Ravenswood v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation
[2015] ICQ 19
•23 July 2015
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Ravenswood v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation
Regulator) [2015] ICQ 019PARTIES:
KATHLEEN RAVENSWOOD
(appellant)
v
SIMON BLACKWOOD (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGULATOR)
(respondent)CASE NO/S:
C/2015/1
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
DELIVERED ON:
23 July 2015
HEARING DATE:
22 July 2015
MEMBER:
Martin J, President
ORDER/S:
Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE – EMPLOYMENT SUBSTANTIAL OR SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR – TO INJURY – where the appellant claims that she sustained a psychological injury as a result of her work as a member of security staff at an airport – where the Commission determined on the basis of medical evidence that the injury arose out of fears about job security – where the Commission found that a number of stressors were either not made out on the evidence or were not work-related – where the Commission found that the injury was not compensable, as it arose out of or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way – where the Commission made findings in respect of the credit of the applicant and the witnesses – where the appellant sought to introduce new evidence – whether the Commission erred in law or in fact
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s32(5)
CASES:
Ravenswood v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2014] QIRC 205
APPEARANCES:
K Ravenswood in person
JJ Wiltshire directly instructed by the respondent
The appellant, Ms Ravenswood, was engaged by Toll Remote Logistics as a member of the security staff at the Roma Airport. She commenced employment at the end of January 2013. Ms Ravenswood claims that she sustained a psychological injury as a result of that work. The Regulator did not allow her claim for compensation and she appealed to the Commission.
In that appeal, she claimed that there were 11 stressors which led to her sustaining the psychological injury. At the hearing, the Regulator disputed both that the injury arose in the course of her employment and that the employment was a significant contributing factor to the injury. The Regulator also relied on s 32(5) of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (‘the Act’) and argued that the injury was not compensable, as it arose out of or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way.
The matter was heard by Commissioner Fisher, who concluded that the medical evidence established that Ms Ravenswood’s injury arose out of her fears about job security. The Commissioner further found that the injury arose out of reasonable management action, taken in a reasonable way, and thus, s 32(5) of the Act precluded compensation.
On this appeal, the appellant seeks to argue that the Commissioner erred in rejecting four of the 11 stressors listed by her and submits that they should have been accepted and her claim allowed. As is sometimes the case in claims concerning a psychological injury, the decision of the Commission rested largely upon the Commissioner’s view of, and findings about, the credit of the applicant and the witnesses.
In this case, Commissioner Fisher made the following finding with respect to the appellant. She said:
“In giving evidence, Ms Ravenswood was vague and inconsistent and at times, not particularly coherent. Because of this, I find her to be an unreliable witness and unless her evidence was corroborated by a witness who I find to be credible, it is generally not accepted.”[1]
[1]Ravenswood v Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator) [2014] QIRC 205, [9]
In the appeal before this Court, that finding was not contested.
Commissioner Fisher engaged in a detailed analysis of the evidence before her by reference to the list of stressors. In doing so, the Commissioner referred to and set out that evidence which was relevant to each of those stressors.
On this appeal, Ms Ravenswood seeks to introduce some new evidence, which is said to relate to some of the findings. No basis for allowing the admission of any extra evidence was established.
Much of what is said in Ms Ravenswood’s submissions on appeal consists of an attempt to go beyond the stressors which were detailed in the hearing before the Commission. The Commissioner correctly proceeded on the basis that the list of stressors confines the matters to be heard and determined by the Commission to those that are raised in the list. The same applies on any appeal.
On this appeal, the appellant does not identify any errors committed in the reasoning of the Commission, rather, she seeks to argue that the decision should have fallen in her favour and that a different view could be taken of the evidence. But there was evidence, set out in the Commissioner’s reasons, which supported each of the findings made.
As I have previously said, no argument was advanced to challenge the finding of credit made by the Commission. That finding underlies a large part of the analysis of the Commission. This is a case in which the Commission had the advantage of seeing the parties give evidence and of assessing their evidence on at least that basis. Nothing which has been said by the appellant has served to demonstrate that the Commissioner erred either in law or in fact.
For those reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
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