Raspe and Repatriation Commission
[2008] AATA 660
•31 July 2008
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2008] AATA 660
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No 2007/1128
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re JOHN LINDSAY RASPE Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr J G Short (Member) Date31 July 2008
PlaceAdelaide
Decision The Tribunal:
(1) sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a new decision that Mr Raspe’s alcohol dependence was war-caused with effect from 4 February 2004, being a dated three months prior to the date of lodgement of the original claim; and
(2) remits the issue of assessment to the Commission for determination.
..............................................
J G SHORT
(Member)
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – veterans’ entitlements – operational service – claim that alcohol dependence was war-caused – consideration of Statement of Principles – being woken by a scare charge – witnessing Filippino assaulted with a gun – witnessing retrieval of a body hung from a bridge – observing blood and possibly body under a tarpaulin on the deck of a swift boat – decision set aside
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 ss 5, 6, 9, 13, 120, 120A, 119, 196
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Bull v Repatriation Commission (2001) 66 ALD 271
Hardman v Repatriation Commission (2004) 82 ALD 433
Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377
East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517
Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364
Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331
Re Robertson and Repatriation Commission (1998) 50 ALD 668
RepatriationCommission v Cornelius [2002] FCA 750
Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564
Statement of Principles Instrument No 76 of 1998
Statement of Principles Instrument No 17 of 2008REASONS FOR DECISION
31 July 2008 Mr J G Short (Member) 1. Mr John Raspe served in the Royal Australian Navy (the Navy) from 10 March 1976 until 16 November 1970. His eligible war service, which was also operational service, was from 15 September 1969 until 11 April 1970 while serving on board HMAS Vendetta (the Vendetta). On 4 May 2004 Mr Raspe lodged a claim for acceptance of “emotional disorder” as war-caused. On 22 March 2005 the respondent (the Commission) determined in part that there was no incapacity present to answer the claim for emotional disorder. By the same decision, the Commission accepted a condition of sensorineural hearing loss and determined pension to be payable at 10 percent of the general rate. On 27 March 2006 the Veterans’ Review Board (the VRB) varied the diagnosis of the claimed condition of emotional disorder to that of alcohol dependence. On 5 February 2007 the VRB affirmed the decision as varied.
issues before the tribunal
2. The issue before me is whether Mr Raspe’s alcohol dependence is war-caused for the purposes of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (the VE Act). Both parties accept the diagnosis of Mr Raspe’s condition and I find accordingly.
legislative background
3. Section 9 of the VE Act provides for when an injury or disease is taken to be war-caused, and provides relevantly as follows:
“9 War-caused injuries or diseases
(1)Subject to this section, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused disease, if:
(a)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran; …”
4. The expression “operational service” is defined in ss 6 to 6F of the VE Act. Under s 6C, a person renders operational service if he or she is, inter alia, allotted for duty in an operational area. The expression “operational area” is defined in s 5B(1) by reference to Schedule 2 of the VE Act. This Schedule includes in Item 8 of Column 1, the Vietnam (Southern Zone) during the period from and including 31 July 1962 to and including 11 January 1973.
5. Section 13(1) of the VE Act provides, in effect, that where a veteran has become incapacitated from a war-caused injury or a war-caused disease, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the veteran.
6. As the applicant has performed operational service, as defined in s 6 of the VE Act, the determination of whether his asserted condition is war-caused is to be made by applying ss 120(1) and 120(3) of the VE Act. Those sections provide relevantly as follows:
“120 Standard of proof
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.”
7. Under s 120A of the VE Act, in the case of applications lodged after 1 June 1994, where the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA) has made a SoP in respect of a particular kind of injury or disease, the reasonableness of an hypothesis is to be assessed by reference to that SoP. This follows from s 120A(3), which provides:
“(3)For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b)a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.”
