Ratliff and Ratliff (Child support) - [2025] ARTA 257

Ratliff and Ratliff (Child support) [2025] ARTA 257 (10 February 2025)

Applicant: Mr Ratliff

Respondent: Child Support Registrar

Other Parties: Mrs Ratliff

Tribunal Number: 2024/BC028194
Tribunal:General Member Mr J Nalpantidis
Place:Melbourne
Date:10 February 2025

Decision:The Tribunal set aside the decision under review and substituted its decision that:
·     For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, the rate payable by Mr Ratliff is increased by $16,361.
·     For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the rate payable by Mr Ratliff is increased by $21,084 per annum.
·     For the period 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026, the rate payable by Mr Ratliff is increased by $23,193.

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

Statement of Reasons

BACKGROUND

Mr Ratliff and Mrs Ratliff are the separated parents of [Child 1] born [date] November 2012., [Child 2] born[date] June 2014 and [Child 3] born [date] April 2016 (the children). For the purposes of child support, the children are recorded as being in the above primary care (100%) of Mrs Ratliff. A case has been registered with Services Australia – Child Support (Child Support) since 13 July 2022 and child support has been collectable by Child Support since that date. Mr Ratliff is the payer of child support and Mrs Ratliff the payee.
In this case, Mr Ratliff applied for a change of assessment on 16 January 2024 on the basis that Mrs Ratliff’s income, property and financial resources makes the child support assessment unfair (called “Reason 8A” by Child Support) and Mrs Ratliff’s income or earning capacity makes the child support assessment unfair (called “Reason 8B” by Child Support).
Mrs Ratliff disagreed with the proposed change and cross-applied for a change of assessment on 29 January 2024 on the basis that the costs of maintaining the children are significantly affected by the costs of caring for, educating or training the children (called “Reason 3” by Child Support).
At the time of the change of assessment , the following child support assessment was in place:
·For the period 1 October 2023 to 28 January 2024, $17,622 per annum. This assessment is based on a 2022/2023 adjusted taxable income (ATI) of $137,742 for Mr Ratliff and a 2022/2023 ATI of $86,562 for Mrs Ratliff.
·For the period 29 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, $27,906 per annum. This assessment is based on the same incomes above for the parents. The change is due to a change in the care arrangements for the children.
On 30 April 2024, the original decision maker found Reasons 8A and 8B in Mr Ratliff’s application not established, and Reason 3 in Mrs Ratliff’s cross-application established. The assessment was changed as follows:
·For the period 16 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, the adjusted taxable income of Mr…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ratliff and Ratliff (Child support) and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2025] ARTA 257
Decision Date: 10 February 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves Mr Ratliff, the father, and Mrs Ratliff, the mother, who are in dispute over the financial arrangements for their children's education post-separation. The matter was before the Tribunal, which had to determine whether the administrative assessment of child support under the Assessment Act would result in an unjust or inequitable outcome for the parties. The Tribunal was required to decide if special circumstances existed that warranted a departure from the standard child support calculation.

The primary legal issue was whether the administrative assessment of child support would be unjust or inequitable given the circumstances surrounding the children's education. The Tribunal considered whether the children were being educated in a manner both parents intended and if the associated costs significantly affected the costs of maintaining the children. The Tribunal also had to assess whether the non-custodial parent, Mr Ratliff, had a reasonable financial capacity to contribute to the children's education costs.

The Tribunal found that while there was an initial mutual intent for the children to be privately educated, this intent was severed when the children were un-enrolled due to the parents' inability to afford the fees. The Tribunal accepted that the costs of the children's education, particularly in 2024 and projected for 2025 and 2026, were significant and impacted Mrs Ratliff’s ability to maintain the children. Given that neither parent could afford to contribute to the school fees, the Tribunal concluded that applying the Assessment Act would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by Mr Ratliff. Consequently, the Tribunal found that special circumstances existed under Reason 3 of the Assessment Act.

