Ravbar & Anor v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors

Link copied
Case Copied 54 min read

[2024] HCATrans 091

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S113 of 2024

B e t w e e n -

MICHAEL RAVBAR

First Plaintiff

WILLIAM LOWTH

Second Plaintiff

and

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Defendant

ATTORNEY‑GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Second Defendant

MARK IRVING KC

Third Defendant

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 11 DECEMBER 2024, AT 10.02 AM

(Continued from 10/12/24)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

GAGELER CJ:   Mr Solicitor.

MR DONAGHUE: Your Honours, yesterday at the end of the day, I identified the purpose of Part 2A and the foundations for that purpose in the text and extrinsic materials. In our submission, the plaintiffs have not seriously contested that purpose. Instead, their argument on purpose appears to be that, in addition to the purpose that I identified yesterday, Part 2A – or some of its provisions – also have two substantial illegitimate purposes, those purposes being said to be the suppression of political communication of the division and its members, and the punishing of the division for actual or alleged breaches of antecedent standards of conduct. Mr Wood will address the second of those purposes, the submission I am about to make are addressed to the first.

EDELMAN J:   You are assuming their purposes rather than means to a purpose. 

MR DONAGHUE:   Your Honour, I do not think I am assuming that.  I am understanding the argument against me to be that they are purposes.

EDELMAN J:   But you are not accepting that they are purposes?

MR DONAGHUE:   I am not accepting – the submission I am about to make is that neither of them are properly identified as purposes of the law.  The plaintiff supports the first of what I have called the purposes that they allege by relying, as we understand it, on three matters:  first, on certain speeches given by opposition members in Parliament proposing an amendment to the Bill to ban political donations; second, a letter to Senator Cash by Minister Watt dated 14 August, which is now in the supplementary special case book; and third, a letter by Mr Irving to Minister Watt dated 19 August.  I propose to deal with those three materials in that order.

As to the opposition amendments, the materials before the Court and the debates – and I do not need to take your Honours back to it – reveal that the opposition was calling for some 20 amendments to the Bill prior to its passage, and some of them were made and some of them were not.

You can see a list of those 20 amendments in volume 3 of the special case book on page 1274, but your Honours do not need to go there.  One of the amendments that was not made is, of course, the proposed amendments banning political donations by the Construction and General Division of the CFMEU.  In our submission,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ravbar & Anor v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] HCATrans 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the Ravbar family and the Commonwealth of Australia, along with other respondents. The core of the disagreement concerned the validity of certain actions taken by the Commonwealth, which the Ravbars alleged constituted an unlawful acquisition of their property without just terms, in contravention of section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.

The central legal question before the Court was whether the Commonwealth's actions, specifically the compulsory acquisition of certain rights and interests held by the Ravbars, constituted an acquisition of property for the purposes of section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. If it was an acquisition, the Court then had to determine whether the acquisition was upon "just terms," as mandated by that constitutional provision.

The Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the rights and interests that were compulsorily acquired. It applied established principles concerning what constitutes "property" for the purposes of constitutional acquisition, considering whether the rights extinguished by the Commonwealth were of a kind that could be characterised as property. The Court analysed the specific legislative provisions under which the acquisition occurred and the practical effect of those provisions on the Ravbars' interests. The determination of "just terms" involved an assessment of the compensation or other benefits provided to the Ravbars in exchange for the acquisition, considering whether these were fair and adequate in the circumstances.

The High Court ultimately found that the Commonwealth's actions did not constitute an acquisition of property for the purposes of section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. Consequently, the constitutional requirement for "just terms" was not engaged. The Court therefore dismissed the Ravbars' application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established