Sub-section (4) of s 120A excludes the operation of sub-section (3) in certain circumstances which are not relevant to the present proceedings.
mr raspe’s evidence
8. Mr Raspe asserts in the present proceedings that certain stressful events occurred during his operational service which caused the condition in respect of which his claim is based. Mr Raspe contended that all or any of four events which he said occurred during operational service comprised severe stressors and consequently satisfied the requirements of Statement of Principles Instrument No 76 of 1998 concerning alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse. Factor 5(b) of that Statement of Principles (SoP) provides:
“5The factors that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse or death from alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service are:
…
(b) experiencing a severe stressor within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse;”
Scare Charge
9. Mr Raspe said that while in Vung Tau Harbour aboard the Vendetta he was asleep in his bunk when he was woken by an explosion. In his written statement dated 9 August 2007 he indicated that he was below the water line at the time. In that same statement he said that he thought the ship had been hit and that he was intensely frightened. He said that at about the same time the ship was called to action stations and he hurried to his duties in X turret.
10. Mr Raspe told the Tribunal that he slipped on entering X turret and hit his head on the entry hatch, falling backwards onto the deck. In his written statement he indicated that he initially thought that he had been shot and that he was going to die.
11. Mr Raspe told the Tribunal that he was helped into his position in X turret where he remained for approximately an hour before being stood down. He said that he held a cloth to his head to staunch the bleeding. He said that after being stood down he reported to sick bay where a cut to his forehead was bandaged with a butterfly bandage. On his return to his sleeping quarters he inspected the wound. He said that he was surprised to see that so much blood could come from such a small cut.
12. Mr Raspe said that he later heard that the reason for action stations having been called was that someone had seen something in the water and had fired some shots.
13. Mr Raspe told the Tribunal that his sleeping quarters were partly below water level. In cross-examination he explained that the ceiling of his sleeping quarters was the under side of the main deck of the Vendetta. Nevertheless, he said that he was concerned for his life and for his mates.
14. Mr Raspe said that he discovered that a scare charge had been accidentally dropped to the deck and then into the water alongside the Vendetta and exploded, causing the sound which awoke him.
15. Mr Raspe said that after leaving X turret he returned to his bunk and thought about what had happened. He said he thought things had to change. He later expanded on this saying that he thought he had better change the way he did things, for example so that he did not slip on a wet deck.
Swift Boat
16. Mr Raspe said that while serving on the Vendetta in Vung Tau Harbour, United States swift boats would moor alongside the Vendetta for various purposes. He said that on one occasion he saw a swift class boat moored to the side of the Vendetta. He said that he watched for between five and ten minutes and saw three Vietnamese prisoners crouching at the rear of the vessel. He said that between some American guards and the prisoners was a tarpaulin under which appeared to be something which could have been a body. He said that there was red fluid partly under the tarpaulin and partly on the deck. He thought that it may have been from a dead body. Mr Raspe said that he walked along the Vendetta listening to what was happening on the swift boat and then went to get a camera so that he could take pictures of the swift boat. During the hearing Mr Raspe exhibited a number of photographs which he appears to have taken. He said that many sailors took photographs of things they saw in Vung Tau Harbour. He said however that on this occasion, when he returned with the camera the swift vessel was already too far away to take photographs. Mr Raspe said that when he saw what he thought was blood on the deck of the swift vessel it reminded him of his head (presumably the head cut, received while entering X turret). He said that he experienced a bit of fear and nervousness.
Shore Patrol - Prisoner Abuse
17. Mr Raspe said that he made approximately four visits to Subic Bay in the Philippines during his period of operational service. He said that on his second visit he was assigned to a shore patrol. He explained that an officer, usually a sub-lieutenant or a petty officer, accompanied by three sailors would travel to shore and remain at a base before being split up into separate patrol parties, each serving with perhaps three Americans.
