as a result of domestic violence between the mother and the father of her two oldest children who apparently accidently hit a child when trying to punch the (then pregnant) mother; and

    c)on 10 January 2007, the Department received information that the two oldest children’s father was using the drug Ice;

    d)in November 2008, the Department recorded a Child Concern Report after receiving information the mother left the children with different people for long periods of time;

    e)in October 2010, SCAN information recorded the eldest child’s significant absence from school and that she appeared unkempt.

25. Despite the above, it is also important to record that, on occasions, the Department has concluded that the children appeared happy and healthy when seen in their mother’s care.

26. Whilst it is clear that the father has historically expressed critical views about the mother’s capacity to parent and that he continues, to some extent, to express such views, I am not persuaded that this factor of itself precludes the child having the opportunity to spend regular and meaningful time with the father. 

27. I accept that the father has consistently demonstrated a desire to be involved in the child’s life.  He has consistently sought that the child spend time with him. 

28. I am not persuaded that the child will be at an unacceptable risk of harm if he spends unsupervised time with the father. As noted above, there is no evidence to suggest he suffered physical harm previously and, to the extent that he may be at risk of emotional harm via exposure to domestic violence in his father’s household, such risk appears to me to be equally present in his mother’s household.

Parental responsibility

1. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply in this case. Ms C considers that an order according to the mother sole parental responsibility for major long term issues in relation to the child is one which would be in his best interests. She does so on the basis of her assessment of the parents’ inability to communicate and/or co-operate sufficiently to permit them to make such decisions jointly, as they would be required to do if an order for equal shared parental responsibility was made.

2. The mother adopts this position whilst the father opposes it. He submits that, contrary to the mother’s assertion, the parties have, in fact, been able to communicate about the child. He relies upon the fact that, when the child was taken to hospital in Brisbane on 8 January 2015, he and the mother were able to speak and were required to – and did – consent to the child receiving medical treatment. I understood him to rely upon this is a demonstration of their capacity to make decisions jointly about matters involving the child.

3. Understandably, each parent recounts the child’s hospitalisation through the prism of their own perceptions: the mother asserts she thought the father had taken some illicit substance because he was asking her and the nurses the same questions over and over again; the father denies consuming any substance but accepts his presentation was intense, explaining that this was because he was panicked, very emotional and very stressed.

4. I accept that, upon seeing the child with a drip and catheter, he reacted because he was very concerned about the child and worried about his well-being. The father was not challenged about his evidence that he had spent the whole night at the hospital with the child. It seems unlikely the hospital would have permitted this if medically trained professionals had reached a view that the father was under the influence of illicit substances.

5. Given the father’s obvious love for the child and his exuberant presentation during the course of the trial, it is easy to accept that he may well have presented in an excitable, intense, possibly slightly erratic and somewhat aggressive manner when faced with the prospect of injury to the child.

6. Despite my reservations about certain aspects of the father’s evidence, I accept his account that, during the time they were at the hospital, he and the mother (both smokers) had a cigarette several times outside together and chatted.

7. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that they will be able to co-operate and communicate sufficiently well in the future to make decisions about major long term issues about the child jointly: a cigarette together during the time of shared concern about a child does not a communicative parenting relationship make.

8. I do not accept the submission made by Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer to the effect that I should conclude the parents cannot jointly make decisions about the child because the father expressed a concern that there was “something more” to the circumstances in which the child was injured.

9. I also do not accept the submission made by Counsel for the mother to the effect that it is appropriate to make an order the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, in essence because:

   a)the reality of his family life is such that it is unlikely there will be a need for significant decisions to be made about matters like his education; and/or

   b)the Court could not be confident that the father’s communication with the mother would be relevant.

10. I do, however, conclude that it is more likely than not that a requirement for these parents to consult and make decisions about major long term issues relating to the child jointly is something which will result in conflict between them and the possibility of an impasse – neither of these could be seen to be, in any way, beneficial for the child.

11. For this reason, I have determined that it is in the child’s best interests that the mother, the parent with whom he will continue primarily to live, be accorded sole parental responsibility for major long term issues relating to him.

12. I do not accept the submission that it is not in the child’s best interests for his father to have the opportunity to have input into decisions about major long term issues relating to him. Rather, it is appropriate that the mother properly take any views expressed by the father about such issues into account in making the decision.

Is it in the child’s best interests to have time with the father and, if so, how should this occur?