The Tribunal ordered that special circumstances existed warranting a departure from the standard child support assessment. The precise financial arrangements for the children's education were to be determined by further agreement between the parties or by the Court, ensuring that the just and equitable needs of both parents and the children were met.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that the children are being educated in a way both parents intended therefore the first requirement under Reason 3 is met. In relation to the costs of the children’s education, the statement of account by [School 1] for 2024 shows that school fees, excluding the general purpose levy and inclusive of tuition fees, infrastructure levy and siblings’ discounts, in 2024 are $8,193 per term over four terms, equating to $32,770 per year for the children in 2024. Child Support applied a 5% annual increase for 2025, and determined it was fair that the parents contribute equally to the school fees, adding the amounts of $16,835 per annum for the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, and $19,303 per annum for the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, to the rate payable by Mr Ratliff. The Tribunal has been provided with updated information about the children’s 2025 school fees. Excluding the general purpose levy, the school fees in 2025 for the three children amount to $10,542 per term, as follows:Infrastructure levy $175Tuition 7 – 12 (per term) [Child 1] $4,035Tuition 4 – 6 (per term) [Child 3]) $3,135Tuition 4 – 6 (per term) [Child 2] $3,135 This equates to an annual amount of $42,168 ($10,542 x 4) for 2025. The Tribunal notes that the tuition fees for one child increased from $2,834 per term to $4,035, as that child’s level of schooling changed from Years 4 to 6, to Years 7 to 12), otherwise the tuition fees on a like-for-like basis, for Years 4 to 6, increased by approximately 10% from $2,834 to $3,135 in 2025. The Tribunal considers it reasonable to apply the 10% increase to the 2025 fees, for the following year (in 2026), which results in annual school fees (excluding the general purpose levy) of $46,385 for 2026. Applying this equally to the parents results in each contributing $23,193 per annum in 2026. The current cost of the children in the current child support assessment is $42,846. The Tribunal therefore accepts that the costs of educating the children in the manner mutually agreed by the parents, in the amount of $32,722 in 2024, increasing to $42,168 in 2025 and $46,385 in 2026, is significant and impacts Mrs Ratliff’s ability to maintain the children. The Tribunal therefore accepts that the second threshold under Reason 3 is also met in this case. The Tribunal therefore concluded that special circumstances exist in this case such that the children are being cared for, educated or trained in a way both parents intended and that the associated costs significantly affect the costs of maintaining the children. The Tribunal therefore finds that, the application of the provisions of the Assessment Act relating to the administrative assessment of child support in this case would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by Mr Ratliff to Mrs Ratliff for the children of the assessment. This ground for departure (under Reason 3) is established.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In response to the original decision maker’s decision, Mr Ratliff provided a written objection to Child Support dated 3 June 2024, stating:Our children are 12,10 & 8 years old. The original signing the enrolment forms was on the understanding that the fees were to be paid by Mrs. Ratliff’s parents. The Department states various enrolment forms have been signed, all prior to separation, all under the agreement that these were to be paid for by Mrs. Ratliff’s parents.Mrs. Ratliff has produced a receipt of $10,377.80 for payment of fees 18 January 2024. There seems that no investigation was made by the Department to see whether Mrs. Ratliff received these funds from her parents. The annual amount of the school fees $32,769 the decision that the department has determined I am able to pay is unaffordable.Mrs. Ratliff was aware at the time of signing that we could not afford the school fees and after separating even less so. I will not be able to contribute to these fees. Mrs. Ratliff on her income of $86,526 would see herself paying more than half of her net income in school fees. The extracurricular activities and travel costs would also see Mrs. Ratliff bereft but of course this would not happen due to the continual support from her parents. She is not in receipt of any Family Tax Benefits.We separated in approximately May 2022. At separation we could not afford the mortgage on our house and the bank accommodated a hardship request. We discussed affordability of school fees and after these discussions I contacted the school to confirm that we could not afford the fees and, regrettably, had to un-enroll the children. Mrs. Ratliff was aware of this and at this point the mutual intent for the children to be privately educated was severed. After that date the children were no longer being educated in a manner intended by both parents.The school acknowledged that the children had been un-enrolled and talked of my rights to access information should Ms Ratliff re-enroll, Presumably, after contact with her parents, she did re-enroll the children at the school. The school acknowledged this with confirmation that your fee responsibility has been waived. See attached emails on both points.Just and EquitableThe children were enrolled for private education on the understanding that Mrs. Ratliff’s parents would meet these costs. My then wife and I both knew that we could not meet these expenses ourselves.Despite this, if Reason 3 is found to be established, the Decision Maker then had a responsibility to properly assess the just and equitable requirements of the legislation.I refer to the decision in Mee V Ferguson [1986} FamCA 3 on intention and affordability.“It refers to the manner in which the child ” is being,” and which the parties to the marriage “expected” the child to be educated. That provision appears to have direct relevance to the issue of private school education, particularly its reference to the manner in which the parties “expected” the child to be educated. The word “expected” in the past tense presumably relates to some expectation of the parties at a point in time earlier than the hearing” (at 37}The Court then went on to say:“Where the non-custodian has agreed to the child attending such a school that person is liable to contribute to the fees involved so long as and to the extent that he or she has a reasonable financial capacity to continue to do so.”The situation is that neither Mrs Ratliff nor myself can afford to contribute to the school fees in the manner found by the Decision Maker. I do not earn an income that would go anywhere near justifying this, and Mrs Ratliff certainly could not without assistance from her parents.ConclusionConsidering all relevant factors, I submit that the only just and equitable solution is to find that whereas, at an earlier stage, there was mutual intent to have the children privately educated, albeit with the assistance from Mrs. Ratliff’s parents, that mutual intention was severed in June 2022, after which Mrs. Ratliff re-enrolled the children of her own volition

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.