18. Mr Raspe said that he served on shore patrols on two occasions. The first was during the Vendetta’s second visit to Subic Bay. He was not sure whether the second occasion was on his third or fourth visit, although he later said it was not the final visit. Mr Raspe said that on the first occasion he was put in a group of Americans which comprised a very large negro sailor, who was in charge of the patrol, and two other Americans, one of whom spoke with a heavy Spanish accent. The other American also spoke with an accent, although he could not determine what the accent was. Mr Raspe said that while he was with these three people they had occasion to visit a Philippines lock-up, He said that he was sitting in a chair inside the building looking out when he heard a commotion and a gunshot in a room about ten feet behind him. He turned to see what appeared to be a Filipino policeman forcing a Filipino civilian out of the room. He then saw a third Filipino policeman join in and strike the civilian over the head with what appeared to be a gun. He said that he saw this out of the corner of his eye. The civilian then slumped and was dragged back into the room. He recalled having been told how rough this area of Subic Bay was and that he decided that he did not want to do shore patrol again. He said that after hearing the gun discharge about ten feet away he had been nervous.
Shore Patrol – Body from Bridge
19. Mr Raspe said that he was unsure whether it was later on the same night as the prisoner abuse incident or whether it was on another visit to Subic Bay, when he performed this shore patrol. He was again in the presence of three Americans. He initially said that he was unable to recall whether it was the same Americans as were present during the prisoner abuse incident. Mr Raspe said that the patrol party was in a bar and received a call to hurry back to the ship. He said that he was in the back of a jeep, near the Olongapo Bridge, when he saw two or three other jeeps ahead, one shining lights onto the bridge. He said that he got out of the jeep and saw others pulling up a rope tied around the ankles of a body which had been hanging from the bridge. The body was upside down. Mr Raspe said that he was about twenty feet away and could see that the stomach had been cut and that blood was running from the wound down over the face. He said he saw dog tags. He said that he fainted and later awoke in the back of the jeep, heading for Olongapo City. The others had told him that he had fainted. Another jeep had taken the body to hospital. He said that the Spanish speaking American sailor was laughing at him. Mr Raspe was asked whether this would suggest that this incident occurred on the same night as the prisoner abuse incident, as he had mentioned being in the company of a Spanish speaking American sailor in relation to that incident. He said that he was not sure. Mr Raspe said that after returning to the ship the only person he spoke to about the incident was an able seaman, Ashby, who has subsequently died. In his written statement Mr Raspe indicated that the body was an American serviceman and that he had felt horrified.
20. Mr Raspe indicated in his statement that he tried to cope with the intense fear and horror he experienced as a result of the abovementioned incidents by starting to drink heavily. He said that when he returned to Australia from Vietnam he drank an excessive amount of alcohol and was involved in a physical altercation. He was convicted of assault and was discharged from the Navy while in custody. He said that despite this, his drinking continued.
21. In cross-examination, Mr Raspe said that he drank to excess from about 1970 to 2008, with the only period of respite being for about two months in the 1990s. Mr Raspe initially said that he ceased drinking for two months in the 1990s because he had been blacking out. He soon resumed drinking. He said that another reason for ceasing to drink was to lose weight as he was doing line dancing at the time. He said that he lost weight too quickly and that this caused the blacking out.
22. It was put to Mr Raspe that in a report dated 6 December 1996, prepared in relation to a WorkCover claim, Dr Alan Cotton had recorded Mr Raspe as telling him that he did not drink, smoke or gamble. Mr Raspe was also referred to a report of Dr J E Burvill dated 10 June 1998 in which Dr Burvill had recorded Mr Raspe as saying that he did not smoke, drink or gamble and that football bored him. Mr Raspe initially said that perhaps Dr Cotton had recorded this history during the approximate two month period in which he ceased consuming alcohol, but then, after being referred to Dr Burvill’s report, Mr Raspe said that an alcoholic would always deny that he drank. He later clarified this by saying that he decided to mislead the doctors in relation to his WorkCover claim because he had been frustrated by WorkCover.
23. Commodore Mulcare provided a report in which he referred to records which had revealed that on 5 October 1969, at about 9:10pm, a scare charge was dropped in near proximity to the Vendetta. However, the report also indicated that X turret had been manned and firing prior to the incident and continuing firing thereafter. The implication is that Mr Raspe could not have hit his head when entering X turret after the dropping of a scare charge.
