| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCR 2025 0168 |
| ANGUS RAWLINGS (a pseudonym)[1] | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE KING | Respondent |
[1]To avoid any risk of prejudice to the administration of justice, these reasons for judgment have been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.
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| JUDGES: | PRIEST and KIDD JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 8 August 2025 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 8 August 2025 |
| DATE OF REASONS: | 21 August 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 190 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Rawlings] (Unreported, 4 August 2025, County Court of Victoria, Judge Marich) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Prosecutor comments raising issue of incriminating conduct without notice – Whether prosecutor’s comments were capable of being cured by judicial directions – Defence application to discharge jury refused – Application for certification granted – Whether judge erred in failing to discharge jury – Whether judge erred in granting certification – Leave to appeal against interlocutory decision refused.
Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 297, 295(3)(b) and (c).
Baker v The King [2025] VSCA 139; Carson v The Queen [2019] VSCA 317; Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427; Director of Public Prosecutions v Pace (a pseudonym) (2015) 45 VR 276; Director of Public Prosecutions v Paulino [2017] VSCA 38; Healy v The King [2024] VSCA 81; Hutton v The King [2024] VSCA 282; Males v The Queen (2021) 292 A Crim R 61; Moore v The King (2024) 419 ALR 169; Pompei v TheKing [2023] VSCA 71; Pope (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2017] VSCA 324; R v Boland [1974] VR 849; R v Vaitos (1981) 4 A Crim 238; R v Walker [2025] NSWCCA 62; Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, applied.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant | Mr J Saunders | ||
| Respondent | Mr D A Glynn and Mr D Hancock | ||
| Solicitors | |||
| Applicant | Valos Black & Associates | ||
| Respondent | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | ||
PRIEST JA
KIDD JA:
Introduction
On 22 July 2025, the applicant pleaded not guilty in the County Court to an indictment containing multiple violence-related charges allegedly committed by him against his wife. A jury was empanelled, and the trial proceeded.
In circumstances we will later set out in more detail, in the course of the prosecutor’s final address to the jury, defence counsel made an application to discharge the jury.
By a ruling made on Monday, 4 August 2025, the judge refused to discharge the jury (‘the ruling’ or ‘the interlocutory decision’). The judge then certified under s 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘CPA’) that the interlocutory decision was ‘of sufficient importance to the trial to justify it being determined on an interlocutory appeal’.
Pursuant to the trial judge’s certification, the applicant made an application for leave to appeal against the interlocutory decision.
We heard the application for leave to appeal on 8 August 2025. At the conclusion of oral argument we ordered…
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- AGLC
- Rawlings (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] VSCA 190
- Case
- [2025] VSCA 190
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the prosecutor's comments were capable of being cured by judicial directions, as required by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The court held that where incriminating conduct reasoning is impermissibly advanced, it does not automatically render a trial unfair, but depends on the specific circumstances of the case. The court found that the trial judge had correctly assessed that the prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s remarks could be mitigated by appropriate judicial directions. The evidence in question, including the purchase of pharmaceutical items and the confinement of WS, was relevant for contextual and relationship purposes and was properly before the jury for consideration within the confines of the evidence rules.
Given the circumstances, the court concluded that the trial judge was not bound to discharge the jury and that the decision to grant certification was appropriate. The reasoning was that the evidence was integral to understanding the context of the alleged assaults and the relationship dynamics between the parties. The court ultimately decided that the trial judge's actions were correct and that the certification was justified, as the evidence was relevant and its prejudicial impact could be managed with proper directions.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the end, and for reasons which follow, the trial judge was not bound to exercise the discretion to discharge the jury. We also consider that the trial judge was correct to conclude that the impugned prosecutor’s remarks were curable by direction. The decision to not discharge was correct.Consideration In his final address the prosecutor relied upon the acts of the accused (e.g., obtaining medical supplies and treating WS’s injuries at home and taking steps to confine WS to the house) and the omissions of the accused (e.g., not seeking medical or any other kind of assistance for his wife). The prosecutor effectively invited the jury to reason from these acts and omissions that the applicant was motivated to conceal WS’s injuries from any outside scrutiny because he knew that any such exposure would implicate him in the assaults. Clearly the prosecutor’s submissions invited incriminating conduct reasoning. So much was accepted by the respondent at trial and before us. As the respondent submitted, where incriminating conduct reasoning is advanced impermissibly by the prosecutor, this does not necessarily render the trial unfair. The authorities show that the answer to this question is dependent upon the circumstances of the case. Where directions on the topic are not given, or where directions are given but are inadequate, there is a significant risk that unacceptable unfairness will be created.[26] There are, however, examples where appropriate judicial directions have been given which have ensured ongoing fairness of the trial.[27][26]Pompei v The King [2023] VSCA 71 (Beach, T Forrest and Kaye JJA); Healy v The King [2024] VSCA 81 (Beach, T Forrest and Kaye JJA); Baker v The King [2025] VSCA 139 (McLeish, Orr and Kidd JJA). [27]Hutton v The King [2024] VSCA 282 (Beach, Kennedy, Boyce JJA). In this case, we indicated at the oral hearing that insofar as the trial judge refused to discharge the jury because any prejudice caused by the impugned prosecutor’s remarks could be ameliorated by judicial direction, the ruling was correct. The evidence of the applicant’s purchase of pharmaceutical items, his medical treatment of WS, and the evidence relating to the confinement of WS to the house, was all admitted without objection. During the oral hearing before us, counsel for the applicant accepted the evidence was properly before the jury for a non-incriminating conduct purpose. It seems that it is common ground that this evidence is relevant as context and relationship evidence. It is integral to WS’s account of the assaults, which must be evaluated within the setting of her relationship with the applicant. It might, for example, explain WS’s own responses such as why it is she did not seek medical assistance. The applicant’s purchase of the pharmaceutical items, and his medical treatment of WS, also shed some light on whether the injuries occurred, which to some degree might still be in issue.[28] The confinement evidence also bears upon the probability of WS being able to regularly attend group sex parties given that she was largely housebound. [28]While the fact of the injuries is largely not disputed by the applicant, the extent or severity of the injuries remains in dispute.