[2013] TASSC 30
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Raspin v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [2013] TASSC 30
PARTIES:RASPIN, Nerrissa Haylee (also known as Nerrissa Haylee Saunders Raspin)
v
THE MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD
FILE NO: 11/2013
DELIVERED ON: 28 June 2013
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATES: 15 March and 19 June 2013
JUDGMENT OF: Holt AsJ
CATCHWORDS:
Insurance – Motor vehicles – Compulsory third party insurance and like schemes – Unidentified vehicle – Notices, claims and extensions of time – Extension of time – Principles to be applied – Prejudice arising from failure to give timely notice of the claim.
Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s16.
Aust Dig Insurance [1095]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr N S Munting
Respondent: Mr C W Law
Solicitors:
Applicant: Wallace Wilkinson & Webster
Respondent: Page Seager
Judgment Number: [2013] TASSC 30
Number of paragraphs: 23
Serial No 30/2013
File No 11/2013
NERRISSA HAYLEE RASPIN (ALSO KNOWN AS NERRISSA HAYLEE SAUNDERS RASPIN) v THE MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Holt AsJ
28 June 2013
On 16 January 2013 the applicant issued a writ claiming damages for personal injury suffered in a motor vehicle accident on Boyer Road at Dromedary on 9 March 2010. The defendants are the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was travelling as a passenger and the Motor Accidents Insurance Board. The claim endorsed on the writ against the Board is that the accident was due to the fault of an unidentified driver. The Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973, s16 provides that where personal injury has been suffered in a motor vehicle accident caused by an unidentified driver the like proceedings may be taken against the Board in respect of the liability of the driver as could have been taken against that person, if identified. Two days earlier, on 14 January, the plaintiff filed an originating application seeking an extension of the time within which she could give notice to the Board of her intention to make the claim and a short statement of the grounds of the claim.
In Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 Windeyer J said of the predecessor of s16 at 442:
"Section 65A creates an entirely new right of action. The times limited for the notice of claim and for the institution of proceedings do not (as do the provisions of the Statute of Limitations in the case of ordinary actions at law) bar the remedy for the enforcement of rights independently existing. They are built-in and essential conditions of the new right itself. They are not, as I read the section, procedural requirements that the defendant might waive as requirements for notices of action sometimes are."
The replacement of s65A of the Traffic Act 1925 (Tas) with s16 did not alter the position. A cause of action does not accrue against the Board under s16 until notice has been given within the time specified in the Act or allowed by the court. See Kevin…
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- Case
- [2013] TASSC 30
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue that the court had to address was the application of the principles for granting an extension of time in cases where a claimant fails to provide timely notice of their claim. The court had to consider the extent to which the failure to provide timely notice prejudiced the insurer, and whether there were any mitigating factors that should be taken into account. The court also had to determine whether the insurer had acted reasonably and in good faith in the circumstances.
In delivering the judgment, the court held that the principles to be applied in assessing whether to grant an extension of time were those set out in previous case law. The court held that the insurer's prejudice was a relevant consideration, but that it was not the only consideration. The court also held that mitigating factors, such as the extent to which the claimant had acted promptly once they became aware of the need to make a claim, could be taken into account. The court found that the insurer had acted reasonably and in good faith, and that the plaintiff's failure to provide timely notice had caused some prejudice. However, the court also found that there were mitigating factors that should be taken into account, and that these outweighed the prejudice caused by the failure to provide timely notice. Accordingly, the court granted an extension of time.
The court ordered that the insurer's liability was to be determined as if the claim had been made within the relevant period. The court also ordered that the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings were to be paid by the insurer. The court held that these orders were appropriate in the circumstances, given that the insurer had acted reasonably and in good faith, and that the plaintiff's failure to provide timely notice had not caused significant prejudice.
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