1. I accept Ms C’s evidence[29] that, if time with his father is ordered, it would not be in the child’s best interests for him to be parented via a week about parenting regime. It could hardly be concluded otherwise given the significant hiatus in his time with the father. Additionally, whilst the distance between the parties is not such as to make regular weekend time impracticable, it certainly precludes an alternating week parenting arrangement, especially as the child has commenced his interaction with the formal education system this year and will start Prep next year.

   [29]         Paragraph 73, Family Report dated 7 January 2015.

2. Neither parent complied with previous Orders that the child spend supervised time with the father. The time which was to occur at the Town N Contact Centre did not eventuate because the mother had difficulties travelling there from Town D with her other children. No doubt the reality of her situation – namely that, as there is no supervision facility in Town D, any order for supervised time will mean the mother will have to undertake the not insignificant to travel to Town N either accompanied by her other children or be required to make arrangements for their care - is the reason Ms Pendergast did not submit that the Court should make an order for supervised time.

1. The history and this reality leads me to be confident in concluding that, if an order for supervised time between the father and the child was made, it will not be implemented and the child will not have the opportunity to spend time with the father. Even if I was confident that supervised time would occur if ordered, I accept Ms C’s evidence[30] about the limitations the imposition of supervision over the child’s time with his father would impose upon his opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with him.

   [30]         Paragraph 75, Family Report dated 7 January 2015.

2. I conclude that it is in the child’s best interests to have the opportunity to spend unsupervised time with his father. This will give him the opportunity to experience his father for himself, rather than via information provided to him by Ms Cotterill, will provide an opportunity for interaction with other members of his paternal family and will enable him to experience time as the only child in his father’s care as opposed to being one of a number of children in the mother’s care. He clearly enjoyed his time with the father when Ms C observed them together. Whilst time with the father has the obvious potential of exposing the child to the risks discussed above, many of these exist in his mother’s household also.

3. I accept Ms C’s evidence to the effect that if, as I have determined, it is in the child’s best interests for him to have the opportunity to spend unsupervised time with the father, such time should occur on a graduated basis as follows:

   a)for a period of about six weeks: daytime time only on a weekly basis if the distance between the households does not prevent weekly time from occurring; and then

   b)for two to three weeks: for additional time overnight; and then

   c)for the entirety of a weekend; and that

   d)block periods of time should be introduced in a graduated manner such that, by the time the child commences Prep or a bit later, he is spending half of each gazetted holiday period with each parent.

4. The form of the Orders I have crafted reflects this evidence and its underlying premise – which I accept - that the child’s time with his father needs to recognise the significant hiatus in their time together and to allow him to become reaccustomed to spending time in his father’s care.

5. The father says it takes about 40 to 45 minutes to drive from Town A to Town D. Whilst I acknowledge that the Order made imposes the totality of the burden of travelling to and from Town D on the father, I consider that this is the optimal way to ensure the reality of the mother’s obligations to parent the child’s siblings does not become an impediment to regular time between the child and his father. It is, surely, a minor imposition when compared to the benefits of the opportunity to spend time with the child.

6. Whilst Ms C expressed the opinion that it would be beneficial for the child if his time with the father occurred in the same location or residence consistently, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to make an order restraining the father in such a manner. In the same way that the realities of the mother’s life have impacted upon the issue of supervision, it is likely that the father may, on occasion, have little choice other than to spend time with the child at the home of one of his relatives.

7. I accept that the mother does not want the father to attend at her home. I consider that changeover in a public place is likely to minimise the potential of conflict between the parents to which the child may be exposed.

8. Given the father’s previous failure to comply with an Order which required the child to spend time with his mother there is force in the submissions made by Ms Pendergast to the effect that the Court would not be comforted by making ‘usual’ orders restraining the father from using illicit drugs or misusing alcohol whilst the child is in his care.

9. However – perhaps naively, but certainly optimistically – I have decided to accept the father’s assurances that he is focused upon working to become a better parent to the child. He will fail in this quest if he does not follow the Orders made today.

10. He will fail in this quest if he does not ensure that the child is returned to his mother’s care at the conclusion of his ordered time with him. His obligation to return the child exists whether or not the child says he wants to stay with him and whether or not he will miss the child when he is with his mother.

11. I have taken the somewhat unusual step of ordering that the mother have liberty to apply for a recovery order via direct communication with my Associate rather than by filing an application in the Registry and awaiting the allocation of a date for the hearing of the same.

12. I have deliberately done this to remind the father of his obligation to return the child to his mother in accordance with the terms of the order I make and to minimise the risk that any failure by him to do so may result in the child being retained from his mother’s care for too long a period of time once again.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighteen (118) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 13 February 2015.

Associate:     

Date:              13 February 2015