Raval v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1441
•4 September 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Raval v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1441
File number(s): SYG 875 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS Date of judgment: 4 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial Review – Where Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the decision not to grant applicants student visas as it found the applicant did not satisfy PIC 4020 – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 359B, 359, 359C, 363A, 379A, 379C
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 500.217
Cases cited: Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 413; [2010] FCAFC 40
He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 568
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 464; [2019] FCAFC 53
LPDTv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 418 ALR 152; [2024] HCA 12
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2 Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 556; [2018] FCAFC 52
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42; 220 FCR 169
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 54 Date of hearing: 18 August 2025 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicants: Self-represented litigants Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr Fyfe, Minter Ellison Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 875 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: PURVIBEN KULDIPKUMAR RAVAL
First Applicant
KULDIPKUMAR ARVINDBHAI RAVAK
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:
4 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application filed on 1 May 2024 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04(h) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SKAROS
INTRODUCTION
By application filed on 1 May 2024, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal)[1] dated 3 April 2024. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the First Respondent (the Minister) refusing to grant the applicants Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visas under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
[1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings.
BACKGROUND
The first and second applicants are citizens of India.
The first applicant (the applicant) applied for the Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (the visa), the subject of these proceedings, on 14 October 2021. The second applicant is the first applicant’s spouse, and he was included in the application as a member of the family unit.
The applicant declared in her application that she had completed a Bachelor of Business Administration at Saurashtra University in India and provided a ‘statement of marks.’
On 8 February 2022, the Minister had information suggesting that the applicant’s qualification was ‘non-genuine’ and considered that she may have provided false or misleading information.
On 19 January 2023, the Department invited the applicant to comment on information regarding her student visa application. The Department noted that investigations undertaken by a Departmental officer found that the applicant’s Bachelor from University was non-genuine. The Department invited the applicant to respond within 28 days.
The applicant did not respond to the letter dated 19 January 2023, inviting the applicant to comment upon the Minister’s preliminary investigation.
On 20 March 2023, the delegate refused to grant the visas on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements of cl. 500.217 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) because the delegate was not satisfied the applicant met the Public Interest Criterion 4020 (PIC 4020).
On 7 April 2023, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. The applicants did not nominate an authorised recipient.
On 6 March 2024, the Tribunal sent an invitation under s 359 of the Act to the applicants at their nominated email address requesting they provide in writing all documents which they intend to rely on in their application for review by 20 March 2024. The Tribunal noted that if it did not receive the information within the allowed period (subject to any extensions), that they would lose any entitlement they may have under the Act to appear before the Tribunal at a hearing.
On 25 March 2024, the Tribunal advised the applicants that they had lost their right to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments as the applicants did not respond to the Tribunal's invitation by 20 March 2024 and had not sought an extension.
On 3 April 2024, the Tribunal made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the visas.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The dispositive issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant met the PIC 4020 criterion as required by cl 500.217 for the grant of the visa.
The Tribunal summarised the relevant background to the matter and explained why the applicants were no longer entitled to a hearing; they did not respond to the Tribunal's invitation made under s 359(2) within the prescribed period and no extension was sought. Consequently, s 359C applied and, pursuant to s 363A, the applicants had no entitlement to a hearing: at [3]–[4].
The Tribunal summarised the applicable law and the issues to be determined: at [6]–[10]. The Tribunal also summarised the background to the application including the declaration that the applicant had completed a Bachelor of Business Administration at Saurashtra University and provided a ‘statement of marks’: [12]–[17].
The Tribunal noted that, on 8 February 2022, the Minister had investigated the applicant’s claim that she had completed a Bachelor of Business Administration and concluded that the qualification was ‘non-genuine’ and may amount to false and misleading information. The Tribunal also noted the applicant had been invited on two occasions to provide evidence or make submissions that the information regarding her previous academic qualifications was not false or misleading information and that the applicant had not done so. In the absence of any contradictory information, the uncontradicted preliminary conclusion by the Department was accepted by the Tribunal: at [18].
At [19], the Tribunal noted that the applicant’s prior academic history was relevant to the assessment of whether the applicant should be granted a student visa, and whether she was a genuine student and genuine temporary entrant.
