[2024] HCATrans 90
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S113 of 2024
B e t w e e n -
MICHAEL RAVBAR
First Plaintiff
WILLIAM LOWTH
Second Plaintiff
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Defendant
ATTORNEY‑GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH
Second Defendant
MARK IRVING KC
Third Defendant
GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 10 DECEMBER 2024, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends MR C.L. LENEHAN, SC, MR C.J. TRAN and MS N.A. WOOTTON for the plaintiffs. (instructed by Hall Payne Lawyers)
MR S.P. DONAGHUE, KC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please your Honours, I appear with MR N.M. WOOD, SC, MS C.G. WINNETT, MR T.M. WOOD and MS M.R. SALINGER for the first and second defendants. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR M.J. WAIT, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR B.L. GARNAUT on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of South Australia, intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))
MS S.K. KAY, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania: May it please the Court, I appear with MS J.L. RUDOLF on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of Tasmania, intervening. (instructed by Solicitor‑General of Tasmania)
MR G.J.D. DEL VILLAR, KC, Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends MS F.J. NAGORCKA and MR K.J.E. BLORE, appearing on behalf of the Attorney‑General of the State of Queensland. (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))
GAGELER CJ: There is a submitting appearance for the third defendant. Thank you, Mr Solicitor. Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: May it please your Honours. Your Honours, the course we will follow is that I will address as to the substantive questions concerning heads of power with a particular focus on 51(xx), the corporations power, and the argument that stems from the interference, as we put it, with the implied freedom of political communication. My friend Mr Lenehan will follow, with respect to matters concerning the acquisition of property governed by section 51(xxxi), as well as matters concerning the exclusive vesting of judicial power in Chapter III courts.
Your Honours, the provisions which bring the parties to Court are found in a remarkable set of provisions – remarkable not only as to their content, but also as to the place they take in what I will call, in very general and non‑constitutional terms, the regulation of industrial organisations in this country. Part 2A of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 takes its form, as I say, remarkably, by what might be called in the jargon of ancient jurisprudence a privilegium. That is, that it grants no bounty; it visits all its attention on just…
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- Case
- [2024] HCATrans 90
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the Court was whether the Commonwealth's actions, specifically the compulsory acquisition of certain rights and interests held by the Ravbars, constituted an acquisition of property for the purposes of section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. If it was an acquisition, the Court then had to determine whether the acquisition was upon "just terms," as mandated by that constitutional provision.
The Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the rights and interests that were compulsorily acquired. It applied established principles concerning what constitutes "property" for the purposes of constitutional acquisition, considering whether the rights extinguished by the Commonwealth were of a kind that could be characterised as property. The Court analysed the specific legislative provisions under which the acquisition occurred and the practical effect of those provisions on the Ravbars' interests. The determination of "just terms" involved an assessment of the compensation or other benefits provided to the Ravbars in exchange for the acquisition, considering whether these were fair and adequate in the circumstances.
The High Court ultimately found that the Commonwealth's actions did not constitute an acquisition of property for the purposes of section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. Consequently, the constitutional requirement for "just terms" was not engaged. The Court therefore dismissed the Ravbars' application.
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