DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 781
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2001/610
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re MARTIN RAYMOND
Applicant
And COMCARE
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms G Ettinger - Senior Member
Date10 September 2002
PlaceSydney
Decision The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirms the decision of the Department of Veterans' Affairs dated 30 March 2001 which held there was no liability to pay Mr Martin Raymond, the Applicant in these proceedings lump sum payment for permanent impairment for bilateral sensori-neural hearing loss with tinnitus.
[SGD] Ms G Ettinger
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
Compensation - veteran - claim under 1930 Act - 41 years later – whether mistake of the Commonwealth or the Applicant – whether prejudice to the Commonwealth - decision affirmed
LEGISLATION
Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930 – 1956 ss 12(1); 16(1)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 - ss 24, 27, 123A, 124
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 - s 119(1)
CASE LAW
Re Muras v Department of Defence (1998) 52 ALD 579
Scott-Holland v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 46 ALR 328
Re Willis v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1989) 19 ALD 665
Commonwealth of Australia v Connors (1989) 86 ALR 247
Telstra Corporation Limited v Roycroft (1997) 77 FCR 358
Secretary of the Department of Veterans' Affairs v Studdert [2001] FCA 1642
Re Loft v Comcare (1996) 52 ALD 606
Secretary of the Department of Defence v Gorton (2000) 98 FCR 497
REASONS FOR DECISION
10 September 2002 Ms G Ettinger - Senior Member
The decision under review before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), was the decision of the Department of Veterans' Affairs dated 30 March 2001 (T36) which stated as follows in relation to a claim by Mr Martin Raymond, the Applicant in these proceedings:
"I refer to a letter dated 15 February 2001 requesting a reconsideration of the determination dated 27 September 2000.
That determination disallowed your claim for compensation for permanent impairment in respect of "bilateral sensori—neural hearing loss".
Having conducted the reconsideration as requested, I have decided it is appropriate to conduct a reconsideration of own motion of the Determination dated 21 June 2000 pursuant to Section 62 of the SRCA. The Determination dated 21 June 2000 accepted liability to pay your compensation for bilateral sensori-neural hearing loss with tinnitis (sic) with the date of the injury deemed to be on 1 January 1958.decision
I revoke the Determination dated 21 June 2000 which accepted liability to pay you compensation for your condition of bilateral sensori-neural hearing loss and tinnitis (sic). Instead I decide that your claim for compensation for partial deafness -- left ear made by claim form dated 13 May 1999 is disallowed and denied.
Further, and I affirm the Determination dated 27 September 2000."The Applicant appealed the decision to the Tribunal 5 May 2001.
The Applicant was represented by Mr J Fitzgerald of counsel briefed by Rockcliffs Solicitors and the Respondent, Comcare, by Mr J Johnson of counsel briefed by the Australian Government Solicitor. The Respondent…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether Mr Raymond's claim was admissible under the 1930 Act despite the significant delay in lodging it, and whether the failure to notify and claim within the stipulated six-month period was due to a mistake or other reasonable cause that could excuse the non-compliance. This hinged on interpreting the provisions of section 16 of the 1930 Act, which mandates timely notification and claim submission for compensation eligibility.
The Tribunal examined the statutory requirement for timely notification and claim submission, as well as the exceptions allowing claims to be considered despite late filing. Mr Fitzgerald argued that Mr Raymond's immediate reporting of the incident to his superior and the lack of medical examination at discharge mitigated against holding Mr Raymond responsible for the absence of formal notification. Conversely, Mr Johnson highlighted the strict adherence to statutory timelines as critical, citing previous cases that underscored the necessity of strict compliance with claim procedures. The Tribunal concluded that despite Mr Raymond's immediate reporting of the incident, the claim was not admissible because it was not lodged within the required six-month period and no reasonable cause for the delay was established.