At [20] to [21] of its decision, the Tribunal found that the information pertaining to the applicant’s academic qualification was false or misleading in a material particular in relation to the visa application: as defined in PIC 4020(5). The Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet PIC 4020(1).
The Tribunal then considered whether the requirements of PIC 4020(1) should be waived. It noted at [25], that neither the applicant ‘nor her representative’ had identified a basis for PIC 4020(1) or (2) to be waived. The Tribunal’s reference to a ‘representative’ appears to be in error as there is no record of the applicant being represented before the Tribunal in relation to the review.
The Tribunal concluded at [26] that it was not satisfied there were compelling circumstances affecting the interests of Australia or compassionate or compelling circumstances that affected the interests of an Australian citizen, permanent resident or New Zealand citizen which justified granting the visa. It concluded, at [27], that the requirements of PIC 4020(1) should not be waived.
The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicants student visas.
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application for judicial review was filed on 1 May 2024, the applicant also filed an affidavit annexing the decisions made by the delegate and the Tribunal. It was not necessary for the Court to take this affidavit into evidence as these decisions are included in the Court Book filed by the Minister on 29 June 2025, which was tendered at the hearing (as Exhibit CB) and is in evidence. I have, however, taken into account the contents of the affidavit as submissions.
The matter was listed for hearing on 18 August 2025 at the Parramatta Registry of the Court and a notice of listing was sent to the parties on 7 July 2025.
At the hearing on 18 August 2025, the applicant appeared in person and was assisted by an interpreter in the Gujarati and English languages. The Minister was represented by Mr Fyfe of Minter Ellison.
Being mindful that the applicant was unrepresented, I explained to her how the hearing would proceed and the role and powers of the Court in judicial review proceedings.
The applicant was guided through her application and invited to make oral submissions in support of the ground of review raised in the application, which she did.
CONSIDERATION
The Court can only grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421 (SZMTA) at [81], the High Court, per Nettle and Gordon JJ explained that:
The categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision-maker includes identifying a wrong issue; asking the wrong question; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; and failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.
To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: SZMTA at [2]; LPDTv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 418 ALR 152 at [32].
Further, as explained to the applicant at the hearing, it is not for the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
One ground of review is advanced in the application (without alteration):
1.Administrative Appeals Tribunal had not acted in the best interest of the applicant (procedural fairness issue) as mentioned in affidavit attached here with.
The applicant submitted that she had not breached cl 500.217, she requested that due consideration be given to her compelling and compassionate circumstances and said when her visa from India was lodged the agent had attached documents of which she was not aware. She said she had her original documents with her which she could provide.
At the hearing, I discussed with the applicant the reasons, as set out in the Tribunal’s decision, for why the Tribunal decided to proceed to a decision on the review without inviting her to a hearing: she had not responded to the Tribunal’s invitation to provide the information requested. In view of this, I asked the applicant why she thought the Tribunal had not provided her with procedural fairness. The applicant said, when she received the email from Immigration that her documents were fake, she was scared and tried to contact the people in India who assisted her with the documents. She said she tried to contact them by email and phone, but they did not respond to her. She said at that time she had already completed her studies in Australia, had paid all her course fees and attended classes regularly.
In relation to her submission that she used an agent in India, I observed that the visa application document indicated that she submitted the application, the subject of the review, herself and there was no record of any agent acting on her behalf: CB 25. The applicant said she provided the correct documents but was not sure what had been done with them.
I took the applicant to the information in the visa application form (at CB 34) and documents (at CB 42–47) of the Court Book which indicated that she had studied a Master of Business Administration at Saurashtra University. I explained to the applicant that it was her claimed studies at that institution that was the subject of the Department’s investigations. When asked if she wanted to comment on the information obtained by the Department (about the non-genuineness) or the Tribunal’s reliance on the outcome of the investigation, the applicant said she could clarify this in about one month. When asked to explain how she would do this, the applicant said she wanted to resubmit the documents. I explained to the applicant that in judicial review proceedings, the Court cannot generally have regard to documents that were not before the Tribunal when it made its decision. I did not understand the applicant’s submission to be an application for an adjournment of the proceedings. However, even if it were, I would have refused this request given the documents she wished to provide would not have been admissible.
