Rathburne & Barnaby

Case [2021] FCCA 1338


FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rathburne & Barnaby [2021] FCCA 1338   

File number(s): ADC 1403 of 2014
Judgment of: JUDGE KARI
Date of judgment: 17 June 2021
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – children – where final parenting orders were made in January 2015 in the absence of the mother – where mother asserts her mental health has improved - children are now aged 16 years and 10 years – consideration of the rule in Rice v Asplund – application dismissed
Cases cited:

Marsden & Winch (2009) 42 Fam LR 1

Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

SPS & PLS [2008] FamCAFC 16

Number of paragraphs: 90
Date of last submission/s: 11 May 2021
Date of hearing: 11 May 2021
Place: Adelaide
Counsel for the First Applicant: Ms Pangallo
Solicitor for the First Applicant: Pascale Legal Barristers & Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Anderson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Lee Kelly Legal

ORDERS

ADC 1403 of 2014
BETWEEN:

MS RATHBURNE

Applicant

AND:

MR BARNABY

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KARI

DATE OF ORDER:

17 JUNE 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.That the Initiating Application of the mother filed 31 July 2020 and the Response filed by the father on 15 January 2021 be dismissed.

2.That the proceedings otherwise be dismissed as finalised.

Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Rathburne & Barnaby is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE KARI

INTRODUCTION

  1. These proceedings relate to the parties children X who is 16 years of age and Y who is 10 years of age.

  2. The proceedings were commenced by the mother in circumstances where she is asking the court to reconsider final orders made on 19 January 2015 in relation to the children’s parenting arrangements.

  3. The mother’s application is bought against a backdrop of final orders being made in the absence of her attendance at a hearing on 19 January 2015. The mother through her counsel acknowledges that she had disengaged from the previous litigation.

  4. The final orders that apply to the children essentially provide for:

    (a)The father to have sole parental responsibility for the children;

    (b)The children to live with the father; and

    (c)The children to spend time with the mother each alternate weekend.

  5. The father opposes the mother’s application to vary the final orders, and he invokes what is known as the “rule” in Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 (hereinafter referred to as “Rice v Asplund”); namely that there has not been a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant the court revisiting the parenting arrangements for these children.

    BACKGROUND

  6. The relevant circumstances by way of background summary are as follows:

    (a)The father was born in 1983 and he is soon to turn 38 years of age.

    (b)The mother was…

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Rathburne & Barnaby [2021] FCCA 1338
Case
[2021] FCCA 1338
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Ms Rathburne (the mother) to vary final parenting orders, which was opposed by Mr Barnaby (the father). The dispute centred on whether there had been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant revisiting the existing parenting arrangements for the parties' two children, X and Y. The proceedings were heard by Judge Kari in the ADC.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the mother had demonstrated a significant change in circumstances since the final orders were made, thereby justifying a variation of those orders. The father invoked the principle established in *Rice v Asplund*, asserting that no such change had occurred. A secondary consideration was whether further parenting litigation between the parties would be in the children's best interests.

Judge Kari found that, despite the mother's engagement with mental health services, the steps taken did not amount to a significant change in circumstances sufficient to justify revisiting the parenting orders. The court also considered that further litigation would not be in the children's best interests, noting the parents' ability to mutually agree increased time for the mother, the father's protective conduct, and the potential for separation between the siblings if orders were varied. Consequently, the court dismissed both the mother's Initiating Application and the father's Response, and ordered that the proceedings be finalised.

Orders

Orders of the court

ADC 1403 of 2014

BETWEEN:

MS RATHBURNE

Applicant

AND:

MR BARNABY

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KARI

DATE OF ORDER:

17 JUNE 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. That the Initiating Application of the mother filed 31 July 2020 and the Response filed by the father on 15 January 2021 be dismissed.

2. That the proceedings otherwise be dismissed as finalised.

Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

The father opposes the mother’s application to vary the final orders, and he invokes what is known as the “rule” in Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 (hereinafter referred to as “Rice v Asplund”); namely that there has not been a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant the court revisiting the parenting arrangements for these children.BACKGROUND The relevant circumstances by way of background summary are as follows:(a)The father was born in 1983 and he is soon to turn 38 years of age.(b)The mother was born in 1984 and she is 37 years of age.(c)Both parents are Indigenous Australians.(d)The parties were in a relationship between approximately 2000 and the middle of 2010; albeit there were periods of time that they lived separately and apart.(e)There are two children born of the relationship, X (hereinafter referred to as “X”) who was born in 2004 and Y (hereinafter referred to as “Y”) who was born in 2010.(f)At the time of final separation the mother was pregnant with the child Y. There were previous parenting proceedings between the parties that were commenced by the father on 16 April 2014. So far as those proceedings are concerned:(a)The proceedings were commenced by the father in circumstances where he pursued orders for the urgent recovery of the children.(b)The father asserted that the children had been living with him from about August 2013 as a consequence of an incident of serious family violence between the mother and her partner at that time.[1][1] Affidavit of the Father filed 16 April 2014, [25-26].(c)The mother retained the children after a period of time spending with them on or about 26 March 2014.(d)The father made allegations that the mother had encountered difficulties since their final separation including but not limited to “violent relationships”, struggling with depression and an inability to look after herself let alone the children.[2](e)The father made complaints about the mother’s ability to facilitate the children’s school attendance.(f)The mother was represented by two different solicitors during the litigation, however it appears each of those solicitors withdrew (the first on 19 August 2014 and the second on 11 November 2014) and she was unrepresented when the proceedings were finalised.(g)It appears that when the proceedings commenced, the mother was residing in a women’s shelter.(h)The mother only ever filed one affidavit in those proceedings, in which she denied any alcohol abuse and/or illicit drug use.[3](i)Orders were made by consent at the first substantive hearing on 6 May 2014, providing for the children to remain living with the mother, and otherwise spend alternate weekends with the father, together with additional touch base time each Wednesday after school.(j)Those orders were effectively continued by consent on 15 September 2014.(k)The mother was unrepresented and did not attend a hearing on 16 December 2014, and orders were made that day alerting the mother to the possibility that the proceedings might be finalised in her absence if she did not appear at the adjourned hearing scheduled for 19 January 2015.(l)The mother was unrepresented and did not attend the hearing on 19 January 2015, and the court proceeded to finalise the proceedings in her absence.(m)The mother was however given liberty to reinstate the proceedings within thirty-five days.[2] Affidavit of the Father filed 16 April 2014, [49].[3] Affidavit of the Mother filed 19 June 2014, [23].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

While the mother is to be commended for engaging with mental health services and taking her prescribed medication (at least up to September 2020), I do not consider that in light of all of the issues that I have discussed that the steps that she has taken to deal with her mental health amount to me being satisfied that there has been a significant change of circumstances.CONCLUSION For all of the reasons that I have identified, I am not satisfied that there has been a significant change of circumstances to justify further parenting litigation between these parents. If however I am wrong about that assessment, and in particular with regards to my assessment with regards to the mother’s mental health, I comment that I do not consider that it would not be in the children’s best interests for there to be further parenting litigation because:(a)It appears that the parents have been able to mutually agree increased time spending between the mother and the children.(b)I consider that the father appears to have acted appropriately protective of the children, and I have no reason to doubt that he would continue to do so.(c)I would be concerned that as a consequence of the mother abandoning her application so far as the child X is concerned, that any change for the child Y would have the very real potential to result in him being separated from X. In light of the evidence presently before the court, I do not consider that it is appropriate for the orders to be varied in the fashion promoted by the mother. For all of these reasons, I make the orders that appear at the commencement of this judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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