The Tribunal ultimately affirmed the decision of the Department of Veterans' Affairs, disallowing Mr Raymond's claim for compensation. The Tribunal held that the statutory requirement for timely notification and claim submission was mandatory and could not be waived based on the circumstances of this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Having accepted then that the incident in May 1959 caused Mr Raymond's hearing loss, I had still to consider his position pursuant to section 16 of the 1930 Act, that is whether his claim could be considered outside of the six months period in which he was required to lodge a claim, and whether he suffered incapacity as a result of the incident.consideration of section 16 of the 1930 ACT Mr Fitzgerald in referring to section 16 of the 1930 Act, acknowledged that there was a notification requirement of six months with regard to claims for compensation in section 16(1)(a) of the 1930 Act, but submitted that pursuant to section 16(1)(i) of the 1930 Act, the Commonwealth was not prejudiced by the absence of notification because Mr Raymond had notified the Army of the incident the day it happened in May 1959. The employer therefore knew of it at the outset Mr Fitzgerald submitted, and Mr Raymond could not be held responsible for the absence of records, particularly as there had been no medical examination conducted on discharge. I was mindful that notwithstanding that the Respondent had conceded Mr Raymond did not know of his rights within the six month period following his accident, and indeed accepted that had he known he would have made a claim as appropriate, Mr Johnson submitted that pursuant to Re Muras v Department of Defence (1998) 52 ALD 579 notification of the accident as soon as practicable after it had happened, and a claim for compensation within six months from the occurrence of the accident were required for the claim to be admitted or entertained. Mr Johnson referred me to paragraph 24 of Muras (supra), where Deputy President McMahon stated as follows:"The applicant did not suffer a latent injury. The effects of the motor vehicle accident were frank and immediate. From the very beginning, the applicant was aware of the seriousness of his injuries. He continued to be aware during the six months period, when notice should have been given, and a formal claim should have been made. It is during this six months period that one must look at claims of the existence of mistake or other reasonable cause: Re Willis and Australian Telecommunications Commission (1989)19 ALD 665; 10 AAR 382 at 394. It could not be said in this case that mistake as to the benign nature of the injuries may have caused a want of notice." Mr Fitzgerald submitted that the situation in Muras (supra) was entirely different in that Mr Muras attended at a naval hospital for treatment, but that he did not actually report his accident as Mr Raymond had. I was mindful of the evidence of Mr Raymond that he had reported the incident to Captain Droltz immediately after it occurred, and twice attended at the RAP in that regard. I noted further that Mr Fitzgerald also submitted that Mr Raymond could have been, but was not examined on discharge. Mr Johnson, referred also to Scott-Holland v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 46 ALR 328, submitting in regard to section 16 of the 1930 Act that "admit" in the section was pursuant to the abovenamed case intended to be read to mean "entertain" or "consider on the merits", rather than "grant". Ellicott J had stated at 334: "The word 'admissible' according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary means allowable". I noted further that in Scott-Holland (supra) at 334, Ellicott J had referred to Australian National Airlines Commission v Cassidy (1964) 110 CLR 172, stating: "In Australian National Airlines Commission v Cassidy (1964) 110 CLR 172; [1964] ALR 780, it was held that the word 'admit' in s 16 of the 1930 Act meant 'entertain' not 'grant'. In other words, it meant that the Commissioner should not hear a claim. This connotation of the word is, however, not in dispute in this case. The appellant argued the matter on the basis that 'admit' in s 16 meant 'entertain'. In my opinion, the Tribunal did not err in law in holding that the two claims relating to physical injury should not have been entertained by the Commissioner's delegate. The correct interpretation of s 104(12)(b) is that it was intended to ensure that a person who suffered injury whilst the 1930 Act was in force the symptoms of which were then apparent would have no greater right of recovery under the 1971 Act, so far as that right was confined by obligations to give notice and make a claim, than was had under the 1930 Act.When the words 'a claim by a person under the 1930 Act was 'not admissible' are read in the light of Cassidy's case I think they mean 'a claim by a person under that Act would not have been entertained.'"