The applicant has not explained in what way the Tribunal had failed to provide her with procedural fairness, though she does allege that an agent in India had provided documents she was not aware of.
Addressing the issue of procedural fairness first, I am unable to identify any procedure which the Tribunal was required to follow but had failed to follow. Whilst the applicant had not been invited by the Tribunal to attend a hearing to give evidence and present arguments, this was the consequence of the applicants’ failure to respond to the s 359(2) invitation to provide information: CB 131. I accept the Minister’s submission that the invitation complied with the requirements in s 359(2) in that it:
·specified how the applicants should respond (s 359B(1) of the Act);
·allowed the prescribed period of 14 days for the applicants to respond (s 359B(2) of the Act; sub regulation 4.17(4) of the Regulations); and
·was sent to the applicants' nominated email address, which was the email address provided in connection with the review (s 359(3)(a) and s 379A(5) of the Act) and taken to have been received at the end of the same day (s 379C(5) of the Act).
As submitted by the Minister, the applicants failed to provide the information within the prescribed period and did not seek an extension of time. Consequently, they were not entitled to appear before the Tribunal: Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 413; [2010] FCAFC 40 at [25]–[32] per Jacobson, Gilmour and Foster JJ. The applicants were informed in writing that they had lost their right to a hearing but made no contact with the Tribunal to indicate they still wished to provide information in support of the review: CB 131. In the circumstances, where the applicants had not provided a response to the Department’s invitation to comment on the investigation and had failed to engage with the Tribunal, it was open (and not unreasonable) for the Tribunal to proceed to a decision on the information before it: see [14], [17] and [18] of the Tribunal’s decision.
Issue raised by the Minister
As a model litigant, the Minister raised the potential issue of the Tribunal not having any independent information before it about the information found to be false or misleading and relying, in effect, on the delegate’s decision.
The Minister contended that the Tribunal was entitled to rely on the information contained in the natural justice letter sent to the applicant by a delegate of the Minister (CB 94–95), which sets out details of the unfavourable information and the delegate’s findings. In support of their contention, the Minister relied upon a recent judgment of this Court, He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 568) (He) in which Judge Coulthard at [37]–[41] considered and rejected a similar argument.
The Minister contended that the facts of the present case are on all fours with He and that the issue should be similarly resolved. I note that in the present case the information found to be false or misleading and the documents found to contain false or misleading information were before the Tribunal when it made its decision. In He it appears that the documents, the subject of the investigation, may not have been before the Tribunal. The applicant in He took issue with the Tribunal not obtaining the ‘bogus documents’ and inspecting them for itself and making its own inquiries rather than on relying on the information provided by the Department.
Notwithstanding the difference in the facts, it is evident the Tribunal in the present case (as in He) relied upon the outcome of the investigation conducted by the Department, which was set out in the Department’s natural justice letter and reiterated in the delegate’s decision record, to conclude at [18] that there was evidence before it that false or misleading information had been provided in the student visa application. A copy of the delegate’s decision record was provided to the Tribunal with the application for review: CB113–114, 116–120.
For similar reasons to those set out in He (and the authorities cited therein), I do not consider the Tribunal’s reliance on the outcome of the investigation undertaken by the Department discloses any error on its part. These reasons relevantly include:
·that the natural justice letter issued by the Department contained information that an investigation had been undertaken by an officer of the Department seeking to verify the applicant’s claimed Bachelor of Business Administration qualification from Saurashtra University which was found to be non-genuine (the adverse information);
·the applicant did not provide any information to the Department or the Tribunal, despite being given an opportunity to do so, to suggest that the information obtained by the Department regarding her claimed qualification was incorrect or mistaken. As noted by the Tribunal at [18], there was no evidence before it which contradicted the adverse information obtained by the Department; and
·there was no information before the Tribunal that could reasonably have indicated that making a further inquiry to verify the information pertaining to the applicant’s claimed Bachelor of Business Administration from Saurashtra University in India would have resulted in a different outcome: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123 at [25]- [26]).