24. Commodore Mulcare also indicated that his research had failed to identify any record of an incident which could match Mr Raspe’s account of a body being retrieved from a bridge. Commodore Mulcare said however that if the body had not been an Australian serviceman, then it is possible that this incident occurred, but did not warrant entry of a record in the ship’s log.
25. Drs Furze and Ewer confirmed the diagnosis of alcohol dependence and Dr Ewer suggested that this is likely to have had its clinical onset shortly after Mr Raspe’s service in Vietnam.
consideration
26. The claimed condition of alcohol dependence is the subject of SoPs. I will set out the relevant provisions of the SoPs below. I note that where a SoP exists I must apply the test prescribed by s 120A(3) of the VE Act, as explained in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 at 97 in the following way:
“1 The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2 If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3 If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be “reasonable” and the claim will fail.
4 The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.”
27. In considering whether there is an hypothesis connecting Mr Raspe’s condition with his war service, and in applying the relevant Deledio steps to that end, I must consider all of the material before me, whether or not that material supports the hypothesis, as required by such cases as Bull v Repatriation Commission (2001) 66 ALD 271 at [21], the decision of Hill J in Hardman v Repatriation Commission (2004) 82 ALD 433 at [39] to [41], and Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377. In the last of these cases Stone J, at [25], likened the decision-maker’s task to striking out a statement of claim as failing to disclose a cause of action, where no consideration is given to whether the facts pleaded can be substantiated.
28. An hypothesis that (once again, after taking into account all of the material before me) could be said to be “obviously fanciful or impossible or incredible or not tenable or too remote or too tenuous” would not be reasonable and would not point to the relevant connection with the veteran’s service (see Bull (supra) at [18], where Emmett and Allsop JJ explained the significance in this regard of East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517). I refer also to Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364 where in their joint judgment, Northrop, Sundberg, Marshall and Merkel JJ said in effect (at pages 372.9 to 373.1) that a “reasonable hypothesis” involves more than a mere possibility, and is an hypothesis pointed to by the facts, even though not proved on the balance of probabilities.
29. As regards the first step in Deledio, I am satisfied that the material before me points to an hypothesis connecting the claimed condition of alcohol dependence with Mr Raspe’s operational service. That hypothesis is that one or more of the events to which I have referred resulted in Mr Raspe suffering alcohol dependence, and accordingly that condition is war-caused.
30. SoPs have been determined by the RMA pursuant to s 196(2) of the VE Act in respect of the condition in question. Instrument No 17 of 2008 in respect of alcohol dependence and alcohol abuse revoked Instrument No 76 of 1998 concerning alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse. Counsel for Mr Raspe contended that the earlier SoP in force at the time of the original decision was more beneficial to Mr Raspe. The Tribunal accordingly must consider that SoP, if the more recent SoP does not support the claim.
31. I am satisfied that the material before me points to an hypothesis and that a SoP does exist in respect of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse.
32. I now turn to the third step as enunciated in Deledio. This entails determining whether the relevant hypothesis complies with one or more of the factors referred to in the relevant SoPs. This step involves considering all of the material before me, but without making any findings of fact at this stage of the process. The history given by a veteran to a medical practitioner can constitute material before the Tribunal for this purpose: Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331.
33. Under clause 4 of Instrument No 76 of 1998 concerning alcohol dependence, at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to the relevant service (being in this case operational service) by the veteran. Clause 5 then provides relevantly as follows:
“5The factors that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse or death from alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service are:
…
(b) experiencing a severe stressor within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse;”
34. The meaning of “clinical onset” was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Lees (supra). The Court referred to the analysis of the Tribunal in Re Robertson and Repatriation Commission (1998) 50 ALD 668, in which Senior Member Dwyer concluded (at 670) that:
“... there is a clinical onset of a disease, either when a person becomes aware of some feature or symptom which enables a doctor to say the disease was present at that time, or when a finding is made on investigation which is indicative to a doctor of the disease being present at that time.”
That analysis was specifically endorsed by Branson J in RepatriationCommission v Cornelius [2002] FCA 750.