I accept, as submitted by the Minister, that the terms of PIC 4020 did not require the Tribunal to be positively satisfied that there was evidence that the applicant had given, or caused to be given, to the Minister information that was false or misleading in a material particular. Rather, the Tribunal had to be satisfied that there was ‘no evidence’ of this having occurred. The information before the Tribunal, which it was entitled to rely upon, indicated that false or misleading information pertaining to the applicant’s claimed Bachelor of Business Administration qualification, (which the Tribunal found at [19]–[21] was false or misleading in a material particular), had been given, or caused to be given, to the Minister. There was no evidence before the Tribunal to the contrary. In the circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude at [22] that the applicant could not meet PIC 4020(1).
For these reasons, I do not consider the matter raised by the Minister discloses any error on the part of the Tribunal.
Validity of the visa application
The applicant’s evidence that an agent in India attached documents to her student visa application, of which she was not aware, raises an issue about the validity of the application. I note, however, that the applicant has not sought a declaration of invalidity in respect of the visa application due to third party fraud, nor has she filed evidence to establish the alleged fraud. Nevertheless, the Minister has raised this as a potential issue in their written and oral submissions.
The Minister, in relying upon Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 556; [2018] FCAFC 52 at [144] per Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ, submitted that, if the applicants are alleging that their student visa application is invalid due to fraud by a third party (the agent in India), then they bear the onus of establishing that:
(a)the third party was responsible for the fraudulent conduct;
(b)at the relevant times, the applicants had no knowledge of and were not complicit in the fraudulent conduct carried out by the migration agent or third party (see also Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 464; [2019] FCAFC 53 per Murphy, Mortimer and O'Callaghan at [178]);
(c)they were not indifferent as to whether the third party engaged in the fraudulent conduct in the visa application process; and
(d)the fraud affected decision-making under the Act.
The difficulty in this case, for the applicants, is that there is no corroborative evidence that they engaged an agent in India to assist them with the visa application. As submitted by the Minister, the visa application form does not indicate that the applicants appointed an authorised representative, nor did it refer to any agent, and the questions on the form were answered in the first person: CB 25–41. The form (at the footer of the first page at CB 25) also indicates that the visa application was lodged by the applicant (as a self-registered user) using the same email address she provided (as her email address for service) in the originating application for judicial review filed in this court. When given an opportunity to make submissions from the bar table about the information in the form which indicated she had lodged the visa application herself, the applicant simply said, without any elaboration, that she had provided the correct documents but was not sure what had happened to them. I appreciate the applicant may have been nervous, but she was not forthcoming with information. The applicant’s response lacked probative value and falls well short of establishing an allegation of fraud.
To the extent that the applicants allege they were victims of (and their application was invalid due to) fraud by an agent in India, this has not been proven.
Purposely untrue
Even if it was accepted that the applicants did receive assistance from an agent in India and were not aware of what had been lodged on their behalf, this does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. As set out by the Tribunal at [9], PIC 4020(1) applies whether or not the information was provided by the applicant knowingly or unwittingly. The Tribunal, by reference to Trivedi v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42; 220 FCR 169, correctly stated that it was not necessary for it to conclude that the applicant was aware that the information was purposely untrue for PIC 4020 to be engaged. It also understood that for PIC 4020 to be engaged there had to be ‘an element of fraud or deception by some person’: at [10] citing Trivedi.
The Tribunal’s reasons disclose that it had regard to the information and documents pertaining to the applicant’s claimed Bachelor of Business Administration qualification, and while the Tribunal did not make an express finding that the information and/or the documents contained information that was ‘purposely untrue’, it is evident from its reasons that the Tribunal considered that the information and/or documents had the necessary quality of purposeful falsity.
It was also not necessary for the Tribunal to make a finding about whether the applicant was knowingly complicit in the provision of the purposely false or misleading information. As discussed above, the Tribunal was only required to consider whether there was ‘no evidence’ that the purposely false or misleading information (in a material particular) had been provided in relation to the visa application. As there was such evidence, it was open for it to conclude that the applicant could not satisfy PIC 4020(1).
I am unable to discern any error in the way the Tribunal construed PIC 4020 or in the way it applied it in the circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
As the ground raised by the applicant and the matters raised by the Minister do not establish jurisdictional error, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros. Associate:
Dated: 4 September 2025
0
13
2