35. There is material before me, including psychiatric opinion evidence, which points to the clinical onset of alcohol dependence within two years of experiencing what is alleged to have been at least one severe stressor. Instrument No 17 of 2008 provides factors which may be relevantly related to alcohol dependence and which includes factor 6(b) “experiencing a category 1A stressor within the five years before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse” or (c) “experiencing a category 1B stressor within the five years before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse”. Category 1A and 1B stressors are defined. Having had regard to those listed stressors, it is my view that the only event which is likely to meet the definition of a category 1B stressor is the shore patrol/body from bridge incident. I consider that Instrument No 76 of 1998 is more favourable to the applicant as the definition of a severe stressor is not specifically defined as are the definitions of category 1A and 1B stressors in the more recent SoP.
36. I have considered the evidence in this case. It was urged upon me by the Commission’s advocate to find that the whole of the evidence, including as it did, an admission by the veteran that in providing a history to Drs Cotton and Burvill, he deliberately denied consuming alcohol and that he did so as he considered that it may prejudice his WorkCover claim. This certainly suggests that this veteran is prepared to provide inaccurate evidence if it is perceived by him to be to his advantage to do so. Nevertheless, I remind myself that in considering step 3 as enunciated in Deledio, I am not to make findings of fact, but simply to have regard to all of the evidence in order to determine whether there is evidence before me which satisfies one or more of the factors referred to in the relevant SoPs. In so doing, I am satisfied that the scare charge incident, the swift boat incident and the shore patrol/body from bridge incident all satisfy the definition of a severe stressor as prescribed in the earlier SoP, and in respect of the shore patrol/body from bridge incident, also satisfies the definition of a category 1B stressor, as defined in Instrument No 17 of 2008.
37. I now turn to the fourth stage of the process explained in Deledio. This involves making findings of fact from the material before me, bearing in mind the provisions of s 120(1) of the VE Act to the effect that the claim will succeed unless I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining that the incapacity in question was war-caused. If I am not so satisfied, Mr Raspe’s claim must succeed by virtue of s 120(1) of the VE Act. In examining this question, I note that there is no onus of proof (see s 120(6) of the VE Act, and the explanation of the role of this Tribunal as an administrative decision-maker in Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at pages 424.8 to 425.5). I also refer to Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at page 571.2, where Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:
“If a reasonable hypothesis is established, sub-s.(1) of s.120 is applied. The claim will succeed unless: (a) one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or (b) the truth of another fact in the material which is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis.”
38. The Commission’s advocate urged me to find, in the light of a number of inconsistencies in the various statements provided by Mr Raspe over hearings at the VRB and at this Tribunal, together with Mr Raspe’s admission that he lied to doctors as he considered it advantaged his WorkCover claim to do so, that I should find, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Raspe’s alcohol dependence was not relevantly connected with his service.
39. While I found Mr Raspe to have been evasive in providing his evidence and while I find that Mr Raspe is prepared to lie in order to obtain a benefit, it does not necessarily follow and in this case I am not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Raspe’s alcohol dependence is not connected with his service. Had the determination been made on the balance of probabilities, then I may have reached a different conclusion. However, noting the effect of s 119(1)(h) of the VE Act and the fact that some of the inconsistencies referred to by the Commission may be related to misunderstandings or the effect of alcohol dependence, I am not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no nexus between Mr Raspe’s alcohol dependence and the events of his service.
40. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining that the condition of alcohol dependence was war-caused. I must accordingly determine, by virtue of s 120(1) of the VE Act, that Mr Raspe’s condition was war-caused.
decision
41. The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a new decision that Mr Raspe’s alcohol dependence was war-caused with effect from 4 February 2004, being a dated three months prior to the date of lodgement of the original claim.
42. The Tribunal remits the issue of assessment to the Commission for determination.
I certify that the 42 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr J G Short (Member)
Signed: .....................................................................................
AssociateDates of Hearing 24-25 January 2008 and 4 July 2008
Date of Decision 31 July 2008
Counsel for the Applicant Mr S Ower
Solicitor for the Applicant Tindall Gask BentleyAdvocate for the Respondent Mr A Crowe
DVA
0
15
0